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PREFACE:  THE MANY WORLDS OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM 
 In 2014, amidst a hot and humid June afternoon, the Communist Party of the United States 
(CPUSA) held its 95th anniversary conference.  There, members young and old gathered to meet and 
greet as well as vote in the new generation of Party leaders.  The conference numbered over 700 and 
attracted a large number of youth activists ranging from students to hard working young adults.  In 
recent years, a growing interest in the concepts of Marxism, communism, and anarchism developed 
around the world as the international economy reached a crisis point during the 2008 recession. After 
the publication of Thomas Piketty’s Capital In the 21st Century in 2013, which unveiled systemic 
conditions about income inequality throughout the modern world system, sales of Karl Marx's Das 
Kapital soared throughout Britain and the United States.  He Nian, a Chinese theatre director, re-created 
an all-singing, all-dancing musical to commemorate Marx's work.    English literature professor Terry 
Eagleton published Why Marx Was Right in 2011 while French Maoist philosopher Alian Badiou 
published The Communist Hypothesis to rally activists into a new era of communist theory.1  In the 2016 
Presidential Election, the CPUSA ardently advocated for opposition against Donald Trump in a manner 
that mimicked their historical attitude toward the 'lesser of two evils,' earning them both attention and 
criticism from American activists, leftists, students, and unionists.  In November 2018, the Historians of 
American Communism gathered in Williamstown to discuss the 100 years of American Communism and 
its legacy in the United States.  Finally, in the summer of 2019, the CPUSA will hold its centennial 
celebration as one of the oldest radical political parties in the nation. 
 This dissertation examines the American communist movement between 1928 and 1957 by 
dividing up the narrative into worlds of activity; particularly political activism, labor organizing, and 
community organizing.  It argues that American radicalism takes on features that distinguish it from a 
specific effort, such as civil rights legislation or collective bargaining agreements.  As a radical tradition, 





about ideological motivation and the practical gains netted by American workers and citizens as a result 
of such motivation.  American communist history is not a history of organizations, nor is it a history of 
how certain ideologies had effects on the actions of individuals.  It is a history of people and how they 
chose to balance their lives on the virtues of American democracy and the ideals of Marxist 
egalitarianism.  This research asserts that American Communism can be understood in a variety of ways 
depending upon the context from which the examined organizers and activists engaged with American 
citizens.  Social movements take on meanings that are very personal to those who experienced them, as 
well as to those who examine them.  When one examines the work of communist political activists, they 
will find experiences that unveil a deeply ideological political movement.  By switching to an 
examination of communist labor activists, one reveals a much different narrative; one focused on legal 
strategies for obtaining collective bargaining rights and that cared less about the conclusions of a 
political committee than it did the demands of local workers.  Finally, if one examines the work of 
communist organizing in the communities against institutionalized forms of societal oppression, they 
will find a more emotional and cultural narrative that sees American radicals trying to balance the ideals 
of the nation with the ideology of Marxism.   
I refer to the "many worlds" of American Communism as the variances of experience displayed 
in the historiographical and biographical record in an effort to unpack how American Communism 
meant different things to different people, and most importantly that these meanings changed with the 
individuals as well.  American Communist history from 1928 to 1957 is best understood as one segment 
of long-standing tradition encompassing a variety of radical political, labor, and civil rights movements 
dating back to the late 19th century.2  By the 1930s, American Communism was indeed a "world political 
movement,” but it also existed as a domestic movement with localized influences that varied in 
experience from nation-to-nation.  As a movement in the United States from the 1920s through the 





social tensions over issues such as race, the extent of unemployment in dominant industries, and the 
palatability of industrial unionism within a given workforce. 
 Since the mid-1990s, scholarship on American Communism has expanded as newer sources 
became available, the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Recent History 
(RTsKhIDMII/RGAJPI) digitized its archives on the CPUSA, and new methods of interpreting history, such 
as an emphasis on personal experiences, became more widely used.  James Barrett's William Z. Foster 
and the Tragedy of American Radicalism along with Randi Storch's Red Chicago were among the first 
works to benefit from newer sources and demonstrated a clear break between the 'traditional' and 
'revisionist' schools of thought, as put by Vernon L. Pedersen in The Communist Party in Maryland, 1919-
57.  The traditionalist school, best represented by Theodore Draper's The Roots of American 
Communism and Harvey Klehr's The Heyday of American Communism, viewed the ideological link 
between the CPUSA and the Soviet Union as the most significant aspect of this history, particularly when 
defining the boundaries of what made a particular strike, event, or organization “communist.”  Seeking 
to understand American communism as a domestic ideological movement, the revisionist school 
countered with an emphasis on the "correction of injustices in American society," with works such as 
Mark Naison's Communists in Harlem during the Depression and Robin Kelley's Hammer and Hoe:  Black 
Radicalism and the Communist Party of Alabama.3  The traditionalist school suffers from a general 
negative perspective of communist ideology and treats it as a foreign/alien movement that only existed 
because of the Soviet Union.  The revisionists suffer from a nuanced and overly positive perspective and 
attempts a 'so what' attitude to the counterevidence revealed by the opening of the Russian archives.  
Both schools, however, unveil an over-arching handicap that prevents the writers and readers of the 
subject to fully grasp the complexity of American Communism. 
 At the root of the traditionalist and revisionist schools of American Communist history is the 





both begins and ends as a political history of dissidents and radicals.  Both schools use the CPUSA as the 
nexus from which their conclusions are drawn:  The CPUSA's ideological link and involvement in the 
Comintern served as the foundation for the traditionalist claim that American Communism was merely a 
front for Soviet espionage and subversive activities.  The CPUSA's promotion of African American, labor, 
and civil rights as a political policy served as a foundation for the revisionists rejecting the significance of 
traditionalist claims.  In both instances the CPUSA is the beginning and the end of the narrative, while 
the externals are used as contextual links and exceptions to the rules, such as divisions between the 
CPUSA and other socialist groups, are considered negligible.  Trotskyists and left-leaning socialists are 
thus placed as a tangential narrative to that of the CPUSA.  More importantly, the individual testimonies 
of low-ranking communists and communists with ties across various organizations are overlooked in 
these analyses.  This unfortunately treats the history of American Communism as a singular narrative 
unique to the period of the early Cold War and fails to highlight the ways in which communists and 
radicals influenced the social and cultural direction of the United States.  
 The traditionalists focus on what I call the political world of American Communism; which 
indeed developed into a highly centralized political movement, with direct connections to the Soviet 
Union, centered on the CPUSA; but filtered out into other organizations such as the Communist League 
of America (CLA), the Workers’ Party of America (WPA), and later the Workers' Party of the United 
States (WPUS).  The revisionists focus generally on one of two different worlds, the labor and 
community worlds of American Communism and also tend to generalize the distinctions between the 
two around issues, such as racial equality in the workplace and at the community despite the fact that 
organizing for racial equality in the workplace was fundamentally different from organizing in the 
community.  Randi Storch was among the first scholars to abandon the approach of a single narrative 
history by examining the social dimension of communist political culture in Chicago during the Third 





demonstrated that amidst the early portion of the Great Depression, American communists both inside 
and outside the CPUSA "learned how to work with liberals and non-Communists" by developing 
"successful organizing tactics and fight[ing] for workers' rights, racial equality, and unemployment 
relief."4  Jacob Zumoff expanded on Storch's approach in his work The Communist International and US 
Communism, 1919-1929, where he demonstrated that while the traditionalists were indeed correct in 
the overt connection between the Communist International (Comintern) and the CPUSA, they missed 
the fact that part of this connection included an emphasis that the CPUSA "Americanize" itself and act as 
a more independent political organization. 
 The division of American communist history into multiple narratives both complicates the 
historiography and more accurately portrays the experiences of those who participated in the 
movement.  Storch observed that the historiography at this point has a few particular avenues; one 
which observes the political dimension of communist activity, one which examines the community-
based organizations and localized communist activism, and one which observes the movement's 
interconnection with other scholarship, such as labor and cultural studies.5  The concept of "many 
worlds" or "rival theories" in history is a common claim in the field of International Relations where 
"competition between the realist, liberal, and radical traditions" consistently reassess our 
understandings of social movements.  International Relations scholar Stephen M. Walt argued this 
concept on a broad level when discussing the nature of international political ideology throughout the 
mid-to-late Cold War (1960-1991).  In a subject where multiple interpretations exist in addition to 
multiple variances of experiences among sources, "no single approach can capture all the complexity" of 
a social and political movement.  Furthermore, the end of the Soviet Union and the availability of new 
sources did little to resolve the struggle of competing theoretical traditions.  Instead, it "merely 
launched a new series of debates" about the extent to which social movements were domestic in nature 





world politics" using a variety of sources and contextual evidence to develop a well-rounded approach 
to policymaking.6  
 The notion of multiple worlds of a single movement also incorporates observations from world 
literature scholars about how "writers frame their respective cultures as 'windows on the world.'"  
Daniel Simon asks, given the subjective nature of writing about international issues, "how do we read 
world literature?"7  This same question applies to almost any social/political movement at the domestic 
level:  How do we read the histories of social/political movements that are invariably linked at the 
international level to various other cultures, movements, and people?  The answer is that we read it 
divided:  When we want to understand American Communism as a political movement, we look to its 
international roots and its ideological links abroad; when we want to understand American communist 
activism in labor, we look to its temperament and palatability with specific working groups, such as 
industrial auto workers and non-white agricultural workers; when we desire to understand 
anticommunism, we look to the Cold War for contextual explanations for the violation of domestic 
constitutional rights.  The particular 'world' focused on―labor, community, political―is invariably 
written with a subconscious emphasis of the specific circumstances of each case, but rarely do historians 
take the next step of linking these various worlds as multiple experiences of the same history; as 
subjective relationships to the same movement.  Instead, each approach tends to emphasize itself as the 
history to be examined; be it the history of American Communism's ideological roots in Europe, the 
history of the American labor movement and its tendency to utilize radical and militant communist 
organizers, or the history of individual American communist's resistance to racial injustice and social 
inequality. 
 The history of American Communism is too complex to relegate it to simply a political or social 
history.  American Communism as a movement incorporated elements that extended into the political, 





of thought have added important contributions to the history, they have also both suffered from an 
approach which treats a multi-faceted social movement as a singular, monolithic phenomenon; each 
emphasizing one aspect deemed significant over all others.  Rather than act as simple conduits between 
Soviet policy and American communist activism, individual American communists channeled increased 
political energy into specific areas thought to be effective at, or at least open to, organizing for social 
change and typically sought at the very least tacit approval from their local Party nuclei.  Storch pointed 
out that in Chicago between 1928 and 1935, "a wide variety of communists coexisted in Chicago," 
including high and low ranking Stalinist cohorts and also non-Stalinist activists engaged in social, 
political, and labor-oriented activities.  Additionally, both the CLA and the CPUSA enjoyed the increasing 
romanticism and popularity of the Bolshevik Revolution among youthful activists, which by 1929 had 
"sparked the imagination of liberals and radicals throughout the United States."8 
Elements of the pan-Socialist tradition, which in urban areas like Chicago included "socialist, 
anarchist, and militant trade-union traditions," rushed to engage with their society under an increased 
sense of urgency.9  The CLA and the CPUSA sought to gain momentum by seizing upon the increasing 
interest in revolutionary theory, Marxism, and the idealism of the Bolshevik Revolution.  Under this 
context, it should be easy to understand that the term "American Communism" does not refer to 
exclusively one group, one organization, or one political party.  This tendency to view the movement as 
a "monolith," where the degree to which someone is or is not a communist is measured by the degree 
to which they are separated or under the thumb of the CPUSA, dominates the existing scholarship on 
American Communism.  It is important, however, to understand the subtle practical and theoretical 
differences of this movement if one is to understand the totality of its impact on American history.   
The Communist International, or Comintern, played a role in the development of American 
Communism but it was not the sole actor as it did not have, and ultimately lacked the means of, direct 





disputes and power struggles internally contributed significantly to the redirection of local American 
communist politics between 1927-1929, which is part of the goal of the first chapter is to unpack and 
explain.  The CLA continued to operate throughout the Third Period, but its work focused on advancing 
"Left Opposition" to the CPUSA instead of pushing a general political policy for the United States.  The 
CPUSA, in turn, resisted oppositional groups like the CLA as endemic of what they called "social 
fascism."10  This dynamic forced the CPUSA to act politically and organizationally in ways the Comintern 
could never predict.  Following the 1928 presidential campaign and the formal separation of anti-Soviet 
groups, the political agenda of the CPUSA "had neither a beginning nor an ending point," as it sought to 
"register the extent of [the] Party's support in the working class by mobilizing the maximum number to 
vote for candidates."11  Throughout the subsequent Third Period, American Communism solidified into a 
social movement through the emergence of grassroots communist activism within the United States on 
the basis of an independent electoral and social strategy and the rise of multiple areas of strategic 
importance for communist work in the United States, areas that I call the many worlds of American 
Communism.  1928 serves as an effective starting point for the origin and evolution of this genuinely 
American communist social movement; one that purposefully differentiated itself from other 
socialist/Marxist organizations on the basis of both theory and action, and one that developed its own 
internal debate over support for Soviet-style communist regimes.  Without an opposition group, 
American communism had little domestically-driven ideology.   
The primary sources chosen for this analysis are broad, and for good reason:  to understand 
what American Communism was we must examine not just Party records and the memoirs of Party 
leaders but also the memories of the lived experiences of the movement across different geographic 
and socioeconomic backgrounds.  The sources break up into two categories.  First, there are the Party’s 
own documents and those archived by the Soviet Union, hereby referred to as the Comintern Archives.  





following the Russian Revolution which lasted from 1928 to 1934, the primary means of distributing 
communist theory in the United States was through a wide variety of Communist International and local 
Communist Party publications.  For communists outside of the CPUSA, such as those that filled the ranks 
of the CLA and the SWP, other periodicals such as The Militant served as the basis for discussion and 
followed a format similar to that of the CPUSA publications.  These anti-Soviet publications were central 
to building a theoretical understanding of communism outside of Russia under the circumstances of the 
post-Russian Revolutionary era.  As such, these resources are the best remaining examples of American 
communist thought throughout the late 1920s and 1930s and include theories both constrained by and 
liberated from Soviet oversight, as some of the sources extend from groups disassociated from the 
USSR.   
Among the most significant and dominant publishers for communist literature for American 
communists were Progress Publishing, based out of Moscow, and International Publishers, based both in 
New York and Chicago.  International Publishers Company started in 1924 in a joint-venture investment 
project started by A.A. Heller, a wealthy socialist who had ties to production industries in the Soviet 
Union.  The publishing company struggled for over 15 years.  At first, it was held up only by Heller’s 
overinvestment.  It later gained a significant amount of support and following from the Workers’ Party 
of America.  The Workers’ Party of America would become the Communist Party of the United States 
(CPUSA) by 1928, but it helped Heller find outlets for the publisher to distribute.  To compete with the 
publication of Marxist and communist works by other publishers, International Publishers focused on 
books "not yet published in English" but written by prominent socialist thinkers.12  Progress Publishers, 
based in Moscow, printed the various works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and the Communist 
International journal, The Communist, in multiple languages for communist parties in Europe and the 
United States.  Since most American communist political philosophy had its origins in the broad 





seen as the lens through that political, labor, and community communist activism manifested and 
evolved throughout the 1920s, 30s, and 40s. 
The next category of sources are personal memoirs, autobiographies, historical biographies, and 
oral histories.  Part of this analysis accepts that party documents, government reports, and political 
newspapers present one interpretation of the historical narrative.  But it also accepts that between the 
depiction of the events in official records and memories of those events by the men and women who 
lived them exists some semblance of the truth.  Autobiographies, like that of Peggy Dennis, provide 
insight into the way American communists thought about the way Party leaders responded to Soviet 
policy decisions in the immediate aftermath of major political shifts.  Similarly, autobiographies of some 
communists, such as musician and chronic traveler Russell Brodine, do not focus exclusively on their 
identity as communists but rather incorporate their ideological experiences into their broader life 
experiences.  The same case applies to the autobiography of the CPUSA’s oldest living member, Beatrice 
Lumpkin, who published Joy in the Struggle in 2015.  Lumpkin’s experience also uses her involvement in 
ideologically-motivated events as tangential and parallel to her overall life experience and thus provides 
a dynamic look into the life of a communist involved in multiple aspects of political, labor, and civic 
engagement.  Personal memoirs, like that of George Charney with A Long Journey as well as historical 
biographies such as The Narrative of Hosea Hudson: Life as a Negro Communist in the South by Nell 
Irving Painter do a similar service of discussing communist activism as part of what these American 
radicals believed to be a component of their American ideals.  Memoirs that focus exclusively on 
specific, geographic, and widely-known experiences such as fighting in World War II help connect what 
grassroots communists believed to be patriotism to their ideological investment in socialism and 
Marxism. 
Oral histories are continuing to serve historians as the ideal ways to understand what lived 





of a movement such as American Communism is how they convey a tremendous gap between the 
average activist and the ideological world of politics.  While possessing the fault of any primary source in 
terms of questionable validity, oral histories are guaranteed to be real in the mind of the speaker.  Over 
the course of 9 years this research has built upon over 10 oral histories of living and deceased American 
communists.  Some of those interviewed remain active members of the CPUSA, others are part of 
political clubs in different parts of the country, and others prefer to remain anonymous for personal 
reasons.  All of their stories, however, help fill in the gap of meaning for a movement that is told mostly 
through the lens of ideologically driven reports with a specific agenda.  In total, the sources used are 
intended to provide a broad examination of the American communist movement from multiple angles.  
The sources chosen for this research were picked because of their desire to tell their personal side of the 
story, and to explain why some individuals dedicated years, often decades, of their lives to a movement 
regardless of how the vast majority of the nation viewed them. 
Outside of strictly industrial workspaces, individuals across the nation joined the American 
Communist movement for a wide range of reasons and under an even wider range of conditions.  As a 
Jewish second-generation immigrant from New York City, Lumpkin spent years learning about the plight 
of workers from her leftist parents and family, as well as fellow community members, as the nation 
descended into the Depression.  William Z. Foster joined after facing difficulty within AFL and syndicalist 
unions in the post-World War I strike wave.  Danny Rubin joined after witnessing anti-Semitism in 
Philadelphia and linking the treatment of the local Jewish population with the general treatment of the 
working class.  Hosea Hudson joined the CPUSA in the wake of the Scottsboro case and the rising 
influence of the International Labor Defense (ILD) as an organization to fight discrimination.  James 
Cannon, like many who eventually held leadership in either the CPUSA and/or other organizations such 
as the CLA, became inspired by the actions and tenacity of Russian Marxists to restore the "unfalsified 





DeCaux joined the CPUSA as a result of his perception of "herd impulses" he felt from teenage 
conformities while attending the Harrow School during World War I and the subsequent shortcomings 
of the IWW with regard to a practical plan to organize the masses.  Russell Brodine joined after finding 
difficulties in his college experiences with the organization of fellow musicians in order to secure spots in 
the orchestra and defend/increase existing pay rates.  In short, there never was a single particular 
reason as to why American communists became American communists—just like any political/social 
movement, American Communism attracted people by the message it delivered and the hopes it 
promised.  The outlets for these citizens were the organizations previously mentioned and the 
subsequent labor and community organizations, such as the CIO and the ILD, that emerged out of the 
struggle.   
The backgrounds of American communists that ended up defining the movement after 1928 
were as diverse as they were complex.  While not exceptional by American political standards, the 
American communist movement was without-a-doubt one of the most diverse of all communist 
movements worldwide.  The political idealists who crafted domestic communist policy in the United 
States under various organizations, clubs, and union locals faced a constituency with American values 
and American experiences, regardless of what their ideological schools of thought taught them.  Either 
they, their parents, or their grandparents immigrated from Europe, or were liberated through 
emancipation subsequent to the American Civil War, to escape political and personal persecution.  
Many who came to identify as communist during the 'heyday' of the movement viewed the tenants of 
socialism as compatible with or parallel to the virtues of American liberty, while others viewed the 
American system as a viable Republic merely corrupted by the special interests of an oligarchic elite.  In 
this sense, American communists by the late 1920s were genuinely American first, and communist 
second.  Furthermore, the diffusion of communists across various organizations masks the numbers of 





Many of the organizations and unions commanded by communists were not "numerically dominated" 
by members of the CPUSA, the CLA, or the SPA.  The International Labor Defense (ILD), for example, 
operated as an independent organization of 2,520 individuals but was led and organized by a small 
group of 150 CPUSA members, and given substantial amount of funding to operate in cities like Detroit 
and Chicago.  Auxiliary organizations, which combined political members with union numbers and 
groups such as the ILD, "suggest a much wider support base than membership numbers allow."14 
 The dissertation is broken up into 6 chapters, all of which are chronological except for the final 
chapter on anticommunism.  The first two chapters break down the narrative history of American 
Communism as a political movement from 1928 until the end of World War II.  Both of these chapters 
emphasize both the dependency of domestic communists on ideological conclusions made in Russia as 
well as the continuous attempt by the Soviet Comintern to domesticate the CPUSA and force it to relate 
more personally to the average American citizen.  The third chapter covers the work of specific 
communists dedicated to the American labor movement during the same time frame, 1928 to 1945.  
The fourth chapter explores communist activism in the communities and the attempt to link class-based 
struggles with social issues such as unemployment and racism.  Both the third and fourth chapters 
attempt to dislodge the notion of monolithism by demonstrating that each sphere of activism had its 
own dominant attitudes, actors, and results; none of which can be deemed all-inclusive of what the 
American communist movement sought to achieve.  The fifth chapter explores the breakdown of the 
political dimension of American Communism and the circumstances of the postwar world as a handicap 
to the continuation of previous work done by communists in the labor and community worlds, leading 
to a mass diffusion of communist activism into other forms of organizational work.  The final chapter 
explores the world of anticommunism, and attempts to expand the timeline of this discussion into the 
interwar period, address espionage, and ends with the Yates v. United States decision in 1957.  The final 





experiences of lower-ranking communists across the country.  The Yates decision serves as an effective 
terminal point for this discussion because it is at that point that American Communism, as a movement, 
no longer existed alone in its emphasis on radicalism and militant organizing against societal norms 
deemed oppressive.  Marxism and radicalism in general within less than one decade of the Yates 
decision became incorporated into a multitude of New Left ideology and philosophy, and communists 
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CHAPTER 1:  THE POLITICAL WORLD OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM, 1928-1934  
Any history of communism as a social movement naturally begins as a study of its political 
theory, its constituent organizations, and its advocated policies.  Communist political activism in the 
United States, as an element of a broader pan-Socialist Left tradition, held roots in the arrival of German 
immigrants in 1848 as well as the late 19th century labor strikes in railway industries.  The theoretical 
heritage of communist activity originated with German idealist philosophy and carried with it implicit 
messages about the importance of certain political institutions and ideals.  Later communist theorists of 
the 20th century, such as Vladimir Lenin, emphasized the need for political movements to attach specific 
social agendas.  Ultimately, theory and action helped facilitate the rise of the world's first communist 
government in Russia.  Theodore Draper's early work on American communists asked questions through 
this lens, such as: "Why did a revolution in Russia mean so much to them?" and "Why did so many early 
communists prefer the 'underground' to an open, legal Party?"  Simultaneously, Draper depicted 
communist sources as tainted with an inherent level of "propaganda," thus alluding to the notion that 
communist activity and communist political theory were inseparable.15   
This study thus begins with the political world of American Communism, a loose, but 
coordinated, network of political action groups, publishing companies, political parties, public figures, 
and grassroots activists.  The political history of American Communism attracted the most attention 
during the early examinations of the CPUSA and the Socialist Party (SPA) in the late 1950s through the 
1970s.  In these studies, the work of communists throughout the 1920s and 1930s were politically-
driven with specific political goals.16  In order to understand the manner in which communist activism 
split into different forms of social engagement that transformed the political ideals into labor and 
community-based policy, it is necessary to understand the foundation upon which communists in the 
United States built their political ideology.  Because in communist theory the political sphere is intended 





sought identity and purpose from the organizations that rallied behind the banner of Marxism.  This 
chapter argues that the political world of American Communism solidified in 1928 by ending of factional 
strife within specific political groups to create a multifaceted movement that subsequently pushed its 
political ideals into labor organizing and community activism.   
The political world formed the central driving core of American Communism from 1928 to 1957, 
and it did not exist in any functional manner prior to or after those periods.  By core, I mean the 
dimension of the American communist movement that most significantly influenced the others; where 
the output of information and policy was more primary than the input of external influences other than 
the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and later, Joseph Stalin.  The labor and community aspects of 
American communist work influenced less political theory than they translated it into practical work in 
their respective fields.  This does mean that the labor and community worlds were slaves to the political 
core found in American communist parties during this time period, but they also created their own 
spheres of influence that extended beyond what Party leaders could have hoped to achieve.  The 
political core functioned very similarly to the manner by which democratic centralism in Leninist Russia 
bound various societal organizations and activist groups to a single political policy.  If one were to 
envision the American communist movement from 1928 to 1957 as an atom, the political ideologies and 
strategies expressed by the CPUSA, Communist League of America (CLA), the Socialist Workers' Party 
(SWP) and the Workers’ Party of the United States (WPUS), formed the nucleus; the labor and 
community worlds orbited this core, both pulled in by its ideological system as well as pushing against it 
to create a dynamic movement with two primary spheres of influence.  Influence filtered out of the 
political core more than it went in, but the core remained flexible and in tune with its orbiting spheres of 
influence right up to the start of its erosion in the final days of World War II. 
This chapter pushes back on claims that communist engagement in the Popular Front was an act 





ideals of their constituency, the working class American.  From 1932 until the middle of World War II, 
American Communism existed as a legitimate political expression of radical Left traditions in the United 
States, and the CPUSA was the most popular radical political organization in the nation.  It was only after 
1945 that the political world, centered largely in and around the CPUSA, lost its grip on the American 
communist movement.  This was in no small part due to the Party’s depiction of the United States in 
1946 as an emerging fascist power; a view that did not align with the sentiments and desires of working 
Americans.  From 1928 to 1945, crusading against capitalism and oppression created a common ground 
that united radical labor activists, passionate proponents of civil rights and the New Deal, anti-Jim Crow 
politicians, working people of color, women, and common community activists eager to see the United 
States expand on its ideals of freedom and equality.   
Although the ideological nexus of American Communism was broader than simply the CPUSA, 
the Party's national statistics during the early formative years of the political core provide a decent 
starting point for understanding the momentum and array of communist activity during the early 
Depression.  The CPUSA had a healthy obsession with categorizing its members, allowing for an 
examination of socioeconomic backgrounds to provide a good understanding of the kinds of 
subgroupings that later came to dominate the movement by the 1930s.  Between 1928 and 1931, the 
vast majority of American communists were unemployed, foreign born or African American, and male.  
As well, foreign-born members tended to stay longer and remain more active than native-born 
members.  Some have speculated this resulted from a lack of exposure to broad American culture in the 
late 1920s.  Whichever the case, foreign-born dues-paying members of the CPUSA remained more active 
for longer periods, with the majority leaving after World War II.  Historian Harvey Klehr found that 
among the employed members of the CPUSA, white collar employees were more likely to remain with 





Though the Party aimed at organizing equal numbers of men and women and focused its 
recruitment efforts on working class neighborhoods, it occasionally attracted well-to-do intellectuals 
and Jewish community activists, such as George Charney and Herbert Aptheker.  Aptheker, like many 
college-educated communists, came to the CPUSA after participating with students in campus-based 
organizations and protests.  Geographically, communists fell into two groups: travelers and settlers.  
Travelers such as musician and union organizer Russell Brodine commonly shifted location due to the 
transient nature of their work (Brodine played symphonic bass).  Settlers, such as unionist and 
community activist Beatrice Lumpkin, usually stuck within the same geographic region for years.  At 
times when they did move, it was typically to a similar scene (for Lumpkin's case it was New York to 
Chicago).18  As for Party leaders, most traveled the country and frequented the major districts of 
Chicago, New York, Detroit, and Los Angeles.  On the whole, however, it is difficult to give a single 
generic socioeconomic background of American communists.  A complex multitude of "varied interests, 
backgrounds temperaments, and (un)willingness to devote themselves to Party demands" created a 
dynamic grassroots membership base in urban areas.19 
During the 1932 electoral campaign, African Americans such as Hosea Hudson and Benjamin 
Davis made up about 9.4% of the CPUSA; and by 1935 they accounted for 15% of all new recruits into 
the Party.  At the end of World War II, African American membership had grown to 14%.  Despite 
gaining traction in the streets, only 20 people of color served on the Party’s Central Committeea from 
1930-1961; compared to over 155 whites.20  There was also a disparity between the backgrounds of 
blacks who joined the Party.  Many of the most active black communists were highly educated: Ben 
Davis graduated from Harvard Law, William Patterson from the University of California at Berkeley, and 
Doxey Wilkerson completed postdoctoral work at the University of Michigan.  Some historians believe 
that this explains the direction taken by many African Americans in joining the CPUSA, which included an 
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unwillingness “to give allegiance to parties that acquiesced in the racial practices prevalent in the United 
States.”21  Overall, American Communism’s fight against racism became one of its principled 
battlegrounds that spanned across all three major dimensions, attracting people of color but also 
contributing to its failure to gain traction with white workers; who at times were indifferent or 
antagonistic toward the plight of non-white workers.  At times the Party made overt attempts to combat 
this, such as using slogans that decried ‘racism chains both’ during the 1932 Presidential campaign.  As 
far as representing American Communism, however, African Americans remained marginalized 
throughout most of the pre-war and war years.22 
Women such as Lumpkin, Dorothy Ray Healey, and Emma Tenayuca also played a crucial role in 
building the movement from 1932 to 1939, although with significant underrepresentation in the political 
core.  From 1930 to 1934, between 3.8% and 7.4% of elected CPUSA Central Committee members were 
women.  This number jumped to 12.8% in 1936, and reached its height of 23.5% in 1940.23  The shift in 
1931 toward electoral politics and again in 1935 toward Populism, which brought communist activism 
off the shop floors and into the public sphere, inevitably meant “that women and the home front could 
no longer be ignored” by American communist strategists.  As communists active in the community, 
many women such as Beatrice Lumpkin began to organize with men to address suicide, mortgage 
foreclosures, evictions, as well as lack of food and clothes for the poor and unemployed in New York, 
Detroit, Los Angeles, and Chicago.24   
In some cases, communist women in the communities proved vital as they took on a variety of 
community tasks, such as surveying their neighborhoods, recruiting for the Party, and promoting active 
participation in the community door-to-door.  This generated a new approach that embedded “*women+ 
in the minutiae of working class life instead of ‘going to the workers’ with a revolutionary message from 
afar” that only targeted one segment of American society.25  The growth in support among women, 





specific interests, such as the Party’s opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment, which it believed 
would “thwart the interests of working-class women.”26  This was not unlike most unions at the time, 
which rallied behind elements of masculinity in labor and the emerging concept of the nuclear family.  
Linn Shapiro expressed that, although the CPUSA maintained a limited understanding of the needs of 
women during the first four decades of its life, it nevertheless "kept alive unachieved women's rights 
goals," including pay equity, acceptance in unions, and, especially, equal rights for African American 
women.27 
Issues of gender and sexual inequality surfaced in the American communist movement during 
the early 1930s and, in many ways, defined the constraints put on women who found themselves 
absorbed into a male-dominated social and political movement.  Because the Party and many individual 
communists traced their understanding of women’s social position in society to Karl Marx and Frederick 
Engels, both who emphasized that the oppression of women coincided with the development of 
capitalism, many within the CPUSA, CLA, SWP and their orbit insisted that women’s equal rights could be 
ensured only via proletarian revolution.  Within the constraints of capitalist society, communists 
believed, the achievement of women’s social equality was impossible.  Within the CPUSA women that 
held rank and occasional spots on the Central Committee did not always hold decision-making power or 
any ability to veto.  Instead, much of the CPUSA leadership, such as Benjamin Gitlow, emphasized how in 
retrospect women within the Party “were able to exercise power only through their husbands and 
paramours.”28  In the lower activist and organizational ranks, women found themselves in a dark and 
sometimes dangerous place, as Dorothy Healey did during her high period of activism from 1934-1942, 
where her “salvation army approach” to love and marriage involved sexual relations with comrades and 
possible recruits and was described as “a sense of Party duty.”29   
The Party’s official stance on homosexuality “considered homosexual practice incompatible with 





and lesbians, both white and black as well as young and old.  At the grassroots level, political ideals met 
with the harsh practical reality that district organizers commanded significant gravitas within their 
geographic area.  When the CPUSA ordered a purge of homosexuals during the late Third Period, district 
leader Junius Scales refused to comply with the order and instead emphasized the “courage” and “trust 
in the Party” many gays and lesbians had throughout communities.30  When communist labor organizer 
Dorothy Ray Healey tried to lecture a younger comrade, Archie Brown, about how Lenin did not approve 
of promiscuity, Brown responded that Lenin “knew nuttin’ about sex.”  According to Kathleen Brown 
and Elizabeth Faue, Left radicals were influenced by the “new Soviet culture,” particularly Lenin’s 
writings on the Women Question, which set a goal that women “achieve equality with men not only in 
law, but in life as well.”31  In Lenin’s collected works, these writings were prefaced by another influential 
figure for the American Left, Nadezhda K. Krupskaya.  The issues of gender and sexual identity within 
American Communism from 1929-1936 highlight the growing disparity between the directives of the 
Soviet-run Communist International (Comintern) and the communist movement within the United 
States, which usually found itself adapting or molding Comintern policy to the practical situation found 
in American cities and homes.32 
The youth's story of American Communism is certainly an underexamined field in the existing 
historiography, in part on the sole basis that youths are so heavily emphasized for their impact on 
subsequent cultural movements such as Civil Rights and Second Wave Feminism.  Draper pointed out 
how before the creation of the Youth Communist League (YCL), early American Communism found its 
greatest appeal among twenty to forty-year age groups and "did not fare so well above or below."  
Previous efforts, such as the Young People's Socialist League based out of Michigan, were short-lived 
and ineffective.  The YCL after 1922 continued to provide "the main reinforcements to the Party's top 
leadership for the next two decades."33  Lumpkin's experience in the YCL is an uplifting one that 





represents one of the best examples of how communist youths took on passionate political action for 
both personal and selfless means.  Lumpkin chose the YCL after weighing out a choice over the Young 
Peoples' Socialist League (Yipsels) and deciding that communists were better "organizers of the free 
speech fight."34  The link between youth communist passion for their movement, their association of 
radical politics with protecting American values such as free speech, and the subsequent significance of 
youth involvement in political action during the 1950s and 1960s has yet to be fully unearthed, but it 
remains a ripe field for future research. 
As a political institution, CPUSA leaders and district organizers throughout the late 1920s 
staunchly advocated a position of resistance to all forms of progressive, liberal, and Democrat policies, 
and they justified their rationale with Leninist communist theory.  This meant depicting the world amidst 
a capitalist crisis, and rallying behind the institution of the Communist International for guidance.  The 
start of the Third Period also hastened the synthesis of communist leaders and non-communist 
political/labor organizers by forcing communists to learn "how to work with liberals and non-
communists" under the direction of their Comintern representatives.35  By the mid 1930s and 
throughout World War II a shift occurred, and those same leaders worked to maintain their distance 
from other socialist organizations, operate more loosely without Comintern oversight, as well as 
contrast themselves from the Roosevelt Administration ideologically while simultaneously maintaining a 
cooperative stance with liberals and Democrats for both economic reform and resistance to the rise of 
fascism.  This included challenging perceived reactionary Republicans and supporting Roosevelt’s 
electoral campaign in 1936 as the means to preventing a step back into the economic conditions of 
1930-31.   
This move alone represented the largest divergence between the CPUSA and other communist 
groups such as the CLA and SWP that emerged in the mid 1930s.  The latter rejected cooperation and 





position as meddling with reactionary and revisionist tactics, words that to a communist sound like 
"conservative" and "centrist."  Outside the political world, the activism got blurry as cooperation across 
ideological lines was necessary in order to obtain real achievements for Americans which was 
understood as the real, practical goal.  In labor organizing, communists, both men and women, such as 
Emma Tenyuaca, Dorothy Healey, John Gates, George Charney, and Beatrice Lumpkin worked 
extensively to maintain relations within the American Federation of Labor (AFL) while supporting the 
growth of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) led by John L. Lewis.  Finally, in communities 
across the country, communists such as Russell Brodine, Benjamin Davis, and Charney, as well as 
Lumpkin and others, built local ties to strengthen their bonds as community members and promote 
solidarity between working people across racial, gender, and political lines.   
Grasping the divide between organizations claiming to represent communism in the United 
States, such as the CPUSA and the CLA over ideology, is essential to understand the full spectrum of 
American Communism and how it existed as its own shade within a broader pan-socialist American 
tradition.  Splits were and remain a common tendency of the pan-socialist Left in the United States, and 
their contribution to the distinction between socialist, communist, and progressive organizations should 
not be overlooked.  Some might even argue it to be endemic of the Left tradition in the United States.  
Perhaps future studies can seek to examine the totality of the pan-socialist Left in the United States, of 
which such studies would find American Communism as complex and multifaceted actor.  The CPUSA, 
CLA, and SWP were born out of such Leftist factionalism, as were the later sects of the Revolutionary 
Communist Party (RCP) and the Communist Labor Party of North America (CLPNA).   
The CPUSA, CLA, Communist Party (Opposition), and SWP formed the political world of 
American Communism.  It was bound together by ideology, but distinguished by its variable 
interpretation of said ideology.  Ideology served and continues to serve a foundation for self-identified 





exception.  Differences in the interpretation of ideology led to factionalism and it was factionalism that 
created a world of communist political activity; for ideas to develop and reach their practical limits in 
American society.  For Cannon and his supporters in the CLA from 1929-1934, the Foster/Browder-led 
CPUSA failed to give credit to the militant and constructive criticism of Leon Trotsky against the rising 
tide of Stalinism, further motivating them to engage with American workers.  The CPUSA, in turn, found 
their opposition to more moderate socialists as their defining characteristic in 1928, laying a foundation 
for principled political campaigning in subsequent years.  Far from being a handicap, however, the late- 
factionalism of 1928 within the international and national communist movements help explain why 
American communists distanced themselves from other socialists, how an obscure figure like Earl 
Browder came to head the CPUSA by 1929, and the political activism of American communists from 
1930 to 1945. 
The Third Period:  1928-1934 
The years leading up to 1935 had been a long time coming for the fledgling American 
Communist movement.  Prior to the Third Period, a broad, loosely organized pan-Socialist Left 
movement for socialism in the United States existed in enclaves across the nation.  This movement 
consisted of numerous regional community clubs, unions, the left wing of the Socialist Party of America 
(SPA), the Workers' Party of America (WPA), which acted as the legal face of the underground CPUSA, 
and broad sections of civil activist organizations such as local chapters of the Industrial Workers of the 
World (IWW), the Workers' Council of the United States, and the African Blood Brotherhood.  The pan-
Socialist Left movement is commonly underemphasized in studies of the Labor and Civil Rights 
movements prior to World War II.  But throughout the 1920s there existed no homogenous or unified 
communist movement; those who identified as politically communist prior to 1928 were more likely to 
be found associating with their supposed political enemies than engaging in mass protests and 





this pan-Socialist Left, and how it solidified a distinctive political programme that distinguished 
communists from other radicals as a result of internal conclusions about factional strife as well as 
external pressure from the growingly-influential Third Communist International, or Comintern.  The 
Third Period from 1928 to 1934 transformed the American communist movement from a small, radical 
contingent of a broad Left tradition in the United States into a sizable political force with influences that 
extended beyond the political sphere of American culture. 
The CPUSA's origin as the left-wing separation of the SPA is a well documented and known story 
among scholars of American labor history.36  Starting in 1919, early American communists built on 
existing, well established leftist cultures in urban areas such as New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia 
where the SPA had a significant presence.  From there they "developed their own enclaves that dotted 
the cities' working class neighborhoods"37 to create by the late 1920s a movement dismembered from 
its origins in the SPA.  The CPUSA was not the only organization dismembered in this process, though it 
is certainly the organization that has received the most attention by scholars, and proved to attract 
more members.  The CPUSA netted the most numbers compared to all alternative groups who similarly 
rejected cooperation with moderate socialists throughout the Third Period. By 1934, communists 
commanded significant political influence in a wide variety of American industries and political 
communities.  But the CPUSA is not the entire story, nor is it functionally the same organization from its 
inception as the Communist Party of America (CPA) in 1919 through the 1920s, and leading up to World 
War II.   
Between 1928 and 1934, the CPUSA thrust itself into the political consciousness of Americans 
with two presidential election campaigns, effectively making it the face of American Communism amidst 
other smaller and less radical organizations.  Though much of the scholarship during the Third Period 
focuses on the nature of the CPUSA's subordination to the Communist International headed by Bukharin 





themselves from the rest of the Left and create a genuinely American communist movement by 1934.  
Most studies show that the early political thrusts into political campaigning by the CPUSA, CLA, and 
Communist Party (Opposition) from 1928-1932 were effective at recruitment: leading into the first post-
stock market crash presidential election, the CPUSA saw an increase in membership from 9,219 to 
14,474, and then to 18,119 by the start of 1933.38  The CPUSA fielded candidates at nearly all levels of 
governance, and made a few local victories such as with Karl Nygard who was elected mayor of Crosby, 
Minnesota.  By the end of 1934, American communist political activity could be seen across the nation, 
fueling the rising discontent of American workers suffering from the Depression, their desire to seek out 
alternative solutions to Depression woes, and the practical limits of Roosevelt's New Deal—then still 
only in infancy. 
The beginnings of the Third Period were a significant turning point both nationally and 
internationally for American citizens as well as those who identified with Bolshevik communism.  From 
July through September of 1928, the Comintern held its Sixth Congress where it outlined the dictums of 
what became known as the Third Period.  The name of the era was coined from a Russian assessment of 
supposed revolutionary conditions around the world following the Bolshevik Revolution.  The immediate 
years following 1917 accounted for the First Period, where the momentum of the Bolshevik Revolution 
pushed working class resistance to heightened levels around the world, including post-World War I 
America.  The slow progression of the Revolution and the perception of a "stabilisation [sic] of world 
capitalism" by 1922 prompted the Comintern to declare a new Second Period which called for a united 
front with moderates in order to gain influence among working people.   For almost four years, the 
Workers' Party of America functioned as the public face of the underground Communist Party.  Mixed 
with the post-World War I red scare, communists saw little momentum in their movement and instead 
banked more on the success of cooperative efforts with the SPA in urban areas and the Farmer-Labor 





Comintern declared a new set of revolutionary conditions, where radicals should pit themselves against 
moderates to win over the working class.  Between 1926-1928, numerous communists and communist 
groups split from their social-democratic parties and unions to form "red" alternatives while also 
intensifying existing factionalism within the CPUSA.  The circumstances of the shift lay both inside and 
outside the politics of the Soviet Union and are somewhat beyond the scope of this study, however an 
understanding of the factional debates and their effect on the political direction of American 
Communism is important to grasping the solidification of a political core of the movement's ideals. 
The Comintern's shift, according to Jacob Zumoff, "still confuses historians," and with good 
reason:  Much of the conclusive assessments made from these shifts were elucidated as evidence of the 
CPUSA's subordinate nature to the Comintern.  Internationally, the shift reflected "the failure of open 
class-collaborationism that had led to disasters such as the British general strike in May 1926 and the 
Shanghai massacre in April [of] 1927" while also paralleling the political changes of the Soviet Union as 
Stalin moved to oust all supporters of his rival, Leon Trotsky.  As one of the last significant influential 
Russian revolutionaries after the death of Russian Revolutionary Vladimir Lenin, Trotsky remained 
Stalin's staunchest political opponent and pushed for an end to his attempt to control Soviet politics 
through the Comintern.  Trotsky remained a proponent of what would be eventually termed 
"permanent revolution," or the development of socialism in agrarian regions and in nations lacking 
advanced capitalist production, while Stalin pushed for a new theoretical understanding of a state-
socialist economic system  he called "Socialism in One Country."39   
At the time, Stalin's theory of a socialist-based national economic policy took a somewhat 
significant turn from traditionalist Marxist and Leninist schools of thought on nationality and statehood.  
More significant than the altering of Marxist-Leninist theory, however, was the quick and immediate 
acceptance of it by numerous American communists.  Scholars have attempted, for decades, to 





remaining loyal to a political policy entirely alien to American life.  Why, for example, do American 
communists accept Stalinist theories of socialism in one country while also assuming the Comintern 
knows the best path for their organizational activity?  Zumoff argues that the overall purpose of the 
Third Period, which extended from the desires of Soviet diplomats concerned about national security, 
was to "persuade dissident communists" while insisting on "subordination and loyalty."40  By 
emphasizing international relationships over domestic effects and how this process subordinated the 
CPUSA, however, scholars often overlook how CPUSA factionalism and quests for power among its 
leadership preceded Comintern intervention as well as how the CPUSA's loyalty to the Comintern 
distinguished communists from other radical Leftists to create a unique American communist social and 
political tradition in the United States. 
In 1928, three voices held the most weight throughout the CPUSA’s politics, each with their own 
faction of dedicated followers: Jay Lovestone, a Party Founder and Vice-Presidential candidate; William 
Z. Foster, trade unionist, Presidential candidate, and leader of the Trade Union Educational League 
(TUEL); and James Cannon, who, like Lovestone, helped found the rival Left faction within the SPA in 
September of 1919 but would later go on to lead the Trotskyist CLA.  According to Storch, the 
factionalism which exploded in the early years of the Third Period had its origins in the CP's attempts to 
create a cohesive political strategy within the context of the Comintern's First Period.  This suggests that 
the existing factions took with them to the Comintern's Sixth Congress their own personal convictions 
about the future prospects of domestic communist strategies.  Hungarian-born American delegate to 
the Comintern, John Pepper, won the committee's support to force William Foster to try and spearhead 
a communist takeover of the Farmer-Labor Party (FLP); then just a fledgling political unit with broad but 
marginal levels of support among farmers and labor activists.  Storch argued that this move pitted Foster 
and Cannon, who did not support integration with the FLP, against Jay Lovestone and Chicago-born 





Comintern, particularly its leader, Nikolai Bukharin.41  This then set in motion a series of events that 
resulted in the rise of a unified and more importantly motivated political movement. 
Throughout the early and mid 1920s, the Lovestone-Ruthenberg faction enjoyed majority 
control of the underground CPUSA, as well as its public face as the Workers' Party of America, and 
steered the two organizations through the First and Second Periods with relative ease, though the 
tensions between factional camps remained strong.  Debates, such as those about the FLP, were 
routine, but rarely resulted in communicative breakdowns and staunch rejection of alternative 
positions.  The decisive moment came when the Comintern began publishing articles that depicted a 
"right danger" of cooperative, progressive organizations between 1926 and 1927.  Outside the context 
of American Communism, this action by the Comintern was part of a broader effort by Stalin and the 
Soviet Communist Party against Trotsky and Bukharin.42  Although supporters of Trotsky within the 
CPUSA were few in number by early 1928, Party representative J. Louis Engdahl flew to Moscow to 
criticize the American leadership for being soft on Trotskyism in America.  This sparked a heated debate 
between the Foster-Cannon and Lovestone-Ruthenberg camps over the future of the American party.43   
This new debate was unlike previous factional differences within the communist political world.  
While Cannon and a handful of other Comintern delegates, such as Canadian communist representative 
Maurice Spector, silently supported Trotsky's efforts to reform the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
they made no real plans or initiatives to rally further support.  When the Sixth Congress of the 
Comintern began at the end of July, the ideological divisions already present within the American Party 
became more visible and public, and particular factions seized the moment to wrestle for power.  Only a 
few months prior to the start of the Congress, Stalin expelled Trotsky from the Russian Party and 
subsequently turned his attention to the last remaining obstacle in his quest for control over the Soviet 
bureaucracy, Bukharin and the Comintern as a whole.  As such, the Congress quickly came to reflect the 





Trotskyism.  American communists became the usable pawns in this move; with Soviet diplomats 
capable of playing the ideological devotion of members against their personal understandings of 
Marxism.44  This created the context in which American delegates to the Comintern, particularly Foster, 
Cannon, and Lovestone, evolved their understanding of revolutionary strategy, cemented their factional 
strife, and solidified their ideological views for subsequent years. 
Foster and Cannon responded to Engdahl's criticisms of the Party's soft nature toward 
Trotskyism by attempting, unsuccessfully, to oust Lovestone from the delegation.   The camp submitted 
a document titled "The Right Danger in the American Party;" labeling Lovestone as a moderate using the 
"rhetoric of the developing 'left' turn in the Comintern."  Lovestone faced condemnation for his "failure 
to orientate towards new unions and the organization of the unorganized" as well as his supposed 
inability to create an effective resistance to the"[John L.] Lewis machine."45  Foster, for his efforts, met 
difficulty with the Comintern once his historic support for "boring from within"b existing labor unions 
clashed with the desire by Bukharin and the Soviet delegates to create alternative revolutionary unions.  
Foster then found himself further pitted against supporters of Lovestone in the higher legislative body as 
well as numerous Soviet delegates who desired a transformation of American labor theory to fit with 
transformations in Soviet policy.   
Cannon faced criticism from his own supporters for trying to pressure a fellow communist, 
William F. Dunne, into withdrawing his seat as a representative.  Both Foster and Cannon, however, 
remained united in their opposition to Lovestone.  They argued that Lovestone was a "rightist" leader 
who "overestimat[ed] the strength of American imperialism."  Lovestone responded by stressing his 
"support for the Comintern's leadership (Bukharin) and its analysis" of international revolutionary 
conditions, while Pepper accused the Foster-Cannon camp for having "a basically different analysis of 
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American capitalism and its role in the general world situation."46  According Zumoff, the opposition led 
by Lovestone against the Cannon-Foster faction "reflected 'corridor' gossip of a break between [Stalin 
and Bukharin]."  In both scenarios, neither Cannon/Foster/Lovestone nor Stalin/Bukharin wanted 
delegates and party leaders aware of the growing factionalism.47 
The Comintern archival records show that a series of meetings between Stalin, Foster and 
Bittleman occurred to discuss Bukharin's support for Lovestone as the head of the CPUSA.  There was a 
clear connection between Stalin's desire to focus on the CPUSA and the subsequent push to remove 
Bukharin from control, where Stalin's delegates Lozovsky and Lominadze attacked both Bukharin and 
Pepper for supposed "theoretical mistakes."  Bittleman felt that the new atmosphere encouraged him 
and anti-Lovestonittes "to take a more or less challenging attitude to Bukharin—the head of the 
Communist International."48  Pepper, Lovestone, and Bukharin retorted by trying to explain the 
"exceptional" and "unique nature" of American capitalism which set it aside as a sort of 'special needs' 
situation with regard to revolutionary activity and theory.  Here we see the emergence of a sort of 
dependency between specific CPUSA leaders and certain voices within the Comintern; not so much over 
their ideological proclivities but rather their desire to have political control of the movement back home 
in the United States.   
Secretly, Stalin made moves to oust Lovestone by having Lozovsky argue to the Comintern that 
it was necessary to "built new unions, including in the US, and that Lovestone and Pepper 'regarded the 
reactionary AFL as a fetish'" which could still be molded with older tactics of winning workers over from 
within.  Stalin's other aid, Lominadze, attacked Pepper's stance as suggesting that "everything is 
hindering" the movement and for having little hope for organizing the American working class.  
Lominadze, instead, insisted that there were "all the premises" necessary to build the CPUSA into "a 
powerful force" and, importantly, that the United States had "more favourable [sic] premises for the 





delegation left the 1928 Sixth Congress, as Bryan Palmer put it, "more divided, and more precariously 
perched" than before.  Lovestone remained in control of the Party, but the Foster-Cannon camp viewed 
this as Lovestone’s ongoing effort to exploit loyalty to Bukharin in order to retain leadership.  By 
December, Lovestone issued a motion asserting that Foster and his allies "accept all decisions of the 
Sixth World Congress of the Comintern without reservations."50  It was not Foster, however, who would 
face the fallout from the Sixth Congress's Stalin/Bukharin split; it was Cannon. 
Prior to leaving the Congress in September of 1928, Cannon came across a document by Trotsky 
titled The Draft Program of the Communist International: A Criticism of Fundamentals, which appealed 
against the expulsions of the Left Oppositionists as their right as delegates of the Comintern and 
"attacked the entire basis of the post-Lenin Comintern."51  It is not known whether Cannon accidentally 
came across the memo, as Cannon stated in his biography, or if it was part of a broad anti-Bukharin 
effort on behalf of Stalin, as suggested by Isaac Deutscher.  Zumoff pointed out that Harry Wicks, a 
British communist at the time and later Trotskist, recalled that the memo was "carefully circulated to 
students, heads of delegations, and members of the programme commission."  The memo attacked 
Stalin's concept of 'Socialism in One Country' as a "betrayal of Communism that would only result in 
more defeats."  The factionalism and stagnant theoretical debates, Trotsky argued, were "not failure[s] 
of analysis, but a programmatic reflection of the degeneration of the Russian Revolution itself."52  To 
Cannon and his sympathizers, Trotsky's staunch condemnation of Stalinist theory "brought together a 
forceful synthesis of what was wrong, programmatically, in the policies of the Communist International."  
By November, Cannon's camp drafted a new newspaper, The Militant, and published as its first headline 
article the entire Trotsky memo.  Cannon eventually concluded that one "cannot build a revolutionary 
political party solely on a national basis" and viewed the Comintern's lack of emphasis in the broader, 





emboldened to "begin a struggle under the banner of Trotskyism" while Lovestone moved to, in 
Cannon's words, "weaken his factional opponents through guilt-by-association."54 
 Foster and Lovestone's continued support for the Comintern after the release of the Trotsky 
memo reflected their idealism of the Bolshevik revolution; but more importantly it served the practical 
effort of keeping Cannon out of power.  It also demonstrated the way American communist leaders 
came to realize how the politics of the Comintern were an effective tool for playing identity politics 
within the CPUSA.  By looking to the Comintern for solutions to national issues and avoiding the 
problems of the Comintern as a whole, "national narrow-mindedness...pushed [American communists] 
into the blind alley of factional struggles."  When it became clear that the only two solutions to factional 
strife was the idealist path of finding common ground for all the factions or the more realistic outcome 
of allowing one faction to simply "become dominant," those seeking approval and support from the 
Comintern used the biases of that institution to further their side.55  By the end of 1928 Cannon's camp 
faced expulsion from the CPUSA and the Comintern, while Foster's faction did a quick about-face to 
condemn the Trotskyists and distance his camp from its previous alliance with Cannon against 
Lovestone; fully confirming the utilitarian nature of Communist Party leaders and their relationship with 
the Comintern.  Although less than a hundred individuals left with Cannon, they took with them 
instrumental activists who for over a decade had a proven track record of organizational success, 
including Arne Swabeck from Chicago and most of the founders of the International Labor Defense 
(ILD).56  The side effect was the creation of another face of the political world of American Communism 
that identified itself as a contrast to the CPUSA. 
From December, 1928, through summer of 1929, Cannon and fellow Trotskyists laid the 
groundwork of what they called the Communist League of America (CLA), an opposition sect of the 
Communist Party.  The CLA laid out its criticisms of the CPUSA, the Comintern, and the Stalinist Soviet 





central problems of Soviet development and what the Soviets, using the rhetoric of Stalin, depicted as 
the problem of Trotskyism in general.  "Trotskyism," Militant author and CLA organizer Martin Abern 
wrote in December, 1928, "[was] 'discussed' without for one moment examining the actual economic, 
tactical and political, proposals of the Russian Opposition."  Rather than allow open debate, the 
Trotskyists believed they were "suppressed" both at the Sixth Congress and back in the United States via 
their expulsion.57  Trotsky's criticism of the Comintern was reprinted for each Militant bi-weekly issue 
between December and February, 1928/29.  In the final issue of The Militant for February, 1929, Cannon 
printed his platform to build what became the CLA, signed off by Cannon himself, Arne Swabeck, Martin 
Abern, and Max Shachtman.  The platform clearly distinguished the CLA from the CPUSA on the basis of 
their interpretation of the Russian Revolution as "collapsed" subsequent to the rise of Stalin and the 
ongoing "contradiction between the existence of a Soviet regime in a country with a predominantly 
peasant economy."  To distinguish the CLA from Lovestone, Cannon emphasized the CLA's view that the 
opening of the American south to industrialization meant "new contradictions" to fight as opposed to 
easy solutions to fight racial injustice.58 
Communists in the CPUSA responded to the shifts of the post-Sixth Congress at the local level by 
pointing fingers and issuing instructions to activists at lower-level shop nuclei to fight against Trotskyism 
in their organizing efforts of party clubs.  Joe Giganti, head of Chicago's ILD and barber by trade, 
attended Party meetings that discussed the "dire criminality of the Trots and their collusion with the 
bourgeois counter revolution."  In an atmosphere where second guessing was viewed as suspicion, 
communists like Giganti faced expulsion for failing to adhere to the Comintern directives.  By February, 
1929, the Chicago Party leadership issued a dictum regarding interaction with Trotskists:  "No 
fraternizing, no audience, no contacts."  As Stalin and the Soviet Union redirected its attention to the 
"right danger" in 1929, referring to Bukharin's ongoing control over the Comintern, American 





Bukharin.  Since both Lovestone and Bukharin continued to support the notion of American capitalist 
exceptionalism as opposed to a generalized theory of worldwide, historical capitalism, Lovestone 
became an easy target for communists looking to change Party leadership.  Ruthenberg's death in 1927 
made the anti-Lovestone effort much easier as Lovestone became the face of the pro-Bukharin camp in 
Chicago-based communist political clubs.59   
Beginning in 1929, the Comintern sent a delegation to request Lovestone to step down and 
hand the CPUSA over the Foster.  Lovestone insisted that his efforts against Cannon were part of a broad 
effort against Trotskyism, and thus his own attempt at combating the perceived "right danger."  He 
argued the legitimacy of his representation, accusing Foster of perpetuating factional problems and 
"harbor[ing] the most dangerous right-wing tendencies."60   Unfortunately for Lovestone, the issue for 
Soviet politicians was not a matter of ongoing support for Trotsky but rather if "Lovestone had the 
confidence of Stalin."  Lovestone flew to Moscow to try and plead his case to Stalin directly, who then 
suggested that Lovestone's popular support within the CPUSA was the result only because "the Party 
regarded [him] as friend of the Comintern."61   According to Zumoff, Lovestone "sowed the seeds of his 
own downfall" through his support of Bukharin, and thus his appeals to the Soviet delegates contrasted 
with the desire by Stalin and his supporters to increase their control over the Comintern.  Lovestone 
attacked both Stalin's ally Lozovsky, and the backdoor negotiations between Soviet delegates and others 
such as Foster who supported removing Bukharin.  This forced Stalin to deny a breakdown in policy 
within the Comintern and criticize Lovestone for undermining the organization as a whole.62   
Lovestone returned to the United States expelled, and scrambled to create a new organization 
with the few hundred that left the CPUSA with him.  Lovestone's organization, similar to Cannon's, 
referred to itself as the Communist Party (Opposition).  By the end of 1929, Stalin solidified his control 
over the Comintern by ousting Bukharin and his supporters.  Communists high and low around the world 





worldwide communist organizations.63  The Soviet dictator's quick reversal of a decision to hand the 
CPUSA over to Foster and instead to a relatively obscure and unknown figure, Earl Browder, was clear 
evidence of a desire to avoid personable and passionate leaders in the American sphere.  Looking 
exclusively at it from this angle, however, makes it difficult to see an alternative interpretation of the 
events. 
In her autobiography, Peggy Dennis recalled that although Stalin's moves were part of a 
coordinated effort to consolidate power over communist parties in Europe by purging supporters of 
Trotsky and oppositional leaders, most active communists back in the United States did not "connect 
[their] own internal struggle with that which had raged in the Comintern."  Whatever the cause, Dennis 
contended, the "salutatory" and short-term benefit of the Comintern's ruling brought on a "militant 
young Party core" in key areas such as Los Angeles and Chicago; all dedicated and eager to begin 
organizational work and sought out political clubs from which to do so.64  Dennis, who socialized with 
the inner circle of CPUSA leaders, likely was not alone in her view that Stalin's orders simply coincided 
with a general desire among American communists to end the factionalism and get to organizational 
work and it is likely that there is a somewhat duality to the ousting of particular factions.  President 
Hoover's continued emphasis on balancing the federal budget as the only practical solution to economic 
crises further worried communist leaders that the U.S. government "did not intend to take significant 
action to relieve the plight of millions of Americans who had been thrown out of work," and that efforts 
to combat the situation would be left to the hands of a dedicated few.65   
There is another undervalued aspect of the Comintern's Sixth Congress of 1928 that underscores 
the significant difference between American Communism as a movement from the rest of the American 
pan-Socialist left throughout the Third Period: its conclusions about racial injustice in the United States 
and the placement of it as a core political platform.  In terms of American communists' approach to 





approach to the 'Negro Question'" where the Comintern argued that "the American black population 
was an oppressed nation [sic] with the right to self-determination, up to independence from the US."  
The conclusions built upon Stalinist interpretations of national minorities, which were themselves 
rooted in theories of ethnic and racial tensions of Eastern Europe, South Africa, and Canada and thus not 
exclusively communist in origin.66  The difficulty for Stalinist strategists lay in the fact that African 
American members of the CPUSA and Comintern delegates predominantly supported the Ruthenberg-
Lovestone faction throughout the mid 1920s.  The factionalism of the Sixth Congress "intertwined" with 
the direction of the Party's understanding of solutions to racial oppression.   
Future political leaders and organizers for the CPUSA James Ford, Harry Haywood, and William 
F. Dunne met in Moscow at the Fourth Profintern Congress in early 1928 to raise awareness of the 
issues of "black workers" and joined Lozovsky in criticizing the Trade Union Educational League for doing 
little "concrete work" at improving racial inequality.    Ford directly attacked the CPUSA for its "little 
success in the organisation [sic] of Negro workers and Negro work generally" in a document that 
stressed the significance of black workers as a significant component of the American working class.  The 
document also criticized the way leadership "relegated" African American communists "to insignificant 
positions" and sometimes even drove them from the Party altogether.  Ford motioned for a special 
Negro delegation of eight African American communists, including Edward Dotty, Fort-Whiteman, and 
himself, to be given access to conferences in Moscow by June 1st, 1928.  The Profintern Congress 
supported Ford's effort unanimously, and ordered the CPUSA to step up efforts in creating "special 
unions for Negroes" while simultaneously "fighting for existing unions to organise [sic] black workers."67 
The CPUSA responded by sending it's delegate, John Pepper, back to the United States under 
the false last name of Swift in order to push a new Party line on organizing against racism.  Pepper's 
document, Policies on Negro Work, "underlined that 'the Negro question is a race question [sic],' while 





[sic]."  The document overall emphasized linking racial oppression to economic oppression by promoting 
"intermediary organizations" to educate African American comrades and urge them to play leading roles 
in "non-Party organizations" as open and proud communists.  Overall, the policy became a method of 
recruitment moreso than it was an effective means of combating racism.  The policy subsumed the racial 
question beneath the Party's emphasis on class by insisting that "it is ideologically impossible to build a 
mass movement on a program oppositional to lynching, Jim Crowism, and political disenfranchisement" 
without first amassing African Americans into one political unit.68  Although a theoretical failure, the 
document highlighted the importance of linking communists' ideas about democratic rights to 
perceptions of socialism in the United States.  Localized conditions and an emphasis of them strongly 
undermine scholarly notions of the CPUSA's absolute submission to the Comintern.  The limited program 
for organizational work, however, fermented resentment among veteran black communists who desired 
to see the fight for racial equality become central to the movement.69  The Comintern's Sixth Congress in 
mid/late 1928 furthered these tensions over a concrete policy on race and Party factionalism ultimately 
dictated which stance the CPUSA took while other groups, such as the CLA,  contrasted themselves by 
adopting stricter or more lenient solutions. 
At the Congress, Ford's dream of eight African American delegates in a special American 
commission was struck down to just two; Lovett Fort-Whiteman and H.V. Philips.  Ford was granted the 
position of a fraternal delegate, and he brought nine black students attending the Lenin School (KUTV) 
to witness the event.  As the Congress opened, the Foster-Cannon camp used their "right danger" 
document to insist that Lovestone and his faction "systematically...neglected work among the Negro 
masses;" echoing Ford's criticism just a few months prior, this time charged with political rhetoric 
between two rival camps.  The Congress concluded that the error lay in "white chauvinism" and 
Lovestone's assertion that African Americans in the rural south constituted "reserves of reaction" 





of a term to be similar in accusatory power of "rightism" or "Trotskyism," and would surface again in 
post-World War II party factionalism.71  As a malleable term, it also carried with it the power of 
suggesting ideological deviation that required no further explanation.  In many ways the accusation itself 
was enough to cause suspicion among groups already prone to factional division.  Lower ranking 
communists, completely alienated from the factional disputes going on in Moscow, would not see the 
overt connection between accusations of 'white chauvinism' and 'Trotskyism'.  Instead, they would see 
the same individuals accused of the same various terms, and assume that one causes the other.72  In this 
case, the end result was likely that Trotskyists and Rightists within the Party were associated with 'white 
chauvinism' and the inability to recognize African Americans as potential allies; regardless of how 
individual Trotskyists actually felt. 
On a theoretical level, it was easy by 1928 for Foster and Cannon to disassociate themselves 
from the accusations of 'white chauvinism' faced by Lovestone, who for reasons already mentioned lost 
support in the Comintern from all except Bukharin.  Foster needed nothing more than to cite Lenin, who 
argued that "the American South is a kind of prison where [blacks] are hemmed in, isolated and 
deprived of fresh air," to link up Marxist-Leninist ideology with the Sixth Congress' conclusions.73  This 
pitted them against Lovestone's view that "rural black Southerners were reactionary" and Bukharin's 
insistence that American capitalism represented an example of exceptionalism.74  Others, such as 
Manuel Gomez, attacked Lovestone's conclusions about race for being "soft on US imperialism" despite 
the popularity of Lovestone among the CPUSA’s African American members.75  To the Congress and 
Soviet delegation, this had little to do with perceptions of racism among American communists and 
instead "highlighted the lack of the Party's connections in the South, still home to most American 
blacks."   
Rather than create a new way of thinking about approaching answers to racial tensions, 





communists had with the Negro question."76  Together, the events trickled into the one path optimal for 
both the Comintern and the Foster-Cannon faction: to stress that communists must recognize "Negroes' 
right to an independent existence" and view African Americans as "a subject nation" parallel to 
colonized people of the third world.77  Setting aside the political quests for power within the Comintern, 
the process resulted in a unique look on race relations in the United States that, although not new and 
certainly not exclusively communist, came to define communist perceptions of race relations in the pre-
World War II years.  Within a matter of years it became communist canon to view racial oppression as 
inherently systemic; that it shared domestically many of the elements symptomatic of US imperialism in 
Latin America, and that solutions within the system were ill equipped to fix the oppressive and 
discriminatory nature of Jim Crow.  The solution then became anti-systemic: the recognition of self-
determination among African Americans became the building block to attaining class consciousness.  
This could then, if necessary, lead to the creation of a new nation-state on the basis of sovereignty. 
Toward the end of the conference, the American delegation put forth a resolution titled 
Resolution on Work Among the Negro Masses of the United States of America where the delegates 
outlined their understanding of racial oppression in the United States.  The document explicitly 
separated "the struggle for the full racial, social and political equality of the Negroes" from "a struggle 
for the right of national self-determination;" seeing the two as part of the same battle but separate 
objectives to achieve.  By separating the concept, the resolution's final assertion subsumed the theory of 
racial oppression under class oppression: "The realisation [sic] of this self-determination cannot be 
secured under the present relations of power under capitalism."78  When Ford's Negro sub-committee 
was able to submit a revised edition of the resolution, he focused instead on the "black peasantry" of 
the South and removed calls for a Negro Soviet Republic.  Ford emphasized emboldening white workers 
to fight against racism in the workplace and in communities, desiring to see white communists become 





document referred more to the right of African Americans to create their own state as opposed to the 
need for it.  After the Congress, the Comintern issued a final declaration instructing Party leaders to 
come out openly in support for "the right" of national self-determination while also setting up 
alternative unions, predominantly in the South, for African Americans to join and fight for integration if 
they desired.  "The Negro problem," the Comintern declared, must become "part and parcel of all and 
every campaign conducted by the Party."79 
The significance of this declaration by the Comintern cannot, and should not, be 
underemphasized.  Ford's document, his delegation to the Comintern's Sixth Congress, and the 
subsequent approval of Ford's dual emphasis on both sovereign rights of African Americans and the 
right African Americans to integration by the Congress, all demonstrate a profound level of influence 
that American communists had on the Soviet-run Comintern.  Whereas it is more common to view 
American Communism as the receiver of theoretical influence and thus a subordinate Moscow satellite, 
the conclusions of the Comintern Sixth Congress on the issue of racism in the United States 
demonstrates that this was not always the case.  Furthermore, the charge of "subordination" to the 
Comintern is more suspect as these documents suggest perhaps a more ideologically-driven link 
between American communists and their Soviet idealists, as opposed to a blind faith.  Ford's acceptance 
of subsuming theories of racial oppression under class oppression while emphasizing the practical 
demands of African Americans against the establishment of a Soviet Negro Republic demonstrated both 
his ideological affinity toward Marxist interpretations of social injustice as well as his domestic 
interpretations of racial injustice.   
Between the CPUSA's Sixth Congress in March, 1929 and its Seventh Congress in June, 1930, a 
combination of ideological commitments, the practical demands of American radicals, and the new 
generation of activists shaped the political path for American Communism.  Whereas prior to the 





life that meshed with sentiments outside initial spheres of influence.  The Party adopted its now-
traditional and current name, the Communist Party of the United States of America, and accepted the 
Comintern's ousting of Lovestone and replacement with Benjamin Gitlow temporary Executive Secretary 
until handing the title of General Secretary to Earl Browder.  During this transition, the CPUSA became a 
more public and visually active and dynamic political organization in comparison to its previous years, 
particularly in urban regions like Chicago.  Chicago's local Party had a significant history with the city, 
dating back to the movement's split from the Socialist Party in 1919.  After the Sixth Congress, Chicago's 
communist leaders "oversaw an organization with a lively, contentious, and varied local party culture 
where individuals and groups emphasized, ignored, or resisted different aspects of the party's dominant 
culture." 
With their separation of the two groups in 1928/29, Cannon's CLA and Lovestone's CP 
(Opposition) effectively mobilized for the same goal, but under different methods, as the CPUSA.  
Organizationally, the two claimed to be at the polar ends of the CPUSA's political spectrum; with Cannon 
to the far left and Lovestone to the right; even prior to Lovestone's official split.80  Many of the CPUSA's 
and SPA's ex-organizers found a new home in the smaller factions and while they clashed ideologically 
about the significance of Leon Trotsky's opposition, they nevertheless found common ground on issues 
such as the promotion of hunger strikes, addressing racial injustice and promoting and end to Jim Crow, 
and the establishment of workers' councils to facilitate the presentation of community grievances to 
local politicians.81  The inability of American communists to set aside ideological debates and focus on 
practical goals mixed with the desire of the Comintern to create revolutionary alternative unions forced 
the CPUSA to abandon collaborative approaches entirely throughout the Third Period.  Cannon 
described the conditions of the mid-1930s as a period in which the "great conservatism" of the 
Republicans, the "craft-mindedness and corruption" of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and the 





workers seeking organization and direction.82  Peggy Dennis remarked how during the mid-1920s the 
pan-socialist Left "hammered at the lessons unfolding in Soviet Russia," and "ridiculed the timidity of the 
reformists, the sellout of the Socialists (SPA), [and] the insufficiency of the economism of the IWW."83  
Realizing the potential for recruitment, the CPUSA pushed for a recruitment drive that "relate[d] 
economic trends to organizing possibilities" in urban, industrial areas like Chicago and New York.84   
Perceptions outside of ideology, such as Len DeCaux's that by 1921 the IWW had lost its 
"revolutionary appeal" due to its use of "desiccated syndicalism," redirected attention toward 
organizations that American workers and radicals believed would be useful platforms to build a 
movement for socialism, such as the CPUSA, CLA, and Communist Party (Opposition).  DeCaux noted 
that inclination toward "this" or "that" organization tended to depend on which industry was under 
investigation.  The IWW, for example, held a significant base in "western harvest fields, logging camps, 
general construction," and other "migratory occupations."  The CLA held support from promoters of 
"Trotskyism" and the "new hope, new enthusiasm, new energy" of an internationalist theory of 
communist activity, particularly among college-educated Marxists.85  The CPUSA netted a base in 
maritime, lumber, and heavy equipment industries by focusing on national labor concerns, such as 
wages, benefits, and workplace discrimination.86  Once the CPUSA emerged in the late 1920s by uniting 
various sects at the orders of the Comintern, the American people witnessed the growth of a localized 
communist movement; from the ashes of World War I, ideological divisions in communist theory, and 
the labor struggles of 1918-1920.  Radicals like DeCaux and Cannon responded to factionalism by joining 
the particular industry and organization that suited their worldview.  As such the Communist movement 
developed between 1928 and 1935 as a multi-faced organic movement that embodied almost just as 
many differences as those between the Republicans, Democrats, and eventually the Progressives.   
Part of what made up the multi-faced American communist movement was the diversity of 





drives were instrumental in building the Party in the early Third Period, it was certainly not the only 
reason the movement gained followers.  A large contingent of younger activists joined because of 
familial backgrounds.  Lumpkin grew up in the East Bronx, New York City, as the daughter of two 
passionate revolutionaries who fought in the anti-Czarist revolution of 1905 in Russia.  Lumpkin's father 
became known as a hero to the Jews of Bobruisk, a city in Belarus, and her mother transported 
ammunition to the front lines.  Through the stories of her parents' struggle, Lumpkin "picked up the idea 
of revolution to end exploitation."87  Seeing her parents work so hard throughout her youth with 
"nothing to show for it" also firmly solidified the belief to Lumpkin that "there was something wrong" 
with contemporary capitalism.  At age nine, the family moved a few blocks from 165th and Tiffany 
Streets where Lumpkin joined the Young Pioneers.  The Pioneers were a youth organization for the 
children of left-wing parents, and facilitated a social life for young Lumpkin around like-minded youths.  
The organization would pile students into trains and travel in solidarity to striking workers, as Lumpkin 
did with striking textile workers in Passaic in 1929.  Lumpkin left the Pioneers after being sexually 
assaulted following one of their late-night winter meetings in 1931.  Two years later she joined the New 
York City's local Youth Communist League (YCL) after weighing out a choice between them and the 
Young Peoples' Socialist League (YPSL) and concluding that communists were "better organizers of the 
free speech fight."88  Numerous young radicals like Lumpkin thus did not require an extensive 
recruitment program on behalf of the CPUSA, but rather naturally gravitated toward it due to personal, 
cultural, and family history. 
The final months of 1929 rocked the lives of American radicals more than any proceeding or 
conference in Moscow could have hoped, especially those who were at the time outside the influence of 
American Communism.  On October 29th, the stock market crashed and ushered in a wave of both hope 
and fear.  George Charney, then only a Harvard graduate student with a "little interest in Marxism" and 





banks as "the saviors of America."89   Lumpkin, only 11 at the time, knew a woman from her block who 
committed suicide by leaping off her five-story tenant building, and the mother of her close friend leap 
in front of a moving subway car.  In the papers, she read President Hoover instruct individual 
communities to handle their own.  For Lumpkin's community, however, "there was no way the hungry 
could feed each other."90  Those who desired a more action-oriented response to the situation quickly 
became exposed to communist literature, including The Daily Worker and The Militant, in search of 
explanation and meaning.  Those following the Worker in the months prior to the crash as well as the 
1928 presidential election recall the persistent prophetic announcements about the imminent collapse 
of capitalism.  The pages of The Militant explained the crash as a result of "a road of production 
increase" without parallel "accompanied by an unprecedented export of capital."91  Very rapidly, many 
who refused to accept Hoover's nascent economic strategy concluded that the answers they sought lay 
in the economical conclusions of Marx and Lenin.  Seen in this way, the crash of 1929 far exceeded the 
influence of the theoretical conclusions of the Comintern's Sixth Congress in 1928.   
Similar to the stock market crash, the influence of Ford's document on the racial question in the 
United States had a far more profound effect on recruitment of African Americans in the years of the 
Third Period than Comintern conclusions about class theory in general.  James Barrett noted that from 
1929-1934 the CPUSA's political program offered young blacks "a rare opportunity to get organized and 
fight back" against their political oppression as well as participate in major national events such as the 
Scottsboro case in 1931.92  To some of its critics, communists seized on major societal incidents such as 
the Scottsboro case as a means for "dramatizing larger political issues." This argument overlooks 
communist theoretical claims of structural racism in the United States laid down by Ford in 1928 and the 
right for integration or national sovereignty.  For most American communists, the systemic nature of 
racism did not require much convincing, as it already fit in with the similar Marxist argument of class 





as a systemic kind of oppression, which although subsumed this oppression to class antagonisms 
nevertheless relates the two together, took a much more radical perspective on African American rights 
and the path for integration than what was offered by organizations such as the NAACP.  Gates 
described the racial culture of the South as an "outrageous social and legal system" that separated 
individual cases "from the oppressive background which gave rise to them."93   The Scottsboro case and 
the CPUSA's stances on systemic, structural racism served as a building block for organization and 
recruitment and even, at times, overshadowed communists' other political goals of economic equality.  
Instead of being a cause for socialism and workers' control over means of production, the CPUSA's and 
CLA's rhetoric about racial injustice caught the attention of numerous younger activists searching for 
means to end the conditions of Jim Crow.  Once this dawned on Party leaders, ending Jim Crow became 
a pillar of the American communist tradition.  Hosea Hudson, a singer for a Birmingham quartet, 
remembered how his early involvement with the CPUSA coincided with the news of the Scottsboro case 
breaking out in March, 1931.94   
As a young African American struggling amidst the Depression, Hudson turned to communist 
philosophy after meeting Al Murphy, an organizer for the CPUSA's district headquarters in Birmingham, 
and his neighbor, Frank Williams, a local Party member.  Murphy joined the CPUSA a year earlier, in mid-
1930, after attending a meeting downtown, "where a white communist led a discussion about 
unemployment, political rights for negroes, self-determination for the black belt, and the Depression."95  
Hudson followed a similar path.  After learning about how Murphy faced public discrimination due to his 
overt support for the Scottsboro boys, Hudson became interested in Murphy's claims of organizational 
work among African Americans.  It didn't take long for Murphy to invite young Hudson to a local CPUSA 
district meeting.  At the meeting, which took place in late March, 1931, Hudson listened to Murphy 





people in the South."  Along with most of the people attending the rally, Hudson signed his CPUSA 
membership card and paid his first dues that night.96   
The stances of communists on racial injustice, such as their unwavered, and more importantly 
public, support for the Scottsboro Boys and the theory of self-determination of national minorities, 
attracted young men like Hudson by the thousands.  To these youths looking for ways to improve their 
communities, communists appeared as some of the most ardent proponents of civil rights leading into 
the early Depression.  At the national level, James Ford's emphasis that "racism chains both" during the 
1932 Vice Presidential election put the Party's official stance on the public ballot box; an act that caught 
the attention of national news outlets like the Chicago Tribune.97  For Hudson, who sought involvement 
in progressive struggles, the CPUSA and CLA became the dominant outlet for expression and activism in 
Birmingham.  Even after losing his job and facing scrutiny from his family for continuing political work, 
Hudson believed that he was best suited to "helping to get conditions better for other people."98 
Due to the large increase of membership in the months following the opening of the Scottsboro 
case, Chicago district leader Bill Gebert met with his constituency in September, 1931, to outline his 
belief that the Chicago Party faced a "mass influx of members that would mark the beginning of a 
second American revolution."99  Just a month prior, Gebert and his constituency were front and center 
witnesses to the murder of three African Americans, Abe Gray, John O'Neil, and Frank Armstrong by 
Chicago police.  The three men were part of a group of nearly five hundred citizens working to prevent 
the eviction of a 72-year old African American woman.  Gray was a Chicago communist and associate of 
Gerbert's, and O'Neil was a leading member of the Chicago unemployment council−both known radicals 
by city officials.  After their deaths, family members and friends laid the bodies of all three under a 
portrait of Lenin as a funeral procession that drew 60,000 participants and 50,000 sideliners blocked 
traffic throughout the city throughout the afternoon.  Gerbert watched as within days the city became 





hundred "police patrolled the South Side with riot guns and tear-gas bombs."100  The Militant blamed 
Chicago Mayor Anton Cermak for increasing pressure on landlords to collect rent and pushing efforts "to 
breakup the ever-growing unemployment movement."101  Reporting back to his base, Gerbert pointed 
out that most of the support seen throughout the city came from employed workers.  Gerbert 
subsequently pushed for organizational improvements that helped facilitate the increased membership 
from 1931 to 1934.102 
For white urban youths like Beatrice Lumpkin, the worsening conditions of the Depression, the 
end of factionalism under Browder, the rising discontent over events such as witnessed and reported by 
communists like Gebert in Chicago, as well as the ineffectual nature of the Hoover Administration to 
respond to these national events all meant that answers to social problems rested in a socialist future.  
After her parents' laundry business in the East Bronx collapsed, Lumpkin turned to the YCL and the 
promotion of hunger marches for the unemployed.  On March 6th, 1930, Lumpkin obeyed her teachers' 
request to avoid involvement in the march, sparked not long after the death of communist labor activist, 
Steve Katovis.  Katovis' death had rocked the city since January of the same year, and the Daily Worker 
as well as the Militant published numerous articles emphasizing the need to stand up for justice.  As the 
months went by, Lumpkin saw that "after millions joined the protests, [the people of New York] won a 
relief program" and recognition of Katovis' death united citizens together.  She concluded that her 
parents were ultimately correct about the power of the people, and that the lessons given to her in the 
classroom didn't always dictate her political options.  Rather, the experience of learning that mass 
resistance could influence local politics on the basis of need, "made [Lumpkin] very skeptical about the 
'official' propaganda heard at school or read in the papers."103  Although already exposed to radical 
literature and philosophy from her parents, younger radicals like Lumpkin manifested a communist 





John Gates, a college student during the time of Katovis' death and the death of the three 
activists in Chicago, turned to communism for many of the same reasons.  Gates attended CCNY where 
he met with other like-minded radical youths such as Winston Dancis, William Gomberg, Max Weiss, 
Max Gordon, Adam Lapin, and future American Communist historian Joseph Starobin.  Gates and his 
college acquaintances watched President Hoover try to convince the nation to "sit tight, keep calm, chin 
up, [and] rely on private enterprise" as the solution to the crisis.  While the socialists, particularly Dancis 
and Gomberg, tended to be in "violent disagreement among themselves," the communists "acted."  
Gates could not accept Hoover's plan and later charged that the President's lack of action and the 
shortcomings of the socialists at CCNY to turn him into a communist before even seeking avenues of 
joining an official party organization.  Gates referenced both the success of the Bolshevik revolution and 
the same March 6th hunger marches referenced by Lumpkin as evidence of the communists' ability to 
act as opposed to squabble over theory like much of his fellow students.104   
Although Hudson, Gerbert, Lumpkin, and Gates all came from different backgrounds, their 
reasons for joining in the American communist movement share one specific trend: a romanticism about 
social change coming from the active work of a few dedicated Americans.  Part of what drove this 
communist romanticism, in a political sense, among the radical youth was the loose social camaraderie 
of Leftist/Marxist clubs and organizations across the nation, which is referred to loosely throughout all 
of the written autobiographical and biographical record from the 1960s up through the present.  In 
discussing social movements on a general level, Ronald Aronson commented on the concept of "hope" 
as a guiding force that motivates not just people but entire movements.105  Gates described his fellow 
students at CCNY as, although more inclined to talk and debate than take action, possessing a 
"missionary zeal and a crusading spirit" that carried them along through their personal and public 
lives.106  Lumpkin depicted the bonds of possessing camaraderie and its effects as the "yeast used to 





solidarity and zealous passion that Hudson believed allowed the CPUSA to take on issues such as the 
Scottsboro case and link it to the struggles and plight of the nation's oppressed minorities.  Camaraderie 
sustained contacts within external organizations such as the International Labor Defense (ILD) in an era 
when racial discrimination was allowed by local law.108   
These examples of individual communist experiences help explain the complexity of American 
Communism's adherents during the Third Period by downplaying the centrality of the Comintern and 
Stalin, and giving them a more domestic context.  They also reveal the way American communists 
desired to see their political movement develop.  Stalinism had its influence on American Communism 
indirectly through the Comintern, but the suggestion that it alone served as the main source of political 
action and theory also suggests that Americans who joined the CPUSA, CLA and those who tacitly 
supported the Party's electoral campaigns for their resistance to racism and unemployment, were 
acutely aware of the complex and highly abstract, not to mention highly secretive, nature of the 
Communist International's bureaucracy.  It furthermore undermines the individual testimonies available 
that put the decision to engage in communist organizations within a much more personalized and 
choice-based perspective.   
As neutral cooperation and increased membership diversity channeled American communists 
down the specific political path that emphasized rigid organizational theory throughout the Third Period, 
the movement also suffered a significant handicap that limited the entire pan-socialist movement of the 
early 1930s: the perception of what I call historical monolithism.  The failure of a collaborative pan-
socialist front by 1931 forced radical organizations, like the CPUSA, into a more centrist position for the 
1932 election, while smaller organizations like the CLA remained outside the mainstream.  In reality, the 
CLA and the Communist Party (Opposition) were entirely different organizations, and in the 1932 
election held staunch reservations about the CPUSA's presidential campaign.  The CLA charged that the 





direction of the working class."109  Despite this, the CLA and the pages of The Militant remained 
committed to supporting Foster and Ford over the SPA's Norman Thomas.  The Socialist Party, in the 
eyes of the CLA, continued to represent "reform" as opposed to the "militancy" needed for substantial 
social change.110  Because of their continued support for the CPUSA, the CLA remained marginalized and 
faced an "imposed" perception as a "faction of the [CPUSA]," along with Lovestone's CP (Opposition), 
including at conferences where all three organizations were present.  Another challenge for the CLA was 
the need for Cannon's supporters to continually distinguish themselves from Lovestone's Party; 
something the CPUSA had less trouble accomplishing.  For this effort, CLA writers attempted to depict 
Lovestone's Party as "pseudo-revolutionary," falling just short of the militancy required to create a 
revolutionary movement.  Tendencies of monolithism within both the communist movement but also 
the historiography tend to ignore the CLA's overt rejection of the Comintern as an organizational 
authority on revolutionary action, holding no representation within the Comintern, and occasional 
overlap in membership between CLA and CPUSA locals.  The CLA is more appropriately described as the 
radical element; sitting just left of the CPUSA and even further left from Lovestone's Opposition.  This 
tendency to view American Communism as a monolith would later serve as a canonical foundation of 
anticommunism during the first Smith Act trials of 1941.  
For the CLA, Cannon believed that this monolithist tendency mattered little once the labor 
movement showed signs of new life and militancy between the 1932 presidential election.  Cannon 
along with other leading figures in the movement more than accepted the fact that to the average 
American worker, the differences between the CLA and the CPUSA were beyond their interests or 
needs.  When getting employment and food was a daily concern in the early days of the Depression, 
communist theories about support for Russian-led international organizations were of tertiary concern 
at best.111  Of much larger significance to the leaders of the CLA was redirecting its constituents away 





bourgeois reformism," the CLA's Militant declared that a vote for the SPA was a vote "thrown away in a 
futile attempt" to enact workers' rights without a "revolutionary" platform.  Urging its constituents to 
see through Thomas' program and recognize that a party for the workers need not hide its revolutionary 
goals, the CLA officially backed the Foster/Ford campaign moving into November.112   
It is important to note that the presidential elections of 1928 and 1932 created space for 
political activism that, during the early and mid-1920s, was unavailable to American communists, but 
available to the broad political Left.  That is, socialist and third party candidates existed prior to 1928, 
but it took until then for the CPUSA to successfully result in large recruitment numbers. The breaking of 
factional ties after the Sixth Congress and the development of a program to promote mass public 
resistance, in part, helps explain why so many who rejected the SPA's cooperative stances turned to the 
CPUSA between 1929 and 1932.  It also helps explain why so many radicals were willing to turn to the 
CPUSA and CLA on the basis of their push for issues such as ending Jim Crow.  In many ways the 1928 
CPUSA electoral campaign facilitated the growth of the Party by entrenching it in specific enclaves 
outside its home in Chicago, such as New York, Los Angeles, and Birmingham, and allowed for a more 
public campaign in 1932.  This is not to suggest that 'communism' as an ideology became more 
respected or incorporated into the daily life of Americans, but rather that the policies communists 
promoted grew more mainstream and adapted to local consciousnesses of American working class 
citizens−as demonstrated by the experiences of Gates, Lumpkin, and Hudson.  In many ways they also 
became less radical.  The political consciousness of Americans radicals thus adapted as the conditions of 
the Depression sank in simultaneously as the CPUSA reoriented its political platform.  By 1930 
'communism' was no longer underground and was no longer as 'radical' as it was during the early-to-






What emerged in the early 1930s were two divergent patterns for political engagement within 
the pan-socialist movement of the United States and continued to distinguish the communists from the 
rest of the radical left up until the start of the Popular Front.  The Socialist Party (SPA) advocated 
revolutionary nuclei within the AFL as well as in farm and factory work while promoting the FLP as a 
progressive electoral alternative to the mainstream.  In addition to supporting the FLP, the SPA ran its 
prominent leader, radical Protestant minister Norman Thomas, as its presidential candidate in 1932.  
The CPUSA and CLA remained critical of the SPA, seeing it as a reformist institution still dependent on its 
Old Guard; a generation of SPA leaders such as Morris Hillquit and James O'Neal.  The Old Guard 
advocated tactics that specifically avoided radical political initiatives, but also fermented agitation with 
younger members.  The CPUSA, CLA, and CP (Opposition), on the other side of the spectrum, advocated 
revolutionary unions pitted against the existing AFL as a means for destabilizing the organization's 
control over the labor movement.  This division over strategy wedged the memberships of all 
organizations, and drew in new members. 
The newer, younger radicals drawn to Marxism by the Great Depression who were present in 
the SPA turned against the SPA's Old Guard in 1932, sparking interest among communist leaders.  At the 
SPA's May, 1932 National Convention in Milwaukee, the youths, who called their faction the "Marxist 
Militants," challenged the Old Guard and created a wedge within the SPA's functioning not unlike the 
very scene that saw the split of the communists from the SPA just thirteen years prior.  Two years later, 
at a Party convention in Detroit, the Militants rallied behind Norman Thomas' message of working 
toward unity with other communist groups.113  Thomas' promises, however, did not live up to their 
ideals.  Although Thomas accepted members of the CLA, and Trotskyists into SPA meetings, including 
former CPUSA members, he nevertheless remained "opposed [to] a united front on a general level, 





not accept Thomas' stance on the CPUSA sought other avenues for radical work; the easiest and most 
visible alternative being the CPUSA itself, the CLA, and, after 1934, the Socialist Workers' Party (SWP).114  
When the Old Guard realized their lack of floor control at the Detroit convention over the issue 
of cooperative politics threatened their base support, they rallied behind Charles Solomon, a New York 
State assemblyman.  Solomon published a pamphlet, titled Detroit and the Party, as a last-ditch effort to 
appeal to the SPA's base and reject the Militants' strategy and "preserve" the SPA.  Solomon described 
the Militants and their chief strategist, Haim Kantrovitch, as promoting a banner of "thinly veiled 
communism."  This brought to surface antagonisms preventing the SPA from "working harmoniously for 
a common objective."115  A delegate to the convention, Powers Hapgood, argued that the official 
position of the SPA had to be amended to include the sentiments of the Militant faction because "the 
workers object to the [SPA] not because it is too radical but because it is not radical enough."  Cannon 
and the CLA pointed out the SPA's subsequent Declaration of Principles "proclaim[ed] anew" the 
organization's "faith in economic and political democracy" and replaced the Old Guard's "social 
reformism" with a generic centrism that "omits any mention of the revolutionary struggle to establish 
the so-called workers' democracy."116    
One subtle theoretical difference between communists and non-communists among the pan-
socialist Left was that communists believed in and reinforced the concept of parliamentarianism as a 
possible route toward building a socialist movement.c  The Marxist-Leninist interpretation of 
parliamentarianism derives from Vladimir Lenin's pamphlet on revolutionary tactics in a war-torn 
European setting:  Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder.  A source of much debate within 
communist philosophy, the pamphlet usually finds itself in a scholarly or theoretical debate about the 
ethical tenants of Marxism-Leninism.  Lenin's thesis, according to Sean McConville, centered around 
"pointing out the nature of the scientific communist outlook in contrast to the various 'abstract' or 
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'pure' versions put forth at the time" in terms of achieving a socialist overthrow of both the means of 
production and the political superstructure of civil society.117  As the concept of 'communism' had 
already, by 1917, taken grip in the consciousness of working people, Lenin suggests, communist leaders 
must relate to the various differences between "Lloyd Georges" and "Churchills" (liberals and 
conservatives).  Lenin exclusively singled out the Communist Workers' Party of Germany for their anti-
parliamentarianism and utopian approaches to revolutionary action.  Instead, Lenin insisted that as long 
as the working class held sentiment and support for parliaments, communists must dedicate themselves 
to working within such institutions and consider them just as viable a path to revolution as any other.118  
This remained a canonical position by Leninists and Stalinists throughout the Third Period, and reflected 
the Comintern's support of CPUSA revolutionary campaigns.  While the SPA remained firm in its 
commitment to an all-inclusive party of progressives, communists worked to advocate for whichever 
method seemed most appropriate based on location, which in some cases meant working with the 
Farmer-Labor Party and in other cases fielding CPUSA candidates for election. 
The CPUSA thus engaged in American politics in a manner profoundly different from the SPA 
and other Leftist groups, including labor parties, to the extent that one might legitimately ask ‘did the 
CPUSA even run elections?’  In 1928, the CPUSA nominated Foster, well known for his work in steel and 
mining industries, and Benjamin Gitlow, a founding member of the Party.119  The CPUSA put Foster up 
again in 1932, this time with James Ford, the first African American ever nominated for the vice 
presidency.  Ford was a postal worker, a trade unionist, a "trusted Party activist" in Chicago who spent 
his early organizing years in Alabama, and as stated, the commissioner of the Negro delegation to the 
Comintern during the Sixth Congress.  In both campaigns, the CPUSA differentiated themselves from 
alternative socialist groups by drawing the line on a national organization policy. The CPUSA focused on 
broad, national agendas such as unemployment relief, eviction protection, and ending Jim Crow via 





existing politics of Congress and the White House.  The 1928 election charged that international 
capitalism was on the brink of failure, a campaign that many American workers by 1930 believed to be 
true.  This new 'communist' political movement in the United States ballot appealed to the interests of 
working citizens while politicizing the failures of capitalism as the cause for societal ills and outlaying the 
solution in the establishment of a Soviet-style republic.  The CPUSA garnered attention and strength 
through its national agenda combined with its rigid post-1929 lack of factional strife.  Thus the second 
pattern for political engagement by American communists developed as a more traditional method that 
was recognizable and relatable to everyday Americans. 
The CPUSA's approach to crafting a practical political strategy that appealed to American citizens 
rested on a philosophical question:  Just what exactly is an electoral campaign to a political party 
advocating revolution?  If one defines campaigns by how the two dominant American parties practice 
them, then the definition becomes straightforward:  an organized effort to get an individual or policy 
voted into office or law, respectively.  For the CPUSA from 1928 to 1934, electoral campaigns, as a 
means to an end, performed the function of drawing in the attention of American voters by offering 
radical alternatives to the solutions presented by Democrats, Republicans, and progressive socialists. 
The campaigns attempted to attract American citizens and workers into the orbit of the Party's 
auxiliaries where they could be exposed to communist ideology, literature, theory, and organizational 
methods.  To do so, the CPUSA utilized the Daily Worker to depict capitalism amidst a crisis broader than 
the immediate effects of the stock market crash and the national economic depression.  The Worker 
spoke of the specific and localized economic crisis as the first indication of a shift toward "an 
accentuation of the general crisis of world capitalism" that appeared insurmountable to stop.120  
Communists desired Americans to link the localized effects of the Depression to the worldwide 
development of capitalism, which included seeing the Soviet Union as the viable economic and political 





communists were depicting the political world as dividing itself economically between the polarizing 
forces of those with Capital and those without as a means for incentivizing Americans into discovering 
communist ideology. 
A closer look at the CPUSA’s engagement into politics in 1932 helps explain this methodology 
heading into the end of the Third Period.  The CPUSA did not run an electoral campaign with the goal of 
winning offices, but rather it attempted to politicize its domestic policies within broad sects of American 
communities.  These policies included ending the Jim Crow laws, establishing a national relief network 
for families in cities, strict rent controls in areas like New York and Chicago, and organization of 
sharecroppers.  Resisting racial discrimination served as a basis for entrenching in areas such as 
Birmingham, Atlanta, and Detroit between 1928 and 1932.  Just like attracting workers into 
methodology through the Daily Worker, the Party utilized publications to demonstrate its message to 
Southern black voters and non-whites in California, Texas, and throughout the Midwest.  In Alabama and 
nearby states, the Party published The Southern Worker, a regional edition of the Daily Worker which 
overtly rejected the label of a "white" or "negro" paper, and instead emphasized its recognition of "only 
one division, the bosses against the workers."121  Additionally, the 1932 election lacked the factional 
strife endemic of the 1928 election, allowing the CPUSA to push forward with a rigid programme for 
social change along with a dedicated cohort of activists. 
The CPUSA's 1932 electoral campaign built on a series of conclusions reached both within and 
outside the Comintern.  Mixed with the American view of the Depression as capitalism in crisis and the 
Comintern’s assessment of an imminent collapse of international capitalism, leaders within the CPUSA 
and CLA became convinced that the Depression would stimulate a revolutionary movement among the 
working masses.122  In 1931, the Party responded to instructions from the Comintern about the need to 
"construct *a+ ‘political crisis’ as a necessary intermediary stage between the revolutionary upsurge and 





contrast the CPUSA against the “other political parties” and their methods.123  The Comintern desired to 
see the CPUSA become a Party "of the workers," which was unclear in its wording but to Foster and 
Browder translated into more hunger marches, the promotion of solidarity between farmers and 
workers by organizing sharecroppers along with industrial unions, and political campaign speeches 
organized by the Party’s local district committees to encourage citizen representation in unemployment 
councils.124  The resulting electoral strategy for 1932 attempted to read the temperature of dissatisfied 
and hungry working families and build a general political policy on the belief that working masses would 
reject the Democratic and Republican proposals for reform if such radical alternatives were proposed.  
In his acceptance speech, Foster reminded his comrades that they were "not going into the national 
election campaign solely for the purpose of votes; [they] also have bigger objectives."  Those objectives, 
which included incentivizing workers "in a political sense" and "mobiliz[ing] them for struggle on all 
fronts," exemplified how American communist leaders like Foster viewed electoral ballots as "only one 
aspect of the general mobilization of the workers" in contrast to the SPA and Norman Thomas, who 
viewed winning the election as the goal.125 
Foster and Ford's 1932 campaign focused on key areas of Party presence: New York, Detroit, 
Washington, D.C., Birmingham, and Chicago.  Foster's itinerary included traveling coast to coast to speak 
with over 200,000 people in just four months from July to September.126  By the start of the electoral 
cycle, the CPUSA, along with the CLA, captured national attention through the promotion of national 
unemployment councils and by leading hunger marches throughout major cities at the local levels.  New 
York had some of the CPUSA's largest marches in 1931 and 1932, as high as 110,000 demonstrators 
demanding food and relief.  Detroit became the scene of a major tragedy when Foster held a campaign 
rally during the Ford Hunger March on March 7th, 1932.  At the time, Detroit's automotive industry 





back to the mid-1920s, Detroit's automotive industry was ripe for further agitation by communist 
leaders and fertile ground for politicizing a significant workforce.127   
The Detroit Unemployed Council, along with the Auto Workers Union, started the Ford Hunger 
March in downtown Detroit and squared off with a line of Dearborn police near the gates of the Ford 
Motor Company's River Rouge auto manufacturing facility.  Although Foster emphasized avoiding 
provocation of violence, his speech rallied workers together to face off the armed police officers and 
private guards called in by Henry Ford and his associate Harry Bennett.  After an unknown participant 
threw a rock into the line of police, the officers returned with gunfire.  Bennett arrived shortly after the 
shooting began to try and disperse the crowd, but was quickly hit in the head with a rock and knocked to 
the ground.  When he got to his feet, he pulled out his gun and began shooting at the crowd with the 
police.128  The event ended with four marchers dead and dozens wounded.  Within a week, nearly 
100,000 were marching down Woodward Avenue toward downtown Detroit in a join public 
memorial/hunger walk.129  Developments like this served as an effective tool for organizing displaced 
workers, drawing in sympathizers to the issues promoted by the CPUSA, and directing many future 
American radicals down the path of exposure to the works of Marx, Lenin, and eventually Mao and 
Stalin.  In less than a year, the campaign thrust the CPUSA to the center nexus of American communist 
political action.130 
Throughout the campaign, the CLA remained ideologically distant from the CPUSA's campaign 
but supportive of it by participating in rallies and recruitment drives.  For example, on January 9th, 1932, 
the CLA criticized the Foster and Ford for advocating open trade with the Soviet Union as a means for 
combating domestic unemployment.131  At the same time, on January 24th, the CLA sent their delegate 
representative Frank Buckley to attend the CPUSA's and ILD's United Front Conference to Fight Against 
Criminal Syndicalist Laws at the Peoples' Auditorium in Chicago.132  The two organizations even 





after a CLA meeting on August 7th, at 7th Street and A Avenue in New York, even though attacks by 
conservative protestors were frequent in that area.133  After the election, the CLA indicated its upset 
over the "distressingly low vote" for both the CPUSA and SPA, which collectively failed to break the 1912 
vote number for Eugene Debs; long considered a watershed moment in American socialist history.134  
Ultimately, though the CLA may have held its reservations about the CPUSA during the election such as 
the unlikely development of making it on the ballot of numerous key states and fielding less support 
than the SPA, Cannon concluded on November 5th, 1932 that "the workers must be told to vote 
communist" and continued to use the popularity of CPUSA politics as a barometer of public sentiment 
about socialism.135 
It is not just because the CPUSA was a ‘radical’ Party that it campaigned in such a manner.  Nor 
should the Party’s methods be attributed solely to its relationship with the Comintern.  Although these 
relationships and identities appear in the Party’s historiography, focusing on them ignores another 
fundamental component to the CPUSA's history:  the specific campaign strategy.  When one observes 
the campaign of Foster, the Party’s approach fits the definition of the antithesis of conventional 
campaigning.  The goal was not that which the mainstream parties sought, but rather an approach that 
desired to undermine the meaning given by the mainstream parties to the electoral process.  The goal 
was to use the campaign to criticize the Democrats and Republicans, thereby contrasting the communist 
political platform against what most Americans viewed as mainstream.  The goal was reached, but only 
in part:  while failing to politicize the dominant pillars of communist ideology, the campaign did draw 
attention toward social injustices in labor and in communities with respect to racism and 
unemployment.  Though the CPUSA and CLA overestimated the capacity to radicalize workers in urban 
and metropolitan areas, the work of both groups and individual communists awakened “the plight of the 
unemployed and in courageously battling against deeply entrenched racial discrimination.”136  The 





CPUSA's campaign emphasis on racial discrimination put American Communism into the front pages of 
major newspapers across the country.   
Part of what made the CPUSA's campaign so attractive to the warriors of social justice against 
racism was the placement of the Party's "Negro Question" at the front and center of the campaign.  This 
set the Party so far outside the mainstream they naturally gained attention−both welcomed and 
unwelcomed.  The Party’s nomination of James Ford to the Vice-Presidential ticket that year remains a 
prime example of how serious the CPUSA took its effort to politicize the plight of African Americans and 
the injustices of Jim Crowism.  The subsequent rise in membership among black voters attests to the 
strategy's overall success.  Additionally, communist lawyers continued to fight localized racial 
discrimination through the International Labor Defense (ILD) and brought together numerous black 
workers who were hesitant to join an organization that claimed to be a political party.  The 1932 
campaign decisively thrust the CPUSA into the spotlight and took attention away from alternative 
socialist organizations like the SPA, CLA, and IWW.137  Subsequently, the fight against racism diffused 
into communities as communist lawyers such as Benjamin Davis worked to create legal precedents 
against Jim Crow and racial discrimination.  Throughout the Third Period and Popular Front, however, 
ending Jim Crow remained a canonical CPUSA political tenet.   
By 1933, Foster and Ford’s campaign netted the highest election numbers in the Party’s history, 
a CPUSA record held still to this day.  The CPUSA received 103,307 popular votes, 0.26% of the total.  An 
increase from 48,551 in 1928 reflected how the Party managed to recruit among groups of urban, 
working-class American voters and the increased appeal of its agenda, which did not alter throughout 
the early Third Period of 1928 to 1932.138  Additional votes went hand in hand with additional 
membership: Chicago alone saw an increase of 2,009, a margin of 79%, between January and Foster’s 
acceptance speech in May.139  Both of these developments translated into political victories for the Party 





"dishearten" the most passionate communists, who viewed their struggle as an overtly uphill battle 
which meant resisting efforts to diminish the significance of their movement.140  Others, such as future 
New York Party chairman George Charney, argued that "cohesiveness and common outlook" made up 
for their lack of public support and such was "the dynamics of history."141  Increased votes meant an 
increased perception by the CPUSA of their legitimacy among American workers, and increased 
membership meant an increased demand for activism.  These marginal victories were a litmus test of 
the palatability of Communist policy amidst the early years of the Depression.   
For African American communists like Hudson, the campaign's increasing popularity meant 
increased action to gain membership regardless of the setting.  On November 7th, 1932, Hudson and the 
Birmingham Party district organized an unemployed council meeting on the courthouse lawn.  Within a 
matter of hours, the speakers were arrested and the meeting broken up by city police.  Birmingham 
communists turned to the Masonic Temple on the corner of 17th and 4th, which offered the CPUSA 
space in their auditorium under contract for the remainder of the year.  Numerous setbacks such as 
these, particularly with police and local officials, riddled communist organizing efforts in the South.  
When Hudson approached his church's pastor, Reverend Patterson, about holding a lecture in support 
of the Scottsboro boys at the church, he faced outright rejection.  Patterson worried that the white 
community of Birmingham would respond harshly with full retaliatory force, and insisted that the church 
would not involve itself in further dividing the community.  To get around the pastor, Hudson invited his 
speaker, David James, to have a quick announcement at a private event for the church right after 
Hudson's quartet finished a song.  James was a member of the ILD and a CPUSA spokesman for the 
Scottsboro case.  When he reached the podium to speak, he told the mostly young black audience that 
they should organize, educate, and arm themselves with the methods of revolution as a means for 
preventing job loss.  When a young church attendee, Reuben Patterson, criticized James' stance as 





threats by racist groups, and failed attempts to get Reverend Patterson on their side, Hudson noted a 
steady increase in Birmingham membership in the subsequent months.142 
College-educated communist youths like Gates joined civil liberties and civil rights organizations 
to voice their support and direct their activism.  The support of the Foster-Ford campaign by prominent 
intellectuals Gates respected while attending college, such as Edmund Wilson, John Dos Passos, Sidney 
Howard, Horace Gregory, Waldo Frank, and Sidney Hook, directed the young activist to the YCL by the 
end of the election cycle.  During the election, Gates dropped out of CUNY and went to the local YCL 
headquarters on East 12th street to volunteer for organizing work in heavy industry.  By November, the 
YCL instructed Gates to begin organizing work in Warren, Ohio, and to focus his efforts on the steel 
industry.  Within a week, Gates changed his name from Sol Regenstreif to John Gates and set off for 
Cleveland where he met up with Joe Dallet, a CPUSA organizer for the district.  In just two hours of his 
arrival, Gates was addressing the City Council of Warren, representing both the CPUSA and the 
unemployed council of Cleveland.  On March 4th, 1933, Gates organized a demonstration for the 
Cleveland Unemployment Council in protest of Roosevelt's inauguration.  Just like Hudson in 
Birmingham, Gates' demonstration in front of the courthouse was met with condemnation and 
resistance by local authorities.  Both Gates and his organizing assistant, Frank Rogers, were arrested and 
placed in the county jail on the charge of "making a loud noise without a permit."  To keep the two from 
talking, Gates was placed in the women's corridor of the jail by himself. 
Lumpkin, still a Youth Communist League member at the time, remembered the unemployment 
councils setup by older but still youthful communists like Gates as "multiracial" and "ready to take 
action" on the issue of evictions and the "hidden homelessness" by organizing citizens to stand in line at 
relief offices; thereby bypassing the extensive procedure of filling out forms and obtaining vouchers.  
Younger communists commonly showed more positive enthusiasm in their everyday organizational 





themselves with the uphill battle of theory and revolution in a zealous pursuit of ideological perfection.  
Participating in the organized councils with the YCL gave Lumpkin "joy in the struggle" as she met new 
people while assisting needy families and, in her mind, helping to build a better community.143  For those 
organizing the councils, such as Gates, the effort was about more than helping families; it also 
attempted to demonstrate a viable alternative to younger generations like Lumpkin to their existing 
paths of political change.   
Part of what kept young men like Gates and Charney firmly in the communist camp was the lack 
of action found in organizations like the Democratic Party and the American Federation of Labor (AFL).  
These organizations, according to Gates, did little to educate workers on their socioeconomic position in 
the world and instead sought to appeal to them as a means for preventing the rise of alternative union 
choices.  In an era where "the principle of government assistance to the unemployed was not yet 
established," organizations like the AFL were reluctant to support unemployment insurance measures.  
This fight, in the eyes of young activists like Gates, "was left to the communists."144  Some communists 
went further, such as George Charney who believed that the rise of Hitler and fascism were symptoms 
of "the decay of capitalism" on an international scale.  Smuggled over from Russia by his parents in 1906 
in a pickle barrel, Charney also spent his early youth in the East Bronx with fellow Jewish community 
members like Lumpkin.  These community-active communists viewed political groups like the Democrats 
and organized skilled labor such as the AFL as incapable of producing "effective resistance" to the 
degenerate effects of capitalism on local politics.  Charney pointed to how the communists were some 
of Hitler's and Mussolini's first victims, creating the belief that communists were the most crucial 
element in resisting the tide of fascism and thus decaying capitalism.145 
Conclusion 
The final years of the Third Period political activism leading up to the Popular Front were not 





on how his presence and activism drew on his enthusiasm for Marxism as the source for societal change 
but sometimes also prevented him from recognizing shortcomings.  In his Bronx Party weekly meetings, 
groups would gather at a particular member's house with a "handful" of other activists.  Meetings 
functioned in a manner where glory and gravitas shifted based on the perceptions of other "comrades," 
as opposed to "the masses."  Gates felt that it was a lack of "healthy skepticism" that blinded himself 
and his associates from the limitations of their work.  By focusing on appeasing existing Party members 
and fellow travelers, some communists avoided any serious engagement with the masses of 
unemployed and homeless and could get stuck in inner circles.146  Gates, infused with "radical 
romanticism," abandoned college to begin work in a radio parts factory for 32 cents per hour.  In the 
midst of the 1932 election, Gates bid his family goodbye and headed to Cleveland with no idea as to 
where he would live or what work he would perform.  What he did know was the location of the local 
CPUSA, and in his eyes that's all he needed.147  This tendency to place the ideal of the revolution over 
their personal lives caused many communists to develop the perception of support and legitimacy in the 
eyes of the masses, but in practice this became a "shibboleth without real meaning."148  The avoidance 
of practical assessments in theory eventually served as the basis for the CPUSA's slow erosion in the 
1950s, but it was clear as early as 1931 with the low-ranking membership. 
For Cannon and the CLA, the emerging Popular Front signaled the need for broader involvement 
in organizational activities similar to that of the CPUSA.  Starting in 1934, Cannon reached out to the 
American Workers Party (AWP).  A.J. Muste and various activists from the Conference for Progressive 
Labor Action (CPLA) founded the AWP in 1933 as a more radical alternative to the Socialists (SPA), but 
also claimed to be more "American" than the Soviet-friendly CPUSA.  Cannon described the AWP as ideal 
for collaboration due to Muste's "progressive character," but felt that the organization was mostly "a 
political menagerie which had within it every type of political species."  Seeing the opportunity to 





out to Muste for a political alliance.  Muste and activists from the AWP's Pittsburg conference agreed to 
unity, while the more "rank and file militants" diversely spread out into trade unions, and "were in dead 
earnest about fighting capitalism," rejected Cannon's proposal.  The latter camp was led by J.B.S. 
Hardman, at the time known simply as "Salutsky," a long time activist in the broad socialist Left.149 
Salutsky worked with branches of the SPA in the early years of American Communism, from 
1917 to 1919, and previously organized with the Jewish Bund of the Russian socialist movement before 
moving on to lead the Jewish Socialist Federation of the Socialist Party.  In the 1920s, Salutsky and 
Cannon met for the first time at a joint negotiation committee for the underground CPUSA and the 
Workers' Council for the purpose of creating a legal communist party.  Over the course of working with 
the subsequent (communist) Workers' Party, Salutsky developed mistrust and animosity against the 
"labor bureaucracy" of the underground movement, which he refused to join.  After leaving the 
Workers' Party, he found his way to the more progressive CLA and thus into the orbit of Muste's AWP.  
When Salutsky sat down to negotiate unity once more in 1934, Cannon felt that he viewed working with 
the Trotskyists as the end to his personal desire the create a "pseudo-revolutionary Party," that did not 
clash with labor bureaucracy but instead acted as a sort of influential platform for the masses.  When it 
became clear that Cannon and the CLA were swaying the majority of Muste's camp toward unity, 
Salutsky quit the Party and moved toward the Roosevelt coalition.150  The turnout ended both the CLA 
and the AWP, but created a new organization: The Workers' Party of the United States (WPUS).  Under 
the new banner, the CLA's editorial renamed itself The New Militant and continued its political 
organizing until diffusing into the SPA in 1936.  It also remains an iconic example of how the 1920s 
factionalism pushed some radicals into the centrist mainstream by the 1930s. 
From 1928 through 1934, the American Communist political world had gone through significant 
changes.  The Depression channeled communist political activism into the issues and regions where it 





communities.  As explained, it also placed a heavy emphasis on the fight against racism and the rise of 
fascism as the years got closer to 1935.  These latter issues, particularly putting a face on anti-Jim Crow 
activism, facilitated growth for the movement that was completely distinct from to the struggle of 
European communist parties, who faced a fundamentally different kind of ethnic/national question.  As 
a political policy, it also gave spark to the subsequent development of a community of communism 
which took the fight against racism as its most dedicated struggle.  To begin a broader movement built 
on collaboration, the CPUSA required substantial political reorganization and a new engagement with 
American voters in 1935−an engagement that pushed the Party even further centrist than the SPA and 
WPUS.  As the Comintern’s Third Period came to a close, new ideas about how to develop a 
revolutionary movement in America fermented with the increase in popular activism from 1930-1934, 
the increase in CPUSA, CLA, and SPA membership from 1932-1935, the passage of the National Labor 
Relations (Wagner) Act in 1935, the rise of non-specialized unionism within the AFL by early 1935, and 
the perceived increasing reactionary nature of anti-New Deal Republicans heading into the 1936 
national election.  By the time the Comintern published its decision to push a Popular Front in The 
Communist in 1935, the American Communist movement had begun its swing toward Populism and 
engaged in a passionate rally cry for working Americans to unite against domestic discrimination and the 











CHAPTER 2:  THE COMMUNIST POLITICS OF POPULISM, 1934-1944 
Peggy Dennis and her husband, Eugene, spent most of the harshest periods of the Great 
Depression in the Soviet Union.  They returned in 1934 to see the America they left transformed by 
years of struggle and attempts by the Roosevelt Administration to quell the conditions of the Depression 
with reform.  They also returned to see a domestic American communist movement unrecognizable 
from when they left; with active Party clubs in almost every major metropolitan area throughout the 
country.  The Third Period had transformed both the CPUSA and the broad sect of politically-active 
communists from fringe radicals to commonplace instigators.  The two presidential elections of 1928 
and 1932 put the CPUSA on the map, and increased membership among youth activists who sought 
allegiances across political lines and community-based political action.  Rather than a small cohort of 
overtly communist organizations and unions as existed in 1929, the Dennis' returned to a menagerie of 
various political and social activist groups−The Workers' Alliance of the Unemployed; the 
Unemployment Insurance Agency; the American Student Union; the American Youth Congress; the 
American League against War and Fascism.  The Dennis' also witnessed the emergence of the Workers' 
Party of the United States (WPUS) as the Trotskyist counter to the more public CPUSA, and the ending of 
Cannon's independent CLA, while Jay Lovestone's CP (Opposition) took solace in the Socialist Party 
(SPA).  At the start of the Popular Front, the previous lines of division between the CPUSA and other 
groups became blurred as communists inside and outside the CPUSA began to engage in broad, 
coalition-style organizing efforts.   
The CPUSA emerged after the 1932 election as the dominant Marxist-Leninist party, while the 
WPUS continued to organize under the leadership of James Cannon, emphasize the Trotskyist message 
of permanent revolution, and continued rejection of the Comintern as an authority.  The SPA, likewise, 
continued to reject cooperation with progressives and thus drew the hard line between the communist 





factionalism and division, the three groups loosely cooperated from 1929 to 1933 to try and sway 
Democratic Party policies further to the left and resist what they collectively called “social fascism.”  This 
relationship, however, proved not to last as the tide of populism became apparent by 1935.  With the 
opening of the Popular Front, the CPUSA shifted further away from its political allies, toward a centrist 
path of cooperation and engagement with Democrats as well as Progressives in order to further advance 
its base among American workers.  From 1935 up through 1944, the political world of American 
Communism attempted to assert its ideology as the “left wing” of American politics as the Roosevelt 
coalition struggled to maintain its broad alliances leading into the 1936 election and as the nation slowly 
descended into war with the Axis. 
Peggy and Eugene brought with them the resolutions and agenda of the Comintern on the 
future of international communist movements; resolutions that would have a profound impact on 
CPUSA politics after 1934 by effectively ending the Third Period.  As explained in Chapter 1, from 1928 
through 1934, the Comintern emphasized that communist parties should resist Western liberalism on 
the grounds that it “conceals the counterrevolutionary character of bourgeois democracy as a form of 
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and thus itself serves as an active factor and channel for the fascization 
of the capitalist state.”151  By January of 1935, this policy shifted to a general resistance against fascism 
on all levels, and did not rule out working with progressives in this mission.  On the contrary, the new 
political tenet set forth by the Comintern’s resolutions required cooperation with non-communist 
groups and a decentralization of political policy.  In July, Bulgarian antifascist Georgi Dimitrov 
encouraged American communists to contrast Roosevelt against the “most reactionary circles of 
American finance capital” and welcome “socialists and middle-class reformers into their coalitions.”152 
To communists like Dennis, Lumpkin, and Charney, this meant less criticism of domestic 
conditions and more cooperative organizing to resist fascism as a political philosophy.  The process 





SPA to establish a “united front” on the basis of specific political and union-related strategies.153  
Thomas quickly rejected the proposal, refusing to work with the pro-Soviet CPUSA and ending the short-
lived alliance the two organizations had in promoting alternative, anti-AFL unions prior to 1935.  
Browder and the communists then embarked on a new, more centrist political journey.   
Coinciding with Browder and Thomas’ fallout was the mid-term elections of 1934, which 
factored heavily into how the American communists assessed the possibilities of a united or popular 
front that crossed political, regional, and ideological boundaries.  Jay Lovestone's address for the SPA to 
the International Lady Garment Workers Union Convention in 1934 outright refused all political 
cooperation with the CPUSA.  Instead, he emphasized trade union work, not electoral politics, as the 
"most all-inclusive, the most elemental organizer of the working class."154  Positioned ideologically 
between the SPA and CPUSA, the Militant agreed in January of 1934 that Roosevelt's promises for the 
New Deal masked "ruling class plans" that ignored the plight of workers; a view that was carried over 
into the WPUS.155  By contrast, Browder reported to The Communist that the 1934 mid-term elections 
demonstrated “mass dissatisfaction with the programmes of the major parties” throughout the United 
States as well as the need for a radical political program to take advantage of said dissatisfaction.   
Browder expressed that the decline in popularity for the rival SPA was the result of internal 
factionalism over participation in collaborative organization efforts, and the unwillingness to consider 
political action as paralleled in importance to trade union work.  In his report, Browder emphasized the 
importance of politics by praising Anita Whitney for netting 80,000 votes for the House in California on 
an independent, socialist ticket, and he reported national votes for the CPUSA at 225,000.  These 
marginal successes, however, were misunderstood as a confirmation of Browder’s Comintern-influenced 
conclusions about the significance of 1934.  Browder attributed the CPUSA’s shortcomings to 
“insufficient contact with the masses, remnants of a sectarian approach,” and a “low degree of 





work, but rather to expand it and work with progressive political groups.  The CPUSA's new path thus 
involved cooperation, willingness to compromise where the SPA and WPUS were not, and above all 
working with groups previously seen as class enemies, such as the Democrats.156   
Leading into 1935, international developments again influenced the direction of the American 
Communism movement.  To Browder and the rest of the top leadership of the CPUSA, the wave of 
support seen for their movement since the 1932 election coincided with a perception of victory in the 
Soviet Union after the first Five Year Plan from 1928 to 1933.  Triumphantly declaring the Soviet 
industrialization plan a “splendid new victory” amid the “capitalist world falling to pieces,” CPUSA 
leaders and the Comintern saw the success of Soviet industrialization and the rise in popularity of 
communist parties around the world as a validation of their efforts.  In a series of articles during the first 
quarter of 1935, the Comintern declared 1934 the “year of great advances” and attempted to measure 
the strength of the proletariat on a global scale by downplaying localized political conditions and 
emphasizing the simple fact that communist parties were on the rise throughout the Western world.  
Subsequently, in the minds of many American Communists, the rise of fascism as a prerequisite for 
“revolutionary crises” in central Europe and the united front of communists and social democrats in 
Spain against Franco's fascist forces paralleled the upsurge in the labor movement of the United States 
from 1931-1934.157  Gaining momentum by building bridges across political lines with progressives and 
Democrats, the CPUSA’s political strategy from early 1933 until the 1936 election promoted a third-
party alternative to the mainstream—the Farmer-Labor Party (FLP)—as well as pushed for an expansion 
of New Deal-style legislation such as unemployment insurance, health insurance, and expanded relief 
programs.  This strategy was short lived as the CPUSA continued to push for more cooperation with the 
New Deal coalition, but was a critical step in the political evolution of domestic communist politics. 
After the Comintern’s article was released, the Soviet Communist Party passed resolutions that 





communist activists/organizers and away from the political center of the CPUSA.  These new resolutions 
required change in how Communist Parties function and engage with their local working class.  Boldly, 
the Comintern enunciated that it would "avoid direct intervention in internal organizational matters of 
the Communist Parties" and "urged each Party to 'avoid mechanical application of the experience of one 
country to another country and the substitution of stereotyped methods and general formulations for 
concrete analysis."  In a clear contrast from the Third Period, the Comintern's new stance urged Western 
communists to think for themselves and organize along means that fit the conditions of their domestic 
political arena; which included abandoning the Third Period "alternative only" approach with regard to 
unionism.  Foster's classical tactic of entryism was welcomed once again, provided it resulted in fruitful 
advances of the socialist programme.158  The result was two fundamental shifts leading up to the 1936 
Presidential election that redefined the politics of the CPUSA for the next decade.   
First, freedom of movement and interpretation of local conditions allowed “practical politics and 
tactics even when communists acted within Marxist-Leninist confines.”159  Between January of 1935 and 
February of 1936, the FLP served to facilitate an alliance of socialists, workers, laborers, and communists 
in rural communities of the South while promoting a "break-up of old political alignments."  Through this 
approach, the FLP created a somewhat neutral ground between communists and socialists, the latter 
still refusing all cooperation with Roosevelt, the Democrats, and other progressives.  But the FLP's 
shortcomings by 1936 also represented the continuation of failed political projects during the Third 
Period, such as the inability to find agreement between Trotskyists in the WPUS and Leninists in the 
CPUSA.  The circumstances of the 1936 election, and the need to resist the Republican Party's "Hearst-
Liberty League-Wall Street drive toward fascism," necessitated the end of the CPUSA's full endorsement 
of the FLP.  Party leaders such as Browder demanded a more direct engagement with voters than via 





This shift drew the CPUSA further into the centrist politics of the Roosevelt Coalition and faded 
the significance of the FLP as a viable alternative in the eyes of communist political organizers.  This 
became clear once the CPUSA published its campaign program, which gave tribute to the FLP's growth 
as a "real people's party," but focused most of its criticism on the "extreme reaction" of Landon and the 
Republicans.  Party presidential candidates Browder and Ford ran their 1936 campaign not to draw 
attention to communist ideals—as was the case for Foster and Ford in 1932—but rather to urge the SPA, 
the FLP, and the WPUS to "unite" with the "mass of the toilers against reaction," solidifying a 'lesser of 
two evils' strategy; a strategy that still exists within the CPUSA to this day.  The CPUSA pushed the 
envelope on criticism of the Democrats only slightly: they used 1936 to call for an agenda of social 
reform funded by "taxation of the rich" coincided with a repeal of sales taxes to compensate lower-
income citizens.161  In rural areas, the CPUSA emphasized support of the FLP as a means to bridging 
together with socialists and ridding the local movement of factionalism.  In states with large urban 
areas, like Illinois, the Party directed its appeal to "workers, farmers, professionals, small home owners, 
small businessmen, youth and negro people" and encouraged resistance to the "fascist threat" of the 
Republicans and the Liberty League.162 
Second to the first element of restructuring, the Popular Front made more room for activities 
that “had begun in the Third Period and created new opportunities to further an agenda the *CPUSA+ 
increasingly shared with liberals.”  Among these opportunities were “racial equality, progressive 
coalition building, advocacy for the Soviet Union, and a belief that industrial union building through the 
CIO and New Deal were important agents of social change.”163  Browder and the CPUSA leadership were 
hesitant to dissolve Party work in political organizing, particularly since they had built such momentum 
by calling for expansions of New Deal programs such as the Works Progress Administration.  This 
included, but was not limited to, the establishment of old age pensions, unemployment insurance, and 





particularly concerned over Roosevelt's relations with the Supreme Court.  Many Central Committee 
members believed that, heading into the 1936 election, those relations had "deteriorated ever since the 
justices' 1935 decisions holding the NRA and the AAA unconstitutional."  The Central Committee 
questioned the future of the Wagner and Social Security Acts, and abandoned its previous ardent 
support for them on the basis that they could not be a reliable bridge of solidarity.165  As the years went 
by after 1936, the CPUSA became more and more open to meeting with Democrats and progressive 
moderates.  By the start of 1939, Eugene Dennis was regularly meeting with New Deal progressives and 
moderate Republicans such as Vito Marcantonio (at the time a Republican), the FLP's John Bernard, and 
long-time democratic socialist and women's rights advocate Meta Berger.  Although these meetings 
were done in secret, usually in pre-determined apartments or houses of certain activists, they do point 
to the willingness of CPUSA politicians to seek outside avenues for political strategy as opposed to their 
approach during the Third Period.166 
While the CPUSA took further steps during the Popular Front to integrate itself among the 
American electorate and surface issues of concern, the WPUS and Cannon struggled with sectarianism.  
Cooperation with the SPA against the CPUSA represented an ideal for Cannon since they had "a quite 
lively youth movement," and "a considerable number of activist worker elements, trade unionists and 
fighters in the unemployed field," but lacked "Marxist leaders" and a revolutionary organizational 
strategy.  For other leaders of the WPUS, such as Hugo Oehler, working with the SPA and the CPUSA 
were out of the question and amounted to treachery against the working people of the United States.  
Oehler's supporters believed that if the "Stalinists" of the CPUSA desired cooperation, they needed to 
simply join the WPUS.  Oehler, like A.J. Muste, was fond of equating all pro-Soviet Communist Parties 
around the world as being one-and-the-same, and used the term "Stalinist" to distinguish between anti-
Soviet domestic communists and those within the CPUSA.  Muste rejected cooperation in Cannon's view 





Cannon's former organization.167  Likewise, working with the CPUSA meant working with the Democrats, 
who Muste believed was deceiving both the CPUSA’s members and the masses with promises of 
peace.168 
For his part, Cannon worked to convince the WPUS to accept the CPUSA's emphasis on a 
resistance to fascism more than he approved of working with Democrats and moderate Republicans.  
During the election cycle, Cannon reminded his supporters that they follow the tradition of Lenin, who 
worked to dismember the "agents of imperialism" from his movement in order to unify working groups 
together.  Boldly, Cannon called for a Fourth International to succeed the Soviet-dominated Comintern 
and jump-started his international career as a communist politician.169  The Oehlerites, however, took a 
firmer stance and denounced the CPUSA's 1936 programme as "glib propaganda" that masked the "far 
more dangerous and far more criminal" act of deceiving American workers into trusting the Roosevelt 
coalition.  This latter act, according to New Militant writer Arne Swabeck, led to a "blurring of the class 
issue" and the subsuming of revolutionary action for reformist collaboration with "Rooseveltian" 
capitalists.170   
After months of internal debating and Cannon's refusal to give up the issue on collectively 
resisting fascism, the Oehlerites made a move to split.  Before they could fully break off, however, 
Cannon and the majority faction of the WPUS expelled supporters unwilling to get in line with Cannon's 
majority.  Muste's faction fell silent when Muste himself left the movement to devote himself to his 
local church, only returning infrequently to participate in WPUS meetings.  Cannon and the WPUS then 
turned their attention to criticizing the CPUSA's ongoing support for the Comintern.171  Although the 
CPUSA operated for the most part independently of strict Comintern control by 1936, to most 
Trotskyists like Cannon the difficulty for future organizing lay in both avoiding "reformism," the 






The attitude of reformism among lower-ranking members was not new for the CPUSA.  It traced 
back to the Party’s solutions to unemployment during the 1928 and 1932 elections.  At the same time, 
early CPUSA interpretations of the New Deal criticized it for being too moderate, as was the dictum of 
the Third Period to reject appeals of social justice which did not offer, as its base, proletarian revolution.  
It was depicted as merely a rejection of Hoover’s “rugged individualism” as opposed to any substantial 
relief for unemployed Americans.173  The stances against the Democrats between 1928 and 1935 shaped 
the years to come as writers within Political Affairs argued that “no issue of broader appeal” existed 
among the masses other than relief.  Whereas the 1932 platform of unemployment relief was attractive, 
it was argued as a necessity by 1935 that could not be resolved through localized, state-based relief, nor 
by the efforts of a handful of understaffed, but dedicated, unemployment councils.  Issues and policies 
such as these likely defined the limits of success for communist activism among members such as 
Lumpkin and Charney by creating hard lines of tolerance on policies.  It also maintained an identity that 
separated the political ideals of communists from those of more moderately-perceived Democrats.  
Moving forward from 1935, some within the Party desired to see continued advocacy of a bill for 
unemployment insurance on a broad scale to create a more radical alternative to that presented by the 
Democrats.  This, however, was too close at the time to the program promoted by the SPA and the 
WPUS.  Ultimately, the national CPUSA leadership chose to expand their identity from an advocate of 
workers' rights into a national resistance to fascism.174   
In March of 1935, the CPUSA published continuous criticism of the Roosevelt Administration for 
not taking more radical steps to address unemployment and racism.  Their solution, instead, was the 
creation of a National Unemployment Congress, united with various labor leaders such as Thomas 
Kennedy, and community activists in major cities.175  These more ‘radical’ steps to unemployment and 
racism were picked up by the House of Un-American Activities Committee in 1936-37, and were 





believed that the communists sought to take over the AFL and CIO in order to shift popular support 
away from reactionary politics.176  CPUSA leaders’ criticism of Roosevelt reached newer heights when 
the administration embargoed shipments of arms to rebels in Spain later that year.  Browder, wanting to 
steer away from the hierarchical nature of mainstream political organizations, sought to create a 
genuinely populist political party that contrasted itself against the “Hearst men” of the Republicans and 
the attempts by Roosevelt to “steer a course between the Hearst Program, on one hand, and the 
interests and demands of the people on the other.”177  While this initiative did not successfully filter 
down to the lower levels of the Party as well as affiliated allies/organizations, many American 
communists at all levels of the movement desired to see more dramatic reform out of the Democrats 
and an increase in the pace of reform. 
Former Vice-Presidential candidate James Ford created a program in 1935 for incorporating the 
issue of racism into the Popular Front.  Ford believed that an important difference existed between a 
reformist and a radical when uniting together, and that this difference must be acknowledged if the two 
groups are going to work together to enact reform.  Radicals, he contended, showed an unwillingness to 
“give in to the white rulers” and instead “fight every step against the ruling class.”178  This mimicked the 
perspectives of other black communists like Benjamin Davis, who saw Roosevelt’s New Deal as an 
accomplishment of only part of the major systemic problems within contemporary capitalism.  Pointing 
to lynching, such as that of Claude Neal in mid-1935, Ford charged that Jim Crow and its cultural effects 
represented the “economic remnants of slavery.”  Ford declared it the communists’ duty to promote 
support for persecuted blacks and that a popular front of progressive groups could not afford to ignore 
this fundamental issue.179   
Fords words resonated with active black communist lawyers such as Benjamin Davis, who, 
throughout the 1930s, found himself defending African Americans such as Angelo Herndon against racial 





forced an alliance on the left of blacks and working-class whites.180  But even Davis’ work, within the 
International Labor Defense (ILD), was not enough for the political ideals put forth by Ford; who desired 
to see the struggle extend beyond the periphery of the ILD and the unions to infiltrate mass community 
organizations.  To Ford, combating Jim Crow was not only a political policy, it was also a moral 
imperative that required grassroots, community-based engagement.  What he ideally sought were the 
utilization of community elements such as churches and social clubs.  Though Christianity in the United 
States had its own criticism of Communism as an ideology, Ford saw no conflict.  Instead he emphasized 
that the church had the potential to “play a revolutionary role” in combating Jim Crow.  Citing Lenin and 
the claim that communists must unite with “all forms of struggle,” Ford put the struggle against Jim 
Crow as a political pillar for American Communism, which filtered down to regional locals and eventually 
spilled into the community world.181  At the same time, Ford’s conclusions merely gave the Party’s 
weight onto concepts many understood.  Numerous communists, such as Hosea Hudson, already 
recognized churches and book clubs as fertile grounds for organizing African Americans and integrating 
them into the movement.  This diffusion of political policy into community based activism will be 
addressed again in the community world of American Communism, but it is important to note how 
CPUSA leaders typically concluded what their lower-ranking organizers already understood at the 
grassroots. 
Because of the CPUSA’s dual approach to social relief, where its national reformist strategy 
mixed with a lower-ranking criticism of the limitations of New Deal reform, some communists saw the 
New Deal and the ongoing popularity of the Roosevelt Administration as demonstrative of a “split in the 
working class” between reformists and revolutionaries.  These strategists believed that economic 
development was of “decisive importance” to CPUSA politics.  They pointed to how much American 
industrial output contributed to world production and how increases in automation contributed to 





of the Depression and a temporary “calm of the masses,” meant that Popular Front tactics had to be 
adopted on a wide enough scale so as to reach those who benefitted enough from social programs to 
remain above “a low crisis level.”182  The conclusion was that to remain effective in a post-NIRA America, 
the CPUSA required tinkering at the local levels of shop and community nuclei to find strategies that fit 
with a large majority of Americans—white, black, Latino, gay, straight, working men and women as well 
as stay-at-home moms.  In the background, the aforementioned issues of creating an Unemployment 
Congress, pushing for the FLP, and growing divisions within the CPUSA between upper and lower tiers, 
were seconded to the realization that to remain part of the political landscape within the United States, 
American communists had to communicate a message that resonated with broad groups of citizens. 
The WPUS's argument that the Popular Front was ultimately a forced decision, and that the 
CPUSA's endorsement of Roosevelt was a sacrifice of ideals for the sake of class unity, is deeply rooted 
in the Trotskyist view of international communism.  In Cannon's personal view, Stalin's expulsions of 
Leon Trotsky and Grigory Zinoviev allowed Jay Lovestone and his faction to gain support by organizing 
meetings to "enlighten" members, branches, and community divisions on the Comintern's decision.  
William Foster's group fell in line behind the so-called "Lovestoneites," and the minority became 
Cannon's camp in 1929.183  More recent studies suggest that the Popular Front developed into a "social 
and political tragedy" with regard to its effect on the militancy of radical groups like the CPUSA and 
WPUS.  Some scholars pointed to the numerous shifts in political trends by communists, identifying 
them as evidence that connected American communist actions to Soviet-oriented decisions in 
Moscow.184  The criticism is a mirror of Cannon's; that the decisions of the Comintern, be they 
productive or regressive for the American worker, ultimately defined how an American communist 
viewed politics.  This view, however, overlooks the fact that the same political evolution that occurred at 





For young, working class communists like Lumpkin, college-educated activists like Charney, and 
low-ranking CPUSA officials like John Gates, the endorsement of a Popular Front had little to do with 
Trotskyism and was more of a practical approach to socialism directed by experts in both the CPUSA 
leadership and representative factions within the Comintern.  For Lumpkin, the radical demand by the 
CPUSA, the CLA, and the SPA for unemployment insurance and employment programs in the 1932 and 
1934 election cycles resulted in the public works jobs programs and increased economic conditions by 
1935.185  Charney described Browder as an effective leader who led to a "flourishing" cultural movement 
throughout New York City, where "thousands" came to work together and attend CPUSA meetings.186  
Gates remembered the transition of 1935 as the moment when communists "began to participate 
seriously in politics" by forming alliances and pacts between the Democrats while "looking forward to an 
independent mass farmer-labor party."187  While not ignoring the influence of the international schism 
in communist ideology, it is important to see the personalized view of these shifts and account for all 
interpretations of motive and the desire to stick with the movement by American radicals. 
When confronted with the charge that American communists engaged in class collaborationist 
policies during the Popular Front, it is important to note the role of Soviet oversight with regard to the 
transition.  Regional political leaders, representing the movement’s ideological core, took the task of 
creating the Popular Front and applied it individually the best they could in their communities.  In 
February of 1935, the CPUSA’s think-tank, Political Affairs, published the immediate tasks for regional 
leaders, emphasizing an “acceleration of the concentration of capital” by leading industrialists and a 
“leftward swing” by American workers as demonstration for the need to expand the influence of the 
Party.188  Many district locals of the Party suffered from a slack in membership recruitment from 1934-
35 in areas outside American Communism’s hometowns of New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, and 
believed these new tasks set by the Communist International to be the solution to slacking recruitment.  





oversight.  Middle-ranking communists, such as Charney, experienced estrangement from the upper 
leadership when they discovered that numerous close associates worked with them as "secretive, 
mysterious...Communist International representatives" on orders to maintain order and discipline in the 
various party organizations.  Charney believed this created an ironic twist within Party circles where 
communists "boasted, on the one hand, of [their] ties with Moscow and, on the other, of [their] 
independence" and freedom of interpretation.189   
For Baltimore district leader Earl Reno, the new strategy to engage in the Popular Front meant 
reviving the Party’s membership and ending internal factionalism throughout Maryland.  Like many 
regional locals of the CPUSA, methodological differences and the distance between communist labor 
organizers, communist political organizers, and communists active in the community created differing 
views and interpretations on the national Party’s policies.  Reno joined the CPUSA during the throes of 
the Depression in 1932.  By the time he was appointed to the Baltimore headquarters in early 1935, he 
realized the principal problems of the local Party centered on having only fifty-two of sixty dues-paying 
members.  It also had an ineffective section committee riddled with factional strife.190  By reorganizing 
the section committee’s oversight of the district into three separate groups that worked in their own 
field of activism and mimicked the three worlds of American communism (one for the Party, one for the 
community, and one for unions), membership increased to 96 by May.  While this effort was done to 
reduce “the threat of factionalism” and “centraliz*e+ authority in Reno’s hands since each committee 
reported directed to him,” it also facilitated the independent growth of these three orbiting spheres of 
communist activity in Baltimore and other cities that adopted a similar strategy.191   
Communists in the larger cities like Chicago centered their local political platform on ending 
support for the failed Trade Union Unity League (TUUL) and reorienting toward independent unions, 
such as Chicago’s Associated Employees (AE), the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin 





point, was a vestige of the Party from the 1920s.  As an organization, the TUUL sought to bring workers 
directly under the influence of labor-organizing communists and, in turn, bring them under the umbrella 
of the CPUSA.  By the end of 1934, the TUUL’s Chicago membership of little over 2,000 was insignificant 
compared to the AFL’s membership of over 53,000.  The Chicago CPUSA leadership acknowledged the 
increase in union membership to over 41% of the city’s workforce since 1930, but it reported that less 
than 18% belonged in the TUUL.  By 1935, the Party’s leaders in Chicago and elsewhere became 
convinced that “if they wanted to have input into mass union drives, they would have to change their 
strategies.”192   
Instead, the CPUSA implemented a new strategy to bring workers within their orbit via 
independent and worker-controlled locals, which meant less political organizing and more labor 
organizing was necessary.  The labor world of American Communism had always been one of the most 
staple and dedicated spheres of activity since 1919; but after 1934 the means by which the political 
world engaged with its labor world fundamentally changed.  In Chicago, for example, this included 
utilizing women’s auxiliaries to promote solidarity across ethnic lines since most of Chicago’s 
steelworkers were a mixture of Spanish, Polish, Serbo-Croatian, and Mexican immigrants.193  The 
moment eventually came when the CPUSA’s political strategy to broaden its appeal coincided with the 
success of specific union drives within the AFL, led by John L. Lewis and the burgeoning Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO). 
In other cities, such as Boston, the means to working effectively as a political party after 1935 
meant replacing old regional leaders with new ones and creating a new sense of purpose among the 
political cohort.  Charney watched as the National Office of the CPUSA replaced their district organizer 
with Phil Frankfeld on May Day of 1935, which to him “symbolized the transition or leap from the old 
line of the party to the new.”  Under Frankfeld, Charney believed the membership became inspired “to 





work.”  By fall, Frankfeld tasked Charney and his fellow comrades with building bridges between 
Boston’s union leaders and the city’s middle-class students and professionals; networks and bridges 
previously tasked to the local TUUL branch.194  For Charney and other mid-level leaders like him, the 
overall shift in political strategy toward cooperation with progressives and the elevation of American 
Communism from a movement for workers’ rights to a national struggle against fascism, simply 
“seemed right.”  Party and Comintern publications conformed with the new direction as well.  One 
article published in early 1936 compared the Popular Front with Lenin’s strategy of broad, mass appeal 
via public presence among working people.195  Charney began to adapt his understanding of the New 
Deal and the immediate needs of Americans as a whole, concluding that “patriotism…was not 
necessarily reactionary.”196  The dramatic growth of anti-fascist sentiment allowed the communists of 
Boston to reach “far and wide” across class groups as public presence of the Party grew during the 
months leading up to the presidential election of 1936. 
Planning out an electoral strategy for the 1936 campaign that mixed Popular Front resistance to 
fascism and workers' rights was the first serious test of the CPUSA's new policy of “collective security.”  
The term collective security contained the idea of the Popular Front right in its words: it meant that 
national security and peace rested on a collective and collaborative effort.  Some of the tactics the 
CPUSA utilized came from the British Communist Party (BCP), which also sought collaborative 
approaches to resisting Hitler’s expansion of political power.  Publicly, the CPUSA and other western 
communists made their views of uniting political parties against fascism clear as early as January, 
1935.197  The 1936 Electoral Program pamphlet released in August dictated that the American people 
faced “the greatest crisis since the Civil War” and compared the “collapse of the Hoover-Republican 
prosperity” with the inability of the New Deal “to protect and restore our living standards.”  On the issue 





protection.  On Roosevelt, the program depicted him as a man unfairly attacked by the Republican 
“camp of reaction,” but also as a leader too weak to fight back.  Instead, “Roosevelt compromises.”198  
Not all of the CPUSA's political philosophy from the Third Period changed after 1934.  In a similar 
approach of politicizing issues through campaigning, the 1936 Browder-Ford campaign sought to uphold 
aspects of the New Deal while criticizing the shortcomings of Roosvelt’s administration.  The campaign 
promised a “free, happy and prosperous America” for those who voted communist and lambasted the 
New Deal as a failed attempt to reform capitalism.199  Downplaying the political issues publicly but 
promoting them in Party locals and nuclei, the CPUSA adopted a populist stance that “engendered a 
spirit of cooperation between liberals and radicals” that was both cooperative yet constructively critical 
of the various policies put forth by New Deal Democrats.  Working together in this manner laid the 
groundwork for “the empowerment of North America’s least privileged citizens” while not 
compromising communist principles for its base supporters.  This process exposed more progressives to 
communist organizers and brought communist debates about politics into the mainstream political 
discussion.  In just the first few years of the Popular Front, American communists saw their new 
programme produce amicable results: the CPUSA increased its dues-paying membership from 26,000 in 
1934 to over 85,000 moving into 1939.200   
Part and parcel to this depiction of Roosevelt were Party debates at the national level focused 
on the “theory of the lesser evil” as an “alleged responsibility for the advent of fascism.”  The theory 
rested on the belief that Roosevelt "could not be relied upon to oppose the Liberty League and advance 
a genuine program of social reform," and thus Roosevelt could only be tacitly supported.  The limits of 
Democrat reform had to be outlined and shown as only partially effective for this line of thought to 
make sense for grassroots communists.  Criticism of Roosevelt had to be maintained to both distinguish 
communists from Democrats in addition to continuing the effort of politicizing communist ideals.201  





particularly among proto-fascist and white supremacist organizations.  On the campaign trail, 
Communist leaders' fears about the stance of Roosevelt amplified when the German-American Bund, a 
white supremacist, Nazi-sympathizing organization, became the public face of National Socialism at the 
end of the summer. 
In actuality, the Bund failed more of its goals that it accomplished and never amounted to a 
serious political threat in the United States.d  Hitler ended up resenting the organization because it 
drove more Americans away from supporting Nazi Germany than it drew them in.202  For American 
communists, however, the German-American Bund was an anomaly that combined the worst elements 
of domestic white supremacy with the worst elements of European fascism.  The Bund was fond of large 
marches down Pennsylvania Avenue where they waved Nazi flags and promoted the supremacy of 
German nationalism.  Mixed with the KKK and other white supremacist organizations like the Black 
Legion, the presence of the German-American Bund terrified CPUSA leaders as well as everyday 
communists and served as another basis for continuing a moderate political path that was inclusive of 
progressives and Democrats.  With the Bund criticizing Roosevelt from the extreme right, in addition to 
the SPA and WPUS criticizing cooperation with Roosevelt from the left, the CPUSA enjoyed being able to 
remain critical of Roosevelt while still maintaining a positive role in the Popular Front. 
For regional Party activists such as Charney, the national Party's concerns for the 1936 election 
were “considered the Soviet and world communist attitude,” and were “primarily intended for Party 
consumption, to allay the fears of the diehards and to carry the Party along, step-by-step” as opposed to 
a realistic national campaign program.203  Browder continuously attempted to remind members at 
meetings that the ideal purpose of the Popular Front was to curb public sentiment into their favor.204  
For Charney, this polemical view of the alternative political groups in America amounted to a “spirit of 
orthodoxy” where the Party could “never embark on a new policy without insisting that it represented a 
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continuation of the old one.”205  For younger members, like Lumpkin, no amount of Party rhetoric or 
political analysis could detract from the visual progress created by the Civilian Conservation Corps and 
the Works Progress Administration.  Quite the contrary, in her hometown of Brooklyn, Lumpkin saw 
both her active work in the Youth Communist League and Roosevelt’s New Deal as an “escape route 
from the misery of the Depression.”206   
It is of no small significance that Ford’s program for ending racism and discrimination in the 
community resonated more with everyday communists and activists than did Browders’ criticism of 
Roosevelt, in addition to the overall CPUSA message about the dangers of fascism.  Browder’s criticism, 
and his early 1936 promotion of the FLP despite its small potential, highlighted a major discrepancy 
within the communist movement that has often been overlooked.  The structure of the CPUSA, best 
illustrated and described by Randi Storch, wedged a dividing line between local leaders and national 
leaders.  The Party’s eighteen districts represented major cities such as Chicago, Detroit, New York, and 
Los Angeles, and regional localities such as the entire states of Indiana, Wisconsin, and the southern half 
of Illinois.  District branches in theory commanded control over local nuclei, either shop- or community-
based.  The local nuclei of the Party, however, were not only the lowest level, they were the most 
decentralized components of the Party structure—more flexible in terms of electing leaders and the 
methods used for bringing Marxism to their community.207  The lower levels of the movement, Naison 
points out, confined support for the FLP “strictly to state and local elections.”  At the same time, 
Browder campaigned nationally—but only to condemn Republicans for threatening to tear down the 
progress of the New Deal.  This process worked, but as Peggy Dennis pointed out, among the leadership 
it blurred lines between dedicated cohorts and so-called “sympathizers and fellow travelers.”208 
One thing the CPUSA and Cannon's WPUS agreed on was abandoning support for the FLP in mid-
to-late 1936.  Although the Comintern continued to characterize the Democrats in the United States and 





communists must present themselves as the heads and leaders of workers’ struggles over “rent, 
housing, work schemes, public assistance relief.”  It also encouraged candidates to run for office on the 
platform of a united front with the mainstream Parties against fascism and to reject the sectarian 
positions of the SPA.209  As stated, Comintern declarations from 1934-1936 coincided with a collective 
effort among American socialists and communists to promote the FLP while also running their own 
candidates.  The FLP gained traction during this time in areas such as Minnesota and Chicago through 
the support of local unions as well as congressmen Ernest Lundeen and Vito Marcantonio.210  By the 
summer of 1936, however, the organization failed to achieve the levels of broad support seen by the 
New Deal coalition and faded in significance for American communist political strategists.  Browder 
remarked that although the FLP and progressive forces "brilliantly penetrate[d] into the territory of the 
old south" and "arouse[d] a mass democratic movement," the southern United States nevertheless 
remained under the dominant political influence of "reactionaries" and the Republican Party.211  The 
New Militant similarly reported that the results of the FLP were "hardly an object of support to socialist 
workers" and concluded that the movement for socialism remained to be built.212 
The CPUSA and WPUS's conclusions about the FLP were, admitted, late by at least a year.  As 
early as May of 1935, the third-party strategy failed to meet CPUSA expectations in recruitment and 
engagement, particularly in areas believed to be prone to union organizing such as Birmingham and 
Chicago.  It was believed that the FLP alternative in southern and rural areas would be able to bridge 
issues that were similar in economic terms but separated by the regional politics of the Republican and 
Democratic parties.  The approach failed to factor in regional and racial boundaries in political ideology, 
such as southern, reactionary Democrats and the racially-divided urban neighborhoods of Chicago.  By 
spring of 1935, a growing split between workers and farmers against CPUSA leaders and union officials 
distanced communists outside the FLP from those inside it.213  Although the FLP found ways to bridge 





Democratic coalition was viewed as unrealistic.  Browder emphasized that American communists had a 
duty to acknowledge this shortcoming as a lesson for future organizing drives.  In May of 1937, Browder 
finished the debate when he announced the Party's full endorsement of Roosevelt and the New Deal at 
Carnegie Hall.214   
These conclusions heavily influenced Party strategists, who sought to maintain their identity as 
American communists while expanding their reach in the years following the 1936 election.  Their 
national debates about a cooperative strategy did not, however, always convince district-level 
organizers and leaders.  Party political strategist John Barnett argued that the failure of the Party to gain 
traction in rural parts of the country from 1934 to 1936 meant the CPUSA needed to organize the FLP in 
those regions instead and reject cooperation with progressive Democrats the way they had during the 
Third Period.  Support for the FLP and Browder’s post-1934 attitudes attempted to “ease the Party’s 
path to political influence” by “loosening the demands of Party membership” and “disavowing armed 
revolution as a goal” for the movement in the United States.215  Of equal if not greater importance, the 
rising popularity of New Deal programs forced Browder and Party strategists like Barnett to reassess 
how to move forward, which in this case included dismembering older elements even if they served a 
functional political purpose in the past.  To do this, Barnett pushed for working with farmer unions such 
as the sharecroppers in the south, and within the existing so-called “old-line” Farmer organizations: The 
Farmers Union, the Farm Bureau, and the National Holiday Association.216  For all of Barnett's passion 
toward the rural districts, the FLP as an organization failed to resonate with communists active in their 
community such as Lumpkin and Charney, who instead admired and supported individuals of FDR’s 
cabinet such as Frances Perkins, agreed with cooperation between communists and Democrats, and the 
overall effects of the New Deal by 1937.     
A look into the personal lives of individual communists helps explain the difficulty faced by 





about societal change and were neither bothered by nor wrapped up in the sectarian debates over 
organizational theory.  Rather than play in the streets with other kids her age, Lumpkin attended classes 
at the Workers School downtown, where she read the works of Frederick Douglas, Marx, and Lenin.  
After Hitler seized power in 1933, Lumpkin took to the streets with her local YCL chapter.  She believed 
that “Hitler *had+ won over many frustrated youth,” and that “millions of young Americans…had no 
chance to work and to learn about labor solidarity.”217  At college in 1927, Charney “absorb*ed+ 
humanist culture through exciting books…that gave [him] some understanding of the human drama, of 
the life of man and his times, and above all an inchoate compassion for humanity.” Additionally, college 
life exposed Charney to a critical assessment of Marx, where theories of a class structured society were 
deconstructed to demonstrate failures to account for “tradition, family, the human personality, and so 
forth.”218  To these younger comrades and field activists, 'socialism' and 'the revolution' were more 
abstract goals than they were to strategists like Barnett, who tended to think of 'revolution' as a 
carefully stacked deck of cards, built on broad theoretical conclusions from international think tanks. 
Lower-ranking members like Charney and younger members like Lumpkin didn’t necessarily 
share the Comintern’s nor Barnett's views on the Democrats or the direct necessity of an alternative 
political party such as the FLP.  While Browder and the Comintern promoted the FLP throughout most of 
1935 and the early months of 1936, Lumpkin found herself attracted to the American Labor Party (ALP), 
which supported the New Deal while pressuring Roosevelt for more worker-oriented benefits.219  
Charney saw the support of a third party alternative as dangerous since it could steal votes away and 
allow a Republican victory in 1936 under Alf Landon.220  In unionism, the most important non-
communist figures to capture the attention of the CPUSA’s base was John L. Lewis and the emerging CIO 
leadership.  Upon engaging with the Popular Front in early 1935, the CPUSA “set in motion change in 
Party life that gave it greater flexibility to adapt to popular attitudes and pursue opportunities for 





themselves supporting Roosevelt’s reelection with yet another step toward moderate centrism.222  For 
rank and file activists like Charney, the FLP remained an ideal to strive for, but the importance of 
Roosevelt’s victory and the thrust of the CPUSA further into the public sphere outweighed the 
significance of an alternative Party movement.223  
After hearing about the success of ousting the so-called "Old Guard" of the SPA by younger, 
more militant radicals at the party's Cleveland Convention, Cannon and the WPUS concluded that the 
SPA was "the best rallying ground for the revolutionary forces in building the party of the American 
proletarian revolution."  All members of the WPUS and those who considered themselves "revolutionary 
workers" were urged to join the SPA.  To Cannon, the ousting of the Old Guard was the culmination of 
events following the SPA's Detroit convention in 1934, where younger members rejected the "cowardly 
and treacherous Social-Democratic reformism of the [World War I] and postwar years."  The New 
Militant also exclaimed that Browder's CPUSA represented a "national socialism of Stalin" and "ceased 
in actual fact to be a party" by 1934.  This ended the short-lived existence of the WPUS, but quickly 
inflated the left wing of the SPA by the end of the year.224  At first, the national SPA permitted no 
publications of the "Left Oppositionists," as the existing younger militants knew them.  Cannon and his 
fellow Oppositionists found solace in the Chicago-based Socialist Appeal edited by a local Trotskyist, 
Albert Goldman.  As independents who shared a more sympathetic view of communists such as Leon 
Trotsky and Lenin, Cannon's Oppositionists always remained somewhat on the fringe of the SPA's Left 
Wing.  Goldman shared Cannon's views on the Cleveland Convention of the SPA and the ousting of the 
Old Guard, calling it an "outstanding achievement" that "marked the climax of the two year struggle 
which [had] gone on since the Detroit Convention of 1934."225  Former prominent writers for The 
Militant and New Militant, such as Maurice Spector, Max Shachtman, and Arne Swabeck began writing 





The months between 1936 and 1937 also saw a growing separation between upper CPUSA 
leaders such as Browder, Foster, and Dennis and lower-level district organizers like Charney and 
Lumpkin.  The wedge had its origins in 1934 but didn't become visible until the Party leadership amped 
up its criticism of Roosevelt's perceived shortcomings before and after the election.  In a dramatic 
about-face, top Party leaders and supportive union organizers within business and industry, who had 
supported the New Deal and were afraid of a reactionary backlash, asked for cutbacks on social 
programs advanced by the Roosevelt Administration and “demanded repressive action against the 
mushrooming mass movements.”226  But communists like Lumpkin and even some high ranking 
members like Peggy Dennis rejected criticism of Roosevelt for the same reason they rejected the 
idealism of the FLP as an alternative.  Dennis saw aspects of the New Deal as a tremendous 
achievement, specifically the mass work projects that put Americans in places of employment and 
training, as well as the successful organization of non-specialized workers in auto, steel, rubber, and 
communications industries under Section 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act.227  Lumpkin, at the 
time only a regional activist for the CPUSA with no seated position, instead emphasized the “great things 
*done+ in record speed” by the Roosevelt Administration and applauded its response to her work on 
unemployment councils in New York.  Neither Lumpkin nor Dennis showed any support for cutbacks on 
social relief for the sake of appeasing reactionary Republicans.228   
To these more grassroots members and organizers, the public works projects of the Civilian 
Works Administration and the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935 by New Deal Democrats 
represented major victories for the working class that could not be ignored.229  Meanwhile, the channels 
of CPUSA literature—The Communist, The Daily Worker, Political Affairs—echoed the sentiments of 
Party leaders like Browder and Foster, remaining cautious and critical about advancing programs that 
might give political ammunition to Republicans.  Nearly all of the CPUSA’s leaders concerned themselves 





should they lose Roosevelt in the 1936 election.230  Although she acknowledged the role of communists 
in addressing issues such as unemployment and hunger, Lumpkin believed these actions were 
necessary, as opposed to following a rigid scheme for revolution.  Lumpkin rarely acknowledged the 
political lines that separated New Deal legislation from the goals of American Communism.  To her and 
communists like her, the headline of Labor Today, which stated that the Civilian Works Administration 
had put 814,511 unemployed to work, signified the real gains for American workers and the nation as a 
whole, not the ideological debate of which organization or what method would further expand 
communist influence.  While organizers like Lumpkin may have been exposed to American 
Communism’s core ideological policies, such as linking the Soviet Five Year Plan with the rise of CP 
popularity, the way in which organizers interpreted these policies were highly subjective and rooted in 
their personal hopes for equality and justice.231   
The split between upper and lower echelons of the CPUSA could have resulted from switching 
political policy at the top while many activists, including Lumpkin and others such as Russell Brodine, 
saw some elements of strategy from 1929 to 1935 as effective for the goals of organizing working 
people and thus saw little reason to change course.  A prime example came from the Party’s central 
battleground to define their political identity while moving into 1935: the attempt to establish a 
National Unemployment Congress.  The CPUSA's proposal, which had its roots in the cooperation of the 
Socialist-led National Unemployment Convention and communist-led unemployment councils, rejected 
Roosevelt’s initial claims that the New Deal had improved conditions for relief.  Communists worked 
with the unemployment councils as well as a labor coalition led by Louis Weinstock to support Ernest 
Lundeen from Minnesota in pushing "a more egalitarian approach to social insurance" with The 
Workers’ Unemployment and Social Insurance Bill (H.R. 7598).  The purpose of the bill was to provide 
relief to American workers and farmers who lost “wages because of unemployment, part-time work, 





workers as "a serious attempt at ameliorating the effects of childbearing on women's access to federal 
resources."233 
The CPUSA’s ongoing criticism of the New Deal echoed their sentiments of the Third Period 
albeit with a more respectful tone toward Democrats.  One Political Affairs article described the New 
Deal as manipulative since it addressed areas “useful in quieting unrest” such as banking and heavy 
industry, but left little relief for farmers and their families.  CCC money was criticized for being given to 
banks and well-off farmers affected heavily by the dustbowl, but only “a minimal amount” went to 
address the worst-affected groups.  Coinciding with this charge was the belief that the New Deal sought 
to “put the small farmers out of commercial production” entirely by catching them “in a reduction net” 
of high prices.234  Lumpkin, in contrast to the article, remembered instead the positive impact of the 
Works Progress Administration (WPA) in her community and the role of the CCC in rebuilding the 
American working class during the worst years of the Depression.  Brodine, struggling as a bassist while 
organizing fellow musicians, obtained temporary work through the WPA up through the 1938 symphony 
season, and saw the practical benefit of social safety-net programs.235  These everyday communists not 
only saw utility in the New Deal, their experiences gave little reason to reject the program on any 
practical basis.  Under such circumstances, more radical propositions such as the CPUSA's social 
insurance bill came to represent an ideal to strive for while maintaining the practical approaches to the 
goal set forth in the New Deal. 
The Third Period criticism of Democrats that remained throughout the Popular Front focused on 
perceived New Deal shortcomings in terms of racial justice for two categories of American workers: 
industrial wage-earners and farmers. Nowhere in the country did these two programs come more 
predominant than in the south, where the plight of white farmers was pitted against the racist culture of 
Jim Crow.  From 1937 to 1939, Southern communists “gained influence in larger organizations than the 





moderate its public activity considering their need for support from southern white progressives, 
despite observations by Party strategists like Rob Hall.  Hall believed that southern whites carried 
“considerable remnants of the old race prejudice,” and would prove divisive if rushed too quickly into 
working with African Americans.237  Part of the growth in progressive activity was external to the 
American communist movement, as pointed out by Harvey Klehr: 
The South was undergoing a transformation.  The CIO launched organizing campaigns in 1937 
and some communists got staff jobs, particularly in the steel mills of Birmingham.  Court 
decisions made Communism less risky.  Early in 1937 a unanimous Supreme Court struck down 
the conviction of Oregon Communist Dirk de Jonge, convicted of criminal syndicalism for 
participating in a peaceful Party protest meeting in 1934.238 
Examples such as de Jonge’s acquittal demonstrated that the CPUSA’s political engagement with 
Southerners benefitted from an atmosphere already undergoing social change.   
 Another example of the more advantageous atmosphere in the south from 1935-1937 came 
from Alabama, where the Workers' Alliance of America (WAA) built a statewide movement for 
unemployment relief and farmers' relief through the use of SPA and CPUSA organizers.  The organization 
was founded in 1935 on the passion and spirit of unity that engrossed numerous activists on the verge 
of the Popular Front.  Unlike the policy of the national SPA with regard to cooperative work with 
communists in 1935, the SPA's organizers in Alabama were keen to working with CPUSA activists from 
day one, and elected several to leadership positions, including John Donavan, Henry Mayfield, and 
Hosea Hudson.  Within a year of its founding, the WAA merged with the existing CPUSA-led 
unemployment committees of Alabama.  Although an important move for Southern communists, the 
WAA remained marginalized until 1937, when Donavan sought to reorganize the Birmingham local.  
Donavan wanted to overcome the WAA's largest obstacle: the presence of a conservative white majority 





Donavan sent in groups of radical African American activists, knowing it would wedge tensions into the 
group and split off those unwilling to work together.  When the chairman of the Fairfield local walked 
out of a meeting with a group of white workers after refusing to compromise, Donavan made his move 
and motioned to elect new candidates to fill vacant positions.  The SPA proved more willing to work with 
Donavan by 1937, and the national leadership of the SPA began to lean in favor of cooperative work.  
Less than two months later the organization elected James D. Howell president, Hudson vice-president, 
and Edwina Collins as the recording secretary.  Although only Hudson was a card carrying CPUSA 
member, the WAA's quick support of the anti-poll movement and the right of African Americans to vote 
earned them the label of 'communist' long before any labor-related organizing began.239 
 In the case of the WAA, the ability for communists to become more active in community 
political organizations rested on the tactics desired by unionists and organizers outside the communist 
ideological sphere of orbit.  Most organizers, like Donavan, desired to see an end to racial divisions 
handicapping the organizational process.  While communists such as Hudson rejected racial 
discrimination as a societal threat, organizers like Donavan saw it more directly as an unnecessary 
barrier to the goals of unionism.  Red baiting, or the accusing of an organization harboring communist 
sympathies, served an effective purpose among white workers who commonly associated racial equality 
with communism.  It also worked:  By 1938, 60% of the WAA's Birmingham local were black.  This did 
not deter communists like Hudson, however, from continuing strategies utilized by the unemployment 
councils to draw attention in to the needs of Alabama farmers and wage workers.240  To maintain their 
image as a community-built organization, the WAA turned to employees of the Department of Water 
and Power to create shop committees and town hall debates to deal directly to the WPA.  Over the 
course of the next year, the WAA turned into a "trade union for the WPA workers" by narrowing its fight 





 The expanded history of the WAA explores some of the limitations faced by both the Popular 
Front in general and American communists in specific, but it also represented some of the changes that 
took place in the south in terms of politics between 1935 and 1937.  In Robin Kelley's assessment, the 
WAA "only slightly resembled the predominantly black, underground, neighborhood-based 
unemployment movement of the early 1930s."  Rather than a dividing force against groups like the 
Fairfield local, the WAA welcomed any and all WPA employees into its ranks including "white-collar 
professionals who had no interest in the fight for racial justice and equality" and an even less tolerance 
of communism.  With regard to the WAA, the "[CPUSA] adopted a somewhat accommodating political 
posture—much like its position with respect to the CIO" and made little effort to pressure the 
organization into accepting this-or-that method or strategy.  Furthermore, it highlighted the contrast 
between the Third Period approach of focusing on the radicalization of all issues to the Popular Front 
approach of focusing on so-called "bread and butter issues."242 
 After a year of writing for the Chicago-based Socialist Appeal, Cannon and the Oppositionists 
within the SPA's Left Wing began to publish a New York-based version of the Socialist Appeal in August, 
1937.  In their debut issue, the Left Wing declared that it "refuse[d] to be muzzled" and rejected the 
ongoing attempts by the national SPA to suppress the circulation of the Chicago-based Appeal and the 
overall position of the SPA's on the Popular Front.243  The Oppositionists asserted that the Left Wing at a 
fundamental odds with the national SPA’s moderate leaders, particularly over the issue of their right to 
publish the works of Trotsky for members.  According to Max Shachtman, the differences between the 
two camps amounted to "reformism" on behalf of the moderates for their support of the Popular Front 
by 1937 and "revolutionary Marxism" on behalf of the Oppositionists, who desired to see a continuance 
of revolutionary alternative unions and organizations.  The tendency for the SPA's moderates such as 
Gus Tyler to support collaborative efforts like the WAA in Alabama, in Shachtman's words, forced the 





the SPA, including Cannon, continued to publish their criticisms of the Popular Front throughout 1936 
and 1937 and instead praised the efforts of the Young People's Socialist League (YPSL) for resisting the 
SPA in its attempt to suppress Trotskyism.244   
Boldened by an easing of tensions and heightened community support, the CPUSA held an all-
Southern Communist Party Conference in Chattanooga, in September of 1937.  Browder was in 
attendance, as was Ford, along with one hundred and thirty-three other delegates.  Party leaders 
applauded increased membership and activity in Southern states.  The goal of the conference was to 
seek local liberal support for the Party's southern efforts at combating racial discrimination and to avoid 
linking racial equality with foreign conceptualizations of communism.  Part of the effort in doing so 
involved renaming the major communist publications, such as The Southern Worker to The New South 
and replacing "published by the Communist Party, USA" with "The Journal of Progressive Opinion."  The 
conference also had a negative outcome by exposing a conflict between the political desires by southern 
communists and the New York-based national CPUSA leadership.  Browder, willing to support 
"experiments in Southernization" to the extent that it garnered more support and membership, also 
wanted to demonstrate the ability for the CPUSA to obtain real gains for southern workers.  Browder's 
interpretation of support for the south, however, usually meant appointing New York-born or North 
Midwest-born representatives, such as John J. Ballam, to lead southern Party efforts.  This effort did 
little to bridge the gap between southern communists and liberals and if anything further complicated 
communist organizing efforts for the lower district activists.245   
Regional organizer Rob Hall eventually recanted some of his earlier prejudices about the south, 
seeing that the movement was picking up momentum independently without communist agitation of 
the local political scene.  The communist camp could not, he maintained, use racism and white 
chauvinism as a linchpin against any and all political enemies found in the southern states.246  To 





fill Hugo Black's seat in the Alabama state senate, despite his opposition to antilynching legislation.  
Black ran on a conservative, anti-New Deal platform that made Hill's position appear to be the more 
appropriate choice given the options.  Still, the CPUSA's announcement to endorse Hill met with 
opposition from its African American base who pointed out that Alabama Democrat had a history with 
the Ku Klux Klan.  Overall, by the end of the election it was clear that CPUSA leaders sought to 
"deemphasize" and downplay their involvement in "black issue oriented politics" by placing what was a 
canonical, national political tenant in the 1932 Presidential election into a more localized, decentralized 
context.  No action by the CPUSA Central Committee exemplified this better than when, in mid 1937, 
they broke down the Alabama ILD and encouraged their local African American base to become more 
active in the NAACP.  By then, the NAACP had become a more socially activist organization subsequent 
to the popularity of unemployment councils in the early 1930s, but the breakup of the ILD and 
encouragement by the national CPUSA leadership to join contributed directly to the NAACP’s growth in 
membership in Alabama, which quadrupled between 1936 and 1938.247 
Not all African American organizers accepted the CPUSA's new political stance nor joined the 
NAACP willingly.  Many, according to Hudson, had to be persuaded by CPUSA leaders at length that local 
community resistance to racial injustice was more effective than national resistance.  The NAACP, to 
Hudson and his other local black communist organizers, was an organization of "better class folks;" 
where "ordinary negro[s] didn't feel that was [their] place."  District CPUSA organizers explained that 
unbeknownst to their base members, the NAACP had served as a liaison between the Birmingham 
district Party local and the surrounding black neighborhoods and that despite whatever perceptions of 
the organization's members were, that they had helped facilitate cooperation during the Third Period.  
Whichever the reasons Alabama black communists chose when they made their switch to the NAACP, 
they brought to the organization a cadre of experienced community organizers that exhibited "a greater 





rank-and-file circles."248  Though communists were not responsible for building the NAACP into the 
national organization it became by the end of World War II, they certainly held the blame for bringing in 
passionate and dedicated activists which made the organization more effective.  In doing so, 
communists also demonstrated by 1938 that issues of racial injustice were not seen in the eyes of Party 
leaders as solely issues of communist ideology.  Instead, as Rob Hall explained at Chattanooga, 
resistance to racial injustice was in the process of becoming its own movement that did not require the 
direction and leadership of the Communist Party.  Most importantly, this new movement against racial 
injustice did not necessarily require defense from the CPUSA, and instead could look to its own 
communities and local organizations to begin an effective resistance.249 
A key test to the CPUSA’s dedication to fighting racism and fascism and their tolerance of 
Democrat stances on peace surfaced once the Roosevelt administration favored neutrality on the issue 
of the Spanish Civil War in late 1936.  Roosevelt would admit later in 1939 that it was a mistake to 
endorse neutrality, but from mid-1936 to 1938 it created yet another effective thorn communists used 
to remain critical of the limitations of Roosevelt's administration.  Additionally, some 3,000 Americans 
signed up to the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, a battalion of the International Brigades, and shipped off to 
fight against Franco’s fascist forces until defeated.  The International Brigades were sponsored and 
organized by the Comintern as well as numerous European Popular Front activists from France, 
Germany, and Italy.  Many of the brigade leaders were communists, or worked closely with communists 
in their home country.  However, the vast majority of those who fought in the brigades were not 
communists; and it was these citizens Browder and Ford hoped to win over by denouncing Roosevelt’s 
pacifist stance.250  For John Gates, the Popular Front presented opportunities to link with a wide variety 
of progressives and anti-fascist individuals.  As General Franco launched an armed revolt against the 
Republic of Spain on July 18th, 1936, Gates and other communists faced the challenge of taking up a call 





became the first volunteer from Ohio to join the Abraham-Lincoln Brigade, XI International Brigades.  
Gates kept his travel plans secret from his family, left for Europe on February 6th, 1937, aboard the S.S. 
Paris, and arrived in Albacete a little more than a week later.251 
The Abraham Lincoln Brigade outfitted Gates with French revolutionary uniforms and Russian-
made rifles, and placed him into a unit composed of English, French, Belgian, German, and Russian-
speaking justice warriors.  After training, Gates was put into the 86th Brigade, and earned the initial rank 
of a Brigade Adjutant.  In contrast to J. Edgar Hoover's suggestion in Masters of Deceit that communists 
merely "use glittering promises, underhanded tricks, and downright fraud to coax young men to go to 
Spain," Gates asserted that "no one had to be coaxed to go to Spain.  There were no promises other 
than the possibility that [they] might lose their lives."  Instead, many of those who fought with the 
Brigades chose to stay even after their tours were up, particularly those with flying skills since Spain's 
revolutionary guards were in short supply of reliable and effective pilots.  Communists also found 
themselves accompanied by numerous American and British authors, including Claude G. Bowers, Ernest 
Hemingway, and George Orwell.252  During his tour of duty Gates met and lost countless friends, but at 
each of his three chances to return home, he refused.  When forced to retreat after a battle on the 
Cordoba front outside of Madrid, Gates took charge of the American contingent of the Brigades in 
Albacete while most of his regiment returned home.253 
The communist experience in the Spanish Civil War between warriors of the Republic and the 
fascist forces of Franco also mirrored some of the domestic issues of ideology when the Workers' Party 
of Marxist Unification (POUM) instigated an armed insurrection against the Spanish Republic in 
Barcelona in the spring of 1937.  The POUM claimed to be a Trotskyist, anti-fascist political party that 
advocated "proletarian revolution and the immediate abolition of capitalism in Spain."254  Between May 
3rd and 8th, POUM revolutionaries held events and brawled with members of the Comintern-backed 





Republic, led by Spanish Socialist Party premier Francisco Caballero, was to at first denounce the 
condemnation of Trotskyist supporters, until he lost significant support and resigned on May 15th.  The 
new prime minister, Juan Negrin, was sympathetic to the criticisms of the Stalinist Spanish Communist 
Party and accepted the accusations of the POUM as a fascist organization working for Franco.  On June 
21st, Soviet KGB agents assassinated the POUM's leader, Andreu Nin.255 
For American communists actively fighting for the Spanish Republic, the POUM incident helped 
justify the continued stance against Trotskyism in the United States as a degenerative and utopian 
approach to revolution.  Gates viewed the Republic's response to the May riots as "entirely reasonable" 
and believed that the POUM's stance of advocating proletarian revolution was "what the supporters of 
Franco also claimed, although from the opposite direction."  To "the communists," who according to 
Gates included not just American but also Spanish communists, "the only issue was democracy versus 
fascism."256  In other words, it was the same schism that back in the United States wedged apart the 
WPUS and the SPA from the more centrist CPUSA.  The bigger issue for Gates in the public perception of 
the Brigades lay in the debates among progressives about the bias nature of communist commitment 
toward fighting fascism.  Some criticized the Soviet Union for decreasing arms sales to the fight in Spain 
after it became clear it was a losing battle.  Others criticized that the Soviet Union provided arms only to 
communist forces in the Brigades and did little to help the Spanish Republic.  The criticism centered on 
the notion that communists fought only when they could obtain a politically favorable outcome, and 
didn't actually hold strong convictions against fascism.  Gates instead remembered how the French 
closed its borders with Spain in late 1937 while Germany and Italy were given permission by "Loyalists" 
to maintain a naval blockade over Spanish ports as the explanation for why the Soviet Union stopped its 
shipment of arms.  With respect to the ratio of arms and equipment across the Brigades, Gates noted 
that while his brigade was stockpiled with plenty of rifles and machine guns, the unit was persistently in 





Back in the United States, CPUSA local districts across the country saw a tremendous rise in 
membership after the start of 1937, although turnover rates continued to be an issue.  In Maryland, 
Albert Blumberg resigned from his position as professor of philosophy at John Hopkins University after 
the spring 1937 semester to run for District Administrative Secretary of the Maryland Communist Party.  
Blumberg had been a CPUSA member since 1933, but had kept his membership relatively unspoken.  
The Baltimore CPUSA district not only "had a solid base in labor" but also worked with numerous young 
former AFL leaders who had turned to the CIO by the start of the year, in addition to Patrick Whalen 
who, in May, became the president of the Baltimore National Maritime Union local and the Baltimore 
Maritime Union Council.  Blumberg's state-level CPUSA local was an iconic representation of the political 
balance communists sought during the Popular Front.  Local efforts after Blumburg won control of the 
district focused on establishing communist clubs at the Glenn L. Martin Plant in Middle River as a means 
to combat the Lovestone-supporting CP (Opposition)'s presence within aircraft manufacturing and the 
greater Baltimore area.  Once these initial efforts succeeded in July, the CIO and the local CPUSA made 
motions to demand a citywide industrial union council.  Quickly, Blumberg's district nominated 
members as council officers to attend the Baltimore Industrial Union Council's first meeting on July 21st.  
The council consisted of "seventy-seven delegates, representing twenty-four unions," of which five were 
CPUSA members and seven were non-CPUSA communists.258 
While Popular Front CPUSA locals became more expansive in their outreach after 1937, one 
problem faced by local district leaders such as Blumberg during this period of membership growth was 
the "low level of ideological awareness among many of the new members."259  Dorothy Ray Healey ran 
into numerous organizational issues with membership in California since huge contingents of new 
members were Mexican-American and Filipino; most of whom had joined because of the Party's work in 
agricultural unionism as opposed to an ideological affinity to Marxism.260  While numerous districts 





leaders such as Blumberg worked to expand the school's budget to two thousand dollars and move it to 
a larger address.  In the Fall, 1937 semester, the Baltimore Workers' School enrolled one hundred and 
twenty-five students at two dollars for each course.  The school's curriculum included English, history, 
politics, philosophy, and economics.  By 1938, Blumberg was so satisfied with the results of the School 
that he recommended one be put in Washington D.C. by the District of Columbia Communist Party's 
chairman, Martin Chancey.  Similar schools either sprung up or expanded in Chicago, Los Angeles, 
Detroit, and Birmingham.  In each district the goal was one-in-the-same:  help fix negative turnover by 
educating new members and those interested in Marxism.261 
Some communist schools, such as the New York Workers' School, had a long history of building 
educational foundations for Marxist and socialist clubs extending back as far as 1923.  In the spirit of the 
Popular Front and "invok[ing] the directives of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International," 
the New York Workers' School reached out to non-communist clubs and organizations in an effort to 
"fight reactionary legislation threatening 'academic freedom in schools generally,' and 'interference with 
workers' education particularly.'"  Additionally, the New York Workers' School "was largely self-
supporting" as opposed to relying on financial support from the New York district CPUSA, as was the 
case in Baltimore.  Those who taught at the school were selected "not only on the basis of their ability 
and experience but also on the basis of their close contact with the struggles of the workers and the 
familiarity with their lives and needs."262  The schools also expressed much more ideological freedom 
than any other type of Party-backed institution.  Newer research suggests that many of these schools, 
during their height of influence between 1937 and 1939, rather than promote toe-in-step approval of 
national CPUSA policies and support of the Soviet Union, "approximated an indirect but necessary path 
to revolutionary transformation" and attempted to instill the notion that "the Leninist model of armed 






 The gains and progress of the American communist political movement hit a dead halt in 
September of 1939, when Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany and Stalin's Red Army invaded Poland; making it 
clear to the world the reality of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the dawn of World War II.  For over 4 years 
leading up to the Pact, the CPUSA and American communists worked with progressives and built 
alliances on the backbone of a policy that wholeheartedly rejected fascism as the single greatest danger 
to the world.  Throughout the Popular Front, fascism came to replace capitalism as the canonical evil 
that must be destroyed and that to accomplish that feat, communist cooperation with Democrats and 
progressives was necessary.   Many liberal organizations, including those supported by the Democratic 
Party, held a moderate-to-significant communist presence by summer of 1939.264 The Nazi-Soviet Pact, 
also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, shifted the American communist political movement into a 
crisis unparalleled throughout the prewar years.  After years of building ties built on solidarity against 
fascism and the promotion of domestic involvement in the Spanish Civil War, the CPUSA began a quick 
reassessment of international events leading up to the pact.  This reassessment served to justify Soviet 
actions and appeal across the political lines to advocate Roosevelt's previous stance of non-involvement 
and neutrality.   
CPUSA leaders pointed to U.S. Senator William Borah, who in March charged that Britain 
encouraged Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia.  They also focused on how the Roosevelt Administration 
recognized Franco's fascist regime in April.  Finally, following the Soviet Union's declaration to "act 
alone, if necessary," the CPUSA noted that neither Britain nor the United States offered a hand of 
support to the USSR, who for years had attempted to pressure Western nations into resisting Hitler.265  
Unlike previous shifts seen from 1928-1929 and again from 1934-1935, the communists in 1939 had a 
lot to lose—secure allies in the Democratic coalition and popularity among politically-active labor 
organizations.  It was the pivotal moment when the CPUSA had the capacity to continue its existing 





defaulted to the ideological step.  After years of denouncing fascism and the rise of Hitler, many 
communists found themselves reluctantly advocating peace with Nazi Germany. 
 In the autobiographical and oral history record, American communists are reluctant to discuss 
their involvement in and opinion about the Nazi-Soviet pact.  Lumpkin, for example, makes no mention 
of the pact in an autobiography that covers involvement with the American communist movement over 
a period of nearly 75 years.  Charney, already frustrated with elements of CPUSA leadership by 1939, 
described the signing of the pact as “a complete shock.”  Some of the local CPUSA district members of 
Harlem shared Charney’s “hot resentment….toward the wiseacres of the Party leadership.”  Writing 
thirty years after the event and an ex-CPUSA member, Charney lamented that the emotional “hangover” 
continued for decades, despite the subsequent change of policy in June of 1941.  The Nazi invasion of 
the socialist motherland reversed the national Party line almost overnight, causing cynicism and mistrust 
within the organizations that shared communist presence.266  Much of the anxiety and tension over the 
pact stem from the fact that the Soviet Union's actions caused two results.  First, the CPUSA's official 
explanation for why American communists should support the Soviet Union's actions read "like a well-
written plot."  Quickly, leaders like Eugene Dennis and Browder rushed to reinterpret and reprint Stalin's 
speech at the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's 18th Congress in March.  Requests for Western 
involvement by the USSR mixed with the anti-war sentiments of centrist Democrats and Republicans to 
produce a stance that pivoted the CPUSA between non-involvement and support for war elsewhere.267 
 Secondly, and arguably more significant, the explanation for the USSR's actions raised the 
philosophical question of just exactly how independent the CPUSA was from foreign influences.  
American communists like Lumpkin, Charney, and Peggy Dennis found themselves in an atmosphere 
where flexibility on action was encouraged—but only when the action didn’t conflict with the need to 
support the USSR.  Most studies assign responsibility to the Comintern for the CPUSA's actions with 





for cooperating with the Roosevelt coalition and the internal Party debates over what the Party would 
support in the outbreak of war.  By 1939, the Comintern still heavily influenced the Party's national 
leadership, but it maintained its 1935 declaration and asked communist parties to act on their own 
interests and conditions.  In months leading up to the outbreak of war, Browder and the CPUSA 
leadership spilled much ink over the topic of Roosevelt’s neutrality.  Roosevelt's stance on non-
involvement with Spain was a contested and controversial issue for the entire American Left, but with 
regard to Germany in 1939, it remained a popular stance.  In May of 1939, the CPUSA urged “every mass 
pressure upon Congress to repeal the Neutrality Act, or fundamentally modify it to penalize the 
aggressor and aid the victim of aggression.”268  After the news of Hitler's invasion began, the CPUSA 
hesitated and then recanted.  The Central Committee pledged in a public letter unwavering "support of 
Roosevelt's position 'against American involvement in the war or in the rivalries and antagonisms which 
have led much of Europe into chaos.'"269  This action, above all, defined the political ideology of 
American Communism leading into World War II:  A noble, but inexperienced, effort at linking 
international socioeconomic developments to the domestic politics of the United States. 
 Between September of 1939 and July of 1941, American communists like Dennis and Charney 
spent most of their time rationalizing the Nazi-Soviet agreement. Dennis remembered her husband 
Eugene formulating the official characterization of 1940 with the battle cry, "The Yanks Are Not 
Coming," after the AFL and CIO passed anti-war resolutions.270  Browder addressed a crowd in Chicago 
to celebrate American Communism’s 20th birthday and read sections of Molotov’s speech to the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, trying to emphasize that lower ranking members not “rush to judgment.”  
The Party’s publications subsequently poured out their general explanation for the pact.  They assured 
their members and readers that the Soviet agreement would sustain peace in the same manner as 
appeasement.271  William Weinstone, a central committee member throughout the Popular Front, 





the Soviet Union with regard to invading Poland.  He described the war as little more than "a battle 
between two bandits for the loot of the world."272  At face value, the CPUSA desired to frame the war as 
justified for the defense against growing capitalist influences extending from Britain, France, and the 
United States. 
 Behind the veil, Party leaders such as Browder, Foster, and Alexander Bittleman debated over 
how to maintain local alliances while supporting the Soviet decision.  Bittleman wanted to see increased 
support for Stalin’s decision and emphasized that a Germany-Soviet alliance might result in a war 
against the capitalist powers of the world.  Foster, reluctant to support a policy that would mean an 
immediate break with existing Popular Front alliances, wanted to maintain the depiction of an 
agreement for peace while avoiding repudiating Western alliances.273  Overall, the direct causes of the 
CPUSA's choice to go neutral on the Nazi-Soviet Pact were fundamentally complex.  They were rooted in 
the duality of the Party’s ideological affinity to the USSR as well as the years of building a domestic 
political platform that attempted to mediate the language and rhetoric of mainstream Democrats and 
progressives in order to appeal to broad constituencies.  The years of 1937 to 1939 give clues into how 
the CPUSA's decision in September of 1939 represented an odd mixture of Soviet dependency and 
American political ingenuity.  The issue of supporting the Soviet Union as an ideological parent is no 
different from the Bolshevik romanticism that existed in American Communism since the days of 
splitting off the Socialist Party in 1919; but it can easily mask and distract from the less obvious causes to 
support neutrality.  More covert are the issues of maintaining political/labor alliances and friendships, 
maintaining a populist domestic policy, remaining critical of New Deal shortcomings while praising its 
practical accomplishments, philosophically debating if the enemy of one's enemy is one's friend, and 
attempting to maintain some resemblance of organizational independence—as they had been doing 





 CPUSA locals directly experienced the Pact's subsequent toll on their popularity and tolerability 
among locals, as was the case with the Communist Party of Maryland.  Blumberg, the Party's mayoral 
candidate for Baltimore at the time, and his Wife, Dorothy, received a summons from the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) in December of 1939.  Both refused to testify, and the 
Committee pushed for a trial to associate Blumberg with the CPUSA based on gathered material.  For his 
defiance, Blumberg faced charges of contempt while at the same time the WPA announced a purge of 
all "Nazis, [German-American] Bund Members, and Communists from its ranks."  The HUAC accelerated 
its efforts and in June, 1940 collected the election petitions sent out by the Baltimore CPUSA to place 
candidates on the ballot.  The HUAC then implied that the signature collectors' efforts were 
"tantamount to admitting Party membership" while at the same time charging that the signatures 
themselves were fraudulently inflating elector signatures.  Maryland's State attorney, J. Bernard Wells, 
responded by pushing charges of perjury against six of the highest-ranking Maryland Party members:  
Dorothy Blumberg (Albert's wife), Sophie Kaplan, Minnie Stambler, Paul Jarvis, Richard Bourne, and 
Benjamin Davis on the grounds that they collected "at least part of the contested signatures."274 The 
national office of the CPUSA in New York tried to respond by drawing attention to the trial as an 
example of overstepping civil rights.  The CPUSA extorted the view that the case was directly linked to 
world events, such as the breakout of war, as opposed to any serious threat posed by the defendants.  
The Party may have been correct, but the majority of Americans by 1941 felt that the government was 
justified in attacking political dissidents regardless of the world situation.275 
Individual communists had their own personal quarrels over the matter independent of the 
CPUSA's leadership.  Charney extorted the Party line, albeit reluctantly.  To him and his Harlem Party 
associates, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was, at first, a natural response to the failure of Britain and France to 
extend a defensive alliance to the USSR by 1938.  Along with this, however, Charney and his Harlem 





non-Party sources such as Frederick Schuman of Williams College and Ambassador Joseph Davies; both 
who found ideological explanations for the agreement.276  Marxist historian and CPUSA member Herbert 
Aptheker publicly towed the Party line while joining with other members in private to press "antifascist 
policies" and reject the "inherent racist and anti-Semitic character of Nazism."277  Meanwhile other Party 
locals, such as Maryland’s district under Benjamin Fields, rejected the premise of the pact; asserting that 
fascism and communism could never “exist together permanently.”  District leaders like Fields and 
Charney felt the pact put at risk much of the gains made during the Popular Front and was endemic of 
their organization remaining, as one historian put it, “hostage to events abroad.”278  With no real strict 
consensus across the CPUSA's upper and lower tiers, the shock and awe of the pact faded relatively fast 
with the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.  For years, however, it remained a stain on the 
movement that few willingly acknowledged as necessary.  The quickness of its fading helped fix, for 
many, the ideological upset caused by the shifting stances; but membership dropped 15% between 1939 
and 1940.279 
The significance of these discrepancies in the narrative cannot be understated.  While many 
historians point to the Party’s leadership and subsequent response to the Nazi-Soviet pact reflecting the 
attitudes of American communists, more recent scholarship and autobiographical testimony reveal new 
perspectives on the event.280  District leaders like Charney, Dennis, Fields, Healey and everyday activists 
like Lumpkin and Brodine demonstrated a clear disconnect with the conclusions of their political leaders.  
Both Lumpkin and Brodine spent their time between 1938 and 1940 working in their respective fields—
organizing unions in the cities and expanding communist influence in the orchestra industry.  Charney 
and Fields rejected the premise of the pact and towed the Party line as an excuse of “pure expediency” 
that rationalized Germany’s invasion of Russia.281  Lower-ranking members like Lumpkin were more 
allied with district leaders such as Charney or Healey than they were with leaders like Browder and 





they were to project the words of leaders.  In less than a decade, lower-ranking members shifted away 
from the concerns of their national Party leaders and turned to politicians like Henry Wallace and 
progressive Democrats.282  By examining the ideological connection between the Pact and the CPUSA's 
promotion of non-involvement, we overlook the impact for individual American communists.  The year 
1939 and the Nazi-Soviet Pact marked the beginning of the end of the CPUSA’s grip on the political 
center of American leftism, and the start of a decentralized era for the political sphere of American 
Communism. 
The CPUSA published a series of articles between September of 1939 and July of 1941 about the 
dual hazards of "U.S. Imperialism", which remained critical of Roosevelt's slow shift away from 
neutrality.  Simultaneously, the CPUSA made a quick reversal of pre-1939 strategies and announced its 
own ticket in the 1940 General Election.  It was here where the public gave their response to the Party's 
actions.  Efforts to get the Party on state ballots met, occasionally, with "violent resistance" while 
candidates faced indictment threats and public exposure in a heightened period of pre-1945 
anticommunism.  When the Party succeeded in gathering 30,000 votes over the requirement in New 
York City to get on the ballot, they faced opposition from the American Legion, who called into question 
certain districts where CPUSA support grew.  It ultimately ruled the votes as invalid.283  Even with this 
limited exposure, Klehr noted, the CPUSA still had some moderate presence in the election.  Although 
facing a serious decline in New York City, the CPUSA saw an all-time high of 30,000 votes in San 
Francisco's municipal election and an increase in votes throughout Ohio as much as 300%.284  Lower-
ranking members were instructed to avoid "oversimplify[ing] problems" and consider the "possibility of 
an American and British rapprochement [sic] with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union."  Such a 
result, Eugene Dennis declared, would necessitate a "course of domestic reactionary policies" and a 





both the AFL and CIO conventions and the National Farmers Union.  Nevertheless, the CPUSA "steadily 
lost ground in the movements it had once exercised decisive influence."285 
 Once Nazi Germany invaded Russia in July of 1941, the war for American communists had 
transformed once again into a “just war” for the purpose of destroying fascism and defending the 
socialist motherland.  It is of no small significance that Hitler’s invasion of the USSR served to 
retroactively rectify the logic of expediency for numerous CPUSA members, including Charney and 
Gates.  The invasion of the USSR was yet another battle cry, albeit with more ideological significance.   
Blumberg in Maryland promised committed support from the state Party district and obtained radio 
time to broadcast the Party's call for U.S. intervention.  The passionate response for action against the 
Nazis and the subsequent Soviet-American alliance during wartime did little, however, to fix the stain 
created by the Nazi-Soviet Pact.  As an organization, the CPUSA continued to see a sharp decline in its 
membership, in addition to its political alliances.  Howard Costigan, a popular radio personality for the 
Washington Commonwealth Federation, resigned in 1940 and later endorsed Roosevelt for reelection as 
did numerous former CPUSA members from the state who left the Party after the Nazi-Soviet Pact.  In 
California, the Popular Front collapsed as long-time loyalists who bridged the gap between the state 
Democrats and the CPUSA, such as Culbert Olson and the Yorty/Tenney Committees went separate 
ways.  Progressives, such as Lieutenant Governor Ellis Patterson, who built a platform to separate 
themselves from Roosevelt and utilize CPUSA views on domestic and foreign policy, found themselves 
landing fourth place in the state elections.286 
 While longstanding alliances began to break and sew divisions that not even the subsequent 
Soviet-American wartime cooperation could fix, the CPUSA remained, for the most part, intact.  
Members and activists like Lumpkin, Charney, Healey, and Brodine remained loyal "no matter what they 
thought of the Pact and its consequences," but it is questionable just how much of their continued work 





activists.  In private, members talked about the "revolting episode" that was the Pact and the 
subsequent months of trying to ignore it.  With the political world divided, the CPUSA turned most of its 
attention to the labor world of American Communism.  The goal, which built off previous desires for an 
alternative third party, was to rally behind John L. Lewis and the CIO by encouraging "greater union 
militancy" while keeping their overt involvement in strike activity to a minimum. Charney described the 
period between the Nazi invasion of France in 1940 and the subsequent turn against the Nazis in 1941 
as "self-critical" that "valid as it was, [was] met with suspicion and cynicism."287  This remained until CIO 
leader John L. Lewis announced an endorsement of Republican Wendell Willkie.  Lewis made it clear 
that although he shared some of the anti-Roosevelt sentiment of the CPUSA, the CIO did not support the 
creation of a third party alternative.288 
 Japan's surprise attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, prompted further calls for 
involvement in the European war.  The CPUSA issued a nationwide statement declaring its unwavering 
support for the United States and Roosevelt's decision to ask Congress for a declaration of war.  All 
efforts, the Party's declaration insisted, must be directed to quicken the "pace of machines producing 
implements of war to save [the] nation and increase aid to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, China, and all 
nations [resisting] Hitler-Japanese aggression."289  It wasn't until Pearl Harbor, Charney noted, that 
Americans became less inclined to "rake over the past;" referring to the Pact.  Instead, "tensions 
dissolved rapidly and the overriding popular sentiment was for unity."290  Lumpkin, as well, reminisced 
of the unity created in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and how the political atmosphere changed once 
the USSR and the US became allies.  One of Lumpkin’s friends had been under investigation by the FBI in 
the years leading up to Pearl Harbor, but the investigations were dropped after agents found out she 
was a CPUSA member of New York City.291 
 The opening of war also helped give communists political success as the atmosphere for 





for city council, Benjamin Davis began work as "an architect of Black Popular Front politics in New York."  
A member of the Alpha Phi Alpha, the Elks Club, and a veteran member of the CPUSA, Davis' political 
career embodied the community-based role desired by other CPUSA politicians.  Davis rarely published 
in CPUSA publications; but in his first year as city councilman for Harlem, he introduced a series of 
antidiscrimination bills, pushed resolutions to urge New York's congressional delegation to support anti-
poll taxes, and supported a law which barred racial and political discrimination in urban areas of the city.  
Although many of the attempts in Harlem to enforce resistance to discrimination failed, Martha Biondi 
described Davis' work as a "benchmark in the evolution of urban antiracist politics."292  By the middle of 
the war, Davis became the icon of grassroots communist political work.   
 Davis’ political initiatives mimicked the Marxist historical view dominant throughout the 
CPUSA’s educational circuit, which was best exemplified by Herbert Aptheker.  Aptheker described race 
relations under modern capitalism as an evolved form of the social arrangements predominant during 
slavery in the United States.  Davis and other communists active in community politics took these 
lessons with them when they crafted initiatives that sought to depict racial barriers as “unspoken 
attempt*s+ to keep blacks and other marginalized people in menial labor.”293  From 1943-1944, Davis' 
political agenda emphasized a fight for "social and economic empowerment, including affordable 
housing, veterans rights, and the maintenance of price and rent controls."  Davis' accomplishments and 
popularity among the people of Harlem helped him strengthen ties with the local Democratic and 
Republican Parties.  His sponsors, which included Lester Granger of the National Urban League, actress 
Lena Horne, and Ludow Werner of the Republican New York Age, helped broaden the audience for 
Davis, making him one of the most popular communist politicians during the war.  By the end of the war, 
Davis' clout with the people of Harlem and the city of New York had both Republican and Democrat 
leaders "doubt[ing] their ability to defeat him" and withdrew candidates to avoid jeopardizing the loss of 





 On the national level, the work of individual communist politicians such as Davis remained 
distant and diffused from the CPUSA's broader concerns and internal fragmentation over issues such as 
the Popular Front and the Nazi-Soviet Pact.  Browder, shuffling the policies back to their populist stance, 
began to push for the dissolution of the Party in 1944.  This came in the aftermath of the dissolution of 
the Comintern, and historians placed much overemphasis on the link between the two events.  Klehr 
noted, offhandedly, that Browder's decision built upon "interpreted signals" from the actions of Stalin at 
the Tehran Conference in 1943.  Mainly, Klehr charged, Browder sought an organization that worked 
"within the two-party system to support progressive candidates committed to peaceful cooperation 
between America and Russia."295  Still, there remains no direct evidence of a link between Stalin's 
decision with the Comintern, a shift in international communist ideology, and Browder's subsequent 
desire to engage in two-party politics.   
 Peggy Dennis criticized Browder's idealism in the aftermath of Tehran, arguing that the 
"projected" purpose of the Party by 1943 and the "dissolution of the Party...evoked little reaction" from 
the base membership.  As early as November, 1943, Dennis noted a distinct separation in how Browder 
and the rest of the Party leadership understood the significance of the wartime alliance between the 
United States and the Soviet Union.  To both Foster and Eugene Dennis, the Tehran conference 
represented "a popular goal to fight for, a rally-cry to keep intact."  To Browder, Tehran symbolized the 
success of this goal and a new state "in which an 'enlightened capitalism' was being led by 'men of vision 
and intelligence.'"  The divergence became fully clear to leaders like Foster and Dennis when Browder 
portrayed the organizational shift as "dramatic proof that we were now a loyal opposition."296  While 
Browder tried to steer American Communism into an era of cooperative unity with the two-Party 
system, the rest of the leadership rallied behind the critical rhetoric of French Communist Party leader 
Jacques Duclos.  Duclos' notoriety in the international communist circuit was well known, and to leaders 





that of most Communist Parties around the world.297  This will see more development in Chapter 5 as 
the political world diffused into various forms of civil and social activism. 
Conclusion 
 One of the unspoken dilemmas of American Communist history is the need to separate out, or 
distinguish between, the various elements of ideology, methodology, and action into categories that 
either do or do not fit the definition of communist.  If, for example, an active communist obeys the 
Comintern's directive to act more independently after 1935 and not apply a mechanical schema to 
organizational activity, then what actions done by said communist constitute communist action?  If 
communist organizational action is defined by localized conditions that do not require a scheme, then is 
the CPUSA's endorsement of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact a rejection of communist methodology as 
dictated by the Comintern in 1935?  These more existential questions about the nature of communist 
activity in the United States is generally beyond the scope of most historiographical scholarship on the 
subject, but they are nevertheless important and necessary questions to address.  The period of 1928 to 
1945 serves as a good foundation for understanding this complexity since American communists both 
inside and outside the CPUSA, CLA, and WPUS began to act more independently, join new and more 
organizations, and broaden their social activism to incorporate various elements of the Popular Front, all 
the while retaining hope and romanticism of Bolshevism.  In turn, these individuals diffused within other 
growing social movements, from the rise of Progressivism to Civil Rights.  This does not necessarily mean 
that issues such as combating racism and unemployment meshed into a broader range of issues and lost 
importance, but rather that those policies on racial and labor justice which began as communist 
principals during the Third Period transformed due to communists' broad engagement with the various 
fronts of the political, labor, and community worlds. 
 Politically, American Communism from 1934-1945 steered toward a centrist pathway that it has 





During the period of the moral crusade, the CPUSA embodied the physical and ideological face of 
American communist politics.  Other organizations such as the SWP, CLA, and later the WPUS, embodied 
the American tradition of contrasting different approaches of ideals while claiming to desire the same 
goal.  Following the Comintern's 1935 directive on a new methodological approach, the CPUSA made a 
series of gear shifts that brought it into the wing of Populism while remaining somewhat critical of 
particular Roosevelt stances and continuing to emphasize civil rights reform and the expansion of 
unemployment benefits.  These criticisms served to maintain a distance between the CPUSA and the 
Democrats while also trying to tug Democratic policy to the Left and avoid concession deals between 
moderate Democrats and Republicans.  Individual communists like Dennis and Charney applied this 
method to their local districts, while others such as Lumpkin embraced the benefits of the New Deal 
while upholding the CPUSA’s initiatives as long-term ideals.  1939 proved to be a serious strain on the 
method, as ideological commitment to the Soviet Union contrasted against the very stances which 
brought the CPUSA to its height.  A paradox ensued where individual communists maintained their 
commitment on the home front of labor and racism while trying to sideline the war effort due to 
ideology.  While the 1941 invasion of the USSR helped to rectify this ideological conundrum for many 
American communists and helped communist politicians such as Davis secure practical gains for 











CHAPTER 3:  RALLYING THE WORKERS AND THE LABOR WORLD OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM 
 When known communist lawyer and International Defense League (IDL) member Maurice Sugar 
visited the Soviet Union in 1932, the experience set a precedent for how the CPUSA's key attorney in 
Detroit would approach a strategy to develop public sympathy for industrial unionism in the Great 
Depression.  Having worked with the Party during the hunger marches of 1930-1932, Sugar believed that 
official contact with the Soviet bureau of public defenders would provide guidelines for legal work in the 
United States.  When meeting with workers and laborers throughout the USSR, including engineers and 
project managers working for the Ford Motor Company at the Gorky auto plant, Sugar got the sense 
that regardless of the Soviet Union's imperfect politics, Russian workers “really did feel they owned the 
means of production.”  Publicly educated children demonstrated proficiency in the concept of social 
class and worldwide affairs such as the Depression’s effects on cities like Detroit.  Upon his return, Sugar 
took his experiences and began to craft a practical legal platform to raise awareness of the plight of 
American workers.  Simultaneously he worked to better workers' conditions within the framework of 
the newly passed National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.298  As one of the foremost left-labor lawyers 
in Detroit throughout the 1930s and 40s, Sugar's strategy represented a prime example of domestic 
communist labor legal strategy in urban and industrial areas of the United States. 
 Sugar also represented something else to communists throughout Detroit; a community icon, a 
public figure, a friend of the industrial working class.  Numerous other Americans−including Beatrice 
Lumpkin, Benjamin Davis, and Woody Guthrie—also became community representatives of linking the 
hopes and dreams of Americans with the plight of working people, people of color, and all those who 
felt disenfranchised.  Many of them attempted to equate the principles of Marxist communism with the 
values of American society.  While the political realm of American Communism set ideological limits and 
created bureaucratic barriers that guided organizational theory, at no point did it ever outright control 





American Communism in the workshops and community centers of the United States generated 
different experiences from what played out in the higher plenums of the CPUSA, CLA, and WPUS 
headquarters in each specific district.  Sometimes, as John Haynes argued, it was a negative quality.  It 
might be understood as a silver-lining.  One can link communists in their communities to their 
ideological program set by the Comintern, but one cannot ignore that multiple communist movements 
existed:  Centralized, hierarchical national political organizations that identified (be it positively or 
negatively) with the international communist movement as well as a coalition of loosely-run, 
decentralized local labor organizations that linked together groups regardless of ideological affinity.299   
 This chapter explores the next dominant world of American Communism after the political core: 
the labor world.  The labor world was unique in that it remains to this day the most iconic memory of 
communist activism and organizing efforts at the grassroots by contemporary communists.  According to 
the CPUSA, communist commitment to the American labor movement spanned from “organizing the 
sweatshops in textile in the [19]20s to the founding of the CIO and the mass production industries, to 
the fight against the right-wing George Meany leadership of the AFL-CIO.”300  Since the modern CPUSA 
places much emphasis on this world, the chapter addresses one of the central questions of so-called 
"revisionist" scholarship of American Communism and the CPUSA as a political organization; that is, the 
extent and significance of communist involvement in the American labor movement.  The labor world of 
American Communism includes the internal political methods of engagement with both workers and 
other union organizations, as well as the grassroots communists involved in shop floor organizing.  For 
communists in the CLA and CPO, organizing labor was a national effort.  For the CPUSA, it was an 
international affair.  Both agendas, however, required at the very least means at the state level to 
sustain grassroots organizing and activism.  Communist labor organizing amounted to an effort to both 
radicalize the American workforce while also obtaining support that could further fuel the legitimacy of 





was more dependent on local conditions and specific labor grievances than it was dependent upon 
political directives.  The labor world also attracted far more people to communist thought than political 
discussions about Stalin, Trotsky, the Comintern, and the theories of the Third Period and Popular Front.  
For many American workers, the labor world of American Communism offered a chance to radically 
challenge conventional labor standards and give one’s self to the broader social movement of societal 
change. 
 Examining American Communism as a bifurcated phenomenon that is an amalgam of personal 
experiences is a relatively new approach for scholars of the subject.  The existing scholarship on 
American Communism in labor typically views the ongoings of district-level and national-level 
communist activism as two shades of the same organism.  However, as Chapters 1 and 2 make clear, 
even within the highly ideological political movement there existed fragmentations, factionalism, and 
above all an overt disconnect between upper and lower stratas of the CPUSA.  Furthermore, the labor 
world was broken up into grassroots organizers who identified with communism, such as Emma 
Tenayuca, and Party stalwarts, such as Southern California district leader Dorothy Ray Healey.  It is this 
disconnect specifically which begs the questions:  Just exactly how independent did communists act in 
their workplaces with respect to their political organizations?  Were individual American communists 
involved in labor activism passive actors in a grand scheme of international communism?  Or were 
communists at the local level pressured both by the context of their working and living conditions as 
well as their ideological proclivities?  This chapter seeks to unearth these questions and demonstrate 
that communists in the American labor movement were, in general, Americans first and communists 
second.  During the Third Period, CPUSA organizers developed an open-ended approach to trade 
unionism that cannot be easily nestled into the theoretical conclusions of the Comintern or the national 






 A dynamic and adaptable approach to unionism in communist organizing efforts came about 
due to the fact that the labor world of American Communism by 1932 was much more regionally-
defined and locally-expressed than communism's political ideals.  Communist activism in the labor 
movement depended not only on the location, due to variances in industrial production across the 
nation, but also on the identities of workers and unions in each region.  Historian Victor Devinatz 
pointed out that much of our understanding of communist organizing during the Third Period has 
changed with the availability of Soviet archives after 1991, and that a thorough reexamination is 
required to understand the complexity of organizational work leading into the Popular Front.301  The 
CPUSA’s Third Period approach from 1928 to 1934 necessitated both the creation of alternative unions 
to radicalize workforces but it faced the practical reality of differences in union makeup between large 
cities such as Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, and smaller areas like Salinas, California and San Antonio, 
Texas.  In the Popular Front, this activism expanded to build unions via any means possible that 
sustained the role of workshop councils and bargaining committees.  These approaches were not 
necessarily new to communist organizers, but the number of achievable goals and the attitudes of 
American workers after 1929 most certainly presented new complexities communists had to mitigate 
with their ideology.  The multi-faceted approach which developed during American Communism's moral 
crusade years from 1928 to 1944 built on a decade of strategies utilized by revolutionary trade unions 
and organizations both communist and non-communist. 
 At the onset of 1928, American communist labor strategists had two methods for building their 
unions:  entryism and dual unionism.  Entryism had its roots in early labor efforts pushed by the Knights 
of Labor in the 1880s, and involved using workshop-level nuclei to infiltrate both local and state-level 
union organizations with the ultimate goal of persuading membership to support specific policies, or, in 
some cases, take over the union entirely.  Dual unionism developed within syndicalist circles throughout 





revolutionary trade unions against the more moderate "reformist" unions of the AFL.  The politics of the 
Third Period necessitated a stricter view of these methods, but typically leaned heavily on the political 
effort to resist "social fascism" as opposed to contrast the tactics of AFL locals.  Stalin's emphasis on the 
"misrepresentation against the Soviet Union" made by "reactionary trade union bureaucrats" tended to 
pit communists against AFL locals in whichever manner contrasted the best.302   
 Many leaders, like Foster and Browder, however, recognized the limited view the Soviets had on 
the American labor movement and acted accordingly.  Foster serves as an ideal example of the kind of 
leadership-led resistance to Soviet influence on American labor methodology in the early stages of the 
Third Period, because of his continued insistence on the tactic of entryism past 1928.  Entryism was 
Foster's favorite organizational tactic, and tremendously successful throughout his career in the late 
syndicalist movement and early communist movement up through 1927.303  Foster believed that 
organizers and radical workers should continue to focus efforts on infiltrating conservative AFL unions in 
order to "influence the rank and file, instead of perpetuating their own isolation."304  As the AFL began 
to utilize syndicalist strategies in the early 1920s, James Barrett argues, Foster found "an alternative 
field of operations" in the CPUSA that allowed him to remain a figure in the American labor 
movement.305  Foster's clout and popularity among radical labor militants earned him the trust and 
support of Browder, who in 1928 was looking for someone to lead the CPUSA's spearhead push into 
labor organizing.  In this sense, Browder allowed leeway in Foster’s use of entryism, but maintained 
emphasis on dual union efforts until 1934.  Biographers of Foster point to the Russian Revolution and 
the romanticism of Bolshevism, with its "effective, exportable workers' system" that made it easy for the 
syndicalist organizer to "adapt to powers stronger than himself within the labor movement to use...for 
his own purposes."  Once Foster joined with Browder after the 1928/29 power shuffle, the two worked 
extensively to "Americanise communism" for the American people, starting with a broad organizational 





The Evolution of Communist Labor Strategy 
 Foster organized the Trade Union Educational League during his days as a syndicalist labor 
organizer in the few years after World War I and the early 1920s.  Later, he brought the League into the 
orbit of the CPUSA, renaming it the Trade Union Unity League (TUUL).  His inclination toward working 
class attitudes and labor strategy came from his parents, James Foster and Elizabeth McLaughlin, and his 
experiences in Philadelphia’s vibrant labor movement.  Historians Edward Johanningsmeier and James 
Barrett offer a good depiction of the future CPUSA Presidential candidate's early influences on labor 
strategy.  Both parents were born into working class families in Europe and immigrated to the United 
States, where they met and eventually married.  Although it is not fully known why his mother 
emigrated from Britain, Foster's father did so to escape persecution as a member of "a secret 
revolutionary brotherhood that had conspired to raise an armed revolt by Irish soldiers of the British 
garrison in Ireland."  As Foster was growing up with his three siblings in Philadelphia, he witnessed his 
younger brothers die from respiratory infections, croup, and bronchitis; solidifying his understanding of 
the plight of the poor under desperate circumstances.  Two other siblings "disappeared" and "cannot be 
accounted for in either municipal records or census manuscripts."307   
 In 1895 during the Philadelphia street railway strike, Foster became active in what he described 
as "the class struggle" as he stood side by side with striking workers.  Although the event resulted in 
violence and property damage, the Philadelphia Inquirer declared a day later that the city's citizens' 
hearts lay "with the strikers."  When the strike ended in a compromise, Foster described how it 
demonstrated to him both the "harsh realities of the labor movement" and "impress[ed] upon him the 
possibilities of solidarity and militant direct action by an otherwise excluded community of supporters 
for a grievance of labor."308  At the turn of the century, Foster's migrant life of working and organizing 





radicalism, one that continued to affect his thinking long after he had become a prominent figure in the 
American labor movement and throughout his early years as a Communist."309 
 During World War I Foster and his fellow syndicalists centered on entryism as primary strategy 
for radicalizing union workers, which he called 'boring from within.'  We have already discussed the 
political impact of this strategy during the Third Period, but it is important to understand the strategy in 
full to see how specific American communists engaged in specific, localized union organizing.  The 
Chicago stockyards during the final years of the Great War provided Foster the perfect opportunity to 
test the strategy as well as "realize his goal of organizing the unskilled masses in American basic 
industry" via such a strategy.  By moving into existing labor organizations and winning over its 
constituents, as he did by becoming an elected business agent for the Chicago District Council of the 
Brotherhood of Railway Carmen and later serving as a delegate for the Chicago Federation of Labor 
(CFL), Foster remained consistently "at the center of things" throughout Chicago's booming and 
"effervescent" labor movement.310  His growing popularity among Chicago's working class organizations 
and the further involvement of organizations such as the CFL into Chicago's electoral politics informed 
his understanding of the 'boring from within' tactic as not only theoretically plausible but 
demonstratively effective with the American people. 
 In the early 1920s, the CFL had a substantial communist presence, estimated at around 20% of 
its membership.  Although Draper argued that Foster's early communist supporters "were not bookish, 
ideologically punctilious types" who only "adopted to communism emotionally long before they 
mastered it intellectually," as James Barrett points out, most were "worker intellectuals, not only gifted 
in their line of political involvement and union work but also intellectually engaged and already familiar 
with Marxist theory."  W.F. Hoxie, a lecturer for the University of Chicago, invited Foster to talk in a 
classroom about Hegelian philosophy while economist John R. Commons spoke highly of Foster's speech 





"reflected this sophistication" by aiming at a literate and politically-active working class.  Likewise, these 
early American communists, which included future leaders Cannon, Bittleman, and Dennis saw in Foster 
the potential to link their ideological movement to the "real world of the American worker."312  Both 
Foster and the TUEL became quickly absorbed into the communist sphere of the pan-Socialist Left 
during the First Period (1920-1924).  The Comintern under Lenin desired to see the expansion of 
communist presence in unions to pit members against reactionary AFL organizers, endorsing entryism 
but also leaving room for alternative approaches.  Under these ideological conditions, according to the 
Comintern, Foster’s tactic for the American labor movement was an ideal strategy to build upon with a 
track record of success.313   
During the Second Period, following Lenin’s death in 1924, Foster's strategy of boring from 
within remained an established approach.  The TUEL’s ability to “gain a following by concentrating on 
concrete concerns and providing leadership and a program for indigenous militants” impressed the 
underground CPUSA leaders, although shortcomings in raw organized numbers were a common 
criticism.  Rather than pay tribute to the Comintern’s desires, the organization “provided communists *in 
the United States+ with their first genuine base in the labor movement.”  As the long-time leader of the 
TUEL, Foster’s influence on the organization soon became entangled in the CPUSA’s and Comintern’s 
factional struggles.  Eventually, Foster’s inclination toward ideological conflicts in the Comintern “cut 
*him+ and his followers off from their natural constituency in the unions.”314 This was best evidenced by 
the conflict of 1928 after the Sixth Comintern Congress.  Foster reorganized the TUEL into the Trade 
Union Unity League (TUUL) in 1929 and overtly subsumed it beneath the CPUSA’s Central Committee.  
This new body, designed for Third Period organizing strategy, served as the bulwark for revolutionary, 
communist-led unions against the organized power of the AFL and alternative “social fascist” unions led 





 Although it was a guideline of the Comintern on labor strategy in America, the Third Period did 
not see the death of Foster’s tactic of 'boring from within.'  It continued to function in practical 
circumstances.  Some of the first grassroots organizing drives occurred in the South, in late 1929, and, 
with the help of the TUUL, “penetrated the region’s mines, mills, and cotton fields.”316   Under the TUUL, 
communists organized both alternative dual, or sleeper, unions and internal shop committees within 
existing unions, choosing whichever means produced the most effective results.  In some cases, utilizing 
both tactics was seen as necessary to loosen the grip of AFL locals.  In Foster's organizing home of 
Chicago from 1929 to 1931, communist presence in unions amounted to about 23% of the city's 
membership, compared to the national membership average of 15.9%.  Unlike many other cities with 
CPUSA presence in these years, the majority of Chicago's communist unionists were in reformist AFL 
unions as opposed to the revolutionary Party-led unions.317  The city's diversity of interests, 
backgrounds, and temperaments among local communists resulted in a different organizational scene, 
with higher turnover rates and reluctance to devote time to national and international Party interests.  
For a city like Chicago, mixing the tactics of dual unionism and boring from within were ideal organizing 
practices.  In other regions, such as the rural South or New England, local union conditions resulted in 
different approaches.318  To suggest that the Third Period necessitated a full abandonment of Foster's 
early syndicalist strategy would be to overlook how the TUUL molded the strategy to their new purpose 
of subsuming organized labor into an international communist movement.  Instead, what we see is the 
evolution of Foster's syndicalist strategy and its limitations based on geography and working-class 
demographics.   
 Outside of urban cities like Chicago, communist organizers faced a multitude of varying 
conditions that necessitated the utility of other methods.  In North Carolina's textile region, the 
communist-led National Textile Workers Union (NTWU) organized the most militant of the state's 





1934.  A small city like Gastonia, where communist unionists preferred a revolutionary counter-union to 
that of the AFL, saw the dual union strategy reign supreme.  Local worker sentiments shaped the nature 
of communist activism and channeled activists down certain strategies while overtly avoiding others.  
Unlike the AFL unions staffed by communists in Chicago, strikes conducted by the NTWU and other 
unions faced staunch accusations of Russian influence and harboring radicals.  Harvey Klehr noted how 
the Party's efforts in North Carolina's textile industry in mid-1929 fell dramatically short when organizers 
faced the "deeply religious" local working class who "regarded outsiders with reserve and suspicion."319  
In deep Southern states, like Alabama, the independent Farmer-Labor Party (FLP) netted more success 
than the TUUL and dual union strategies.  Combating racial tensions, though, proved more difficult than 
in Northern states.  In California, a combination of efforts, including boring within existing unions, 
promoting the TUUL, and organizing independent communist-run unions all proved effective.  There, the 
CPUSA banked heavily upon inclusion of a predominantly non-white, Spanish-speaking labor 
workforce.320  In total, American communist labor strategy leading up toward the Popular Front was 
anything but homogenous.  Unlike the political world, which found its defining ideals in both foreign 
theories of social change and practical conditions of American politics at the federal and state level, the 
labor world found its ideals shift from workforce to workforce and from city to city. 
Communist Labor Strategy during the Third Period 
By far one of the largest successes of communist labor strategy during the Third Period was 
“organizing the mounting legions of unemployed” in the early days of the Great Depression.  This 
operation resulted in the tremendous expansion of CPUSA, CLA, and CP (Opposition) influence and 
recruitment for labor organizing.  The ideological framework of the Third Period dictated certain 
constraints but also put forth practical goals to achieve.  The general economic crisis of 1929 to 1930, far 
more than the dictums of the Comintern in 1928 and the solidification of a Third Period strategy, 





organizers.  To accomplish the goal of “organizing the unemployed,” the CPUSA worked with SPA and 
CLA to setup the Unemployment Councils of the United States of America (UCUSA) informally under the 
umbrella of the TUUL.  These organizations functioned as community-based centers of action, but were 
operated much like a labor union.  The SPA countered in certain areas like Chicago by setting up their 
own independent Council for Unemployment, but the purpose of the councils was uniform: facilitate 
means of resisting the perpetuation of unemployment.  For the purpose of this chapter, the 
unemployment councils are considered a bridge between the labor and community worlds, but one that 
starts with labor strategy and the TUUL.  For both CP-led and SPA-led organizations, “local organizers 
represented the heart of the movement,” in part because the collaboration of the two parties was 
unexpected throughout the Third Period.321  The collaboration was not immediate, and it took between 
1930 and 1932 for the unemployment councils to find common ground to build what they termed a 
united front against unemployment. 
 From 1930 to 1934, local activists inside and outside communist groups marched for relief, 
forcefully moved evicted citizens back into their homes, and physically confronted authorities on behalf 
of those without a job in the first two years of the Great Depression.  Part of what made the 
unemployment council movement so successful were the countless other non-communist activists who 
"shared the social justice perspective of the CPUSA," but didn't necessarily identify with the Party; 
instead preferring the label "militant democratic unionism."322  Although the communist-led UCUSA was 
not the only existing organizations of the unemployed, they were by far “the most effective.”  The city-
based councils organized hundreds of marches across the nation, creating precedents in law for fighting 
evictions and assisting welfare recipients in obtaining their benefits.323  As such, a large portion of the 
TUUL's work was directed toward community activism as well as labor organizing.  It is here where 
thousands of poor American families came into the orbit of street-level American Communism.   





of ideological theory and practical applicability at the local level to produce a diverse and vibrant 
tradition that linked community-based activism with appeals to specific workers' rights and the 
promotion of unions to pressure politicians into supporting said rights. 
 While regionally-defined conditions framed the nature of communist labor organizing, 
communists generally responded to any opportunity that offered the chance to bring their presence to 
public attention.  Such was the case after a police officer shot a picketing communist organizer, Steve 
Katovis, during a small CPUSA-led strike at Miller's Market in New York, in early January, 1930.  The 
TUUL had called for a demonstration to show solidarity with striking clerical workers on the 16th, and 
contingents of the local CPUSA, YCL, and Bronx Cooperative responded assist the striking workers.  
Katovis had collided with a police patrolman, Harry Kiritz, while trying to prevent the police from 
reaching the loudspeaker used.  After being knocked back and having his club taken from him, 
patrolman Kiritz fired several shots from his small pistol, hitting Katovis.  Katovis spent the next eight 
days in the hospital.  The police gave an official report on the incident, where they described Katovis as a 
"criminal" guilty of "felonious assault" against a New York City patrolman.  On the eighth day in the 
hospital, Katovis told his family and friends to "keep up the fight; organize the workers" before dying 
from his wounds.324  
 By January 25th, seeking to make the issue national news, the CPUSA under the leadership of 
Sam Darcy organized a public march on City Hall.  There, demonstrators squared off with city police.  
After the demonstration was broken up, around 50,000 citizens gathered in Union Square for Katovis' 
funeral.  The CLA's Militant described the actions of New York police patrolman Harry Kiritz, as "savage" 
and questioned the police department's actions in contrast to its passive approach to "gambling, 
bootlegging, racketeering thuggery, and general corruption."325  Popular participation in the funeral and 





to the organized fundraisers and marches of the UCUSA.  Some falsely took it as an indication of the 
public's support of a persecuted communist.   
 After the demonstration, the CPUSA felt imbued with a sense of purpose and continued its push 
for several weeks following Katovis' funeral.  Foster’s return from the Comintern in early 1930  brought 
orders for the CPUSA to hold demonstrations in remembrance of "International Unemployment Day."  
The New York Party district organized a march for March 6th that defied all their expectations.  Over 
35,000 citizens participated in the march, while the CPUSA claimed numbers as high as 110,000.  The 
situation degenerated after Foster refused assistance from police commissioner Grover Whalen for a car 
escort to obtain a permit at City Hall.  Questioning the city's demand for a permit, Foster turned to his 
constituents and asked them if they accept Whalen's demand for city approval.  After a resounding "no," 
Foster began a march toward City Hall.  The march quickly decayed into a chaotic mob as police moved 
into the crowd and set off a series of street brawls.326   
 Across the country, The Daily Worker claimed support in numbers as high as 100,000 in Detroit 
and 50,000 in Chicago.327  The CPUSA heralded it as a great moment in the awakening of the masses to 
both the plight of labor and the solutions offered by communists, but jumped the gun on expectations 
for future efforts at organizing the unemployed and radicalizing those in trade unions.  Subsequent 
drives in May and August were significantly smaller in number, and the Party ultimately concluded that 
the March 6th demonstrations were less of the result of the CPUSA seizing workers' sentiments and 
more of a "spontaneous outpouring of hundreds of thousands of workers with no other outlet for 
expressing their feelings."  Regardless, the CPUSA continued to organize what became known as hunger 
marches following the tradition of their work on March 6th.  Subsequent marches tended to be smaller 






 Despite their political division with the CPUSA, the CLA's leaders did show support for their 
fellow communists both during and after the March 6th demonstrations.  In April, 1930, The Militant 
reported on how William Foster and his four CPUSA associates were "framed" by the city of New York 
due to their March 6th demonstrations.  Martin Abern's description of the event amounted to an 
emphasis on the significance of the upcoming May Day and the ability of the CPUSA leadership to rally 
thousands, including those merely sympathetic to socialism, to the defense of workers' rights.  Abern 
felt that the CPUSA, CLA, and SPA were necessary elements of a "broad campaign to mobilize the 
working claims against the repressions of the workers and their organizations by the employing class 
and the government."  May Day, which has a rooted history in the United States labor movement, 
represented the one moment in 1930 where the three divergent sects of the pan-Socialist Left could 
come together.  It had the potential to both commemorate the origin of socialist labor practices in the 
United States while simultaneously represent the unity of the three camps.  The only pre-requisite to 
this process, Abern insisted, was a general agreement for unity by communists within the labor 
movement and a halt to workplace factionalism; an agreement that did not demand nor require political 
uniformity.  Abern's criticism of the CPUSA focused on their framing of the conditions of the United 
States, as opposed to any fault on their understanding of the needs of American workers.329  
Nevertheless, both the CLA and the CPUSA overestimated the palpability of May Day onto the 
consciousness of American Workers.  By mid May, communists in Boston concluded that while the May 
Day demonstrations were "well attended," their limited numbers also proved that "the big crowd of 
25,000 on March 6th was a curiosity, excitement-seeking crowd" who expected "a big fight" between 
police and activists.  The conclusion, on May 24th, was that the limited turnout and result of May Day 






 One of the issues discussed by the Central Committee of the CPUSA in terms of limited 
organizational success was labeled "language work."  Many of the communist clubs in New York 
functioned as language-based "fractions" that gathered activists in their respective neighborhoods, such 
as the Finnish Cooperative, Lithuanian Workers' Club, and the Jewish Buro.  Of equal importance to 
communist city leaders to organizing the unemployed was combating the "nationalism advocated by 
[language fraction's] respective bourgeoisie" published in the native languages of members.  The 
opportunist response by Jewish communists in New York over a Palestinian uprising in early 1930 was a 
cited example and represented the ongoing prevalence of "nationalist ideology in many workers' 
language schools for children."  The central problem in language work was termed "federationism;" the 
process of maintaining language fractions by national identity as opposed to unify on the basis of being 
workers under the same oppressive system.  The CPUSA tended to deny agency to individual's ethnic 
background in these discussions, referring to the embracement of ethnic culture over proletarian unity 
as "stubborn resistance to the line of the Party."331  This was but one of many examples of the CPUSA 
looking outwardly toward their own ineffectiveness as opposed to a realistic assessment of their 
shortcomings.  When publishing the membership breakdown of its language fractions, the CPUSA 
emphasized whether or not organizations were "controlled" or "influenced" by the Party or if they were 
"under enemy leadership."  Even still, regardless of those organizations "controlled" by the Party, their 
influence was "comparatively narrow" contrasted with "organizations consisting of over a million 
members."332 
 In terms of inward criticism, communists in the CPUSA placed blame for their shortcoming after 
March 6th on "a lack of sufficient political clarity and [due] to a failure to develop proper methods of 
work."  By this, communist writer C.A. Hathaway meant that the communists had failed to maintain 
their "intensity" after the demonstrations; that the pressure of communist rhetoric had waxed over the 





first and most aggressive in giving expression to [workers'] demands and in organizing their struggle."333  
The CLA focused their criticism of the post-March 6th lull in public response as a result in a failure of 
"strategy and tactics among the masses."  The socialists would, Swabeck contended, "continue in their 
role as tools of imperialism" by making the very process of uniting workers nationally a near-impossible 
feat.334  Rather than be distracted by the politics of more moderate leftists, the CLA encouraged its 
constituent shopfloor workers "to move toward elementary forms of shop organizations" and reject the 
idea that the TUUL was the only means to reaching workers in a revolutionary way.  The AFL offered 
even less opportunities as "part of the employers' industrial staff" for CLA labor organizers.  Subsequent 
examinations of the movement's need for a reassessment by the CLA called for less political action in 
the street and the organizing of more shopfloor nuclei.  Simultaneously, the CPUSA encouraged more 
effort in the unemployment councils.335   
 To some activists and communist scholars, the early experiences during the Third Period made it 
clear that not only was capitalism unlikely to suffer any immediate collapse but also that the approach 
of specific strategies, such as relying heavily the Party-run TUUL “produced ambivalent results at best.”  
One historian charged that the CPUSA’s Third Period labor strategy from 1929 to 1932 both trained a 
dedicated cohort of labor activists while simultaneously dividing the national labor movement between 
progressive and revolutionary forces, producing limited results and gains that ultimately fell far short of 
ideals.336  This however negates the divisions within the pan-Socialist Left and places excessive blame on 
communists as a group.  Rather than see it as a broader effort to engage the American people that 
failed, scholars have tended to depict the CPUSA leadership as showing hesitant strides toward a 
cohesive labor strategy in the years leading up to the Popular Front.  Although political disputes 
between socialists in the SPA and communists in the CLA and CPUSA commonly muted any attempt at a 





a movement at the workshop and local district level.  There, local conditions and the personal 
sentiments of those involved took precedent.  
 The presidential election year of 1932 brought forward the most potential for the CPUSA and 
CLA in their desires to create a broad and unified labor movement during the Third Period.  It began 
after Foster gave his speech at the River Rouge manufacturing facility on Monday, March 7th.  The rally 
was called for by the CPUSA-staffed Unemployment Council of Detroit, and began the march in 
downtown; moving along Michigan Avenue until they crossed the road that leads up the Rouge River to 
the plant.  After the death of four workers amidst Foster's campaign speech about emphasizing the 
rights of citizens moving forward into the depression and the need for an unemployment bill in 
Congress, news of the Ford Hunger March spread fast across the CPUSA and CLA's periodicals.  The men 
killed, Joe York, George Bussell, Coleman Leny, and Joe Blasio were all identified as Detroit-born workers 
and members of the CPUSA's YCL.  To communists across the nation, the response by the Dearborn 
police in rallying for the defense of Henry Ford's massive auto facility represented the "peacemaker of 
modern industry and of industrial democracy, whose hands are dripping with the blood of militant 
workers."  It also further highlighted the significance of the fight against unemployment and secured 
unemployment relief as the primary message to deliver to labor groups leading up to November.337 
 For the remainder of the election cycle, the incident at Ford's plant in March created a backdrop 
upon which communist criticism of industrial democracy and unemployment rights developed.  When 
Henry Ford reported to the New York Times in June about his interest in finding solutions to help those 
taking to the streets, the Militant responded by comparing Ford's proposal with a "return to feudal 
serfdom."  Even if, the communists asserted, Ford's words about higher wages were honest, he was 
"helpless before the competitive chaos of which he is such a characteristic example."  The "limitations of 
modern capitalists" and the notion that higher wages threatened the stability of the industry prevented 





heralded an event urging recognition of the fallen workers hosted by the local Detroit Party district, the 
Dearborn Conference of Labor and Fraternal Organizations, the Detroit Unemployment Council, the 
Dearborn local of the SPA, and workers from the city council as "monumental."  The Communist 
reported that following the Ford Hunger March, "no two workers could gather on the streets of 
Dearborn" until, within months, "a new and determined fighting spirit" developed to "intensify a 
broader united front movement."339  This movement gathered momentum from June through August, 
until leaders within the various organizations decided to meet in Chicago for a national conference of 
unemployed councils. 
 In preparing for their annual conference as the 1932 electoral process neared a close, the 
Lovestone-led Communist Party Opposition (CPO) noted that the CLA, CPUSA, and SPA all saw significant 
increases in broad levels of support among urban constituencies of the American working class, 
particularly in metropolitan cities like Detroit, New York, and Chicago.  The CPO also criticized the same 
organizations, including their own members who held cross membership, for failing to uphold serious 
dedication toward building a united front of labor organizations.340  The CPUSA expressed their thoughts 
on the shortcomings of their unemployment efforts as early as the aftermath of the Ford Hunger March, 
but typically focused on other issues such as public defense of the Soviet Union as a legitimate nation-
state, criticism of the SPA for the same shortcomings in organizing the unemployed, and staunch 
rejection of the AFL for their previous support of the Hoover Administration despite the Federation's call 
to institute "six-hour day[s] and five-day week[s]."341  Building this "united front" of labor both during 
and after the election was not easy and it did more to unveil deeply-rooted rivalries embedded within 
different labor traditions across the United States than it did to unify workers behind a single cause.   
 The earliest recorded meeting between the CLA and CPUSA in terms of an official communist-
organized united labor front meeting occurred on May Day, 1932, in Hillside New Jersey.  There, the 





Organization, the Hungarian Workers' Singing Society, the Slavish International Labor Defense (a 
subsidiary of the ILD), the Polish Workers' Club, and the Jack London Club collectively met to discuss 
terms of coordinating efforts.  Joseph Freeman, representing the CPUSA, and Louis Basky, representing 
the CLA, co-conducted the meeting; the purpose of which was to demonstrate the capacity for unity 
across the working class groups of the city.  To do so the group sang songs from the Singing Society and 
watched play reenactments performed by younger members of the Jack London Club.  Though a small 
and rather insignificant meeting at the time, it demonstrated the desire by individual communists and 
working organizers at the local level to push the issue of a united front while national leaders spent 
most of their time bickering about organizational shortcomings.  It also delivered a message to Party 
leaders about the desire and inclination for cooperative work by lower-level Party activists such as 
Freeman.  Over the course of the summer, numerous other sects of the CLA and CPUSA held small 
meetings until pushing for an open united labor front conference set for November, in Chicago's 
working class districts of its Southern Loop.342  By the end of the electoral cycle, prominent leaders from 
the various district-level echelons of the CPUSA, CLA, and CPO reached out and requested for a formal 
meeting held in Chicago after the election results became public. 
 The November meeting for a united front council in Chicago brought together all the hopes, 
dreams, as well as pitfalls of the 1932 electoral cycle to a head as around 750 delegates representing 
over 350 unemployment organizations met together; including local representatives of the FLP, AFL, 
CLA, SPA, CPUSA, various city unemployment councils, and the TUUL.  The Militant reported a dramatic 
scene, where workers who engaged "in a common fight against a common oppressor" set forth practical 
demands for the city's employers and politicians.  The CLA, hopeful about the context of the convention, 
asserted that although different organizations carry out independent work and retain "their right to 
criticism [and] to formulate their own opinions," the purpose of this new united labor front was to form 





more confrontational manner, insisting that the existence of two unemployment councils, the CPUSA-
led Unemployment Council of Chicago and the Socialist Party-led Chicago Committee for 
Unemployment, "reflect[ed] the weakness of our unemployed organizing and activities" moving forward 
into any kind of unified movement.344  Although ideological rhetoric masked their criticism, the CPUSA 
attempted to address the elephant in the room: the fact that a visible split between the communist "left 
wing" and the socialist "right wing" existed apriori and would continue to exist unless it was addressed 
immediately at the conference.  The Socialists, pushing for an emphasis on labor as opposed to political 
identity, desired to avoid open displays of communist presence in the effort, particularly the CPUSA's 
banner and the usage of the CLA's publication The Militant, both which used the iconic hammer and 
sickle as its centerpiece.  It is here, not on the actual issue of unemployment relief, that the CLA took the 
philosophical stance of backing the CPUSA.   
 In response to the SPA's desire to avoid political identity in any united labor movement, the 
CPUSA insisted on "drawing the political lessons of the protest [for unemployment]."  The CLA, as well, 
stated that they believed the CPUSA was justified in bringing its banners for Foster and Ford to the 
conference despite their low polling numbers in the election.  Anything short of this "would have 
marked a capitulation to the Right Wing and the reactionaries [of the SPA]."  While a progressive move 
for the CPUSA in terms of widening its audience and reach, this "right-about face" of working with those 
previously denounced as "social fascists" demonstrated a shift in overall CPUSA policy as a direct result 
of the 1932 election.345  Though the move was important to the CLA because it linked various workers' 
organizations together, it also "marked a departure from the official Stalinist (CPUSA) position on the 
United Front [sic]."  By the end of the conference, the ideological rigidity of the CPUSA became 
somewhat exposed, leading to further debate about the future of cooperative communist labor 
organizing, both within the CPUSA and the CLA.346  The CLA continued to support the change in attitude 





Third Period ideological line.  Militant author and CLA organizer Max Shachtman referred to the CPUSA's 
shift as an affirmation of the Trotskyist theories of labor organizing and warned its readers to avoid 
"opportunistic tendencies" such as sacrificing gains for unemployed but employable workers in favor of 
a broad political alliance.347 
 1933 proved to be a rather dynamic year as it was both the beginning of the end for Third 
Period organizational and political policies as well as the early stages of a united front for radical labor.  
Starting with the appointment of Adolf Hitler to the position of German Chancellor on January 30th and 
then the tremendous popularity of Roosevelt's first hundred days, the CPUSA made national overtones 
of the political shift first expressed at the Chicago conference while the SPA made signs of an internal 
breakdown.  By the start of the year, a significant split in the SPA gave advantage to the CPUSA, CLA, and 
CPO in terms of winning over the more militant union organizers.  A battle between the Socialist Party's 
"Old Guard," and the younger "militants" led by Devere Allen and Presidential candidate Norman 
Thomas over the latter's insistence of rejecting war resulted in bogged down effectiveness as an 
organization up through 1935.  The Old Guard believed that the younger Marxists were succeeding only 
by accepting former CPUSA members and allowing CLA organizers to work together with SPA-led 
unemployment councils and that their allowance of antiwar rhetoric opened the door for repression 
from the federal government.348   
 As the SPA became increasingly tied up with internal divisions over support for issues such as 
how their members presented themselves and spoke, communists warned against "opportunist 
distortions of the united front tactic" and instead told organizers that all they needed to do was "draw 
the masses into the most basic struggles," such as the campaign to free Tom Mooney, the defense of the 
Scottsboro boys, and the promotion of May Day.  Communists focused their criticism on a conference 
called by the SPA in New York just under a week prior to a conference setup by the Unemployment 





Devere Allen and the "militants."  The "militants," in turn, organize their own conference and invited the 
Unemployment Council of New York but voted against efforts to work with the CLA, CPUSA, and IWW at 
relief bureaus.  Efforts to exclude members from the CLA, IWW, and CPUSA from united front strategies 
amounted to "stupid sectarian politics," according to Communist author C.A. Hathaway, and served little 
use for building a broad movement of numerous working groups.  As the months went by, militant 
organizers from the CLA and the SPA's younger Marxists turned to the CPUSA, attracted by its calls for 
practical action and its rejection of divisive tactics.349 
As the 1932 united front convention came to a close and it was clear that the CPUSA would have 
to continue to labor organizing on their own, the Party tasked its members of the Unemployment 
Council of Detroit with focusing on the Briggs auto manufacturing plant in Highland Park.  The Briggs 
Manufacturing Company produced body parts for Ford and Chrysler in four plants, and faced increasing 
pressure under the conditions of the Depression to lower wages.  At the start of the New Year the 
company announced a wage cut, causing the entire factory to shut down as the workers walked out.350  
John W. Anderson was one of those who walked out, having just joined the Briggs workforce between 
Christmas and New Years.  Anderson recalled that the wage cut was only the straw that broke the 
camel’s back.  Working conditions and variances in pay were the staple issues.  The plant’s “air was full 
of dust particles,” it had “no adequate facilities for washing your hands,” and there was “no cloak room 
or dining area.”  Typically workers would arrive each day “never know*ing+ how many hours *they+ 
would work.”  Additionally, workers across all divisions of the plant were paid unevenly according to 
three different standards:  “some at piecework rates, some on a bonus system, and others an hourly 
rate.”  Anderson was hired at fifty-two cents per hour to match his previous earnings at other plants, but 
he never received that rate while working at Briggs.  When the wage cut dropped his earnings to thirty-
five cents per hour, Anderson and his fellow workers decided to walk out as a group, spreading the word 





workers that they had to make demands and meet with the company, and volunteered along with two 
other metal-finishers to speak for the strikers.  Anderson met with Walter Briggs, owner of the factory, 
but failed to get the company to agree to anything in writing.  It appeared, at first, that the battle had 
gone nowhere.352  
When Anderson returned outside to the striking workers, he found that Phil Raymond, 
representative of the Unemployment Council of Detroit, was encouraging the workers to make their 
way to Hamtramck “where many *CPUSA+ activities were carried on.”  While a large contingent of the 
striking workers followed Raymond to Hamtramck, Anderson was hesitant, worried that being seen as a 
leader of the strike would hurt his future goal of working management.  Instead, Anderson tried to 
report the Briggs Company for violating labor law to the Michigan Department of Labor and Industry.  
The department representative, while sympathetic to the strike, told Anderson that he couldn’t 
challenge the company without a union and that his proper place belonged on the strike committee.  He 
returned the next day to the plant to discover that unbeknownst to him, the workers had elected him to 
the strike committee.  By the next day, the other three Briggs plants went on strike amounting to a total 
of fifteen thousand workers.  To handle the size of the strike, the CPUSA used its TUUL-affiliated Auto 
Workers Union (AWU) to help “formulate the demands of the strikers” and provide “organizers, meeting 
halls, legal defense, and the money to pay most of the expenses.”353  The lead organizers were Phil 
Raymond at the Mack Avenue plant, John Weissman Mack at the Highland Park plants, and CPUSA 
candidate for governor of Michigan, John Anderson, representing the ILD.e  Lacking a strike fund to 
setup a kitchen, local communists organized “chiseling committees to solicit business places and others 
with money who were in support of the strike.”  While the company began to improve working 
conditions, the strike committee held out for union recognition and a return of all strikers to their jobs.  
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Anderson believed that without the work of these three CPUSA organizers “the strike would have been 
broken in a few days with no important gains made.”354    
 In Chicago, a struggle over leadership in a dressmakers' strike at the Sopkin and Sons factory 
broke out in June between the union's representative, Oscar DePriest, and white Jewish communist E.B. 
Girsch.  Sopkin's factory employed predominantly young African American women, but subjected them 
to harsh "sweatshop-like conditions."  DePriest felt he could connect with the women as an African 
American unionist, and garnered support from the local NAACP.355  Organized by the District Committee 
of the Chicago CPUSA, the strike organizers targeted the Sopkin shop on 39th and Michigan Avenue, in 
the heart of downtown, as a means of "crippl[ing] production in other shops."  The local communists 
criticized DePriest as a "Negro reformist" and "misleader."  Politically active organizers present, such as 
Claude Lightfoot, noted that the communsits did not bring the Party's presence "to the forefront" of the 
strike so as to "avoid the 'red scare' issue."356  The event stunned Lightfoot as the striking women 
chanted "we want Girsch!" and demanded that DePriest step down as committee organizer.  After a 
quick vote, Girsch was elected lead representative of the Needle Trades Workers Industrial Union under 
the TUUL.  After his defeat, DePriest tried to coax the Sopkins to refuse bargaining agreements with the 
workers, but ultimately failed.  The workers won not only recognition of their shop bargaining 
committee, but also a 17.5% increase in wages.  Lightfoot became a regular member of the Chicago 
CPUSA after the affair and remained with the organization until his death in 1991.357 
 In under a month of the Chicago dressmakers' strike, the CPUSA announced that no party could 
claim to be a revolutionary party nor be serious about a united labor front if it did not concentrate daily 
efforts on transforming the labor movement into a broad social struggle that linked the personal with 
the political.  Organizing the unemployed remained a canonical platform, but linking unionized industrial 
workers, the unemployment councils, and the broader community efforts against racism became the 





marches.358  This new directive set forth clear and concise directives to build "a mass proletarian Party," 
while accepting that the CPUSA in its current form was anything but what was necessary to move 
forward.  What was needed, Party theorists concluded, was "concentration work," or efforts to 
concentrate on specific, key industries as a means to mimic the tactics of Bolshevik organizers in 
Petrograd, Moscow, Don Basin, and Baku from 1912-1917.  The Party noted some centers of 
concentration, such as the unemployed, mining, and in parts of the auto industry, but also concluded 
that Party districts could not expect to take leadership over the multitude of struggles that varied from 
factory to factory and state to state.  The Party's Third Period policies boosted the popularity of their 
program and led numerous efforts for the daily demands of working Americans, but it failed to "raise 
the consciousness" of the general public.  While communist ranks grew by the thousands in its Third 
Period organizing efforts, many of those who joined found that "from inside, the Party looks different" 
than it appeared from outside.  New recruits were exposed to an "inner life permeated by sectarianism, 
bureaucratism, and mechanical routine work" that destroyed the "'why' that brought them to join."  
Only by improving the latter and steering the Party districts away from becoming tightly-knit ideological 
sects would new members remain with the movement and stay within the orbit of the CPUSA.359 
 In much of these Third Period efforts, the CPUSA used their union drives and organization of 
strike committees as a dual purpose; they sought to both direct/organize the workers, but also to recruit 
them into the Party.  It was this latter aspect of the CPUSA’s presence that occasionally disinterested 
workers.  When John W. Anderson attended a meeting of the Briggs striking workers hosted by local 
communists at Dance Land Hall in February, 1933, both he and a number of strikers quickly lost interest.  
As a result, IWW organizer Frank Cedervall spoke to the workers and helped convince the strike 
committee to vote to remove Phil Raymond as the daily speaker.  Raymond at the time was 





free.  By that point, the strike committee had turned “hostile to the CP*USA+” and the communists were 
labeled “foreign” in contrast to the “Americanized” IWW.360 
 Browder’s open letter to denounce dual unionism in 1934 served as the starting point for new 
avenues of strategy.  Communist labor activists such as Sugar, who desired, in contrast, a flexible 
approach, found their place by 1935 and the opening of the Popular Front.  Browder remarked how 
although the strike movement of 1934 was a “major manifestation of radicalization of the working 
class,” the independent “red” unions, within which so much hope was placed throughout the Third 
Period, the TUUL's efforts “passed into the background” while AFL locals continued to expand.361 But 
while communist labor strategists like Sugar developed specific labor approaches based on local factory 
conditions in the years leading up to the CPUSA's political shift between 1934 and 1935, regional 
communist activists throughout the United States abandoned the Party's TUUL based on practical 
necessity.  Just like the efforts in Chicago and Gastonia, national organizing strategy up through 1944 
continued to depend on what communists found both necessary and practical as opposed to idealized 
schemes.  The process of retooling organizational methods also undermined the CPUSA's goals by 
prompting resistance by moderate, anticommunist labor organizations such as certain AFL chapters, 
continuing a trend by conservative labor leaders to "shape federal legislation and policy on policing 
political radicals."362   
 Activists and low-ranking communist labor strategists in California and Texas, such as Mexican-
American field organizer Emma Tenayuca, avoided the Party's national agenda and instead turned to the 
work of local organizers such as Donald Henderson.  Although only influenced by her work with the 
CPUSA, her work nevertheless gained her the title of one of Texas’ most well known communist 
organizers by 1937.363  Tenayuca grew up in San Antonio, Texas, in a Mexican-American working class 
family.  She participated in a series of strikes for cigar and garment workers between 1933 and 1934, 





mexicanos *sic+ from many New Deal relief programs.”  She joined the CPUSA in 1937.  According to 
historian Max Krochmal, Tenayuca’s attraction to the CPUSA was “not out of adherence to Party 
dogma,” but rather because the Party's support for improving “the civil rights and working conditions of 
ordinary mexicanos *sic+.”364  Others, such as Latane Bartlett, who grew up around North Carolina’s labor 
scene and attended various “radical political clubs,” joined the CPUSA during the Popular Front because 
“she ‘saw them as more effective than the socialists in terms of what was going on in the South.’”365  
Tenayuca reached national attention when she was arrested in July of 1937 at a local CPUSA meeting in 
San Antonio where the city police suspected she was using the meetings to organize Mexicans against 
the local government.  The support Tenayuca got from the local community was a "radical step" at the 
time for agricultural organizers.366   
While no Party stalwart, Tenayuca’s views on Latino history in many ways paralleled the 
CPUSA’s theory of national self determination for African Americans.  She and her husband, Texas Party 
leader Homer Brooks, described the Southwest United States as a region “originally Spanish and later 
Mexican, whose customs, language, traditions and culture were essentially different from those of the 
rest of the country.”  She argued that Latinos were critical components in the building of the railroads in 
Texas, California, Colorado and Arizona, which also explains the development of Latino populations in 
those states.  Latinos in the Southwest were divided, Tenayuca states, between “descendants of those 
living in the territory at the time of annexation” and “immigrant Mexicans and first or second generation 
native-born drawn from the impoverished peasantry of Northern Mexico to work as super-exploited 
wage workers.”  More specifically, Tenayuca believed that the expansion of the United States into those 
states segregated Latinos from whites “into colonies” characterized by “disease, low wages, 
discrimination, and lack of educational facilities.”  The specific use of the word “colonies” most closely 
resembles a parallel to the concept of national self-determination of the black belt, which was 





sentiments of Tenayuca fit neatly into the political world’s desired depiction of oppression shared by 
other non-white communist labor organizers, such as Hosea Hudson in Alabama.367 
Brooks’ work in Texas extended back to 1935, when he became the lead publisher and editor of 
Red Trade Unionist, a monthly paper that focused on statewide organizing issues and mirror articles 
from the Daily Worker.  In 1936, he became executive secretary of the Texas Communist Party and held 
the position until 1938.  Throughout the 1930s, the Brooks focused the majority of the Texas district 
CPUSA’s attention to the plight of sailors and longshoremen across the Texas Gulf Coast.  Brooks 
benefitted from the fact that radicals had already seized enclaves in the Texas maritime industry 
throughout the early 1930s.  Grassroots communist organizers, whose influence “overshadowed labor 
activism in the Texas maritime industry,” directed the attention of its readers to the “abominable 
working and living conditions” of sailors aboard US vessels.  After a series of wildcat strikes between 
1936 and 1937, Texas communists helped establish the National Maritime Union as “a militant 
alternative to the ineffective International Seamen’s Union.  After 1938, Brooks stepped down from 
Party leadership but continued his work with the Party until 1939.368 
 Henderson, an economics professor at Columbia University and field labor organizer, pushed for 
an independent, agricultural-based union movement starting in southern California, eventually 
spreading throughout the Southwest.  Henderson lost his tenure once his CPUSA affiliations became 
public, but he quickly began work into the organization of agricultural workers in southern California 
canneries with the help of a dedicated cohort led by Dorothy Healey.369  Although a communist, 
Henderson believed that the path to union victory rested on what was most palatable for the workforce, 
and in the case of California agricultural workers the TUUL made insignificant headway.  The dual union 
strategy served to help turn the mostly non-white, female, Mexican-American workforce away from 
corporate unions.  Once the dual union effort gained renewed momentum in late 1937 and early 1938, 





communities with working populations that could identify with union leadership on a personal level.  By 
1938, the lower-level activists such as Tenayuca proved to be the defining elements of communist-led 
agricultural unionism as opposed to the over-arching strategy of the unionization.370   
 Contrasting the experiences of labor organizing by communists during the 'Moral Crusade' is one 
of the few ways to understand the multi-dimensional nature of American Communism's labor world.  
Although the political world forms a core of defining the limits of what is and is not communist activity in 
American history, the labor world permeates aspects of national culture and functions with the 
community world in ways that the political core could never hope to achieve.  The political world's 
relationship to American labor is like that of the CPUSA's leaders to William Foster in the early 1920s:  It 
was a means for them to take ideology and put it into the lives of American working people.  The 
political realm of American Communism was conscious early on of the importance of linking their ideals 
to individuals and organizations that had a broadly diffused constituency.   
UCAPAWA:  Grassroots Communist Labor Organizing at its Peak  
 Communist labor organizer Dorothy Ray Healey grew up in Denver, Colorado, with her parents, 
brother, and sister.  Her mother rebelled against the "orthodoxy" of Judaism and Christianity as 
deceptive and controlling, leading her to read and study socialist philosophy.  While Healey's father 
didn't always approve of her mother running off to socialist rallies, Healey admired her mother and 
looked up to her for her passions and joined the Youth Communist League (YCL) at the start of the Third 
Period in 1928 at the age of 14.  During this time, Healey became a dedicated and passionate stalwart of 
the CPUSA’s youth wing.  In 1937, she met Henderson, along with Walter Donnelly, the first regional 
director of the CIO, and Lou Goldblatt from the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) in 
Denver.  There she got her first look at the merger of the Communist Agricultural Workers Industrial 





United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA).  It became one of the 
largest agricultural unions in the nation and heavily staffed by communist activists and sympathizers 
appointed personally by Henderson.371   
 Healey then went to the San Francisco district CPUSA chair and requested organizational work.  
Schneiderman handed Healey the task of organizing for UCAPAWA in Southern California.  In the months 
prior, national YCL chairman Frank Carlsen attempted to oust Healey from organizational work at the 
same time, calling her efforts of leading the YCL in southern California "a failure."  He preferred instead 
that she spend time organizing a small club in North Beach, near San Francisco.  After pleading her case 
to Schneiderman, the Party organized a meeting and voted Healey to lead the organizing effort for 
UCAPAWA.  She was to be listed as an international representative and Vice-President of the union 
second only to Henderson.  Carlsen's vote was the only nay.  By the start of 1937, Healey moved to Los 
Angeles and began her active role as a communist unionist for UCAPAWA.372 
 Healey's first major role as representative of UCAPAWA centered on forming a union at the 
California Sanitary Canning Company (CalSan) in mid-1937.  Her work was understood as the basis for 
gathering strength against the cooperative business association responsible for worsening work 
conditions in California agriculture, the Southern California Grower-Shipper Association (GSA).  CalSan 
employed roughly 400 individuals on a seven-month seasonal basis.  Its work force was predominantly 
female, and its canned goods were produced and distributed by the GSA.  As early as 1932, the GSA 
commanded significant political power over the southern California canning industry and agricultural 
labor.  It retained close business relations with large industrial conglomerates of Southern California 
such as Southern Pacific Rail and Pacific Gas and Electric.  Henderson and the CPUSA viewed organizing 
the migratory workers at companies like CalSan as "imperative because they were an integral part of the 
state's highly integrated agricultural industries."  In the early days of the UCAPAWA, they laid the 





involved organizing industries that the GSA depended on, specifically canning and shipping.  This would 
then create leverage with which to organize against the GSA as a whole, bringing pickers and field 
workers into the bargaining process.374  To start the effort off, Healey organized picket lines outside the 
Beverly Hills home of Joseph Shapiro, an owner of CalSan, in the summer of 1937.  She used her 
connections in the Los Angeles Jewish organizations to "adopt resolutions condemning [Shapiro] for his 
refusal to bargain with the union."  Working with local students who sought summer-time jobs at the 
cannery, Healey and the UCAPAWA got first-hand knowledge of key workers, stewards, and bosses 
involved in the company.  When Shapiro refused to concede that the union represented the majority of 
his employees, Healey called for a strike which lasted about two weeks.375   
By the summer of 1937 when Healey led the strike at CalSan, the UCAPAWA had already made 
tremendous strides in building an agricultural labor movement staffed and organized primarily by 
communists.  Henderson built the union into an icon that defied the attempts by Southern California 
growers to avoid collective bargaining agreements, which in 1934 were not protected rights by the 
National Industrial Recovery Act section (7a), which only guaranteed the right to bargain for industrial 
workers.  Henderson’s approach sought to work around this handicap by organizing canneries and the 
shipping industries that California growers depended on.  This forced recognition of wage standards by 
the growers through their dependency on canning and shipping industries prior to passing of the 1935 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  The subsequent act, along with its creation of the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB), provided the means for the UCAPAWA to organize pickers on the basis of 
organizing dependent canneries even though the NLRA still lacked protections for agricultural workers.  
UCAPAWA exemplified the regionally-based and more independent strategy pushed by communists 
who did not hesitate to work with the AFL and emerging CIO under John Lewis.  They built their union 





poised to take advantage of the CPUSA’s acceptance of cooperative strategies and began a militant 
organizational push leading up to the 1936 Presidential election. 
In 1936, Salinas Valley workers for the GSA picked approximately 90% of all lettuce eaten 
throughout the nation.  At the time the workers were organized under AFL Local 18211, but regularly 
dealt with attempts by the company to encourage membership in the company-run union. Sensing little 
to fear from the mostly Mexican-American and female-run union, the GSA posted a new non-negotiated 
contract on September 1st, 1937, for its Salinas Valley pickers, which replicated the previous years' 
terms but included a wage cut.  One day later, over 3,500 GSA lettuce pickers walked out on the job and 
jump-started the Salinas Valley Lettuce-Pickers strike from the grassroots.  The GSA, in turn, teamed up 
with the city banks, electric companies, and the Sherrif to setup to Citizens' Association of Salinas Valley 
(CASV).  What concerned workers the most according to their legal representatives was the highly anti-
union atmosphere and lack of concern shown for the workers by GSA associates as opposed to picking 
conditions and work hours.377  When the GSA hired a deputized city militia who used clubs, teargas, and 
machine gun nests to defend the entrance of the packing sheds, the strike turned violent.  Within a 
week the company lost the support of the federal National Labor Relations Board.  As images of the 
striking workers hit headlines, the chairman of the State Federation of Labor, Edward Vandeleur, sided 
with the GSA and removed the AFL's representative from Local 18211.  Having won the short game, the 
GSA used its re-hiring efforts to exclude AFL organizers and representatives from employment and 
posted a blacklist of names that could never again be part of the Salinas Valley picking community.378  
When criticizing the AFL representatives and Local 18211, the GSA referred to organizers as "ruthless 
leaders, often trained in communist schools, but shrewdly acting in the name of labor."379  
 J. Huddleston, a Salinas Valley picker, contacted UCAPAWA in August of 1937 to express his 
grievances about the failed 1937 strike and the possible options for future organizing efforts.  





workers in Salinas would "have to join, or they [would] be moved out of the job."380  Since blacklisting 
and exclusion of individuals based on current and former union affiliation was a violation of the National 
Labor Relations Act, classified as illegal hiring practices, Henderson and Healey saw the opportunity they 
needed to expand the union and broaden the scope of union representation.  The CPUSA's subsequent 
endorsement of Henderson's UCAPAWA and the Salinas Valley strike indicate that they saw the GSA's 
illegal activity as a means for securing national support for the lettuce workers under a new non-AFL and 
non-Company affiliated union.  The CPUSA began funding Henderson to start up the Cannery and 
Agricultural Organizing Committee (CAOC) as a means to educate the mostly uneducated female 
workforce, who were generally not fluent in English, and to publish pamphlets and distribute literature 
to Salinas Valley workers.381  Henderson then turned to the San Francisco law firm Gladstein, Grossman, 
and Margolis to open an NLRB case against the GSA for illegal hiring practices.382  The firm, in their letter 
to the GSA, focused their attention on a specific foreman's discharge of three union members due to 
their "CIO union talk," highlighting that "discrimination against employees by reason of union activity 
constitutes [a] violation of the National Labor Relations Act."383  In NLRB court, the case proved to be 
long and drawn out, but by 1938 UCAPAWA managed to obtain open negotiations with work-shop 
agreements that protected pickers' choice of union membership. 
 With little to back up their illegal hiring practices, the GSA accepted the UCAPAWA and the 
CAOC as the new bargaining agent for the workers of Salinas.  The results of the case also caught the 
watchful eye of John Lewis and the national CIO leadership, who increased funding to Henderson.  The 
CIO asked that the union consider expanding into other sections of the nation's agricultural industry.  On 
Henderson's appointment, Healey then took on a commanding role in both the CAOC and the Southern 
California UCAPAWA, noticing that "many of UCAPAWA's organizers were [also] communists."  To a 
young activist like Healey, this generated a strong devotion to the union's purpose similar to the 





came to embody many of the ideological commitments held by communists.  Among its tenets was an 
emphasis on gender equality within the workplace and racial equality in the communities of Salinas and 
other southern California agricultural towns.384  
 The efforts of the UCAPAWA as a known communist-run union headed by Henderson did not 
always turn out so fruitful.  This was the case for organizational efforts in the Florida citrus industry, 
where throughout the seasonal periods of 1936 through 1938, the UCAPAWA combated efforts by the 
Ku Klux Klan to suppress strikes and union negotiations.  Depicted as "rural, agrarian, and southern" in 
the early-to-mid 1930s, the Florida citrus industry was ripe for organizational efforts against the 
collective efforts of citrus owners.  The owners of the various citrus farms and distributors believed "that 
organized labor, communism, socialism, and what the American Legion called 'the other isms' were 
essentially alike−un-American."  Throughout the early 1930s, the Florida Klan suppressed union 
organization by the United Citrus Workers "swiftly and fiercely;" including abducting and assaulting 
Joseph Shoemaker for organizing a state-wide group to socially combat the Klan called the Modern 
Democrats.  Shoemaker died in a hospital after two weeks from burns, internal bleeding.385  Henderson 
responded by sending a single field organizer to central Florida with $40 a week to train and recruit 
other activists locally.  Within a month, Edward Norman, a local from Polk County, became the most 
passionate and dedicated activist for UCAPAWA in the region.386   
 To resist the union effort early on and try to prevent Henderson from gaining traction, city 
officials across the state passed anti-picketing ordinances.  This was the case the employers of the 
Eckerson Fruit Canners Company expected a strike in December, 1937.  Utilizing local police forces, 
employers such as C.H. Eckerson were at first successful in keeping early UCAPAWA efforts to a 
minimum.387  UCAPAWA Local 10 workers at the Polk Packing Association at Winter Haven refused to 
work after John A. Snively announced a reduction in wage rates during the 1937-1938 picking season.  





wage and get the workers signed for bargaining recognition as well as get striking workers back to work.  
Finally, the UCAPAWA's organizers came head-to-head with the Klan after the summer of 1938 when 
negotiations between the workers of AFL Local 21210 in Auburndale and the Lake Alfred Citrus Growers 
Association broke down.  As picket lines were established on November 29th, about 600 workers walked 
off the job.  Once news of the strike came to Winter Haven, the KKK organized a parade for Lakeland on 
August 31st, and told citizens that "strikers and radicals will not be tolerated."  With the intensity 
increasing as the year closed, the strike was called off and no bargaining contract or negotiation 
agreement was made.  An example of some of the negatives created by the UCAPAWA, the efforts of 
Henderson and Edward Norman in Florida "reinforced the already widespread belief that organized 
labor and communism were indistinguishable."388 
 In the Southwest, the UCAPAWA met similar difficulties related to the work and involvement of 
communists in unionizing drives.  Emma Tenayuca represented the kind of American labor activist who 
participated in communist political meetings and union organizing because of its tangential connection 
to promoting civil rights and social justice as opposed to Marxism-Leninism and the overthrow of the 
state.  Tenayuca admitted that her commitment to the Party's ideological foundations was minimal at 
best.389  She became active in 1938 when the Pecan Shelling Workers Union (PSWU-UCAPAWA) put up 
resistance to Julius Seligmann and his Southern Pecan Company.  The strike against Southern Pecan 
proved to be a decisive moment in Texas labor history, and remains a primary example of how 
communist labor organizing could act as a progenitor for a much large social struggle.  Seligmann, the 
Texas "Pecan King," employed nearly 12,000 workers, 90% of whom were women who lived in the West 
Side of San Antonio.  Collectively, the workers shelled about 15 million pounds of pecans per year and 
netted the company a significant profit margin by avoiding machine shelling, keeping the cost of 
production relatively low.  The burden of intense, high-speed labor thus fell onto the individual workers 





payroll took home $192 annually.  It amounted to some of the lowest wages in the country and kept the 
workforce dependent on Seligmann's employment to survive.  Between 1934 and 1937, the Southern 
Pecan Company enjoyed relative ease with the lack of overt protection for agricultural workers from the 
Wagner Act.390   
Strikes at Southern Pecan were regular from 1934 onwards; however a company union was the 
sole bargaining agent for workers.  UCAPAWA’s San Antonio Local 172 was established in 1937, but it 
took Emma Tenayuca to turn the tide for the workers.391  She seized the moment on January 31 1938, 
after Seligmann posted a 15% paycut, increased unpaid "homework," and the company issued a refusal 
to address the "deplorable" plant conditions.  She ordered a walkout by the shellers, to which “six to 
eight thousand” employees of Seligmann's 170 shelling plants responded.392  It was not long after the 
walkout that she was elected strike organizer and PSWU lead negotiator by the mostly Mexican-
American, and mostly women, shellers.393  Tenayuca directed the striker’s attention to a combination of 
both the failure of Seligmann to properly address concerns as well as “the city’s miserly public 
assistance, the refusal of firms to hire mexicano [sic] workers into skilled jobs, and the terrible living 
conditions on the West Side.”394   
The Socialist Appeal reported over 700 arrests after the strike began, with numerous strikers 
held in jail without charges.  In the midst of the strike, the SWP encouraged its national base to focus 
attention and donate in order to provide relief to UCAPAWA organizers.395  The incident turned for the 
worse in August, 1939, when the KKK organized local citizens to storm the city's municipal auditorium 
during a speech given by Tenayuca.  Threatening to lynch Tenayuca and her closest supporters, the mob 
formed "the largest riot ever in San Antonio."  Tenayuca and her supporters escaped out a back exit, 
eventually finding a way to secretly leave town.396  The initial battle met fierce resistance by San Antonio 
police, who rather than address the KKK moved in on the union and arrested all leading UCAPAWA 





the incident prompted many citizens of San Antonio to take an active participation in the city's labor 
struggles.397    By this point, the strike had “taken on the aspect of a mass uprising among the Mexican-
Americans in the entire West Side of San Antonio.”  While many of those who participated were part of 
the union or the labor community, many others were, in the words of activist George Lambert, just 
concerned about “improving on the poor conditions on the West Side.”398 
The turnout of the riot, particularly the response by police, caught the attention of the national 
UCAPAWA as well as the CIO.  They also found their assigned organizers arrested and detained when 
trying to take control of the situation locally.399  Once CIO leaders and Henderson arrived, the lines were 
“blurred” between the strike and the community protest against city conditions.  As Krochmal described 
it, the strike “rattled the city machine.”  In the eyes of San Antonio’s handful of business elites, a united 
West Side “threatened to disrupt” their control over City Hall.  Local police Chief Owen Kilday, who 
treated the event as a means from preventing “a communist-led uprising along class lines,” insisted that 
he did not interfere with the strike, but rather he “interfered with a revolution.”400  Two things resulted; 
first, the Texas State CIO council took over negotiations from the PSWU, and second, the CPUSA 
informed Henderson that continued financial support to his union was conditional upon downplaying 
the role of Tenayuca in further strike efforts.f  Henderson and the rest of UCAPAWA recognized that 
their communist identities were hurtful toward the union’s purpose, and set themselves aside to allow a 
friendlier ‘CIO’ face to handle the formal negotiations.401  While local “ordinary mexicano pecan shellers” 
did not embrace the ideals of communism, it is important to not make the mistake of omitting 
ideological agency and ignore the role played by organizers like Tenayuca in the incident; but rather to 
see them and her as a fundamental motivating element in linking the conditions of the West Side with 
the demands of the workforce in San Antonio.  Alberta Zepeda Snid, who joined the strike after local 
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UCAPAWA organizers came to her neighborhood, remembered “interacting with Communist Party 
officials, other mexicano leaders from the Workers Alliance,” and unionists because “being united is 
power regardless.”402 
 To take over the strike, Henderson sent Luisa Moreno, a skilled contract negotiator and feminist 
organizer, to replace Tenayuca.403  Moreno had a long career in grassroots organizing prior to joining the 
CPUSA in 1930.  In 1929, she organized co-workers into a garment workers’ union in East Harlem, then 
was hired by the AFL in 1935 to organize Latina and African American cigar rollers, all before ending up 
with UCAPAWA by 1938.404  The decision to remove Tenayuca from a central role in the strike was not 
taken lightly by Tenayuca or her close supporters, who ignored the CPUSA's request and continued their 
work in the strike.  Kilday also refused to back down, and promoted an anticommunist smear campaign 
to disrupt the strike while protecting scab workers on their way to the shelling plants.  Kilday believed 
he was preventing a popular insurrection, and gained further support from local conservative, anti-
unionist citizens in pushing back strike efforts.  Tenayuca instructed the union workers to take a passive-
aggressive stance by not looking directly into the eyes of police, avoiding agitation such as spitting, and 
following all city ordinance laws.  Despite this, a few workers vandalized pecan shipments and police 
cars, resulting in a crackdown by Kilday.  Following the damaging of property, police began to physically 
break the strike by using teargas to disperse crowds and clubbing those who refused to leave.  More 
often than not, Kilday’s efforts were endemic of excessive police brutality, including incidences of 
clubbing women and children.  Those who had the misfortune of being caught usually found their entire 
family sitting with them in jail.405 
 The San Antonio incident caught the attention of Texas State Governor James Allred, who 
viewed the KKK riot at the auditorium and ongoing strike by the workers as a "popular uprising."406  
Desiring a swift end, Allred warned Kilday that if his unit was incapable of restoring order the Texas 





the UCAPAWA as the source of agitation when the Texas Industrial Commission opened up public 
hearings for the workers.  The most discussed issue in the hearings was the possible civil rights violations 
done by Kilday's police officers against the workers for their choice in union membership and political 
affiliations.  To both Kilday and Governor Allred's relief, Seligmann stepped in to end the debate by 
recognizing UCAPAWA Local 172 as the sole bargaining agent for his pecan shellers, thirty-seven days 
into the strike.  Unbeknownst to the shellers, this victory was short-lived as mechanization and a more 
efficient industrial shelling system left many of Local 172's workers unemployed the following season.  
Local 172 continued to fight for those who kept their jobs at Seligmann's company, but overall union 
activity dropped significantly after the strike of 1938.  Tenayuca left the town blacklisted and found 
employment in Houston under a pseudonym.  To rescue Tenayuca from public defamation of character, 
the CPUSA nominated her for the San Antonio Candidate for Congress.  From then on, Tenayuca's active 
organizing work was predominantly political for the next year until she got married and moved to San 
Francisco.407  Tenayuca's work in the Pecan Shellers' strike has been called the origin of the Hispanic 
Workers' Movement by the AFL-CIO as the "fearless and effective union activist" encouraged young 
Mexican-American women to stand up for their rights as citizens and as human beings.408 
The last UCAPAWA local established prior to 1939 was Local 64 in San Diego by the workers of 
the Van Camp Seafood Company (VanCo), the precursor to the contemporary Chicken of the Sea 
Company.  The union gained traction between fall of 1938 and winter of 1939 as it fought off racism and 
red-baiting tactics used by a local chapter of the Ku Klux Klan, and later gained acknowledgement by 
Henderson as one of the most important fights "popularizing the conditions of black and Mexican 
American workers."  Within a year of establishing the grounds for the local in May of 1939, VanCo 
signed a contract guaranteeing Local 64 as the sole bargaining agent.409  Apart from being a successful 





but did catch the attention of union organizers.  This helped the union stand out during a time when 
red-baiting threatened to destroy gains made. 
 Back in California, UCAPAWA locals led two final fights near the end of the 1939 season: One 
against CalSan and one in Madera County.  In Madera, cotton pickers had been pressuring for better 
wages since 1933, when a massive strike over base wages and going rates turned into “the largest 
agricultural strike in California history.”410  In March 1939, farm supervisors from over seven San Joaquin 
Valley counties met in Madera to plan how to limit the power of increasing numbers of migrants into 
their cotton-picking workforce.  Nationally, concern about low wages and poor working conditions in the 
cotton industry had become a major concern as demonstrated by a cultural mileu of novels and 
testimonies identified by historian Devra Weber.  In the start of October, pickers were on strike again 
with Mexican-American workers playing “a role disproportionate to their numbers.”  Cotton pickers in 
Madera were joined by sheep shearers and other field workers’ locals through the help of UCAPAWA 
organizer and secretary for the Shafter Local, Stephen Rodriguez.  Rodriguez, in turn, found assistance 
from other Mexican-American organizations such as Labor’s Non-Partisan League, the Workers Alliance, 
and Josefina Fierro de Bright and Eduardo Quevedo, two leaders of the Congresso del Pueblo de Habla 
Española, also known as the Spanish-Speaking People’s Congress.411   
To generate momentum, Rodriguez’s local used local recruitment camps setup within the FSA 
relief camps just outside Madera County.  Once ready, UCAPAWA demanded $1.25 per 100 pounds of 
cotton as a set wage, and asked that wages be placed “on a sliding scale to be renegotiated with price 
increases.”412  Strikers started on October 12th by mass picketing outside cotton ranches.     By October 
15th, 90% of the workforce was on strike, mimicking the tactics used in 1933 which included using 
caravans of cars sent from FSA camps to showcase signs in support of the strike and cut off strike 
breakers.  The strike spread to other areas of the valley, with walkouts confirmed in Fresno, Kern 





outside the Madera County courthouse, the movement was multiethnic and embodied the previous 
traditions of UCAPAWA as an inclusive union.413  To resist the strikers, the Associated Farmers criticized 
UCAPAWA and the People’s Congress as “headed by nationally known communists” and “following in 
the footsteps of Hitler and Stalin.”414  With UCAPAWA operating on only three organizers in the valley, 
the strike became more localized and responsibility for sustaining the energy of the strike was left to the 
workers.  Once it became clear to the Associated Farmers that they were dealing with a strike that 
rivaled the size of 1933, they sought government help and at the grassroots level farmers threatened to 
lynch non-white strikers.415  Even after physical assaults were made, the State of California made no 
effort to intervene.  In the end, the strength of the growers mixed with the “reluctance” of state relief 
administrators in supporting the strikers to create to the most significant loss of UCAPAWA’s history.  It 
was also the first instance where Henderson’s original goal of expanding New Deal programs to 
agricultural workers.416 
At CalSan, Healey took another commanding role in a strike made up of mostly Mexican, 
Russian, and Jewish immigrants.  Healey described the work against CalSan as her first action as a 
"feminist," fighting explicitly for rights to address the needs of working women and expanding the 
union’s scope.417  The fight against CalSan utilized local YCL chapters who were eager to assist Healey 
and her efforts.  Students and young communists flocked to Healey for advice, direction, and to find 
ways to get involved.  Making matters easier for the UCAPAWA, the chartered AFL Local No. 21,138 had 
become increasingly unpopular among CalSan employees by 1939.  Healey and the local UCAPAWA 
leadership seized the moment to charter Local 75 the same year, banking on those workers who felt 
dissatisfied with or untrustworthy of the AFL Local.418 
 To get the workers involved quickly, Local 75 took their fight directly to the homes of the 
Shapiros.  In August of 1939, they picketed and caused various noise disturbances throughout the night.  





of food processing plant owners.  The vast bulk of community support came from Los Angeles Jewish 
organizations.  These organizations, seeking to support the Jewish contingent of the striking workers and 
reject the aggressive bargaining tactics of the Shapiro’s as bad for the community, began to condemn 
the Shapiros’ business practice publicly.   Shapiro then called for a midnight bargaining session with the 
leaders of Local 75, Healey, and members of the Jewish organizations, and UCAPAWA received 
recognition as the sole bargaining agent.419 
 Healey and Henderson handled the UCAPAWA's over-arching strategy remarkably for its size 
and limited staffing capacity.  While Local 75 secured its slow victory over the CalSan, Healey also 
worked with California State Assemblyman Samuel Yorty to organize walnut workers on the other side 
of Los Angeles.  Yorty was known as a 'red assemblyman' for his association with figures like Healey and 
Henderson but also for his strong public support for grassroots unionism.  In 1938, due to a confession 
made by an associate, Arthur Kent, Yorty was charged as a communist from the California division of the 
House Un-American Activities Committee.  Yorty's popularity among leftists and communists, however, 
had little to do with his actual ideology and more to do with his actions and stances on particular issues, 
such as his membership in the American League Against War and Fascism and his championing of 
political unity to combat the rise of European fascism.  In an era where Roosevelt followed isolationist 
policies despite his fears of European totalitarianism, Yorty banked his political popularity on pressing 
for a more critical view of passivity and neutrality.420 
 Throughout these events, relationships developed among the UCAPAWA, the CPUSA, and the 
state government through the cooperative activity of the Farm Security Administration (FSA).  
Commonly remembered in literature by Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath, the camps setup by the FSA 
facilitated the purpose of providing a stable center for laborers to live while searching for temporary or 
permanent employment.  UCAPAWA locals such as Rodriguez’s in Madera and the Los Angeles district 





particularly noted the advantage of "a relative stability and continuity in the camps; when you went 
back, you could find the same workers you talked to the previous time and sign them up."421  Working in 
the camps demonstrate how relationships among the Party, their supportive unions, and state 
organizations helped mature younger communists like Healey.  It gave them a political perspective on 
the possible benefits certain political actions and actors could have for unions and their members.  
Healey noted how these experiences taught her that "the fact someone works for the government 
doesn't mean that they've been coopted and sold out" and that "it can make an enormous difference 
what administration is in power and what kind of appointments they make."422  Direct experiences such 
as these likely contributed toward Healey's worldview as a communist during the Popular Front more 
than any resolution made in Moscow, or even from the higher echelons of the CPUSA.  Many American 
communists like Healey simply learned that to be a good communist you had to keep your hands busy 
and obtain real results for American workers. 
 It was difficult for organizers within UCAPAWA who worked with communists to maintain their 
ties once the world got closer to war.  As early as 1938, the House Un-American Activities Committee 
held a series of hearings which honed in on the CIO for "harboring hundreds of communist organizers."  
Several active labor Communists faced increasing scrutiny within their workshops, but typically not from 
the workers.  Until the Nazi-Soviet Pact became a reality, the CPUSA routinely ignored the HUAC/Dies 
Committee investigations.  To the CPUSA Central Committee, such accusations came off as bleak efforts 
to accuse communists of being Un-American and subversive.  After the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Committees 
"adopted much more direct and threatening tactics" in specific cities such as Baltimore and Chicago in 
order to root out communists organizing for labor.423  The Pact, according to Sun columnist C.P. Ives, 
"stripped Stalinist communism of its 'recent aura of romanticism.'"  Ives charged that American 
communists were "agents in good standing of a foreign dictatorship which is only technically friendly 





friendly."424  On the grassroots level, individual communists faced a growing intolerance within their 
areas of activity―first from union leaders and regional organizers, eventually to the point where the 
political atmosphere no longer permitted an open admission of communist affiliations. 
 In the months leading up to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the UCAPAWA had roughly 93,000 contracted 
beet-pickers and nearly 100,000 cannery workers under its banner.  Stretching across lettuce, cherry, 
and nut industries, the union commanded enough labor power to rival the United Auto Workers (UAW) 
in size and scope.  In August of 1938, however, Henderson faced public scrutiny when the New York 
Times labeled him as a "red" and the UCAPAWA as a "communist ruled" front bent on overthrowing the 
government.425  The article, and the public scrutiny that followed, were promoted by AFL President John 
P. Frey, who subsequently prompted the House Un-American Activities Committee to begin an open 
investigation of CIO-affiliated unions, including the UAW and the UCAPAWA.  Frey's continuous public 
scrutiny of non-AFL unions was an iconic example of so-called "commonsense anticommunism."426  After 
the article, Henderson and the Union continued its interracial organizing campaign by targeting 
Memphis, Tennessee.  There, union leader and CPUSA member Harry Koger built a stronghold local out 
of mostly African-American cotton stocking and seed oil processing workers.427 Koger joined the 
agricultural labor movement in 1938 when he served as a regional director for UCAPAWA locals in Texas 
and Oklahoma.  Within under a year, he was organizing various locals utilizing a key tactic that worked 
around anticommunist fears.428  Koger won over the Memphis workers with his appeals to southern 
hospitality and Christian values which, to him, "supported class struggle, equal rights, and socialism."429   
By 1941, women were encouraged to continue to take leadership roles in the UCAPAWA.  A 
prime example came from Local 92, organized by Luisa Moreno with help from CalSan Local 75, also 
known as the California Walnut Workers Association (CWWA-UCAPAWA).  The mostly female, non-white 
work force of 500 gravitated toward UCAPAWA's appeals to gender and racial equality and linked it with 





concerns: violations of the Wagner Act which gave the union precedent and an advantage in opening up 
bargaining agreements.  The union leadership found that growers were routinely "firing union 
organizers and had setup a company union," that made in near impossible for workers to present 
grievances.431  Having been through this fight before, Healey filed charges of unfair bargaining practices 
with the NLRB, making it the first time since the battle in Salinas that the UCAPAWA had taken its issues 
to the national level and the first time Healey got to witness the process.432 
 The UCAPAWA managed to stand out from most other unions in the communist orbit in that it 
was not an explicit Party organization, such as the TUUL.  Instead, throughout the 1938-1939 seasons, 
UCAPAWA presented itself as an arbiter of agricultural workers against the power and influence of the 
GSA, corporate unions, and conservative AFL locals throughout southern California and Texas.  Their 
method of organizing specific grower-dependent industries as a basis for organizing others created a 
foundation upon which the union steadily built membership.  Henderson, Healey, Tenyuaca and other 
professional organizers within the UCAPAWA, however, were dues-paying members of the CPUSA, or 
affiliated with a regional communist club, such as the Los Angeles Workers' Association.  Those who 
were not part of the CPUSA found themselves surrounded by advocates and activists who identified 
with communism and linked the practices of the GSA to the overall failure of capitalism to offer a fair 
deal to workers.433  Although the organization went through intense scrutiny during and after World 
War II, the UCAPAWA remained in the eyes of communist labor organizers a primary example of how 
the shifts in communist labor strategy of the early 1930s did not necessarily require or expect support 
and policy endorsement by the CPUSA.  Rather, the organizers of the UCAPAWA focused on the practical 
necessities of agricultural workers within existing labor law and seized the momentum in the late 1930s 
to build the union into the Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allies Workers (FTA-CIO), one of the largest 





 Not all communist-backed unions or members shared the rapid success of the UCAPAWA.  Many 
unions that followed a similar path, especially those created by the TUUL, faced growing condemnation 
from the AFL.  AFL anticommunism traced back to before World War I, but the intensity and ferocity by 
which it developed during the 1930s reached an early peak in 1927 when American trade unionists, 
including John L. Lewis and future Illinois senator Paul Douglas, visited the Soviet Union to discuss the 
nature of the Comintern and the American communist movement.  While the delegation returned to 
pronounce the legitimacy of the American communist movement and the need to diplomatically 
recognize the USSR, the AFL sided with former Menshevik revolutionary Alexander Kerensky in rejecting 
both conclusions.  Historians have since drawn a distinction between the "armchair anticommunism" of 
anti-radical authors and activists such as Elizabeth Dilling, who "had little occasion to contend with 
actual communists in their daily life," and the "commonsense anticommunism" found in AFL leaders.  
While antiradicals drew connections between Communist theory and anti-Christian or anti-American 
values, the leaders of the AFL understood American Communism "as a much more delimited 
phenomenon that was manifest in communists' observable activities organizing workers and activists 
into parties and unions."435  
The AFL was not the sole bastion of pre-World War II anticommunism in the sphere of labor that 
made it difficult for communists to continue their engagement with the Popular Front after 1936.  The 
early days of the UAW from 1935 to 1937 were riddled by attempts from conservatives to brand 
“nativism” as part of local workers’ movements in rising areas of labor activity such as Detroit.  Many of 
the foreign-language workers, such as those in the Polish and Jewish communities, did not join the 
Automotive Industrial Workers’ Association (AIWA), the early precursor to the UAW, in 1935.  Because 
of the lack of participation by non-Catholic and non-Lutheran workers within the local Detroit 
community, which did not pick up until mid-1936, the “political weight” of the earlier, anticommunist, 





subsequent UAW.436  To combat the rising influence of communist organizing, the AFL's anticommunists 
and UAW nativists simply told workshop recruits about working conditions in the USSR to link domestic 
efforts with international communism while emphasizing that "desperation was the breeding ground of 
radicalism."437  Pre-war anticommunism, however, lacked the social estrangement where domestic 
communist activity was understood as fundamentally anti-American.  As such, many communists simply 
continued their work albeit with less overt ideological overtones.  
 The isolated few unions that could avoid most of the stigma of pre-war anticommunism, such as 
the UCAPAWA, were ideal unions for communist labor organizers to work within.  Among the largest 
unions in the nation, the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America (UE), contained by 
far the largest percentage of communist members within the industrial working community.  In the late 
1930s, it was "the largest and most powerful organization run by communists and their allies" mainly 
due to growing alongside the increases in production leading up toward World War II.  By 1945, it was 
the third largest member of the CIO, and had the highest proportion of women out of all unions 
represented.438  The UE was perhaps the best example of a 'flagship' communist union, an organization 
that typified the ideals of the Party line.  UCAPAWA, however, was more dynamic in its reach and 
effectiveness because of its lack of rigid Party control and the more grassroots-level presence of 
communist organizers.  Some of UCAPAWA’s organizers were Party stalwarts, but others were 
“independent leftists who had been schooled in a political culture strongly influenced by communist 
views on race.”439  The work of historian Vicki Ruiz revealed a “more complex picture” made up of 
Marxist board members who were better trade unionists than communists and some were “better 
described as ‘just good liberals.’”  Neither the UE or UCAPAWA gained traction exclusively through rank-
and-file communist organizing or "boring from within" AFL locals, but the latter demonstrated the 





Although methodology was integral to CPUSA, CLA, and SWP locals throughout the 1930s, many 
of the unions that came into the orbit of American Communism did so "because [their] leaders recruited 
communists as staff members and organizers."  This was much less a matter of choosing ideology over 
effective organizers as much as it was the simple fact that at times communists were more effective 
labor organizers than they were political advocates.440  Henderson was a Party man prior his work in the 
UCAPAWA and some of his best organizers got their training in CPUSA district locals.  Although the UE's 
president was not a member of the CPUSA or SWP, his two top officers and a large percentage of his 
staff were.  For the UE and UCAPAWA, this process produced admirable results.  In other efforts, such as 
with the Denver-based International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (Mine-Mill), the coalition 
was unstable and prone to infighting as the communist leadership's priorities conflicted with ethnic and 
racial tensions on the shop floor.441  Union in-fighting such as those at Mine-Mill not only made 
organizing difficult, it also cultivated an atmosphere where anticommunism quickly served the needs of 
workers looking to oust their communist union members.   
 The burgeoning anticommunism present in the labor movement served as a basis for filtering 
out into political work after World War II, as the very presence of communists in political and labor 
organizations was used to justify their persecution.  It was only after World War II that the social 
estrangement of communism as an ideology brought on by the Cold War took root.  Afterward, 
American communists in public opinion went from committing acts of radicalism to acts of treason.  
UCAPAWA and other unions influenced by communist organizers and leadership nevertheless impacted 
a significant portion of the American economy.  A large majority of American communists outside of 
these unions instead turned to existing unions and the emerging CIO under John L. Lewis to solidify their 
goals. This was particularly the case in industries where communist presence extended back for more 
than a decade:  shipping, auto manufacturing, mining, and steelwork.  For active Communists from 1933 





period."442  This perception reflected the growing militancy of industrial unionists to distance themselves 
from craft unions--such as Lewis' punching of 'Big Bill' Hutcheson in the jaw because of "the fighting 
image that appealed to advocates of industrial unionism."443   
Communist Labor Organizing During the Popular Front, 1934-1939 
 For those communists not working in a large multi-state union like the UCAPAWA, working 
within the local industrial scene was the only means for securing further support among American 
workers.  To build their movement in Detroit, communists and fellow travelers sought representation 
from CPUSA and ILD lawyers like Maurice Sugar, who attempted to create a systematic approach to 
industrial unionism based on working cooperatively with members of the community, local labor 
organizations, and civil rights groups.  It was in this way that the labor world of American Communism 
split over into both political and community work.  In many respects, the flow of methodology between 
the labor and the community world was inward; the community at large typically dictated the 
organizational methods that would prove most effective.  The flow of methodology between the labor 
world and the political world was reversed; more often than not organizational methods attempted to 
influence political policy.  Even if regional differences such as those explained by UCAPAWA necessitated 
particular strategies, organizers like Healey found themselves routinely explaining justification of their 
methods to local and national-level CPUSA leaders.   
 The strategy of working with both political and community groups for labor organizing dictated 
involvement across various social spheres; communist labor clubs or shop-nuclei were both in the 
workplace and in the communities.  Communist labor organizers utilized a wide range of methods for 
meeting with associates in local bars, at picnics, or at formally organized Party meetings that it is 
questionable if they were even 'methods' as much as they were 'meeting with friends.'444  As well, 
regionally active communist political organizing went hand-in-hand with promoting labor and civil rights 





ideology at the national level and localized into a common effort at the city level.  Such was the case 
with Sugar and his strategy for Detroit.  Starting in December of 1934, Sugar, working with William 
Weinstone of the CPUSA, Baptist Pastor Reverend A.C. Williams, and Detroit Board of Education 
member Crawford Nelson, crafted a general legal strategy for the city that sought mayoral and court 
affirmation of the right to organize and picket, rejected factory spying, and attacked production 
speedups.  Ultimately, Sugar and his associates attempted to link the plight of workers with the 
international struggle against fascism by building a community resistance effort against local employer 
business practices deemed tyrannical.445 
 Like many American communists pursuing a broad strategy, Sugar and his associates in Detroit 
understood that their efforts mixed at times with a battle against ethnic divisions and workplace 
discrimination.  Additionally, the lack of union membership among Detroit workers made the existing 
organizing strategies suggested by Weinstone and the CPUSA nearly impossible.  To Sugar, this 
battleground was not new.  He had gained notoriety in labor circles for pushing back against the 
Michigan alien-registration law of 1931, which many throughout Detroit took as an attack on Jewish-
born communists.  Building off this resume, and his recent experience with Soviet workers, Sugar 
organized for the Detroit Federation of Labor (DFL) in early 1935.  He began a two-month tour of eighty-
four different union locals, auto plants making up the dominant portion.  For Sugar, however, like much 
of the Party's labor functionaries, preaching to the already organized about future union prospects 
remained a secondary goal at best.  Instead, the "main goal" was to organize those untouched by the 
unions but still present in working-class communities―the "the mass of Detroit workers who through 
fear, ignorance, or ideology kept trade unionism at a distance."  To accomplish this, "communist-
sponsored organizations" setup contact points where individual workers would meet with passionate 
and ideologically-driven activists.  The first official formal gathering of Sugar, his associates, and 





and raised money for branch leaders with a banquet open to all working families of the city.  Meetings 
such as this "in turn led to appearances before gatherings of the same ethnic group that were not 
necessarily left-wing."  They then served as a basis for communist organizers to reach out across ethnic 
lines and bring them into the union community of mostly white auto workers.446   
 From 1936 to 1941, Sugar spent the majority of his time "revealing the layer upon layer of 
repressive instruments, legal and illegal, that had hamstrung the labor movement [of Detroit] for so 
long."447  During that time, he worked as the legal representative of Local 600 of the UAW, not shying 
away from his Party affiliations in the communist-friendly local.448  Detroit's companies, not unlike 
Sugar's labor legal strategy, built a massive umbrella that linked various political and community groups 
together to combat the tide of labor.  Sugar tried to expose how the Detroit-based antilabor strategists 
at Ford and GM developed a "hegemonic apparatus" that "included civic groups, fraternal organizations, 
many churches, and the schools" in order to promote the "values of rugged individualism" and the 
"'natural' capacity of male WASPs to lead."  He did so through speaking tours of the workshops and 
union halls to describe the auto labor movement as a "two-front war" between the plants and the 
workers on the one hand and the industry and city life in general on the other.  Sugar's main target was 
the white supremacist Black Legion, which had a rather substantial enclave in Detroit by 1938.449 
 In workshops where Party presence was a familiar expectation, social camaraderie strengthened 
ties between workers.  Local 600 was known for its indirect affiliations with the local CPUSA branch of 
Detroit, particularly its defense councils.  With a flat fee of only $3 per year, per worker, the union 
provided an internal support for ease and efficiency.  Elements of the Party's organizational efforts in 
Detroit blended into the fraternal community of Local 600.  Local 600's basic correspondence paperwork 
mimicked the jargon and prose of common CPUSA publications such as The Daily Worker and The 
Communist when discussing union grievances and demands.  Throughout all of the correspondence 





language of camaraderie worked to further instill the social notion of solidarity among fellow employees 
within a specific workplace.  Local 600 also supported its members beyond their employment, providing 
instruction to "assist [members] in seeking or obtaining employment after alleged discrimination and 
discharge."450 
 While Henderson organized field and cannery workers under the umbrella of a non-communist 
industrial union in California and Sugar worked with local Detroit organizations to cross ethnic and 
political boundaries, younger communists like Beatrice Lumpkin in New York City acted independently.  
In the years following the Seventh Congress of 1935, the CPUSA directed attention at continuing support 
for the Farmer-Labor Party to rally against the centrist policies of Roosevelt.  Regardless, communists 
such as Lumpkin did not fully share the Party's overarching conclusions about activism and instead used 
their political affiliation and Party stance to give meaning to their actions in workshops and 
communities.  Lumpkin viewed the Party-driven efforts to combat unemployment in urban areas as an 
effort to unveil the "hidden homelessness" of the Great Depression and present the conditions of the 
1930s in a manner that left no room for misinterpretation of the necessity of action.451  These grassroots 
communists took their Party affiliation and ideological connection to mean something passionate for 
their own actions while the whims and decisions of upper-ranking CPUSA bodies were not as significant 
as the identity of being a communist.  Thus, for a dedicated activist like Lumpkin, the CPUSA was an idea 
and symbol to rally behind―not a directive body from which to derive meaning and purpose. 
 At the age of 15 Lumpkin got her first job on the lower East side of New York City, building and 
sorting radio parts for the Eby Company.  After feeling shorted on her first paycheck and seeing quotas 
double after the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) instituted minimum wages, Lumpkin began to 
work with her local YCL chapter to try and organize the factory of about 100 women.  Lumpkin 
succeeded in gathering an organizing committee with recognized union cards, but her final year at high 





YCL for many years as a result of her early organizing work and experience.  Experiences such as the Eby 
Company convinced her and other young communists that "the YCL and the [U.S.] labor movement in 
general were another source of rich culture."  As teenagers, exploring the outdoors on weekends in the 
city meant climbing the roof of a local tenement building, where they "talked, laughed and sang 
movement songs until the sun came up."  At dawn, Lumpkin and her friends would begin a local Daily 
Worker route through the city and finish off their day at the beach.453   
 Lumpkin's experiences were common among other labor activists inside and outside the Party's 
political circle.  The social cohort of socialist and communist families, the community-style approach of 
organizing committees, and the work for the Party created an atmosphere for young communists where 
the philosophical and social arguments about labor in the United States manifested as truths, not 
debates.  Lumpkin described her experience with the YCL as one that provided "an escape route from 
the misery of the Depression."  She rationalized that the economic issues were "not the workers' fault," 
and that "blaming oneself for not having a job was self-destructive and paralyzing."  Witnessing the legal 
effects of the NIRA "taught [Lumpkin] that it paid to fight" and that there was "joy in the struggle" since 
it forced more radical measures out of politicians.454  Historian Michael Goldfield argued a similar point 
when he described the NIRA as a result of the pressure felt by government officials over the "increasing 
strength and influence of radical organizations, particularly the Communist Party."455  Between 1935 and 
1937, thousands of young Americans found themselves exposed to pan-Socialist Left labor theory via 
associations with either the YCL, a local communist club, or―as Len DeCaux put it―through "Brother X 
of the AFL, Comrade Y of the Socialist Party, Fellow Worker Z of the IWW."   Many American communist 
labor activists identified this "not only by what they advocated, but by the way they went about 
things."456 
 Other younger and community-level communist activists approached their labor organizing 





organizing was concentrated among miners and industrial workers.  Hudson and his Birmingham 
comrades understood their job as needing to be personable and relatable to workers on an individual 
basis.  Unlike Lumpkin's fellow workers at the Eby Company, Birmingham workers were predominantly 
male and contained a sizable non-white contingent.  When faced with workers hesitant to join a political 
organization for reasons of being open to suspect, Hudson directed them to the ILD.457  Similar to 
Lumpkin's approach, however, Hudson utilized his local CPUSA district and YCL to reach out to 
steelworkers’ and miners’ families.  The goal was to link community-based issues to the plight of a 
divided labor force.  Hudson's district began to print Hot Blast, a paper aimed at addressing known 
grievances among the local working community and allowed individual miners to contribute stories.458 
 Throughout the mid-1930s, activist Len DeCaux remembered how communists like Lumpkin and 
Hudson were "behind the scenes" in almost every major rally or event.  Some made themselves known 
with either speeches to "unite the crafts into industrial unions" or to politically "recognize Soviet 
Russia."  But for organizers like DeCaux, while communists may have been "a problem to a lot of 
people," they understood the value they contributed outside of their political debates.459  Historian 
Roger Keeran commented on the conflict between most writing on American communists in labor and 
the different conclusions drawn from investigating their involvement in CIO unionism.  Rather than be 
seen as illegitimate or lacking significance, more recent historical evidence suggests that "[communists] 
were legitimate, even exemplary trade unionists, that they played an important, even crucial role in the 
development of [the United Auto Workers], and that they were as good Communists as they could have 
been under the circumstances.460  This helps explain the rapid success of communist activity in CIO-
based unionism between 1935 and 1937.  Such was the case with the United Laundry Workers (ULWU) 
of New York City, where Lumpkin got her first real hands-on experience in organizing the unorganized in 





 The ULWU managed to succeed in organizing 20,000 city laundry workers within about two 
months that summer.  In June alone, the union grew from 2,750 to 11,000.  This succeeded in part 
because the ULWU organized all workers throughout the industry―including service, maintenance, 
production workers, and even the lunch kitchen staff.  Lumpkin worked on the CIO organizing 
committee and helped link the hundreds of plants scattered across the city.  Meeting directly with 
workers to collect grievances and sign union cards, Lumpkin and her team of hand-picked organizers 
built the local movement on the central issues brought forth by laundry workers: "miserable wages, long 
hours, hot heavy work, sexism and racism."  Of the 30 organizers working with the laundry workers, half 
were active in either the YCL or the CPUSA.  This was common in most industries where the YCL had a 
local presence throughout the city, and YCL organizers within the ULWU regularly committed to 
unlimited hours, sometimes reaching 16 more or day, as the case of Lumpkin.  With pay set at only $10 
per day, Lumpkin survived by living at home with her parents throughout most of the summer.462 
 In the years leading up to World War II, Lumpkin persisted to "overcome divisions" that existed 
in the working spheres of America for decades, built on sex and race.  These divisions proved both 
difficult and abrasive barriers to union organizers.  For Lumpkin and the ULWU, the workers essential to 
the success of the union that summer were predominantly black kitchen workers.  She noted that, while 
many African American workers were inclined to work with the union since it was legally backed by the 
NIRA, some were "concerned about the sincerity of the union leadership."  Lumpkin interpreted this as a 
reference to the mostly white, mostly male union organizing committee.  As a response, Lumpkin and 
her associates encouraged the workers to remain active and persistently attend meetings in order to 
address grievances directly to the organizing committee.  By the end of the summer in 1937, Lumpkin 
decided not to return to college as the union's need to persist in facilitating cooperation became both 





passion the DeCaux emphasized about American communists that occurred in the streets and at the 
grassroots, typically among younger organizers.  
World War II and the Erosion of the Communist Labor World 
 The announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the war in September, 1939 hit communist 
activism in the American labor movement hard.  Prior to the pact, many union organizers such as 
Dorothy Healey from the UCAPAWA emphasized the communist message of an antifascist crusade on 
behalf of the working people of the world for years.  This message clashed with the reality of the Soviet 
Union's willingness to ally with Nazi Germany.  Even under the auspices of preventing war and 
protecting Soviet national security, the Pact was difficult to accept.  A few dedicated organizers such as 
Emma Tenayuca became so disillusioned by the Pact's meaning that they left the CPUSA and cut ties 
with communists.  Party loyalists and ideologically committed organizers like Healey accepted that the 
Pact resulted from a struggle between European powers and the desire by the USSR to do something as 
a means of checking Hitler's expansionism.  Other views built off the continuous fear that Western 
leaders desired Hitler to attack the USSR.  After all, all sects of communists dating back to the 1928/29 
split feared that war with the USSR by Western nations was inevitable.  "I think the Soviet Union was 
probably justified, had no alternative," Healey explained, "there was no question that the main powers 
were trying to turn Nazi Germany solely toward attacking the Soviet Union."464  Nevertheless, the labor 
world of American Communism fractured in 1939 and this fracture contributed toward a gradual 
breakdown of active communist unionists and unions up through 1946. 
 In late August, 1939, the dominant communist periodicals of the United States of each sect—the 
CPUSA's Communist, the Trotskyist Socialist Appeal and Militant, as well as the Lovestoneite Workers 
Age—all rushed to breakdown the grand significance of the Nazi-Soviet Pact for American labor activists.  
While the CPUSA reiterated the view that the Pact was evidence of peace assured by Stalin, the 





American workers.  The SWP desired to maintain an anti-war campaign among its constituent workers' 
locals, but also openly criticized the CPUSA for endorsing "a deal with fascists" while simultaneously 
trying to divide labor groups by labeling Trotskyists as "fascist."465  This move by the SWP would later 
prove a fatal error as anticommunist Smith Act trials began to target them after 1940.  Jay Lovestone 
and the Oppositionists, on the other hand, shared both hesitation and optimism about the short-
sightedness of the Pact's nature and the CPUSA's quick endorsement of Soviet actions.  Lovestone 
hoped the event served as "a signal for a reawakening of revolutionary thought and action in many 
sections of the labor movement hitherto paralyzed by Stalinist ideological perversion," and thereby 
could assist organizational matters where the Oppositionists held significant sway, such as the United 
Mine Workers and the International Lady Garment Workers' Union.466  The political leaders of the 
organizations were handicapped, however, at preventing the breakdown of their organizers' legitimacy 
amidst the Pact's fallout. 
 A prime example of the slow breakdown of openly communist activity in the labor sphere as a 
result of the fallout from 1939 occurred in 1941, in Maryland at the Industrial Union of Marine and 
Shipbuilding Workers of America (IUMSWA).  As a CIO affiliate, the union began organizing with the 
efforts of Carl Bradley, Norman Dorland, and James "Scotty" Atkins in early 1938.  By the summer of 
1939, it was voted as the collective bargaining agent for the repair shipyards at the Maryland Drydock.  
Bradley previously spent time fighting the fascists in Spain, and he returned a well known and 
passionate communist activist.  Dorland was an established CPUSA activist among labor groups.  A 
machinist, he left home in Minnesota to engage in organizing work for Bradley.  Both, by the end of the 
summer, established an aura of respectability and dedication to collective bargaining as blue-collared 
communists in the workplace.  In August of 1940, Dorland was elected president of Local 31 of the 





 In January of 1941, a year and four months into the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the IUMSWA passed a 
series of mandates that prevented active members from promoting or supporting "Nazism, 
Communism, or fascism" with the threat of expulsion for violators.  Bradley and Dorland found 
themselves in a tough situation; both were known Communists, but they were also both established and 
popular organizers among the workers within the union.  Despite their records of performance, William 
Smith, the IUMSWA regional director, preferred that charges be brought against the two.  Smith then 
sought to revoke the autonomy of Local 31 until new leadership could be obtained.  Dorland and 
Bradley resisted expulsion by organizing supporters from within the union and striking on the docks until 
they lost support by the National Maritime Union.  Finally, the U.S. Navy requested an arrest of the men 
at the drydock due to a perceived "security risk" by their presence.  When they asked for reinstatement 
in September, the convention committees refused to hear them speak.  For the following year, Bradley's 
concern shifted from bargaining for a better workplace to defending his constitutional rights.468  The 
early war years convinced communist organizers on the shop floor such as Bradley and Dorland that 
their freedom of speech and right to be communists was far more significant than an effort to fight for a 
particular union. 
 Overall, the fallout from the Nazi-Soviet Pact affected the political world of American 
Communism more than it did community or labor.  What filtered down into those spheres was the 
growing anticommunist sentiment of American politicians and increasing numbers of voters that served 
to slowly segregate active communists from their work and their unions.  Those who faced direct 
expulsion for their ideology, like Dorland and Bradley, shuffled back into the Party atmosphere and 
looked for organizing work.  Others, like Sugar, found ways to minimize their exposure as members and 
supporters of the CPUSA while continuing to pursue gains for workers during the war.  Nationally, to 
signal its commitment, the CPUSA endorsed a no-strike pledge during the war effort after June, 1941.  





relations in the workplace.  When A. Philip Randolph pushed for a march on Washington to promote 
more racial equality in the workplace between blacks and whites, Browder and the national Party 
leadership scolded him.  This is where grassroots American Communism pushed resistance to the upper 
Party functionaries.  The CPUSA's efforts to maintain a positive image with the American government 
and union leaders simultaneously pitted them against some of their bread-and-butter issues, such as 
challenging racism.  Still recovering from the Nazi-Soviet Pact, active communists in labor thus witnessed 
their decade-long built alliances and broad levels of support among workers fade in just three years.469 
 For many pro-active labor communists, the war and reemerging anticommunism did not negate 
the fact that American communists had been successful in improving the lives of American workers.  
Lumpkin obtained a more permanent job working through the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of 
America (ACWA) hiring hall and finished up her final year of college during 1939, only to pack her bags 
and shift back to Brooklyn by the end of the year.  By July, she was elected to the new local executive 
board as its educational director for ACWA Local 328, which organized for the workers of Spartan 
Laundry in the central part of the city.  Working with 328, Lumpkin developed what she described as 
"comradeship" with her coworkers and soon developed her own circle of followers.  It was under these 
conditions, and her popularity as a representative that earned her seat to the American Youth Congress 
(AYC) to meet with Eleanor Roosevelt.470   
 By 1940, the ACWA leadership began to respond to the growing anticommunist sentiment 
brought on by the Nazi-Soviet Pact.  Once the leadership honed in on Local 328, Lumpkin and her 
comrades organized an emergency meeting, where she was elected as a representative delegate to the 
ACWA convention, to which the Local was not invited.  Lumpkin and her fellow supporters arrived at 
Rochester to attend the ACWA national convention after an arduous night car trip through the 
Adirondack Mountains, carrying extra supporters on the running boards of their cars.  At only 21 years 





unjustly "appointed" representatives of Local 328 without seeking approval of the workers.471  
Unfortunately, Lumpkin's pleas fell on deaf ears, as she never made it to the floor and more state-based 
concerns of the union dominated the convention.   
 The ACWA leadership subsequently chose to "rid themselves of the troublemakers of Local 328" 
by issuing charges against the business agents of the Local, George McGriff and Michael Coleman.  To 
finalize the issue, the ACWA leadership bussed in numerous other Locals to the 328's membership 
meeting in March of 1941.  Their presence drowned out the local workers' pleas to support McGriff and 
Coleman.  By the end of spring, Local 328's leaders were put on trial in the ACWA as communists, 
effectively isolating Lumpkin as an active role model for the workers.  The Local's board was shut down 
after the ACWA committee determined that "the local was under the complete domination of a small 
group of officers who respected only the policy and discipline of the Communist Party."  Despite the 
setbacks, Lumpkin and her cadre collectively agreed that regardless of the ACWA's decision, their work 
won better working conditions.  It set a precedent for a strong union community by effectively 
educating workers about their rights and possibilities under the context of the Wagner Act.472  As the 
war continued, Lumpkin switched industries and began working as a drill press operator for Dictograph, 
a Queens machine shop, where once again her class conscious attitude landed her in a pitted battle 
against employers refusing to hire African Americans.473 
 Once the war became a "just war" for American communists following the invasion of the USSR 
by Nazi Germany during Operation Barbarossag in 1941, their activism in labor industries became more 
acute and embodied a more righteous sense of purpose.  Lumpkin described American communists as 
"passionate" about winning the war against fascism both at home and abroad.  Lumpkin linked the 
resistance fighters who fought in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade against fascists in Spain to the new effort, 
by 1941, to defeat fascism in Europe entirely.474  Russell Brodine gave up his position in the orchestra of 
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Los Angeles with an associate, Phil Goldberg, to work for Calship building Liberty ships.  Brodine trained 
as a welder as a side job while working with various orchestras during the late 1930s, but he viewed the 
job differently after the attack at Pearl Harbor.475  Blumberg, in Baltimore, encouraged the city's labor 
unions to pass "second-front resolutions," which stipulated the possibility of a general strike should 
Roosevelt rescind support for the Allies.  These actions, though noble, met with "mixed" responses by 
labor leaders, who were more interested in maintaining existing gains than expanding the influence of 
organized labor on foreign policy.  The Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America 
(IUMSWA) hosted a staged rally, where heavyweight champion Jack Dempsey pushed the CPUSA's calls 
for unity and intervention, but it had an unexpected result.  Rather than encourage other labor leaders 
and unions to accept the necessity of a second front, it evoked the notion that military decisions are 
best left to "experts" and that labor unions had little, if any, business in directing the affairs of the U.S. 
military.476 
 For Brodine and other working class communists after June, 1941, welding was more than just a 
side job.  With the war in full swing, it became a duty and a means for becoming involved in the effort to 
defeat fascism.477  It was these tiny shifts in activity that had great meaning for individual communists 
like Lumpkin and Brodine, particularly if it meant setting aside one's personal ambitions in the 
workplace.  The Party faced mixed results from its commitment to support the CIO's no-strike pledge.  
The pledge tacitly suggested that efforts to integrate African Americans into the workplace and to 
secure living wages and sustain families were contrary to the needs of the nation.  Many workers 
believed that the time was "ripe" for striking, even while working for war-related industries like Calship.   
For communists like Brodine, such an endeavor was more than serving the nation in its time of need.  It 
was simultaneously supporting one of the most dominant communist ideals of all―defeating ultra-right 
fascism.478  While five years prior, the CPUSA would have leapt at the opportunity to strike amidst a 





Board with grievances and pressured workers to maintain production.  Despite this ongoing 
commitment to patriotism and the war, the Party's stance nevertheless created more problems than it 
solved.479    
 The war saw the decline of some large unions dominated by communist activists, such as the 
UCAPAWA and Conference of Studio Unions (CSU).   By remaining committed to production and pushing 
grievances through the War Labor Relations Board, communists also lost prestige in their local union 
halls.480  While the War Labor Board maintained labor peace that allowed unions like UCAPAWA to make 
collective bargaining agreements, it also limited how much power these unions had in their agreements.  
Wage formulas and adherence to them further limited the possibilities of gains throughout the war 
period.  The CPUSA regional district in California and its affiliates, along with the independent, but allied, 
union groups agreed to the no-strike pledge and a limitation on slow downs for the UCAPAWA locals.  
This move, however, demanded conformity among the workers and upkeep on individual worker 
productivity, especially since UCAPAWA workers were involved in the production of agricultural goods.  
The stances of the Party and the desires of the workers quickly made it easy for union members to 
pinpoint who was and was not a communist organizer, and it served as a barometer of how much an 
individual sided with the union over the Party's ideals.481 
 While Healey and other union leaders gained some levels of traction in the early stages of the 
war, such as organizing an agreement for Val Vita workers in 1942 and the integration of non-
discriminatory policies into union hiring practices throughout Southern California, they also faced 
negotiating difficulties as the communist organizers became more visible in the wake of the Party's 
actions regarding the Nazi-Soviet Pact.482  Brodine faced similar scrutiny while working with the CSU in 
1945, which supported the no-strike pledge but was publicly condemned as "communist dominated."  
As the war approached its end, the CSU sought to maintain its strength against a rising rival, the 





and engaged in an illegal drawn-out strike against the production studios of Los Angeles―a risky move, 
but a successful one.  Before the year was done, the CSU successfully won the contract over the IATSE.  
The win came with a downside as it proved to be "an early indicator of what happened after the war," 
particularly the amplification of worker grievances previously "muted during the war on behalf of 
national unity."  As workers took advantage of the union's abandonment of the no-strike pledge, "a 
wave of militant strikes" broke out in early 1945 and exposed deep seated fears of communism in the 
responses by public officials and union leaders.483   
 As the need for national unity in the war effort waned in the early months of 1945, workers 
began to question just how useful their communist organizers were given that they sidelined worker 
grievances for the sake of a war effort they supported only after the Soviet Union faced annihilation.  By 
1944, the negative portrayal that had plagued the UCAPAWA since the pre-war period as "communist 
dominated" forced Henderson to change the name of the union to the Food, Tobacco, Agriculture, and 
Allied Workers of America (FTA) and broaden his constituency of union memberships.  Henderson and 
the FTA would later face CIO expulsion and disintegration after the passage of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, 
which stipulated that bargaining unions could not have communist ties.  In the years after the war, the 
labor world of American Communism faced a new working class, one that was both aware of its needs 
as well as the limitations that prevented workers from achieving them, particularly partisan and 
ideologically-committed activists.484 
 Throughout the Popular Front and American Communism's 'Moral Crusade' for the hearts and 
minds of American workers, individual communists displayed an expert capacity for leading as well as a 
handicap against further gains once public sentiment began to turn against Communism as an ideology.  
Leading strategists, such as Donald Henderson, Dorothy Healey, and Maurice Sugar, created a legal 
strategy tailored to the specific industries they sought to organize.  The strategies relied on the 





American communists in clubs across the nation such as Lumpkin, Brodine, and Healey, did not need 
instruction from their local Party nucleus on how to properly engage with workers of the machine, 
orchestra, or agricultural industries.  To active communist labor organizers, the CPUSA and the ideals of 
communism represented a framework and an outlook on the world; not a determinist schematic for 
how to develop a communist republic.  Communists throughout the labor world also found themselves 
creating a wedge between workers' needs at home and their ideological commitments abroad.  Some 
activists, such as Lumpkin, did indeed go above and beyond the normal requirements of an organizer 
and it often served as a basis for their subsequent roles as leaders in the labor movement.  The majority 
of communists active in labor by 1945, however, found themselves facing an uphill battle against unions 
who no longer desired to feel constrained by the ideals of Marxism-Leninism. 
Conclusion 
 The "heyday of American Communism" in the years between 1928 and 1945 has formed the 
focus of research done by historians, due to the movement's "special relationship to the Soviet Union."  
This relationship is canonized in the historiography after Theodore Draper and Davis Shannon's works in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s.  Historian Harvey Klehr later admitted that this depiction didn't obscure 
from the fact that many American communists were ordinary people who "came out of all 
environments, had all sorts of motives for becoming members, and differed greatly in their commitment 
to the cause."  Even "ex-Communists," Klehr contended, was a term that applied only to those who left 
the CPUSA and did not imply leaving ideological or organizational affiliation.485  Many American 
communists, like Lumpkin, Charney, Dennis, Healey, Davis, and Sugar demonstrated the capacity to act 
independently in their own particular spheres of labor influence while remaining committed to 
communism as an ideology.  However, this does not negate the fact that these Americans worked with 
and were active members in an organization that held allegiances that extended beyond the United 





American exceptionalism, rather as movement that was dedicated to both upholding the virtues of 
American political ideals, such as free speech, as well as dedicated to reforming elements of American 
society viewed as detrimental to societal needs. 
 In the labor world, communists experienced the aforementioned political shifts as broader 
engagements with the labor community and a more militant fight which utilized protections garnered by 
the Wagner Act's section 7(a).  The rise of industrial unionism coincided with the Popular Front to create 
by 1935 a fertile nesting ground for American communists like Lumpkin and Sugar to implement their 
interpretation of Marxism-Leninism within the confines of the American legal justice system.  Much like 
Lenin argued how the international labor movement took on many principles of Marxism after the 
publication of Capital in 1865, American communists found that the labor movement of the United 
States by 1935 was sympathetic to much of their strategic and abstract philosophical goals.  While 1939 
put a stain on the political image of the movement, the activism and organizational work of communists 
in labor continued.  The labor world of American Communism was the only of the three dominant 
spheres of influence where political organizational strategy found a home, but commonly found itself 
adapting to local conditions.  Communist labor organizers like Hudson and Healey were more concerned 
about the practical and regional limitations of their activities than they were the ideological approval of 
their actions. 
 The community world of American Communism differed from the labor world in that 
community-based organizational activity had the tendency to influence the direction and perspectives of 
the national CPUSA, CLA, and SWP leadership more than labor organizers.  The success of a particular 
strike for the UCAPAWA, or the organization of the UE, paled in comparison to the hunger marches of 
the early 1930s and the efforts by Alabama Party members to get African Americans registered to vote.  
Whereas the labor world's limits of success were defined in the specifics of a strike or a bargaining 





particular event, such as marching for unemployment relief, typically only led to more desire for 
continued change.  The CPUSA was fond of measuring the levels of their acceptance among the 
American masses in the pages of The Communist and The Daily Worker by looking at the levels of broad 
support within the communities, as opposed to the levels of support seen for a specific strike or labor 
grievance.  While successes in labor organizing were certainly a pillar of American communist efforts 
during the Moral Crusade, it was ultimately the communities that communist leaders sought affirmation 
from.  These conditions changed as World War II ended and the social acceptance of communists in 


















CHAPTER 4:  COMMUNIST ACTIVISM IN THE COMMUNITIES, 1929-1945 
 In the mid-1930s, as communist community activism reached a peak, Birmingham organizer 
Hosea Hudson concerned himself less with organizing unions, and more with organizing churches and 
civic groups throughout the city.  The local district CPUSA was given orders from other districts in 
Detroit, New York, and Chicago to get active in "mass organizations."  The way Hudson saw it, white 
Birmingham citizens "didn't have no mass organization to go to, only into the unions."  Black citizens, 
however, had their churches, their singing groups, their book clubs, and their local NAACP; many of 
which had cross membership.  Activists like Hudson understood that to be an effective political force, 
American communists needed to direct their attention not just into organizing workers but also into 
rallying communities behind specific issues.  The community world of communism was distinguished 
from the labor world through its emphasis on local politics, culture, unemployment relief, and ending 
racial discrimination.486  Communist community organizer’s fight against evictions promoted large 
progressive reform and activism through the lens of grassroots community politics.  More importantly, 
only by examining the individual experiences of communists in their respective communities, removed 
from the organizational politics of the CPUSA, CLA, CPO and WPUS, can we see these varied experiences 
and how it links grassroots organizers together instead of separating them ideologically.  
 This chapter explores the complex web of community-based organizations, councils, fronts, 
book clubs, and meeting groups that composed the community world of American Communism.  This 
world, unlike the previous two, was not limited to a union hall or a political party district headquarters.  
More importantly, communist activism in American communities throughout the Third Period and 
Popular Front differed fundamentally from the mission of communist organizing in labor.  Community-
based communist activism attempted to link the logic of Marxist claims about the inability to sustain 
capitalism with the deteriorating conditions of high unemployment and the perpetuation of societal 





unemployed to racism and sexism, as the natural byproduct of capitalism exposed of its weaknesses in 
the midst of the Depression.  Whereas the political world attempted to create a framework for its 
constituents to understand the nature of capitalism in the Third Period and subsequently the Popular 
Front, communists in local communities channeled their efforts into combating specific incidences of 
racism and discrimination against the unemployed as grassroots challenges to the status quo.  While the 
labor world worked to radicalize and organize working Americans and provide them with the tools 
necessary to secure favorable bargaining agreements with employers, community-driven communists 
sought to organize their wives, their children, their husbands, and their neighbors to "bring misery out 
of hiding in workers' neighborhoods."487 
 The slogan throughout the Third Period from 1929 to 1934 was "organized the unemployed," 
which served as the early foundation for communist activism in American communities and centered on 
grassroots resistance to evictions as well as demands for unemployment relief.  By organizing the 
unemployed, American communists meant something more than just getting people jobs.  It meant 
resisting efforts at the community level by employers, landlords, and city officials to dictate and control 
the lives of working class citizens.  It also meant rallying citizens to address the needs of the poor so as 
to make unemployment an undesirable situation for employers and politicians.  As one of the dominant 
political tenets of Third Period American Communism, the unemployed masses were seen as a "reserve 
army" that capitalists utilized to keep wages low, and provided logic to Marxist-Leninist ideology about 
the need to organize such a mass.  In communist philosophy, the reserve army of unemployed was 
understood a critical element in wage labor systems since it kept people dependent on employers while 
simultaneously pitting workers against one another in competition for jobs.  To American communists at 
the time, organizing the unemployed through community-wide resistance took on the meaning of 
organizing the one vestige of wage labor that sustained class relations.  It was also one of the few issues 





Socialist Party of America (SPA) could agree on during a period of deep political mistrust among the 
organizations.  Not less than three weeks after joining the CPUSA in 1930 did Hosea Hudson get his first 
work in the Birmingham unemployed community.  Witnessing the establishment of unemployment 
councils at age 15 gave Beatrice Lumpkin insight into social ways to address poverty as an early YCL 
member.  As with numerous civil rights and social unemployment battles throughout the early 
Depression, the YCL and ILD facilitated most of the early meetings of unemployment councils from 1931 
to 1932 and ushered in a wave of young, passionate activists.488 
 At sixteen, Christine Ellis joined the Chicago district CPUSA, along with fellow Croatian activists, 
not long after the stock market crash. Ellis landed a job at Chicago-based medical equipment supplier, 
Bauer and Black, which managed to survive the crash.  She described the Chicago-based Croatian 
communists as "cultured, educated, kind, [and] devoted people" who were interested in bettering the 
lives of those affected by the Depression.489  Ellis began organizing for the Chicago Unemployment 
Council in May, 1931, in an all-black neighborhood on the West Side.  At her first meeting, Ellis watched 
as the local communist organizers explained the goals and procedures of the unemployment council 
until one man spoke up.  The man asked what the Council intended on doing about an African American 
family who was evicted that day at the corner of 13th and Loomis.  The council responded: "very simple; 
we'll adjourn this meeting, go over there, and put the furniture back in the house."  The meeting quickly 
ended, and the entire council walked the block until they found the family still sitting on their furniture 
in the street.  Ellis helped the organizers break the lock on the door, haul in chairs and beds, rig the gas 
stove to work, then afterward return to the Council Hall.  When they returned, the hall was jammed 
with dozens of other city members looking for assistance.  Over the course of six months, Ellis and her 
local communist cohort helped more than two dozen families resist efforts by landlords to slowly 
remove working class families from housing.  For communists like Ellis, squaring off with landlords and 





could not continue "unchallenged."  By July, 1932, at age seventeen, Ellis was promoted to district 
organizer for Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Kansas, and Iowa.490   
 Unemployment councils like those Ellis worked with became staple fronts within the community 
for grassroots communists and other radicals in the early years of the Depression, particularly for those 
looking to turn their rhetoric into action.491  Between 1932 and 1933, Carl Winter presided over the 
Unemployment Council of Greater New York and organized a series of national hunger marches with the 
goal of attracting radicals and incorporating them into a grassroots movement against landlords and city 
officials.  Winter was not new to the CPUSA, but he was new to organizing masses of unemployed city 
workers, as were most communists in the early years of the Depression.  Winter viewed the 1929 Stock 
Market Crash as "a crushing blow to the self-serving promises of the ruling class" while the subsequent 
rise in unemployment went hand-in-hand with "the rising tide of protest and resistance."  As with his 
other New York City comrades, Winter viewed rising unemployment as a growing reserve army of the 
unemployed.  With regard to solutions offered by the Hoover administration, Winter believed that the 
President’s policy of "reassurance" was meant to merely "pacify the people" and ignore the "glaring 
examples of human wreckage" left by the market.  Winter referred to the March 6th demonstrations of 
1930 as origin of the CPUSA's new program for the unemployed.  The purpose of the Unemployment 
Councils after 1931 was to organize "workers most determined to combat the new calamity which had 
befallen them and their families."492 
 Like most communist organizers in cities such as New York, Chicago, and Detroit, Winter desired 
an inclusive community.  He wanted black workers, first and second generation immigrants and—above 
all—women involved in council proceedings as well as in decision-making committees.  In this sense, 
Winter had more flexibility than did Maurice Sugar in the auto unions of Detroit and more than Lumpkin 
in the needle trades of Manhattan.  Whereas communists in trade unions had to accept certain 





Winter attempted to target demographics excluded on other fronts.  In 1932, the councils began to 
circulate their own newspaper, The Hunger Fighter, with a manual that encouraged dedicated activists 
to "organize and conduct united and militant resistance" to "those who own and control the wealth and 
government."  Its draft program called for unemployment insurance equal to full wages for all 
unemployed "regardless of race, sex, age, or nationality."493  Once established, the councils began their 
work in the city by mimicking the CPUSA's efforts in Chicago and physically halt eviction efforts.  Winter 
viewed the evictions as a combined result of speedups and reduced pay in the workplaces, which led to 
workers' inability to pay city rents.  Squads of mostly educated working-class councilmen became adept 
at moving furniture, restoring electric and gas services, and keeping watch on city police to know when 
they could act.494   
Certain Unemployment Councils, such as the Detroit Unemployment Council, succeeded at 
building bridges with local unions like the Auto Workers’ Union and student clubs to organize some of 
the most effective and nationally impactful hunger marches.  The Ford Hunger March on March 6th  
1932 not only impacted the political world by giving agency to William Foster and James Ford’s 
presidential campaign, it also generated sympathy for families of the victims throughout the working 
class community of Detroit.  The four men shot and killed by Dearborn police and Harry Bennett’s hired 
guards were Joe York, George Bussell, Coleman Leny, and Joe Blasio.  Their public viewing and funeral 
procession began on March 12th, at the Michigan District CPUSA headquarters with over twenty-five 
thousand in attendance.  The procession’s slogan of “Smash the Ford-Murphy Terror” was aimed at 
Henry Ford and Detroit Mayor Frank Murphy, viewed as passively actors the killings to occur.  Murphy 
did, however, blame Harry Bennett for instigating further violence out of the crowd and questioned the 
legal differences between the Dearborn police department and Ford’s private guards.  Three months 
later, a fifth marcher who participated on March 6th died from internal bleeding.  While the event ended 





 Although the unemployment councils sought inclusion, their efforts typically existed during a 
period where masculine responses to activism equated to the ideals of the communist movement.  
Stella Nowicki remembered how many women "felt the union was a man's thing because once they got 
through the day's work they had another job."  While men were "competing for positions," in unions 
and the councils, many women "were brainwashed" into accepting a socially-defined role in their 
workplace activism.  To work around this tendency, women organizers such as Nowicki created women's 
groups and organized dances as a means to bringing people within the circle of community organizers 
and bringing women into the movement.496   Communist recruitment tactics followed gender lines as 
well: to sign individual activists up, councilmen organizers went to "flophouses, shelters, and 
breadlines...hop[ing] to transform the migrants into a disciplined unit."  Many male organizers found 
themselves attracted by the chance to infuse radical politics into the unemployed masses, while just as 
many were looking for the moment to physically challenge employers and landlords.  The result was a 
"romantic image of male struggle" that transformed street fighting from a simple brawl "to a political 
statement."497  There is a continued theme of this idealism of inclusion and the practical outcomes of 
community-based activism across the American communist movement well into the 1950s.   
 One of the main reasons the councils succeeded so rapidly was that CLA district leaders in New 
York shared Carl Winter's views on Hoover and the CPUSA's stance on racism as an obstacle to the 
efforts all working people.  In February of 1931, chief editor of The Militant, Arne Swabeck, described 
Hoover's supporters as "gullible" to "optimistic promises" despite the growing increase of "an industrial 
reserve army."498  At the district level, community activists in the CPUSA and CLA began to work 
together to circulate papers, build clubs, and maintain the urban unemployment councils throughout 
the mid-1930s.  While the socialists occasionally organized their own alternative councils for 
unemployment, the CLA stuck with their fellow CPUSA organizers in many cities to promote a unified 





as all the councils nationwide suffered from high turnover.  Part of the reason came from the vast 
differences experienced by the councils, such as those between Northern and Southern districts, which 
"undermined the more successful block clubs by diverting time and resources to the transient 
population.”499  To the grassroots communists who stuck with the effort, turnover rates and difficulties 
did not devalue the significance of the fight. 
 In 1934, Beatrice Lumpkin finished up her last year of high school on the debate team.  The hot 
topic of the year was unemployment insurance and whether or not it constituted a "communistic" policy 
for Americans.  According to her, the teachers' attempt at red-baiting the students backfired.  Since 
most students sided with the idea that unemployment insurance was a good thing, many found 
themselves accepting―as opposed to rejecting―the label of "communist."  Lumpkin then read in The 
Daily Worker that CPUSA representative Louis Weinstock attempted to gain the attention of AFL 
delegates and direct their attention toward unemployment insurance by leaping from a balcony onto a 
chandelier.  Tim Wheeler, an employee of the Worker, recanted the story about the effect Weinstock's 
actions had on him and fellow comrades in 2016.  For both Wheeler and Lumpkin, unemployment 
compensation rectified many of the problems they saw in their communities between the years 1930 
and 1934.  When the Social Security bill passed Congress in August of 1935, Lumpkin saw it as less a 
solution provided for by the New Deal coalition and more as a struggle fought for by American labor 
leaders.500  Communist activism in the community carried with it the ideals and goals of the political and 
labor worlds, but the community-based movements that resulted did not echo the CPUSA national 
leadership and instead typically influenced it. 
 In specific states, such as New York, Michigan, Minnesota, California, and Wisconsin, the issue of 
unemployment insurance became a staple reason for linking up labor organizers in unions with 
community-based organizers in unemployment councils.  Communists focused their attention on the 





in 1934.  The Bill authorized the Secretary of Labor to establish "a system of unemployment and social 
insurance for the purpose of providing insurance for all workers and farmers unemployed through no 
fault of their own."  Communists at the time saw the bill as the culmination of efforts promoted by the 
unemployment councils and trade unionists such as Weinstock dating back to 1932 agreements to push 
for unemployment insurance.501  C.A. Hathaway, writing in 1933, also urged that "nothing short of full 
social insurance" for the masses were a "necessity for the entire working class."  Hathaway wanted his 
readers, particularly those below him reading at local communist clubs and those above him at the 
National Committee, that the predominant attitude toward unemployment insurance aimed "to cut 
down the cost to the bosses of maintaining the unemployed" and institute a system to "transfer the 
burden of caring for the unemployed millions from themselves to the toilers."  In the years leading up to 
the proposition of H.R. 7598, communist commitment to pushing social services and social insurance 
programs heightened significantly in urban communities.502 
 Social insurance as a concept was not so much debated between communists in the CPUSA, CLA, 
and CP(O) as much as they were critical of existing state-level legislative attempts at the concept.  
Hathaway described the communist perspective as the "insurance principle," which called for "setting 
up a common unemployment insurance fund...out of which all workers who are unemployed for any 
reason whatsoever, are regularly to receive an amount each week equal to their average wages for the 
entire period of their unemployment."  Hathaway called this principle a theory of "social responsibility" 
whereby the public assumed the maintenance and security of unemployed American families.  To 
contrast this view, Hathaway pointed to the more common state-level "reserves principle" found in 
Wisconsin law that "approaches the question of unemployment from the viewpoint of capitalist 
individualism" by rejecting a common fund in favor of separate funds for each individual employer.503  
Writing just a few months later in July of 1933, The Communist author I. Amter declared that the 





that conditions for unemployed workers had worsened since the start of the Depression, but that the 
militancy and tenacity of unemployment councils demonstrated unity among those who require relief.  
Amter linked relief efforts to marches against forced labor in Washington, Oregon, New Jersey, 
Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Ohio, to efforts resisting evictions in Pittsburgh, Chicago, and New York, 
to hunger marches in Detroit, Chicago, and New York, to fights against social racism as evidence of a 
broad contingent of Americans all pushing for relief.  For communists such as Amter and Hathaway, all 
of these battles rested on a general need for relief from the conditions of the Depression, the 
predominant condition being unemployment.  Furthermore, the lack of unemployment insurance and 
social welfare in many ways amounted to an exacerbation of systemic problems, such as racism, forced 
labor, and homelessness in the eyes of American communists.504 
 By the start of the Popular Front, communist support for social insurance at the federal level 
reached new heights and was in more ways than one an evolution of Hathaway's "insurance principle" 
from 1933-1934.  The Western Worker reported in January of 1935 that relief to the eighteen million 
individuals on relief rolls averaged "less than one dollar a person for each week;" the result of relief 
councils headed by "business interests and reactionary labor leaders."  In response, dozens of 
organizations rallied together in Washington D.C. to elect delegates to the National Congress for 
Unemployment Insurance, electing Teamsters organizers, delegates from the Bethel AME Church, the 
Burks County local of the SPA, Branch 10 of the American Federation of Hosiery Workers, and the 
Detroit Conference of Italian Organizations.  H.R. 7598, the Worker contended, was "the only effective 
national measure proposed" to handle social insurance by "providing for payment of $10 a week to 
every person unemployed and $3 a week for each dependent."505  In addition to support for H.R. 7598, 
California communists looked forward to State Assembly Bill No. 791, the Workers State Unemployment 





communists also linked the effort to push this bill with an effort to repeal the Criminal Syndicalism Law, 
which they believed specifically targeted military community organizers.506   
 While State Assembly Bill No. 791 did not pass, it served as the premise for California Governor 
Frank Merriam's subsequent enactment of the alternative Unemployment Reserves Act, which began in 
August, 1936 on the basis of the reserves principle.  The Act did not extend all the demands put forth by 
the unemployment councils, particularly due to its exemption of small businesses as well as agricultural 
laborers, domestic servants, and officers of crews or vessels.507  While the California Act can be seen as 
merely an addition at the state level of the programs established by the 1935 Social Security Act, passed 
just over a year prior to Bill No. 791, communists saw it as the development of a social safety net for 
American workers that originated with their demands for broad unemployment insurance in 1932.  At 
the local level, communist activists such as Lumpkin and Hudson viewed both state and federal 
enactments of social security as responses to the actions of unemployment councils.508  
 To stay connected with their national movement and other state-based struggles, Lumpkin, 
Wheeler, Hudson and countless other young communists benefitted the rather substantial educational 
program setup by the CPUSA throughout the early-1930s.  The program rotated speakers and 
distributed the various regional versions of the Daily Worker as a means to keeping members aware of 
other struggles.  Herbert Aptheker, at the time a student and scholar of African American history at 
Columbia University, regularly taught courses on U.S. history and racial discrimination through the 
CPUSA's New York Workers School.  Elizabeth Lawson helped develop African American history courses 
that were "intended both to appeal to black workers and to combat prejudice among whites."509  In 
some regions, like California, the "labor-Left" culture existed as a framework extended well beyond the 
CPUSA, but also served as a means to educate citizens on radical philosophy and politics.  The California 
Labor School attracted students and activists from across the state, teaching social science courses that 





humanities classes that offered "little ideological content" and instead focused on the creativity of Left 
culture in America.510   
 When major cases developed, such as that surrounding the Scottsboro Boys, educators such as 
Lawson took over CPUSA publications to direct publishing efforts toward the plight of African Americans 
while the California Labor School educated its students on understanding the matter as tied to racial 
discrimination.  Aptheker and Lawson regularly contributed to Economic Notes a Labor Research 
Association publication to raise community awareness of labor-related developments.  Communists 
across New York City attended Aptheker's courses on American history regularly and helped provide a 
foundation for members of the YCL, the CPUSA, and even the CLA to direct their attentions toward 
improving social relations within the community.511  Efforts such as these, far more than the political 
dictums published in The Communist, facilitated the awareness of social issues for American communists 
and directed their community activism.   
 On August 16th, 1930, the CPUSA released its first edition of the Southern Worker, a regional 
version of its Daily Worker published in New York.  Perhaps no paper better encapsulated how 
communists viewed the significance of race by geographic location.  Communist organizers depicted the 
Southern Worker as "the voice of the Negro and white workers and farmers of the South crying in united 
protest against the state of starvation, suffering and persecution to which they have been subjected."  
Claiming to be "neither a 'white' paper nor a 'Negro' paper," the Southern Worker set out to delineate 
the class struggle as the dominant social issue for Southern communities, one that perpetuated and 
necessitated racial discrimination.  Although the Southern Worker was a regional paper, it regularly 
published mirror articles from the New York Daily Worker, and vice versa, as did other regional CPUSA 
publications such as The Michigan Worker.512  To Hudson, this was a positive development, as other 
regional bodies of the CPUSA became exposed to the "anger against the conditions [of the South]" by 





of similar issues, communists facilitated a radical Left culture that rallied behind the unemployed 
councils and condemned Jim Crow.513   
 As with most communist periodicals, the Southern Worker always contained the framework of 
the political world's ideological spectrum.  The newspaper carried the Third Period political message of a 
"dispossessed nation" and advocated the right of African Americans to "self-determination."  For 
activists like Hudson, this message linked racial oppression to class oppression and provided a solution 
for struggling African Americans.  The Southern Worker did so by publishing stories of racial 
discrimination from across the nation, including reports about discriminatory federal employment hiring 
practices against African Americans, such as on the Hoover Dam in March, 1932.  The paper actively 
tried to frame the context of racial oppression within the theoretical view of the Comintern.  At the 
same time, the paper accepted the unique fight against racism in the United States in comparison to 
other communist parties around the world and reminded its readers that physical violence against 
people of color was a routine component of American society.514   
Writers for the Southern Worker pointed to the Scottsboro case and numerous incidents where 
the law failed to protect those accused of crimes, such as when two young boys from Alabama were 
"brutally lynched" after being "framed for a murder which they did not commit" in August of 1933, as 
the evidence of their ideological solution.515  The result was a fusion of racial and class theory that would 
resurface in the works of Malcolm X in the 1960s.  Many African American communists viewed their 
actions as parallel to taking back the fruits of slave labor and concluded that in order to combat racial 
discrimination, the various community-based organizations had to take practical steps to address issues 
with the courts, police forces, and ultimately align with the masses of unemployed.  The motivation 
derived from this ideological vision served as a tremendous source for the appeal of communist 
organizing in the South as the Southern Worker continuously spoke to the interests of those desiring an 





 In terms of community activism unrelated to unemployment, no issue was of greater 
significance to the southern communists in terms of fighting racial discrimination than Jim Crow.  
Promoting an end to racial segregation and challenging the concept of “separate but equal” throughout 
the nation was not only one of the most successful efforts on the part of communists during the 1930s; 
it was a watershed moment in the history of civil rights in the United States.  A staple issue in the 
communist political world, rationalizing racism as systemic was easier to ideologically-committed 
activists than it was among grassroots communists in American communities.  It became even more 
popular outside the upper-echelons of the CPUSA after the Third Period.  Newer scholarship shows that 
the fight against racism in communities attracted far more attention between 1935 and 1937 than the 
issue of unemployment insurance from 1933 to 1934.  It also facilitated a steady increase in membership 
in the African American community into the CPUSA.  Between Foster and Ford's 1932 presidential 
election and the opening of the Popular Front in 1935, communists were among the most outspoken 
critics of so-called "white chauvinism," the idea of social superiority embraced among some white 
working class communists and the predominantly white membership of the CPUSA in urban areas.  One 
historian described African Americans by 1935 as "predisposed to be receptive to the Communist Party."  
They tended to view the CPUSA's "emphasis on white chauvinism more favorably than others who saw it 
as exaggerated or as an error."517  For Hudson and CPUSA City Councilman for New York Benjamin Davis, 
the experiences of racism were both personal and political and rationalized socialism as a solution to 
racism prior to ever reading a single text by Marx or Lenin. 
 The main reason the fight against racism did not attract more attention until 1935 stems from 
the fact that communist anti-racist activism came slightly late to the Third Period once the Scottsboro 
case became international news.  This came two years after the Party solidified its end to factionalism in 
1929 and three years after the Comintern accepted theories of national self-determination and the 





issue by attacking perceived "white chauvinism" from the ranks of various communist-backed union 
locals, community clubs, and workers' schools.  The campaign against white chauvinism would take on 
various distortions throughout the 1930s and 40s, but in the middle years of the Third Period it 
grounded communist locals in a general fight against arbitrary discrimination, including within the 
CPUSA and its constituent clubs/meeting groups.  In January of 1931, these efforts coalesced around the 
trial of August Yokinen, a Finnish communist living in New York City.  Yokinen attracted negative 
attention to his CPUSA local after refusing three black workers entry to a local Finnish Workers' Club 
dance in Harlem, a regularly scheduled affair to facilitate communists meeting with one another.518  
Essentially an internal show trial by the New York district CPUSA leaders, the trial's jury consisted of 
seven white and seven black Party members.  Presiding over the court was Alfred Wagenknecht, a long-
term Party leader in the city.  Over 200 elected delegates of the CPUSA from over 110 different city 
organizations attended the event.  Wagenknecht explained that the purpose of the trial was to avoid the 
biased courts and to bring Yokinen forth as an example of unacceptable conduct unbecoming of an 
American communist.  Occurring just as communists were beginning to target racism in the 
communities at the onset of 1931, the trial set the limit of tolerance for subsequent years with regard to 
the way in which local communists handled organizing groups, which for years had been split into a 
variety of language-speaking sects.519   
 The 1931 trial of Yokinen demonstrated the seriousness with which urban communist leaders 
took the circumstantial significance of racism in the United States.  It also showed how Party leaders and 
local communists desired an end to the ethnic and language-based factions of community.  Party leaders 
also attempted to use the trial as an appeal to the interests of the New York City's African American 
working class and adhere to the dictums of Third Period policies on building an American Negro Labor 
Congress.  According to International Labor Defense (ILD) lawyers who conducted the initial portion of 





discrimination was explained to "[serve] as a ruling class excuse for the acts of suppression and 
persecution of the Negro workers and farmers," and that this function was unique to the situation of the 
American working class.  Failure to recognize this was thus considered tantamount to approval of racial 
divisions.  Yokinen subsequently faced expulsion on the grounds of "violation of the fundamental 
program of the Party" and the division of regional CPUSA clubs, reading groups, and community dances 
by ethnicity or language were banned.520  Through Yokinen, the CPUSA attempted to set an example 
because they wanted to show what was socially unacceptable for communist activism in the 
communities.  Yokinen's trial was a rallying cry, an attempt to show the earnestness communists held 
toward ending racial divisions in communities.  The trial also served as a basis for understanding how 
and why individual experiences of racism, exclusion, and discrimination such as anti-Semitism led 
numerous activists into the orbit of their local communist club.   
 As the CPUSA and ILD attempted to set standards for socially acceptable behavior among 
activists, some youths drifted toward the orbit of communist organizing due to experiences of 
discrimination in their hometown.  Danny Rubin grew up in the Northeast side of Philadelphia along the 
Delaware River.  His father worked in a local lumber yard while attending night courses to practice law 
while his mother was active in the SPA.  Before Rubin joined the CPUSA during World War II, he dealt 
with routine discrimination in his neighborhood promoted by the local land and property owner, the 
Disston family.  The Disston's owned one of the largest manufacturing plants of saws and wood 
equipment and from 1871-1945 transformed the small area of Tacony into an industrial town.521  
According to Rubin, the predominantly white, Catholic community rallied behind the Disston's restrictive 
city covenant of "No Negros, No Jews, No Dogs, No Bars," in order to further define the exclusivity of the 
neighborhood.522   
By the mid-1930s, when swastikas and graffiti regularly appeared at Rubin's local synagogue, his 





Catholic population.  Rubin also witnessed anti-Semitism firsthand at school as he was the only Jewish 
student in his classes.  He found friendship and acceptance among other marginalized groups―African 
Americans and Italian Americans.  At first, the actions against him and his religion prompted Rubin to 
join organizations in Philadelphia to combat such discrimination.  This led Rubin to the American Youth 
for Democracy and exposed him to the works of Marx and Lenin.  It also led to CPUSA publications that 
covered the Yokinen trial and emphasized how it was an effort only capable through the Party.  In his 
own words, Marxism and the Party’s stances on white chauvinism helped Rubin gain an understanding 
of how and why people were anti-Semitic and to what ends they served in terms of homogenizing a 
populace.  Learning the philosophy of communist views on racism, in particular the Party's critical 
inward stance toward members rejecting white chauvinism and ethnic divisions, reaffirmed what Rubin 
already knew―that racism and anti-Semitism were directly correlated and to combat one meant to 
combat the other.  More importantly, Rubin found that the only people waging such a fight were in 
some manner affiliated with a local communist club.523   
 To communists like Lumpkin, Brodine, Rubin, and future national committee member Benjamin 
Davis, community-oriented struggles were a reflection of their commitment to communist ideals and 
the principles of Marxism.  Sometimes, as was the case with Rubin, this commitment existed even 
before they became open communists or joined a communist organization.524  While the need to 
combat racism in the workplace was understood by communists as necessary to "lay the groundwork for 
organizing the CIO" in Southern mining and textile industries, organizing against racism in local 
communities took on a moral dimension.  It was understood as "central to bringing about peace, 
democracy, and justice."525  CPUSA leaders and grassroots organizers experienced this in both indirect 
and direct ways.  The Yokinen trial remained an iconic message to communists across America, and 





 Ben Davis grew up in Dawson, Georgia, a city racially segregated by the railroad tracks.  He 
described the so-called 'peace' of Jim Crow as "the peace of the master's domination over the slave; the 
kind of peace that white supremacists say is disturbed when Negroes become restless for their 
rights."526   Like many African American communists throughout the 20th century, Davis developed an 
acute sense of power struggles in communities based on his experiences growing up.  When he directed 
his studies into law and anti-racist activism, Davis did so "with mixed motivations―idealistic and 
humanitarian aspirations, as well as the need for a career."  He recognized the limitations of his career 
choice due to segregation and the general racial bias of southern courts, but he pushed forward.  In the 
early 1930s, during the Scottsboro case, Davis joined the CPUSA and the ILD.  In June of 1932, he landed 
his first major case after the ILD informed him about a young boy named Angelo Herndon who was in 
jail for trying to organize industrial African American and white workers in Atlanta.527 
 Herndon was a 19-year old African American communist charged in Atlanta with "attempting to 
incite insurrection," a charge which carried the death penalty.  Davis viewed the death penalty statute in 
this case as an archaic remnant of the pre-Civil War period, in which it originally applied to slave 
rebellions.528  Working through the ILD, Davis got the opportunity to represent Herndon in what would 
become arguably the most significant civil rights case backed by the communist movement in the U.S.  
Davis' approach was radical and poignant.  Rather than argue the citizenship rights held by Herndon, 
Davis instead argued that "the jury system of Georgia in 1933 was illegal and unconstitutional, and had 
operated for twenty years in accordance with a policy of premeditated and deliberate exclusion of 
qualified Negro citizens."  Davis thus charged that the courts and judicial system, not Herndon, was to 
blame for Herndon's situation.  When Judge Lee B. Wyatt tried to dismiss Davis' opening statement, 
Davis retorted by emphasizing he’d like to see the case elevated to the Supreme Court.  When asked 





race and the way courts approaches cases on a racial basis.  Although a questionable legal strategy, 
Davis remained committed and pushed concerns to the state-level before the appeals process began.529 
 Davis took his concerns about the court to Governor Eugene Talmadge not long after the initial 
court proceedings.  Talmadge centered his concerns on "meddling outsiders" and questioned Davis' 
northern education as a possible bias against his own state.  Davis explained to the Governor that his 
support for the law and the Communist Party were not due to him "knowing much about communism" 
but because "[he'd] vote for any party that offers [him] and [his] people a square deal."530  Quickly, 
public opinion shifted against Talmadge as the widespread news about the Herndon case coincided with 
the publication of Robert E. Burns' book, I'm a Fugitive from a Georgia Chain-Gang.531  The state of New 
Jersey went so far as to refuse to extradite a known Georgian fugitive after reports of Georgia's 
mistreatment of prisoners, including Herndon, made national headlines.  In the spring of 1934, the 
Herndon case shifted to the Georgia Supreme Court while a separate case began to build against the 
Georgia penal system.532 
 At the Georgia Supreme Court, Davis requested additional aid from the ILD and added a second 
legal representative, Carol King.  The two presented their appeal in a 50-minute presentation about the 
history of Georgia law and its relevance to Herndon's case.  According to Davis, the Fulton County Court 
"cut the guts" out of the original court transcript, replacing words such as "nigger" with "darky" or 
"negro" and "expung[ed] the very substance of the prejudiced conduct of the trial."  After his protest fell 
upon deaf ears, Davis accepted the transcript as it was, in order to retain his appeal in court.  In May, 
however, the Georgia State Supreme Court handed down the same verdict given by Fulton County.  
Chief Justice Richard B. Russell, after delivering the verdict, spoke to Davis directly and ordered him to 
"never refer contemptuously to the arguments of the state's attorneys" and to "try not to become 
involved in such cases" again.  Davis turned to his strategists at the ILD and secured Whitney Seymour, 





to the Supreme Court.  After the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Herndon, the young activist was 
voluntarily released to the Georgia state court in order to file a writ of habeas corpus, which led Georgia 
District Court Judge Hugh M. Dorsey to declare the state's law unconstitutional.533  Davis, performing 
much of the background work that facilitated the eventual decision, became the movement's silent 
hero. 
 According to the ILD and Davis, the subsequent victory over the Georgia court rested on the 
"mass movement" that followed them throughout the trial.  Time magazine printed an article 
highlighting the alleged communist conspiracy that surrounded the trial and the subsequent Supreme 
Court's defense of supporting such views.534  To Davis and his fellow communist activists in the ILD, 
Herndon's acquittal "was a triumph for free speech, free press, and free assembly."  The trial put Davis 
on the map and into the spotlight, but not favorably.  Prior to the case, Davis was treated with "benign 
cooperation" by city courts.  After the case, he was met with "suspicion" and viewed as "a rooshan-
inspired Bolshevik."  For weeks, Davis faced death threats from the local KKK.  At one point, the Klan 
placed a note in the sawed-off barrel of a revolver outside his office door, requesting his suicide.  
Experiences like Davis demonstrate that it took conviction and courage on the part of many communists 
to defend civil rights within the context of Jim Crow.535   
The lasting effect of the Herndon trial, combined with the Scottsboro case, was a subsequent 
rise in civil rights activism.  In Davis' words, the aftermath of the Herndon case demonstrated that "what 
had become clear to the class-conscious Georgia officials had also become clear to large sections of the 
Negroes on the street."  The sentiment was no longer something that had to be pushed by groups like 
the ILD or the CPUSA; it had become a self-sustaining civil rights campaign.536  Because of ideological 
influences coming from the CPUSA, communists like Davis addressed specific issues, such as Herndon's 





for better wages and against unemployment.  As such, they saw their subsequent community support as 
emblematic of support for communism in general though this tended to not always be the case. 
 Other communists helped draw in the attention of numerous working-class blacks, especially in 
the South, by emphasizing the precedent of discrimination as a norm and actively attempting to fight it.  
Hosea Hudson faced a choice in 1932 of joining the CPUSA and publicly endorsing communist ideology 
or simply joining local leagues for racial justice around Georgia.  While family members and friends 
pressured him to avoid the communists and, more importantly, avoid the stigma of supporting 
communism, Hudson believed that his economic suffering was "like all the rest."  The only way to better 
his own condition was to "get conditions better for other people."  Because of his outlook, Hudson had 
little trouble working with white communists.  He saw their depiction in the newspapers as "red 
agitators" as parallel to the previous treatment of abolitionists, Jewish salesman, and Northerners 
throughout the South.  The choice to join the American communist movement for southern African 
Americans like Hudson was a difficult one that built on an individual's perception of whether or not their 
activism would amount to meaningful gains.  It didn't take long for him to see communists as organizers 
and activists for what could be seen as the little man, or the underdog.  537   
 Between the fall and winter of 1932, Hudson lost his job at the Alabama Stove Foundry, which 
prompted his work organizing for the local YCL in Birmingham.  The goal, however, was neither strictly 
labor-focused nor exclusively political.  Hudson's task was to rally masses of Birmingham against the 
surrounding pillars of racism, particularly within and against the local African-American neighborhoods.  
To convince fellow community members, Hudson presented a program that demanded immediate 
action by the state government to address the existing grievances of African American southerners.  
Hudson's team of organizers included Henry O. Mayfield, Joe Howard, and Birmingham YCL official Ted 
Horton.538  To push the CPUSA's stance on Jim Crow and ending racial discrimination, the organizers split 





included confronting police brutality against people of color, federal housing, an end to poll taxes, and 
voting rights for all citizens.  Hudson's efforts, much like most community-organizing activists at the 
time, avoided overtly presenting their views and identity as "communist" in order to prevent rousing the 
suspicions of Birmingham police.  When push came to shove, and citizens responded to the activism by 
supporting policies or signing petitions, the ILD took over efforts to address grievances individually.539   
 In November of 1932, Hudson and the Birmingham CPUSA local were organizing their first of 
many public meetings to promote the defense of the Scottsboro boys.  For their first demonstration, 
they chose the Masonic Temple and filled it with over three hundred citizens.  Outside the meeting, 
numerous city police officers stood with shotguns and rifles to "'protect' the meeting from the Ku Klux 
[Klan]," which had made threats to sabotage the event.  For subsequent meetings, Hudson's group 
chose churches such as the Negro Congregational Church.  To address the city's unemployment, 
Hudson's YCL local organized a meeting at the courthouse steps.  Within hours, the city mayor, Jimmie 
Jones, ordered the police to forcibly remove individuals on the courthouse lawn.  As police moved in, 
they had "scuffles" with bystanders, typically white, who "didn't know what was going on" and weren't 
involved in the protest.  The scene impressed upon Hudson the idea that average whites "were no more 
than Negroes in the eyes of the ruling class of Birmingham and their police."  Throughout the rest of 
1932 and the first half of 1933, Hudson's YCL local worked to build unemployed block committees that 
linked with section committees in a larger city committee.  This final committee became the 
Unemployment Council of the city of Birmingham.540 
 As a close associate of the ILD, Maurice Sugar's campaign for Recorder's Court and the Detroit 
District Common Council in 1935 replicated the experiences of Davis and Hudson.  Sugar's campaign 
represented an "example of the cross-fertilization that fed new crowd politics" throughout the labor 
organizations and Communist groups in urban areas like Detroit.541  Representing "organized labor" and 





questioned the plans of other candidates about the "interests of black Detroiters."  Despite losing the 
election, Sugar had supporters that extended to the NAACP local, as well as Reverends R.L. Bradby and 
Dr. O.H. Sweet during the campaign and "demonstrated the reach of black protest politics by the middle 
of the thirties."  Similarly, Sugar's campaigns utilized the broad, cooperative strategy of linking 
community organizers with civic leaders found so effective in organizing labor.  The subsequent result 
was a redirection of the localized politics "from one based on accommodating to the interests of the 
industrial elite to demanding equal participation in economic and civic affairs."542  Sugar's public 
endorsement of communists and organizers throughout the city "was trumped [only] by his 
commitment to fighting for the interests of black Detroiters."  Sugar's efforts, however, were merely a 
continuance of the local Party's "vision of interracial unionism among foreign-born men and women as 
well as among black workers" that extended back as far as 1924.  From the mid-1920s up through the 
start of Sugar’s campaign, African Americans in Detroit had worked with the League of Struggle for 
Negro Rights “hoping to introduce revolutionary and nationalist ideas within the political discourse.”543  
For broad levels of community-based support, regional campaigning wasn't enough.  
 In terms of culture, communists were attracked to music and theatre that complimented 
working class community organizing, with notable examples Pete Seeger and Woody Guthrie.  The two 
folk icons led an inspirational culture that dominated leftist circles throughout the United States in the 
1940s and 1950s.  Lumpkin considered them “a prominent part” of the Progressive Party in 1948 and 
part of a large “cultural movement” of working class activism during the early Cold War.544  The two 
artists, who would go on to influence the work of Bob Dylan and other postwar folk singers, participated 
in what scholars refer to as a "folk revival" led by sections of the CPUSA.  Ronald Radosh wrote about 
the revival of interest surrounding the Popular Front and the folk-style music that characterized leftist 
circles, particularly those in and within the orbit of the CPUSA.  Radosh, along with Martha Bayles, 





same people helped save a rich musical legacy from extinction."545  Lauren Weiner also discussed the 
nature of 1930s coffeehouses and working class music halls, shaped by the influence of communist 
politics and the music of folk.  Much like the experience of the CPUSA's political front, which 
experienced heightened popularity due to the economic crisis more than the power of communist 
ideology, Seeger and Guthrie were "carriers of a superannuated ideological minority [who] found 
themselves celebrated as the leaders of a mass movement."546  Most suburban Americans who came to 
adore Guthrie's celebrated classic, "This Land is Your Land," knew little about his background.  Even 
fewer knew about his work as a columnist for the CPUSA's Daily Worker.  Communists and their fellow 
travelers commonly saw music "as a weapon in the class struggle" to be used as "social documents, 
often stretching the most innocent of songs to have a subliminal political message."547  In Guthrie's 
popular classic about sharing America, the phrase "this land is your land" was a direct response to Irving 
Berlin's "God Bless America," a song which Guthrie found "complacent and cliche-ridden."  His original 
music notes included verses to denounce private property rights, but he altered them to mimic the 
hymn of a Baptist gospel.548 
 Starting in 1929 but throughout the 1930s and early 40s, Grace Hutchins became the CPUSA's 
"authority on working-class women." She published books, articles, and distributed pamphlets to argue 
the effects of capitalism on women in American society.  Hutchins studied at the New York School of 
Social Work attending lectures that grew from the roots of the Progressive era.  In 1934, as the CPUSA 
was beginning its major political shift for the subsequent year, she published Women Who Work, which 
became the Party's central text on women's roles in the class struggle.549  Her main argument built off of 
Marx's dissection of alienation between work "at home" and work "in the workplace," suggesting that 
women suffered exploitation in both social spheres.  Historian Lynn Shapiro pointed out that this use of 





achieve socialism."  More importantly, Hutchins' publications asserted an "area of concern" for 
communists "beyond the (mostly male) industrial labor force."550   
 By 1936, Hutchins and her associate Anna Rochester worked their way into the CPUSA's inner 
circle; but according to Shapiro, they never held any official rank or status within the Party.  Tasked with 
managing a fund for ill activists and serving as an outside treasurer for the 1936 electoral campaign, 
Hutchins continued her work for the CPUSA without ever officially joining it.  She later used her status as 
a trustee of the Civil Rights Congress bail fund to post bail for numerous activists and Party leaders 
during the 1950s.551  Hutchins' written works and activism for the CPUSA helped to "popularize the 
Communist notion that wage-earning women of the working class faced a 'double burden.'"552  This was 
later adopted by the Women's Liberation Movement and subsequently became a major component of 
Second Wave Feminism by the 1960s.553 
Margaret Cowl canonized the communist perspective on women and the Popular Front with an 
article to The Communist in 1938.  Referencing a history dated back to the Seneca Falls Women’s Rights 
Convention in 1848, Cowl argued that courage and mass organizing was the means to breaking the 
barriers that “kept *women+ from equal participation in the public life of the country.”  What proved the 
effective answer, Cowl suggested, was the ability and willingness to “link up the women’s movement 
with other progressive movements of the day.”  Referring to the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) as 
“utopian,” Cowl and other communists believed legislation alone did not suffice.  Rather than create a 
standard by which equality was enforced, Cowl desired to see an expansion of “special legislation that 
fits the needs of women.”  This was indicative of how the CPUSA needed to address the women 
question if it wanted to further integrate itself into the community.554 
To accomplish her goals, Cowl and communists like her turned to the Women’s Charter, a 
Popular Front women’s organization that “recognize*d+ that the demand for equality [was] inseparable 





Central Committee that women were desired in pro-active positions throughout the Party and its 
auxiliaries throughout the Popular Front.555  While these narratives of women's' experiences in Party life 
were vibrant to those in the movement, they rarely make note in historical narratives.  The nature of 
women's rights movements in U.S. history after Suffrage dictated that the CPUSA "situate itself" with 
that history by pushing broad national goals but maintaining "a decidedly local or regional focus."  
Without more narratives that examine the acute, community-specific differences, the actions of 
communist women amalgamate under the broad analysis of communist politics; drawing attention away 
from the link between feminists of the interwar period and feminists who became communists during 
the Third Period and Popular Front.556   
 Of particular concern to grassroots organizers after the summer in 1937, a post-New Deal 
recession hit American working families.  Initially, families looked to community-based organizations 
advocating immediate relief.  Hosea Hudson, again without a job, collected unemployment relief for ten 
weeks before he began rallying friends to form a voting club in Birmingham, bridging the political world 
into the local community.  Starting the following spring, Hudson worked with two activist friends, 
Cornella Hibbard and Mack Coad, YCL organizers Hazel Stanley and Jimmie Hooper, and a local minister 
to organize a voting committee at the city's Masonic Temple.  Equipping their activists with pamphlets 
of the U.S. Constitution, the club encouraged members and citizens to fill out voting applications and 
bring them to the club meetings for further instruction.  Using an old-style mimeograph, the club mass 
printed registration cards and freely distributed them along with their leaflets.  Each week, the club 
instructed eligible voters on the process of application and helped clarify the requirements of 
constitutional knowledge by explaining elements of the Constitution and the history of the United 
States.  This was due to the fact that, despite the Board of Registrars never requiring direct knowledge 
of the Constitution in Alabama state law, board members routinely asked African American applicants 





and began to attract teachers, steelworkers, coal miners, and everyday service workers, all of whom 
sought eligibility to vote.557  To draw in broad support, Hudson got active in the city's Workers' Alliance 
and created a bridge between the poor whites seeking relief and the black workers seeking rights.  
Hudson's strategy met its test in the summer, when he organized both the voting club and the Workers 
Alliance to collectively apply to vote.558 
 Hudson gathered four white members of the Workers Alliance and marched to the Board of 
Registrar's office in June of 1938.  He watched as all four white workers obtained their cards, filled out 
their information, and quickly received voting registration cards.  When Hudson applied immediately 
after, they handed him a blank card with questions about U.S. history ranging from the names of 
Presidents to the meaning of certain clauses in the Constitution.  After turning in the forms, the 
Registrar told Hudson he would hear back from the office after "investigations" and received no card 
that day.  From there, the five men went to attorney Arthur Shores' office to file a formal complaint 
against the board for discrimination.  Weeks went by.  Numerous club members applied for voting cards, 
but all were turned down.  After waiting a few weeks to let the petitions mount, Shores picked six of the 
cases, five school teachers and Hudson, and presented the case for a court hearing.  At the hearing, 
Judge McEleroy refused to call into question the tactics and motives of the Board of Registrars, but he 
agreed to overlook the applications personally.  At first this caused a panic among those applying for 
voting cards as the newspapers put the names of those who contacted Shores on their front pages.  By 
the following week, all six citizens received voting registration cards in the mail.  The tactic proved 
successful, if only marginal.  Before the end of the summer, the Birmingham district of the NAACP joined 
in on the meetings and mass applications.559  Hudson’s tactics demonstrated the clear power of 
grassroots organizing and prefigured subsequent efforts in throughout the Civil Rights movement in the 





Unlike in northern urban areas such as Chicago and Detroit, and western regions such as 
Southern California, a southern communist’s engagement with their local community did not necessarily 
require involvement in a union or political action club.  While Hudson devoted almost all of his time to 
Party work between 1932 and 1938, he also remained heavily involved in the local Birmingham church 
network by participating in quartets and relied less on union meetings to attract new members.  Once 
he started his regular singing quartet, the Smithfield Vocal Singers, Hudson toured the predominantly 
African American churches along 23rd Street near downtown Birmingham.  There was methodology to 
Hudson’s community engagement; in his words the church functioned as a “mass organization” for the 
non-whites of the community.  White Birmingham workers, on the other hand, had the unions and their 
local political committees.  The African American community, instead, had churches and family 
gatherings.  These tactics were found in other areas as well, such as Virginia where black voting drives 
came about from “the rise of a Southern black ‘organizational repertoire’ of elite leadership and 
political-civic voluntarism.”560  In Birmingham, Hudson used the opportunities provided by his quartet to 
urge church members to register to vote, and to encourage civic participation within the African 
American community.  By 1938, Hudson encouraged community members to join the local NAACP, 
although he believed that the organization was not for “ordinary” African Americans.  Younger activists 
looking for community organizational work were directed to the CPUSA.561 
 While the CPUSA’s Popular Front methodology dictated supporting involvement in mass 
organizations like the NAACP, for communists like Hudson, the organization held a stain due to its 
history of anti-radicalism and its attempt to thwart the efforts of the International Labor Defense during 
the Scottsboro case.  As was usual during the Popular Front, these issues were not blamed on the 
organization as a whole per se, but on specific leaders such as Walter White and William Pickens.  As 
such, organizers like Hudson were not deterred by their involvement but rather saw the NAACP as an 





new officers and captains.  At first, Hudson and his fellow Birmingham communists remained quiet and 
inactive at NAACP meetings.  Eventually, Hudson felt the need to speak his mind and recommend 
certain new approaches to recruitment and organizing tactics.  He argued that they should become 
more outspoken about community-specific issues including police brutality against non-whites and the 
ongoing horrors of lynching.  Hudson and his fellow African American communists promoted an anti-
lynching bill in late 1937, early 1938, which the pages of The Communist declared to be “an inseparable 
part of the fight for progressive legislation.”562  In the context of the segregated South, where most 
African Americans lived under segregationist politics, the communist message of political justice 
resonated with those who sought to undermine the power of Jim Crow ordinances. 
It is of no small significance that Hudson and the CPUSA did not depict resistance to the anti-
lynching bill as an extension of localized, systemic racism, but rather “Wall Street,” which pulled the 
strings of a “reactionary minority” of Republicans.  In contrast, the working masses of the South, white 
and non-white, were depicted as “awakened” and unified in their quest to destroy “the age-old barriers 
of sectional and racial hatreds, which served reaction so well in the past.”563  The sometimes over-
romanticized idea of a Southern working class ready and capable of action, only held back by the politics 
of reactionism, was a common theme in communist publications throughout the Popular Front.  
Communist writers such as Theodore Bassett went through numerous rhetorical hoops to link the 
communist message in the South to the writings of Lenin and an emphasis on mass involvement against 
reactionary forces.  Although mistaken in its assessment of how to break down racial barriers, the 
rhetoric and idealism of communists such as Hudson kept them engaged in their communities and drove 
them to continue a focus on racial divisions as the basis for building organizations such as the NAACP.564  
 In other cases, the specific aspects of an individual's engagement with social activism depended 
on the individual’s perception of discrimination in their local community contrasted against the 





conditions thought to be too similar to, or a reflection of, growing racism and anti-Semitism in 
European, fascist nations.  Russell Brodine studied at the Curtis Institute for Music in Philadelphia from 
1932 to 1939.  There he met with musicians who struggled during the economic depression to not only 
find work but also to find a home.  While studying, Brodine met Fred Batchelder, a bass player and 
fellow activist.  According to Brodine, Batchelder promoted peace in radical and sometimes dangerous 
ways, including disrupting the path of warships with a canoe during a U.S. Navy flotilla.  Actions such as 
these were not viewed as inherently communist by Brodine, but supported the general worldview 
extorted by communist philosophy.  Brodine and Batchelder frequented discussion groups covering 
current events with other students at Curtis as Hitler came to power in 1933 and the Scottsboro case 
became worldwide news.  Watching the Scottboro case and comparing it to the rhetoric of the Nazis 
helped Brodine conclude that "the fight against racism was central to brining about peace, democracy, 
and justice."565   
 At Curtis, Brodine was instructed to both learn from and respect his teaching conductors.  This 
did not prevent him from speaking up when he felt it was necessary.  After watching one conductor yell 
at a student, causing him to leave school, Brodine committed himself to resisting the "domineering" 
attitudes of the Curtis instructors.  One of his teachers, Anton Torello, was a personal friend of deposed 
King Alfanso of Spain.  Once Torello became aware that Brodine was considering playing in a concert 
dedicated to Spanish democracy, he informed Brodine that "[he] was following the wrong side."566  
When the Roosevelt Administration announced the National Industrial Recovery Act and subsequent 
relief for Americans, it confirmed dedication to a pro-worker, anti-racist world view years before joining 
his first communist club in 1937.  Community activism and the tangible reality of it producing results 
drove Brodine into the communist orbit.567 
 While communist activism in the communities leaned on resistance to racial and gender 





discrimination, both class-based and racial-based, with other world events.  Witnessing the rise of 
fascism from Hitler in Germany and Franco in Spain, Brodine used his musical talents to express his view 
that fascist oppression mimicked the oppression of minorities in America.  In 1936 he helped organize a 
concert "to raise money for North American Aid for Spanish Democracy" at the Philadelphia Music 
Center; a hot spot of the "flourishing left cultural movement" at that time for the city.  Brodine 
remembered the Music Center as "organized by progressive musicians with communist leadership" and 
used charity donations to "give low cost instruction to students who could not afford to study elsewhere 
and to organize musical performances for progressive causes."  The concert included professional and 
popular Jewish musicians of the period, such as Eduice Shapiro, Phil Goldberg, Victor Gottlieb, and Sol 
Kaplan.  Working with active communists inside and outside the Party to arrange the event, the concert 
represented to Brodine the moment when his musical and social/political influences unified to form his 
ideological view.  In just two years, Brodine joined the Philadelphia district of the CPUSA.568  It was the 
kind of organizing the CPUSA managed to succeed with in urban and middle-class communities.  By 
linking together class-based and racially-defined struggles around the world, progressives were exposed 
to the kind of international uniformity of identity desired by communist philosophy.   
 Brodine's work with the Philadelphia concert organizers exposed him to many of the city's YCL 
activists and leaders.  He frequented political meetings that centered on the issues of "rising fascism in 
Germany, its smashing of democracy, its persecution of Jews, communists, [and] trade unionists" and 
economic concerns such as the recession of 1937-1938.  These meetings also captured members’ 
disillusionment with the idea that capitalism could resolve the depression.   Brodine’s participation led 
to the organizing of the Communist Musicians Club at Curtis, where Brodine invited speakers and 
scholars on Marxism to provide educational seminars.  In effect, Brodine copied what the CPUSA had 
done with the Philadelphia Music Center, but it was important that he not damage the Party's approach.  





students, Brodine met with the city's CPUSA district organizers, who, in turn, emphasized how important 
it was that the students not "jeopardize [their] education or [their] careers in music" and downplay their 
activism as openly 'communist.'  The club's presence and ideological commitment in the music 
community spread as students reported some of their music teachers instructing students to avoid "that 
crowd," referring to Brodine and his comrades.  Brodine remained active with the club, promoting 
seminars and money-raising rallies, until his final school year at Curtis in 1938-1939.569 
 During the political conundrum of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, communist musical work 
displayed a link between the ideologies of the political world and its influence on those who saw 
themselves as cultural representations of that ideology.  In late 1939, Guthrie wrote an ideologically-
charged song intended to "defend the fruits of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and [depict] the division of Poland 
and the Soviet takeover that was part of the pact as a favorable development welcomed by the Poles."  
The lyrics described Russia's involvement as beneficial since Stalin would "give the farm lands back to 
the farmers."  Guthrie was soon labeled a "dyed-in-the-wool Stalinist" by moderate progressives who 
"believed, along with the CP[USA], that FDR was at best an imperialist and the savior of American 
capitalism."570  Brodine, on the other hand, felt "no confidence that [the war] would be an anti-fascist 
war."571  But unlike the image they presented to their fans, Guthrie was hardly a proponent of Marxism.   
Throughout the 1940s, artists attended New York City district CPUSA leadership meetings because, in his 
own words, he "trusted the communists to know generally the right thing that [they] should be pushing 
for, whether it was peace or war."  The German invasion of the Soviet Union aided folk artists like 
Guthrie and Pete Seeger by making the message of defeating fascism popular again.  "Almost 
overnight," writes Radosh, "the once shunned folksingers were singing on behalf of the Allied war effort, 
urging the labor movement to put strikes on pause until victory was won."  Other figures such as Paul 
Robeson made the shift as well, and their lasting memory in American culture derives from this later 





 Brodine spent the first few years of the war on the road after graduating from Curtis, pursuing a 
long-term career as a bassist.  After landing a temporary position in the Seattle Symphony, he met his 
soon-to-be wife, Virginia, who organized local domestic workers through the Pension Union.  Russell's 
union and Party contacts put him in direct association with Virginia, as he rarely went to a single city 
without visiting a known local Party outlet.  Virginia spent the previous years studying Suffrage 
movements with her friend Cecelia Corr.  She came to work with the Pension Union to advance women's 
rights in the industry.573   
After the symphony season of 1940, Brodine studied welding through the National Youth 
Administration (NYA) to make himself useful in the booming war industry.  Brodine believed that as a 
communist his efforts to fight fascism were better suited in the war industry than in music.  Convinced 
that the U.S. would soon enter the war, and unable to leave each other, Russell and Virginia married on 
October, 1941, before setting off for California in search for employment and organizing activities.  
Shortly after arriving in Los Angeles, Virginia got employment at the local bureau of the Daily Worker 
while Russell used his new welding experience at the shipyards, taking home $52 per week.574  Teaming 
up with a fellow musician, Phil Goldberg, the Brodines rented a house on Crenshaw Boulevard, in the 
west-central part of the city.  After the attack at Pearl Harbor, the shipyards became an ideal place to 
earn quick money for seasonal musicians such as Russell and Goldberg, who played the violin.  The only 
musical positions available between late 1941 and early 1942 were through the Janssen Orchestra in 
Hollywood.  Things changed in June of 1941, due to shifts in the war.  Not long after, Brodine and his 
fellow musicians found better outlets for their musical talent in local CPUSA fundraising drives.575 
 In the early summer of 1941, Hitler invaded the Soviet Union with Operation Barbarossa.  The 
move shocked some international leaders, but it was consistent with the agenda of the Fascist regime in 
Berlin, which was known for overstepping its bounds on sovereignty and repudiating previous 





as Lumpkin and Brodine heard news that the Nazis had invaded the Soviet Union, the birthplace of 
modern communism.  Some of these members were already in a state of disillusionment from the Nazi-
Soviet pact, as discussed in Chapter 2.  As the political world realigned itself for the war efforts in the 
wake of the Nazi invasion, so too did the community world see a public about-face by numerous groups 
and individuals.  There was, however, almost no mention of the change in attitude throughout personal 
testimonies.  Instead, communists reoriented their newly-infused resolve to defeat fascism and secure 
peace with the Soviet Union.  In part shaped by anti-interventionist sentiments among the American 
Left, Guthrie revealed his biases once again after the Nazi invasion of Russia.  A series of songs, such as 
Songs of John Doe, recorded in mid-March of 1941 and which emphasized peace with Germany, never 
left the recording studio once news of the Nazi invasion became public.  The decision to rescind albums 
and songs likely faced pressure from New York City district CPUSA and national Party leaders.576  To 
accomplish the goal of rallying their base and community support to defeat fascism with the USSR, 
regional communist clubs such as the Communist Musicians Club of Los Angeles and the Third Ward 
Party Club of Baltimore promoted events hosted by talented artists to organize support for intervention, 
fund relief efforts to Russia, and promote military enlistment.577 
 After leaving Seattle to return to Los Angeles, Russell Brodine regularly organized violinists, 
violists, and cellist players to liven up People's World benefits while his wife, Virginia, distributed the 
Daily Worker at the Communist Musicians Club and local Los Angeles community town centers.578  In 
Baltimore, the Communist-led Third Ward Party Club reorganized itself into the Club Convoy located on 
1603 Bank Street to dedicate itself to the supply efforts for Britain throughout the late summer and into 
the fall of 1941.  The new organization reprinted membership cards in red, white, and blue, rather than 
the standard red; and it organized citizens to register for the draft.  Pedersen noted that the Baltimore 
clubs were so successful, in fact, that they imported activists and coordinators from other areas of 





signed up into the U.S. Army and Merchant Marines.579  To promote the war effort and secure ongoing 
support, the Baltimore clubs hosted gatherings for the CPUSA that displayed Russian film, song, and art.  
Additionally, funding was gathered for the Russian War Relief Incorporated (RWRI), which caught the 
attention of the FBI as a possible communist front.  The Soviet Union sent Ivey Litvinoff, wife of the 
Soviet ambassador, and Ludmilla Pavlichenko, a Red Army sniper, as delegates to the RWRI's charity 
banquets and managed to raise over $25,000 of relief aid for Russian citizens.580  The Party's regional 
clubs across the nation conducted similar drives, but the actions of the organizations rarely capture the 
full impact of the war effort on individual communist activists.581 
 Other communists benefitted from similar associations and relationships that derived from their 
political activism.  After graduating from Hunter College at CUNY, Lumpkin relied on comrades and 
activists in Brooklyn to provide employment opportunities and a union position in the ACWA Local 328 
chapter.  Within a month, her fellow workers at Spartan Laundry elected her to the shop committee.582  
Davis also relied on community-based support during the war from progressive and labor-oriented 
activists to succeed with his candidacy for New York City Councilman in 1943.  With a "jubilant" 
following and a "people's progressive coalition" that emphasized the unity of labor and African American 
struggles, Davis captivated the black community of Harlem with the prospect of electing the first 
communist and the first African American to the city council.   
 For many American communists, the war was not as fruitful or beneficial for labor as it might 
have been.  Brodine remarked how, although the no-strike pledge and price controls established by the 
War Labor Board protected the livelihood and daily employment of the American people, the "patriotic 
duty of business to put the nation's needs before their profits was honored more in the breach than in 
the observance."583  When the Conference of Studio Unions (CSU) went on strike, Brodine hesitated to 
support it, due to the war-time pledge.  As the war edged on, the communists within the CSU and 





Unconvinced that his father's efforts in unemployment councils were sufficient to help the people of 
Chicago, Armando Ramirez turned to the American Youth for Democracy (AYD), which masked the 
CPUSA's YCL.  He attended courses intended to educate Mexican-Americans in the Chicago area to 
organize in solidarity.585  In Birmingham, Hosea Hudson and the local district CPUSA liquidated their 
Party organ and reconstituted as the Alabama People's Education Association.  They sought to 
disassociate with the label of "communist" and work toward more collective support for the war effort.  
Even then, the new organization faced racial discrimination and political scrutiny.  Regionally, each of 
these communists were affected based on the conditions of their local communist work in the 
community, but overall the war proved to be of little assistance in resolving the struggles held most dear 
to community active communists:  socially reinforced racism, workplace discrimination, and 
unemployment.586 
 The second half of the war was more routine for American communists than they were 
turbulent and divisive, like the previous decade.  After the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and witnessing 
the expulsion of a union leader from the ACWA, Lumpkin rotated jobs throughout New York City until 
landing a position at Dictograph machine shop in Queens under a local chapter of the United Electrical, 
Radio, and Machine Workers of America (UE).  She went from hammering terminal boards to operating 
the shop's drill press within a matter of months, but had issues with her foreman that referred to 
women by their employee numbers rather than their names.587  Lumpkin's future sister-in-law, Jonnie 
Lumpkin, got a job working for Bell Aircraft, where she continued communists' commitment to fighting 
racial discrimination in the workplace.  Bell hired African Americans for primarily clean-up and 
maintenance work, while white women were given preference in production jobs.  Jonnie described 
how at first "black folks were eating outside at the railroad tracks [while] white folks ate inside at the 
lunchroom."  Jonnie teamed up with the Buffalo division of the YCL, the Buffalo Urban League, and the 





dining commons and hiring white workers exclusively for production employment.  Jonnie also got the 
opportunity to meet Letha Cloare from the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC).  Although the 
company denied the accusations, by the next day the company upgraded 140 jobs for African Americans 
to full-time production.588   
 Communists traveling the country and living together like the Brodines carried on with the 
understanding that "what one of us could not do alone we could sometimes do together."  Russell 
worked in the shipyards up through 1945, when the music industry began hiring more actively.  He then 
secured a seat in the Los Angeles Philharmonic in the spring.589  When the Carpenters’ Union, a 
subdivision of the CSU, went on strike in March of 1945, Russell's attention and work moved toward the 
labor world.  Russell and other musicians from his union joined with the carpenters' picket line to face 
company-hired police, who used intimidation and violence to clear a path for scab workers.  When the 
Burbank police arrived, they forced the crowd into the Warner Brothers' side lot, where striking workers 
were held in a make-shift police quarantine.  Guitarist Earl Robinson was present supporting the 
workers.  He led the various supporting unions in a series of labor ballads, particularly "Joe Hill" and 
"Ballad for Americans."590  Although his part in the strike was "very small," and he was not part of the 
union, Russell saw supporting the striking carpenters as part of his duty as a communist in the 
community.  "I believe," Russell states, "that unity and solidarity are important principles, and, 
practically speaking, the only way unions can maintain the strength to stand up to the power of 
corporations."591 
 In his mind, this kind of sacrifice, which included risking to his employment at the Los Angeles 
Philharmonic, gave Russell purpose while dictating the limits of his activism.  When the picketers were 
arrested outside the university, the local police used the campus grounds as a staging area to contain 
detainees.  The willingness of the state university to accept the actions of local police, in Russell's eyes, 





justice."  Although the musicians union representatives warned Russell and his fellow musicians that 
they were pushing the limits of the leadership's tolerance, most of their warnings were ignored.  By the 
end of 1945, the CSU strike was won.  The post-1945 atmosphere of anticommunism, however, quickly 
undermined the effectiveness and social acceptance of studio craft unions.  Intolerance of communist 
presence compounded after Walt Disney testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee 
on the ongoing presence of communists in the media industry.  Subsequent community organizing, 
particularly by members of studio unions, faced public ridicule and possible indictment under the Smith 
Act.592   
 Not all experiences for the community world were progressive during the war years.  The seeds 
of the political breakdown were in place as early as 1939, but continued efforts to transform the political 
core by the national CPUSA leadership limited ongoing efforts of regional CPUSA locals.  In Alabama, 
Hosea Hudson made preparations to liquidate the local Birmingham district of the CPUSA in 1943 and 
replace it with the Alabama Peoples' Educational Association (APEA).  Although the APEA downplayed 
communist rhetoric, it did not abandon the ideological foundation of Marxism-Leninism and continued 
to seek the democratic-centralist organization of community members.  As such, the APEA presented 
itself as a community-based educational group that desired broad inclusion of Alabama citizens, 
regardless of race, gender, and geographic location.  In practice, Hudson saw the APEA as a renaming of 
the CPUSA's Alabama district local that caused more confusion than results.  The difficulty surfaced 
when the APEA sought to gain assistance for striking steelworkers and instructed Hudson to downplay 
his talk about workplace justice for African Americans.  Hudson concluded that the orders came from 
the top, particularly Earl Browder, and that the fundamental change between the pre-1944 era and the 
post-1944 era was that communists were to "cease rigid criticism...in order to have more unity" with 
other members of the political and social community.  It wasn't until nearly a year after the war that 





 Perhaps no greater example of the growing distance between the community world of American 
Communism and its political core was the response by regional members of the CPUSA to the liquidation 
of the Party in 1944.  Most communists throughout the 1930s were supportive and flexible with 
Browder's innovative approach to local communist politics.  Many grudgingly supported the move to 
create the Communist Political Association (CPA) as a "pressure group within the existing political 
structure."  Simultaneously, community-based communists such as Hudson, Lumpkin, and national 
leaders like John Gates, all questioned the purpose of the move.  The creation of the CPA, which 
amounted to a quasi-community based, quasi-political front that might compare today with a political 
action committee.  The goal of the CPA to make the politics of socialism mainstream was by far 
Browder's "boldest proposal."  This goal was in part the result of growing anticommunism after 1941 
and the lack of electoral appeal previously experienced in the Third Period.  Although he never overtly 
mentioned it, Browder's proposal meant something that many American communists found 
uncomfortable:  The idea that there was no more need for a communist political movement.  In just a 
matter of years, the community world of American Communism responded by rejecting Browder's 
proposal at the political level and, in their communities, siding with Progressive coalition forces and 
Presidential Candidate Henry Wallace in the years leading up to the 1948 general election.594 
Conclusion 
 It is easy to miss the significance of regionally difference experiences in American Communist 
history.  Personal testimony and the actions of activists in their communities demonstrate that countless 
American communists, both inside and outside the Party, looked for social recognition, support, and 
acceptance based on the Constitution and American political values, rather than through the lens of 
ideology.  Many did so not as individuals or with the help of the CPUSA organ, but rather via the 
complex network of associations, clubs, and community centers that created space for American 





the lives of community organizers, but rather that it did not define their lives.  Davis and the ILD would 
have had a difficult time arguing the legitimacy of communist doctrine instead of the civil right of 
Herndon as an American citizen to practice whichever doctrine he preferred.  Brodine's shift into the 
CPUSA did not rest on his acceptance of theoretical Marxism, but rather on the practical experiences of 
working with communists in his career and community to work toward a more peaceful world.  Lewis' 
CIO hired "communist sympathizers" as general counsel during the early days of the Steel Workers 
Organizing Committee because of the strength and cohesion that resulted from the "unanticipated 
political alliance" of communists and progressives.595  This approach was not some rigid Party-defined 
strategy nor was it doctrine via the Comintern.  It was one of the ways that American communists 
engaged with their community and what separated their movement from the communist movements of 
Europe and the Third World at the same time. 
Throughout the Third Period and Popular Front, American communist activism in the 
communities targeted elements that were both socially advantageous to leftist organizing efforts on a 
broad scale as well as seen to be critical elements in the coming fight for civil rights.  In a manner similar 
to the Labor World, the communist organizing in the communities differed from region to region and 
organized on the precept understood as most effective for cultivating membership in the CPUSA, CLA, 
and WPUS.  Unlike the Labor World, communists in the communities were not required to organize with 
the consideration of workplace racism and hostility toward working women; rather, they were able to 
take the fight against racism and fight for social equality in a manner that could not be waged in the 
workplace.  Understanding the similarities and differences between these two worlds is essential for 
understanding American Communism as a broad radical movement, and as a movement that was 
capable of affecting the lives of individual Americans in a myriad of ways. 
 Many communists, such as Lumpkin and Brodine, were involved in both their communities and 





unions directly affected their careers and livelihoods by fighting against workplace discrimination and 
inequality, and another where their efforts directly affected others in their community who were 
suffering from targeted discrimination.  In certain instances, friction between the two worlds caused 
activists to choose one over the other; by 1945 Lumpkin was organizing almost solely in the community 
while Brodine was organizing principally in the Musicians Union locals.  Some, such as Woody Guthrie 
and to some extent Hudson, had a deeper connection with their community-based experiences of 
communist  organizing than they did their labor organizing efforts and as such developed a community-
oriented understanding of communist practices.  The chief concern of communist community organizing 
was raising class awareness, which in terms of practical work meant raising awareness of inequality and 
discrimination and directing individuals toward that end. 
 Nearly all of those who participated in the community world of American Communism held ties 
to the political world, but these experiences differed far more than they did with the labor world.  
Communists met together in small groups, and communication between upper echelons of the CPUSA 
and lower district clubs was so mute that decisions made at the local level did not necessarily reflect the 
sentiment of the national Party.  As the political world fractured after 1944 and increasing fears of 
anticommunism purged numerous activists from the labor movement, the community world became 
the dominant expression of communist ideals by the end of World War II.  The post-1945 community 
world reacted to the suspicion of a rollback on ideals:  fears of rising unemployment, fears of racial 
discrimination, fears of losing the gains for women, and fears of social repression.  Without the CPUSA 
to dominate the narrative, the community world of American Communism slowly shifted into the 








CHAPTER 5:  HANGING IN, 1945-1957 
 As World War II came to a close, so did the temporary wartime peace accord netted by 
American communists between themselves and the majority of American society.  Numerous changes 
had occurred during the moral crusade era of 1928 to 1944 for American communists.  The most 
notable changes were the re-centering of the political sphere around cooperative, yet critical, centrist 
politics, an accord in labor to promote a link between workers and the effort to defeat fascism, and a 
shift to combat issues of racism and discrimination within the community through legal strategies.  The 
years saw an emphasis on community leaders as opposed to nationally-led agendas.  These 
developments were in part a result of Comintern discussions about the need for communist parties to 
act more independently and avoid schemas for revolutionary activity.  They were also a result of 
American communists pursuing avenues of action and organization that proved more effective in the 
labor and community spheres than they had been prior to 1934.   
The attempt by communists such as Maurice Sugar and Benjamin Davis to engage in a legal 
strategy for social reform was precisely the avoidance of schematic approaches desired by Moscow.  
Further, it was their attempt to focus on the legal context of American courts, negotiation tables, and 
the needs of working Americans.  Browder's decision to run a platform in 1936 that resisted Republican 
attempts at New Deal reform helped direct attention to the utility of Roosevelt’s programs while 
simultaneously pushing on the Democratic voter base further Left, and thus indirectly put pressure on 
the Democratic Party.  In both of these examples, American communists adhered to the dictums of the 
Comintern while engaging more directly and practically with their own society than they had prior to 
1932.  After World War II, American Communism, unlike during the period of the moral crusade, 
diffused its community activism into a broad spectrum of Progressive and Democratic alliances, and it 





 This chapter explores the darker period of American communist history, where its three worlds 
fragmented as a result of the failure of class-collaborative strategies for the CPUSA and their allies, a 
return of party factionalism, and a growing fear of Communism as a political ideology.  The CPUSA lost 
its influence on domestic politics after it displaced itself in a power shuffle during the final years of the 
war while the FBI, along with the House Un-American Activities Committee and numerous 
anticommunists in labor unions, worked to "immobilize and ultimately destroy the Party and its support 
groups."596  The shortcoming of the class-collaborative approach established during the Popular Front 
became clear as communists’ involvement with labor organizations quickly became suspect in the 
emerging Cold War decade.  Some labor organizers and union leaders, facing renewed hostility from the 
Right, viewed communists as a general threat.  A great many also believed the ongoing presence of 
communists in organizing efforts threatened to undo the years of success made under the banner of 
solidarity.  There were thus both a political and a social dimension to the breakdown of the political 
world of American Communism.   
 Just how did American Communism as a movement continue while the CPUSA handled internal 
factionalism and a reassessment of political theory?  How did anticommunism transform American 
communists into more passive political activists?  To what extent did the "worlds" of the moral crusade 
continue throughout the postwar period?  What new fields of engagement surfaced in the wake of 
McCarthyism?  Could Americans be communist and yet not be members of the CPUSA or any particular 
Leftist organization?  Much of the postwar period saw former communist ideals, such as combating 
racism and discrimination, shift to a general fight for civil rights in the United States that did not seek 
assistance from communist organizations like the CPUSA as during the Third Period and Popular Front.  
It is the goal of this chapter to explain how and why the American communist movement experienced a 





Lumpkin, Charney, Davis, the Brodines, and others found practical avenues for their ideological and 
political proclivities.   
 Between 1945 and 1957, the political world, particularly the CPUSA, eroded as a dominant 
player in the pan-Socialist Left of the United States.  Its ideals, ideology, and practical gains made 
throughout the course of the moral crusade resulted in large part from abandoning the sectarian and 
ineffective methods of the early and mid 1920s.  Now they were carried on under new paths of 
engagement and under new leaders unassociated with the CPUSA and SWP.  Many American 
communists dropped their identity, but they remained passionate activists, earning them the title of 
"ex-communist.”597  Others continued to carry the label while newer recruits took it on, but most were 
forced to accept the new players such as the NAACP, the ACLU, and civil rights organizations who were 
leading the struggle and dedicated to reform through the courts.  Some of these organizations, including 
the ACLU, had come into existence through the help of communist organizers, but they did not remain 
under communist leadership after the Popular Front.  They also were in no direct way subsumed 
beneath the CPUSA in the postwar era.  This created space for new ideas and new communist activity to 
thrive, which facilitated the transition of the movement through the 1960s.  It also signaled the moment 
when the liberal Left, associated with civil rights reform and the labor movement, became publicly 
anticommunist and sought to sever its ties with the CPUSA, SWP, and other communist organizations. 
 Although this was an era of decline, it would be inaccurate to describe it as an era of 
termination, as some scholars have done.  This view, as historian Edward Pintzuk described it, "omit[s] a 
detailed examination of Party community and organizational activity in that period."598  The CPUSA 
continued, despite a tremendous loss in both membership and political clout, while individual 
communists inside and outside the Party worked with civil rights groups to create change.  By the end of 
the 1950s, American Communism would find itself folded into a new radical tradition led by younger 





organization, one that returned to class collaborative policies due to their popularity but rarely 
succeeding in making practical gains for American workers, as they had during the Third Period.  
Although some could describe it as a betrayal of the revolution, one might also see it as an evolution of 
localized communist philosophy based on practical necessity.  The outcome of political fracturing and 
anticommunist repression was not the dissolution of the three dominant worlds of American 
Communism, but rather the rapid and broad diffusion of the American communist movement into 
various forms of civil, social, and political action that led into the 1960s. 
The End of an Era:  The Breakdown of the CPUSA's Grip on the Political Sphere 
 As Chapter 2 explained, much of the CPUSA's displacement as the political core of American 
Communism began with the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 and the subsequent reversal of policies following 
the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany.  The final blow, however, came in the final year of 
World War II, as the communists held onto high hopes for the future of US-Soviet relations.  Misreading 
moves made by Stalin to dissolve the Comintern and uphold agreements between the Allied Powers at 
the Tehran Conference, Earl Browder, still effectively in command of the CPUSA, pushed to dissolve the 
organization in 1944.  Browder emphasized what he called the "spirit of Tehran", dramatizing the 
supposed postwar peace between capitalist and communist nations.  Building off the strategies of 
political cooperation between 1936 and 1940, the Party leaders, following Browder's lead, reorganized 
into the Communist Political Association (CPA).  Their goal was to broaden the Popular Front into the 
postwar period and directly influence politics at local and state levels.599  Other leaders—particularly 
Foster, Ben Davis, and Eugene Dennis—viewed Browder's shifts as subsuming the theory of class 
struggle to "right opportunism" by "sacrificing principle for the sake of mass popularity."600  Grassroots 
members like Lumpkin described the "spirit of Tehran" as coinciding with the tremendous achievements 





circumstances of the war's end allowed Lumpkin to, in her own words, "swallow the silly theory that 
some capitalists could be so smart that they would stop exploiting workers."601   
 Condemning Browder’s decision, the French Communist Party (PCF) issued a staunch criticism in 
April of 1945 by Jacques Duclos.  Duclos attacked Browder for abandoning Marxism-Leninism and 
praised Foster's minority camp for resisting the efforts at reform.602  Both at home and abroad, 
Browder's move manifested discontent among active communists and signaled that the cohesive 
political atmosphere of American Communism during the prewar years was crumbling.  For Duclos and 
other European Communist leaders, Browder's conclusions on the significance of Tehran lacked "a 
Marxist analysis of the situation," particularly with regard to a "false concept of the ways of social 
evolution in general."  Simply put, Duclos’ article charged that Browder had succumbed to idealistic 
fantasies and purported tremendous assertions about rather insignificant outcomes.  The specific part of 
Browder's conclusion that Duclos rejected was the assumption that Tehran implied "peaceful 
coexistence and collaboration in the framework of one and the same world."  Duclos asserted that 
Browder must explain and justify the need "to reconstruct the entire political and social life of the 
United States," including his decision to change the Party's name to one that implied "conformity...with 
the political traditions of America."  This new organization, the CPA, would "not intervene as a 'party'" 
nor "propose candidates in the elections," but rather "will work to assemble a broad progressive and 
democratic movement within all parties."603   
 Browder's decision implied three major ideas that could only be understood by outsiders like 
Duclos, but in the moment reflected real perceptions by numerous communists.  First, it 
overemphasized the significance of cooperation between the Allied Powers during the war.  The 
decision assumed, falsely, that the wartime alliance to defeat fascism would mean the sort of postwar 
peace accord promoted by Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War I and that the Soviet Union's 





Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition could be sustained, long-term, after the war without Roosevelt himself.  
Unlike his fellow communists Eugene Dennis and William Foster, Browder believed in the effectiveness 
of New Deal policy as opposed to the identity behind it.  He assumed Republicans would give up efforts 
to combat New Deal legislation and that the Democrats were united under liberalism.  Finally, it 
neglected the living conditions American workers, who for the most part were happy about winning the 
war and fearful for the future of postwar labor relations.  What Browder and the Communist Political 
Association (CPA) did not consider was that since 1930, the communist political world used "the mindset 
of people in the United States [to] determine the effectiveness of that line."604 
 Nevertheless, the CPA attracted more members in the first few years of its inception than the 
CPUSA did from its peak in 1942 until early 1944.  The case could be made that Browder was simply 
caught up in the war's ending and the collapse of Hitler's regime.  To many, regardless of their ideology, 
it was the beginning of a new era and the decline of an older one.605  Browder's conclusions also could 
be viewed as a revision of communist theory and excessively hopeful of postwar relations; but they 
were not unrealistic.  Some members romanticized the postwar changes in attitude as visible reflections 
of a more prosperous world.  When Saul Wellman, a communist from Detroit, returned from active 
duty, he went on a political action tour on behalf of the CPA.  Wellman later reflected to future Party 
leader Eugene Dennis that "an enormous transformation in the 'newly changing labor movement'," such 
as the introduction of vacation pay, indicated that "a new America [had] emerged."606  Other 
perceptions about a hopeful future for US-Soviet relations, admittedly preemptive and naive, started as 
early as April of 1945, when reports about the meeting of Soviet and American troops at the Elbe River 
Crossing depicted a peaceful end to the European theatre.607  Browder's "Spirit of Tehran" coincided 
with a short-lived feeling of peace that reflected the aftermath of a major military victory.  There was 





seizure of Berlin.  All of this contributed to "a change in attitude" about the public appeal of not just 
communist ideals but of its rhetoric about the victory over fascism.608 
 Coinciding with the reorganization of the CPUSA was a reversal of theoretical strategy for civil 
rights activism, which up until 1944 helped build significant followings in predominantly black 
communities.  Browder’s decision further distanced the CPUSA’s assessment of race relations from the 
political consciousness of minority Americans.  He declared that, "the Negro people had chosen the path 
of integration" and rejected the long-standing theory of "self-determination" for African Americans that 
stemmed back to the Sixth Comintern Congress of 1928.  By “integration,” Browder meant the ability for 
African Americans to become part of the political consciousness of America, with an equal say in voting.  
This alone would not have sufficed to effectively distance the CPUSA from its cohort of dedicated African 
Americans, but Browder advanced his theory beyond acceptable limits for civil rights activists when he 
asserted that "the fight for [civil rights] had already been largely won, and would be finally achieved 
rather effortlessly and painlessly in the postwar period."609  This latter belief brought tension within the 
ranks of the Party leadership and alienated some African American activists, the majority of whom were 
not convinced that the battle was over.  Anticommunism within the black community continued to build 
on decades of personal and political experiences with communists, most of which were divisive and 
uncooperative with organizations African American activists participated in, such as the NAACP.  
Anticommunism had its own effect on African American engagement with communism as an ideology in 
the postwar years.  For now, it is important to recognize the political aspect of the CPUSA's theory of 
civil rights and how it distanced numerous activists that originally found purpose and direction by the 
CPUSA's and ILD's staunch fight for young people of color, such as the Scottsboro Boys and Angelo 
Herndon in the 1930s. 
 A few African American communists were willing to consent to the concept of integration 





"been largely won."  Hosea Hudson, accustomed to working with white organizers in the Alabama 
CPUSA, remained suspicious of Browder’s decision until the Duclos disclosure changed his assessment.  
Hudson spent the following six months rebuilding the Alabama and Louisiana Party contingents with 
support for Foster's emerging minority camp.610  John Gates, who saw his role in the CPUSA skyrocket 
from a regional organizer and war veteran to within the close circle of leaders by the 1950s, attended 
the 1946 Party conference in New York to review work "on behalf of civil rights."  At the conference, the 
Party's leaders conceded the point that African Americans desired to remain citizens of the United 
States, but a cohort of "left-sectarians"h sought to reinstate the self-determination theory.  From 1928 
until 1944, communists had operated on the theory that African Americans represented a “nation within 
a nation” and deserved sovereignty should they desire it.  Party leaders and grassroots organizers 
challenged the vote on the basis that integration of African Americans into the political mainstream had 
not been "largely won."  Gilbert Green, a leader in the YCL, and Doxey Wilkerson, an African American 
teacher who worked for the Party on civil rights initiatives, spoke out against reinstating the Stalinist 
concept of an oppressed nation, including “the right of separation from the United States if the local 
population so desired.”  Green and Wilkerson believed that the theory was “wrong and unrealistic” for 
African Americans and did little to advance civil rights in a practical manner.  Despite their protest, the 
argument that blacks sought their own nation became once again the ideological prism through which 
the post-Duclos CPUSA viewed civil rights activism.  Those who disagreed, such as Green and Wilkerson, 
were labeled guilty of “white chauvinism.”  It quickly sent the CPUSA, in the words of John Gates, "off in 
a direction opposite to that of the influential [civil rights] organizations."611   
 The reaction by the “left sectarians” to Green and Wilkerson’s objections were endemic of 
American communists’ tendency to be fickle about abandoning principles and concepts if there were no 
one to blame for the mistake in theory, or, if the Comintern did not explain the mistake as a 
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misinterpretation of theory.  With the case of racism in the United States, pointing out that integration 
had yet to succeed yielded little room for a new interpretation of organizational theory because at the 
core of the theory was a dimming of class antagonisms.  This appeared paradoxical in contrast to the 
CPUSA’s depiction of class antagonisms as heightened at the end of the war.  African American 
communist leaders like Ben Davis disregarded the significance of Browder’s conclusion, stating that no 
amount of political agreement made at Tehran could change the fact that African Americans were “still 
the victim*s+ of a system of national oppression and segregation.”  To identify the lack of substance in 
Browder’s assertions and civil rights, Davis pointed to the mass lynchings that occurred in Monroe, 
Georgia, in the summer of 1946, and the tremendous effort put on local committee organizers in trade 
unions and Party clubs to raise awareness of the brutality of the murders.  It became easy, then, for 
organizers like Davis and Hosea Hudson to side against Browder and push a more radical interpretation 
of what needs to be done for civil rights.612 
 To national leaders like Eugene Dennis, Foster, and Green, Duclos' criticism of Browder, 
combined with the slow devolution of communist work in civil rights organizations, undid many of the 
relationships communist grassroots organizers had with their communities and their political leaders.  
Many leaders, particularly Dennis' camp, accepted the criticism of Green and Wilkerson but rejected 
"the public form it had taken."  Quickly, factions formed and committees assembled.  Dennis believed 
that Duclos' critique denied the CPUSA its own voice and that subsequent policy changes would be 
viewed "only as a result of pressures from abroad."  The aftermath was "a recriminative explosion" that 
alienated local activists and civil rights supporters, particularly those who joined the CPUSA’s political 
movement in the 1930s because of its emphasis on civil rights.  The Party's base membership "turned 
against all leadership with anger and criticism," and citizens holding active Party positions across the 
nation resigned.  Party unionists, like Lumpkin, felt reassured by Foster and Dennis' efforts to reform the 





as racial exploitation.613  By the time Dennis and district leaders such as Robert Thompson and John 
Williamson rationalized the need to "examine together where and why we were wrong" in early 1946, it 
was too late for the CPUSA.  After Browder's expulsion in February of that year, Dennis took charge of 
the Party with the blessings of Foster and long-time Party advocate Elizabeth Gurley Flynn.  He did so 
under the context of "a difficult healing process" where he spent days trying to rationalize the future of 
the Party.  Peggy Dennis remembered the subsequent skepticism of Party leaders as "healthy" for the 
movement at the time, but negative for her husband, as it placed him in a vulnerable position should he 
fail.614 
 As the Party began to implode internally throughout 1946, the position held by the CPUSA 
within the political spectrum of the United States shifted.  As over 200 bills went through congress 
attempting to limit bargaining powers for unions, abolish union shops, end the right to strike, legalize 
labor injunctions, and modify the National Labor Relations Act.  This coincided with a strike wave in 1946 
that saw more than five million workers went on strike in the largest coordinated strike effort in 
American history.  Tangential to responding to labor, however, was an effort to alienate communists 
from the scene altogether.  Anti-New Deal Republicans banked on anticommunism as a political tool 
since it was effective against the labor movement and simultaneously created difficulties for 
communists in the public sphere.  The end of the CPUSA’s fortunes were also subject to forces outside of 
its control, specifically developments internationally between the Soviet Union and the United States.  It 
is equally important, however, how communists like Dennis and Foster viewed these developments as 
unfavorable to a positive public image.  As the "spirit of Tehran" faded, the grim realities of Stalinist 
diplomacy in the postwar era acted as a mirror against the desires of the CPUSA and other communist 
organizations.  From 1928-1941, American communists were seen as agents of a foreign power, but one 
that merely lacked legitimacy and sought to undermine the productivity of American industry.  During 





fascism.  By 1947, communists were representative of a new enemy; one that did not seek to improve 
the conditions of Americans along their own political philosophy, but rather desired to usurp the entire 
American way of life.615   
 This well documented end of Browder's control of the CPUSA, and, in theory, the decline of the 
American communist movement by 1945, helps explain the diffusion of communist political work in the 
United States to the local level.  District level communist politics, however, acted earlier than 
international communist leaders.  Although Browder's faith in the Tehran Conference resulted from his 
desire to reform the CPUSA, communist Al Lannon from Maryland's district took steps to reorient the 
local communist politics and labor organizing practices not long after Stalin announced the dissolution of 
the Communist International on May 22nd, 1943.  Lannon ordered local members to abandon their 
work in industrial clubs and integrate into existing neighborhood clubs, in addition to ending the 
practice of members-only meetings.  The idea, in Lannon's view, was to become "community centers 
where everyone of a progressive bent could come and discuss the issues of the day."  This came with a 
downside.  After noting high numbers of recently recruited black members, Lannon banned the 
recruitment of African Americans in eastern Maryland while also ordering western districts to continue 
to attract black members from AFL unions in order to meet quotas.  When Lannon explained the 
purpose of the shift, he told his fellow organizers that the workshop nuclei and closed meetings "acted 
as magnets for anticommunist cliques in target unions" and that "the Communist Party is now fighting 
for its legality."  Lannon, like Dennis a year later, recognized the uphill battle against anticommunism in 
the final years of the war and did not want his local clubs bringing unwanted attention to local unions.616   
 The "spirit of Tehran" had been more of a spirit of victory against fascism and imperialism than it 
was a hope for the future to many grassroots communists.  Lumpkin knew well the importance of 
remaining active in her workplace, and she and her comrades took the war's victory as a signal for 





New York City to find it empty and the union collapsed.  After a few months of searching, Lumpkin 
landed a job at Western Electric's North Tonawanda plant, north of Buffalo.  Faced with a company that 
almost exclusively hired younger black women within a predominantly white suburb, Lumpkin felt that 
union bargaining and workplace collaboration proved at the onset nearly impossible.  Consistent 
oversight and loud machinery forced Lumpkin to try a new approach.  To earn respect from her new 
fellow workers, Lumpkin became a "model of efficiency."  In doing so, she simultaneously avoided 
scrutiny from the company’s "efficiency experts."618  John Gates, whose role in the CPUSA continued to 
amplify after 1945, watched as the Party gradually "reverted to policies similar to those of 1939-41" 
during the immediate postwar years.  As the Soviet Union sought allies and friendly governments in the 
East as a buffer against Western encroachment, Gates saw France and Italy go to great lengths to reduce 
the powerful influence of their communist parties.619  Both Lumpkin and Gates recognized the limited 
capacity for action while simultaneously refusing to give up their dedication to Marxism-Leninism as an 
ideology.  Individual communists thus faced a decision of remaining stalwart Party adherents, or 
remaining active organizers for peace and justice.  Many chose the latter. 
 The labor world of American communism saw tremendous changes from just a few years prior.  
The period from 1945 to 1949 reflected the growing weakness of communist activism in unions as the 
postwar strike wave, which to some seemed "favorable to American Communism," developed without 
significant involvement by the Party or any other communist organization.  Two large series of strikes, in 
the winter of 1945 and the summer of 1946, spanned across "almost every segment of the trade unions" 
and captured national attention for the first time in the postwar era.  First, the CIO's auto workers struck 
outside General Motors for nearly 120 days.  The Steel Workers and Electrical Workers union, 
predominantly staffed by communists, assisted in negotiations while John L. Lewis led the 1946 strike of 
coal miners.  The labor movement appeared to be "on the move."  Till, the CPUSA misjudged the 





over their political ties.  In many cases, business employers and union leaders called out segments of the 
labor movement as communist.620  The government depicted communism as “the main obstacle” to the 
postwar world, going so far as to charge that “communists already influenced if they did not actually run 
the NLRB and the Labor Department.621  Political relationships were put to the test as confrontations 
between the government and the CIO intensified debates over wages and the legal ability for unions to 
recruit new members.  After years of participating in a coalition with the Democratic Party, unions 
across the nation now found themselves at odds with President Truman and his centrist attitude toward 
labor.  He made agreements with anti-New Deal Republicans and supported for anti-labor legislation.  
When communists hesitated regarding a response, their power and utility as effective organizers faded 
from the consciousness of American workers.622 
Donald Henderson, still in command of the UCAPAWA (by that point renamed to the Food, 
Tobacco, Agriculture Allied Workers of America, or FTA), criticized the CIO's leadership, particularly 
Walter Reuther, for supporting the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.  By Fall of 1950, the CIO 
mounted raids to purge the leadership of various FTA locals in California such as 78 in the Salinas Valley 
and 7 of Stockton.  Most of the locals merged with the ILWU to form the Cannery Workers and Farm 
Laborers Union (CWFLU).  At the end of the year, the CIO's national leadership won an NLRB election to 
become the sole bargaining agent for the CWFLU locals while Henderson and the rest of the FTA faced 
expulsion from the CIO on the basis of "following the purpose and program of the Communist Party."623  
The union's tumultuous history with the CPUSA ended after that fateful moment, and the increasing 
pressure of Taft Hartley Act to provide loyalty oaths resulted in deportation for many of the union's key 
organizers until finally the union itself was expelled from the CIO.624 
 George Charney returned to Harlem from the war in the summer of 1945 and within hours was 
confronted with the positive news of his reassignment to county organizer for Manhattan as well as the 





inspiration to Charney ever since he joined the CPUSA, but no amount of Party history could turn the 
tide “against the frenetic mood that engulfed the Party in the period of crisis and changeover.”  As 
someone who experienced the fight against fascism first hand, Charney returned "eager to resume work 
in the [CPUSA]," but was shocked at how the Duclos article so radically altered temperament of his 
district.  Bob Thompson, at the time the district Party leader in Manhattan, reminded Charney that his 
new position within Party leadership had to embody "all the wisdom of the class struggle," and that 
abandoning his ties with his old friend were necessary.   
District leaders like Thompson evolved during the war to become "the personification of the 
vanguard," and as a veteran of both the Spanish Civil War and the Pacific theatre of World War II, 
represented the epitome of the Bolshevik tradition in the eyes of many New York communists, 
especially younger and more militant activists prone to the fiery rhetoric of Duclos and Foster.  
Thompson’s ascendancy to power over the New York district, however, was less the result of his work in 
the war than it was the Party's reconstitution under Foster and Dennis.  Thompson was a dedicated 
supporter of Foster and viewed his role in the New York district as similar to Foster's in rescuing the 
Party as a whole.  Even though the Comintern was dissolved and the previous standards of the Popular 
Front over, Thompson asserted control over the Manhattan district where organizational discipline, class 
and Party loyalty were measured "in international, Soviet terms."  To long-time members like Charney, 
this was neither new nor radical.  Only in hindsight does Charney admit that there existed the “bitter 
truth” that most “*communists+ believed in the spirit of Tehran and postwar unity” but nevertheless 
“instinctively clung to the Party.”625 
It is also important to note that middle-ranking leadership did not overlook nor misunderstand 
that Duclos’ criticisms spoke on behalf of Stalin.  Charney watched as the attacks laid down against 
Browder served as the basis for a more general assault on Browderism “as a species of revisionist 





capitalism was inherently reactionary, expansionist, and imperialistic matched the attacks later made 
against Josep Tito, resulting in Yugoslavian expulsion from the Cominform.  In addition to Tito, Charney 
noted similarities between the treatment of Browder and László Rajk in the Hungarian show trials in 
1949 conducted by Mátyás Rákosi.  By 1950, it appeared as if the frame-up trials in Poland, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia “were actually the climax of the campaign originally unleashed by the 
Duclos article against Browder and the *CPUSA+.”  At the time, however, Charney also felt expectant of 
criticism for the United Front; that the CPUSA perhaps was guilty of going “too far” in its class 
collaborationism for the sake of defeating fascism and that “now the time had come for readjustment 
and correction.”  In this sense, Duclos’ link to Stalin was ignored and Charney as well as his fellow 
middle-ranking leaders accepted the idea that it was time to end peaceful relations with liberals and 
progressives and refocus on the international class war.626 
 Joseph Starobin pointed out that the postwar developments in politics and labor raised new 
questions about organizing and ideology to which communists were incapable of forming an effective 
response.  As a result, many turned away from the CPUSA, or simply stopped attending meetings, rather 
than outright reject the Party or communism as an ideology.  Subsequently, the labor and community 
worlds of American Communism diffused to the grassroots as individuals began to focus and emphasize 
on their own answers to societal ills.  These answers, in turn, did not require the authority of groups 
outside their immediate spheres of influence, let alone approval from a national Party committee or 
newspaper.  Among the questions they asked were the extent to which government should be involved 
in bargaining processes, particularly with regard to whether or not this constituted a form of industrial 
nationalization, what role unions should take in national economic affairs such as price controls, and 
above all the union's influence on political foreign policy.  With the CPUSA involved in its own internal 
breakdown at the national level, pro-active communists at the local level rallied support behind Henry 





 The 1948 election represented the decisive moment when a large contingent of American 
communists turned toward the Progressive Party and the ideals of social democracy, in contrast to the 
Stalinism of CPUSA leaders and the more hyper-Left communism of the SWP and the Workers' Party of 
America (WPA).  At the upper stratum of the CPUSA and SWP, support for Wallace was based on his 
stances against the U.S. Economic Recovery Program; the Marshall Plan.  At the same time, communist 
leaders and editors of the Daily Worker were estranged by Wallace's "harmful remarks" about the Soviet 
Union regarding political purges.  It took clarification by Eugene Dennis to explain that the his comrades 
"failed to grasp" that Wallace represented their only option against the "get tough with Russia policy" of 
the Democrats and Republicans.628  Some, like Russell Brodine, viewed the election as a means to an end 
like the CPUSA's support for Roosevelt during the Popular Front.  Brodine saw the Wallace campaign as 
beneficial for the Left in general since it "forced Truman...to woo former Democrats by taking over some 
of the main planks of the Progressive platform."629  In this manner, Wallace was continuing what the 
CPUSA had done in the late 1930s; acted as a leftward gravitational pull on Democratic policy.  Brodine's 
cultural icons also supported Wallace, such as Katherine Hepburn, who spoke at a pro-Wallace rally in 
Los Angeles in 1948.  Having film celebrities and folk stars on their side likely fueled enthusiasm, but 
Brodine suspected it wasn't enough to deter supporters from voting Democrat in order to resist 
Republican encroachment on power.630   
 Others, like Lumpkin and George Charney, favored Wallace and his program as a continuation of 
"FDR's policy of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union and other New Deal policies that benefitted 
working families."  Lumpkin described Wallace's campaign as "the most important third-party campaign 
of [her] lifetime" that set a precedent for her growing understanding of the American political 
spectrum.631  Ben Gold, president of the International Fur and Leather Workers' Union (IFLWU) and 
proud Party member, believed that Wallace and the PP ticket was "the hope of the nation for peace, 





"shifting trends of New Deal groups within the Democratic Party" overtly countered the Truman 
administration's perpetuation "of unrest, confusion, and fear."  As unions and working class community 
organizations became increasingly "at loggerheads" with the direction Truman took after the war, 
communists in communities across the nation "stepped in to embrace" Wallace and his political 
program as the "historic fulfillment" of the ideals of the Popular Front.  Many, like Charney, for the first 
time saw the future of their movement in more social democratic politics than Marxist-Leninist 
revolutionary theory.633   
 At initial New York district CPUSA meetings in the early part of 1948, Charney noted an 
"overwhelming support" for Wallace and the PP.  This was in part due to the "dim" awareness most of 
the New York City membership had of the factionalism at the national Party level, but also of a lack of 
acceptance among many members that gaining broad approval from the labor movement was a 
necessary precursor to rallying behind a new political organization.634  Numerous communists who 
performed political action duties joined the Wallace-supporting Progressive Citizens for America (PCA) 
to counter the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), which supported Truman.  Their goal was to 
build a political faction to sway liberals away from the center.  These more politically-oriented 
communists looked to long-time Party historian and writer Herbert Aptheker, who described the 
purpose of the pro-Truman ADA as an attempt "to prolong the life of an obsolete social order."635  
Communists in labor unions and the organizers who acted as mediators between the Party districts and 
union shop nuclei, however, insisted on supporting whomever labor supported.  UAW President Walter 
Reuther and CIO President Phillip Murray hesitated to support Wallace, in part because of the 
tremendous amount of political support initially shown by communists, even as Foster publicly 
advocated a "wait-and-see attitude."636  Murray ultimately refused to support Wallace, and threw his 





to halt the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, which threatened to limit the bargaining power of unions.  
The President’s opposition to the act factored heavily into the decisions of Reuther and Murray. 
 Charney witnessed the slow evolution within the New York CPUSA district of support for Wallace 
despite early requests to wait for a response by labor.  Those who were, in the spring of 1948, decisively 
pressing for labor's general support, by the summer "argued that Reuther, James Carey, and others 
could not stem the rank-and-file upsurge in favor of Wallace."  Those who remained critical of Wallace 
pointed to his speeches at Madison Square Garden, where he lashed out at postwar Soviet diplomacy.  
Much of the negative communist press coverage of Wallace came from the WPA's New Militant, which 
from 1946 up through the election published a series of articles depicting the ex-Vice President as a 
warmonger who sought to use the atomic bomb against the Soviet Union.  As the summer of 1948 went 
by, however, their criticisms became muted by increasing numbers of pro-Wallace Party members.  At 
the end of the summer, communists in New York and Chicago became convinced that "the [Progressive 
Party] would achieve broad labor support in spite of its 'misleaders.'"637   
 Communist support for Wallace, while understandable through the lens of grassroots Party 
members such as Lumpkin and Charney, ultimately drew a line in the labor world that could not be 
undone.  As the political leaders in New York and Chicago increased emphasis on their support for 
Wallace throughout mid and late-1947, communists staffed in labor unions throughout Detroit, New 
York, and Berkeley were not as supportive.  At a New York district meeting held in December, 1947, the 
communist unionists were skeptical over the political wing's desire for a full push behind a third party 
movement.  Unionist Mike Quill charged that forcing support for Wallace would divide the CIO and 
threaten to undo past gains.  Party representative Robert Thompson, on the other hand, argued that 
such a split was negligible if it meant getting Wallace into office.  After the meeting, numerous 
communists still active in unions "quietly" left the Party scene, while others from the meeting 





communist organizers, such as the leading board of UAW Local 600 in Detroit, permitted the union to 
remain outspoken Party members while simultaneously defying the CIO's national leadership and its 
support for Truman.  This, however, was one of few exceptions to the general rule that the decision to 
support Wallace saw labor communists either leave the Party, or leave the union.638 
 What became continuously clear in the early years after World War II was a return of the 
divisive factionalism that had marked the pre-Third Period eras.  It began with Browder, but exacerbated 
with the Wallace campaign.  While the policies of communist governments after 1947 hardened into the 
strict division between Eastern and Western spheres of influence, Foster and his faction within the 
CPUSA "increase[d] pressure" on the New York and Chicago membership to resist Dennis' attempt to 
continue a coalition-style approach to public action.  Dennis believed that the CPUSA's real purpose 
remained in a Popular Front-style alliance with progressives.  Dennis and his faction used the pages of 
the Daily Worker to emphasize resistance to Foster, who desired to see a return to the Third Period's 
approach of contrasting communist groups from progressives.  Opposition originated around Foster's 
removal of Jack Stachel from the position of trade union director because he lost the race for president 
of the United Auto Workers to Walter Reuther.  As a response, Dennis' faction fired the editor-in-chief of 
the Daily Worker, and elected Gates to the position.639  After eighteen years of ending factional disputes, 
factionalism once again became a dominant feature of the American communist political sphere, 
effectively limiting the leadership at the national level in 1947. 
 The manifestation of renewed postwar factionalism took on two main issues: "self-examination" 
on the part of reemphasizing "scientific socialism" across all districts starting with drawing the line on 
Yugoslavian independence, and a campaign against perceived "white chauvinism" within the ideological 
ranks of the Party.  These efforts surfaced during debates about Yugoslavian independence and were 
endemic of a desire to emphasize “scientific socialism” as the most effective and rational way to 





scientific versus utopian socialism, but by 1938 came to represent the Soviet Union’s pseudoscientific 
attempt to assess everything ranging from “the study of social life” to “the study of society” through the 
lens of Marxist materialism.640  Starobin suggested that one of the difficulties faced by the CPUSA in 
trying to avoid the return of factionalism was ironically the increased governmental and public 
repression of the postwar period.  The "most repressive aspect" of the Smith Act trials from 1949 to 
1953, Starobin states, were not the threats to personal liberty, but rather the shift in public opinion 
against communism to the point that moderate leftists found themselves in a situation where "unless 
they cooperated abjectly with these committees they faced not only prosecution but also ostracism."  
Self-examination in an era of societal judgment thus became a function of the CPUSA.  Above all this 
period of self-examination sought to understand the cause of political dilemmas "in the make-up, 
behavior, and capability of Party members" as opposed to question the palatability of the ideology with 
the American people.641   
 The Yugoslav-Soviet split, which began in 1948, further increased factionalism within American 
communist circles, as it reflected basic opinions about the sovereignty of nations and amplified concerns 
about possible ideological differences.  Yugoslavia, having been occupied by the Nazis throughout World 
War II and assisted only minimally by the Red Army, recognized Josip Tito as the provisional Prime 
Minister in early 1945.  In the aftermath, Soviet diplomats focused their complaints on Tito's nationalism 
and resistance to becoming a Soviet satellite.  Following Stalin's application of scientific socialism to 
social development, Tito emphasized national sovereignty and resisted joining the USSR.  This appeared, 
to the leaders of the Soviet Union and other European communist parties, as counterrevolutionary and 
utopian in its assessment of postwar possibilities.  How could a communist place the abstract nation 
over the proletarian revolution?  For American communists, this question came to be a measurement of 






 Another test for American communists in the search for scientific socialism was the "campaign 
on behalf of Lysenko" to reject "all schools of psychological thought except Pavlov's."  Trofim Lysenko 
worked throughout the 1930s and early 1940s in Soviet agriculture studying theories of environmentally 
acquired genetics.  Lysenko’s theory of soft inheritance from external conditioning rejected the hard 
inheritance theories of Mendelian genetics.  Lysenko's work had a profound effect on American 
communist leaders who debated the issue not in terms of legitimacy but rather of using it to draw the 
line for members.  After Lysenko’s theories were accepted in the Soviet Union, he was made director of 
the Institute of Genetics at the Soviet Union's Academy of Sciences.  Numerous Soviet scientists who 
refused to renounce Mendelian genetics faced forced resignations, and support for Lysenko back in the 
United States "became the test of Marxian orthodoxy" for American biologists and geneticists.  Within 
the CPUSA, a wedge between members with and members without knowledge of Freud and Mendel 
widened as committees and subcommittees were held.  Even long-time Party leaders, such as Avrom 
Landy, who attempted to relate Marxism scientifically to the democratic revolutions of the nineteenth 
century and thus place it within the context of the United States, faced judgment for refusing to accept 
the Soviet pseudoscience.  Although Landy’s conclusions might be seen as an attempt to mend the 
theory to existing Marxist philosophy, Party leaders were more interested in conformity than they were 
rationalizing of theory.643  As the Party leadership's obsession with Soviet philosophy intensified 
divisions, so too did it further alienate educated communists and activists, such as Landy, from their 
more ideological comrades. 
 The conclusion drawn by many CPUSA leaders was that if "treachery" in "powerful" communist 
states such as Yugoslavia was real and if treasonous scientists were confirmed in the communist 
motherland, an "inexperienced and vulnerable" Party such as their own was bound to have its own 
cohort of subversives working under the radar.  Quickly, and without hesitation, CPUSA districts across 





and Political Affairs.  The staunchest critics at the time were John Gates and Gilbert Green, who, 
between October 1949 and March 1950, criticized numerous Party members and fellow travelers over 
support for Yugoslavian independence.  Among the most popular activists singled out were playwright 
Lillian Hellman and Progressive Party activist and former Party lawyer O. John Rogge. The Party 
condemned their publication of Yugoslav theories on independence in their works.  Louis Adamic, a long 
time Party supporter and writer, lost his public standing as a progressive among Left circles, once his 
support for Tito became known.644   
 Arguably a more blatant example of increased Party factionalism was the ill-planned political 
campaign against perceived "white chauvinism" from 1948 to 1953.645 The term’s use as a pejorative 
against racism previously referred to socialists and activists unwilling to accept the national self-
determination theory for African Americans during the Third Period, but by 1948 was an effective tool 
for denouncing deviants of the Party line.  In 1949, Pettis Perry, CPUSA Chairman for the Negro 
Commission, issued a staunch call for communists to stand up against "chauvinist moods and themes" 
within American society and within local ranks of Party districts.  Although masked as a positive way for 
the CPUSA to reassess itself, the campaign examined "everyday language for signs of racism" among 
members.  It quickly saw numerous high-ranking district leaders demoted for "real or alleged insults to 
black members."  Specific terminology, such as using the phrase "whitewash" or "black sheep," was 
deemed inherently chauvinist, and its usage became suspect to demotion in and in some cases 
expulsion from the Party.  Over a short period of time, the "motivations became blurred" as both blacks 
and whites in unions and the CPUSA began "to take advantage of the enormous weapon which the 
charge of 'white chauvinism' gave them to settle scores, to climb organizational ladders, [and] to fight 
for jobs."  Simultaneously, it gave numerous black communists the chance to check the tendencies of 
their white comrades.  Organizers and activists spread out into the AFL, CIO, and Progressive Party, and 





 Grassroots communists viewed the national campaign against white chauvinism much 
differently from their Party leaders.  They viewed it as a practical effort to combat community racism in 
the postwar era that could not be done a decade prior.  Sherman Lebovitz in Philadelphia directed the 
local CPUSA clubs to rally to the defense of an African American who was fired once returning white 
soldiers came home from the war.  Lebovitz and his district comrades distributed leaflets door-to-door 
and engaged enlisted troops to consider supporting those who helped maintain the local economy 
during the war.  While ultimately a failure “in an atmosphere that guaranteed returning veterans priority 
and preference for jobs,” Lebovitz believed that the local communist effort to combat white chauvinism 
represented a continuation of efforts to combat localized racism while “an inordinate number of blacks” 
faced convictions in “frame-up rape trials.”  Lebovitz cited his “witness to the executions of the 
Martinsville Seven in Virginia as well as the execution of Willie McGee in Mississippi” as the primary 
trials formed his concern over racism in the postwar era.647   
 As American activists around the country geared for a fight in the face of McCarthyism, Foster 
and Dennis instead decried American postwar domestic policy as a rise of fascism unparalleled even to 
that of Nazi Germany and "militarist Japan."  Although hyperbolic and divisive, Foster and Dennis' were 
not altogether unrealistic, given the atmosphere of politics and tensions within the labor movement.  
Similarly, growing concerns about the federal government's plan to scale back wartime fixed price 
controls convinced many inside the labor world of American Communism that the war had offered the 
domestic labor movement only temporary relief.  In 1946 strike wave seemed to confirm this hypothesis 
as more than 5,000 strikes in steel encompassing over 4.5 million workers demonstrated that the gains 
made prior to the war and secured through the war would not be easily relinquished by American 
working families.648  To Dennis and Foster, the federal government’s response to strikes, particularly the 
US Chamber of Commerce’s condemnation of communists influencing labor, mirrored the passive 





peace coalition” by the Left.649  In the fall of 1948 at the CPUSA's fourteenth convention, fascism was 
declared to be a virtual reality throughout the United States.650  If, during the Third Period, the CPUSA's 
claims about the imminent danger of capitalism's collapse seemed somewhat convincing with the Great 
Depression, their conclusions in 1948 must have appeared as a complete reversal in the logic of Party 
leadership, regardless of how rational their concerns may seem in hindsight.  The Party’s language about 
fascism in the United States directly conflicted with the views of grassroots organizers, who displayed 
more hope for future efforts based on the war’s outcome.  Activists like Lumpkin saw the postwar strike 
wave as a continuation of previous efforts, not an effort to combat fascist policies of the federal 
government.651 
 Historians Irving Howe and Lewis Coser argued that communists and the CPUSA pushed a policy 
emphasizing the fascist nature of the Truman Administration.  They pointed to the psychological effects 
of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the Marshall Plan one year later.  While both were policies of 
anticommunism that sought to contain communist activity outside the borders of the United States, the 
two doctrines came late to communist criticisms and were viewed as fascist initiatives to sow divisions 
among CPUSA members.  As early as March 1946, TUUL organizer John Stachel worried about fascism 
when he suggested that the labor movement's frustration lay with a forced acceptance of a wage freeze 
during the war coupled with a no-strike pledge that made it impossible to negotiate working conditions 
and pay.  With the removal of price controls "the wage movement," Stachel stated, "embraced the 
majority of organized workers" and "large sections of the AFL" to turn against business "monopolists" 
who sought to undermine trade union legitimacy.652  By ignoring the emphasis on labor concerns in the 
aftermath of the war, historians tend to think about communists in relation to abstract cultural 
polemics, such as the idea that a culture of fear and paranoia, mixed with Truman's expansion of the 
Federal budget and the inability to get civil rights reform through the Republican-dominated Congress, 





prior.653  This was true for specific communists, such as members of the national CPUSA leadership, but 
false for many grassroots communist organizers active in the mid-to-late 1940s, including Lumpkin, who 
got divorced from her first husband after the war.  As the Truman Administration passed policies 
denounced by CPUSA leaders as fascist, Lumpkin focused her organizing efforts on the Wallace 
campaign for the Progressive Party and her engagement with African American activist Frank Lumpkin.  
Based on the continuity between her wartime activism and postwar engagement with progressives, 
Lumpkin appeared to have no need for the Party’s ideological conclusions about Truman’s policies.  
Instead, she and other grassroots organizers took their lead from the demands of their community.654 
 Communist leaders such as Foster became enamored with Churchill's depiction of a world 
divided on March 5th, 1946.655  With the economic power of unions effectively creating political power, 
relationships between the labor movement and the business community became politicized.    
Communists viewed the 1946 strike wave with disdain and a “settlement” that organized labor in the 
United States could reshape class relations.656  They also typically blamed the settlement on the business 
community’s anticommunism.  George Morris depicted the business community's negotiations as an 
attempt to politicize unionism in the same manner that Truman politicized the Cold War and support for 
Europe.  Targeting individuals for their refusal to support the Marshall Plan and refusal to support 
Truman in 1948, the House Un-American Activities Committee pushed a public policy of loyalty.657  This 
prompted businesses to take a defensive stance toward organized labor.  With passive support from the 
Truman administration, all tactics including violent strikebreaking were considered "justified."  To 
grassroots communist labor organizers, all that was built over the past decade appeared to be coming 
undone.658 
 In some cases, communists fought back at the local level and relied upon circulated CPUSA 
periodicals for public support.  Communists in the IFLWU fought against House Un-American Activities 





condemnations of his union run by communist thugs, IFLWU President Ben Gold exposed the criminal 
nature of corporate attempts to coerce and bully workers away from the union.  After testimony given 
by Irving Potash, two known gangsters, who went by the pseudonyms "Lepke" and "Gurrah," were 
arrested for the suspected murder of Morris Langer, manager of the IFLWU Newark Local.659  During a 
debate over charges of conspiracy made by company leaders, Gold reminded Texas Representative 
Wingate Lucas and Missouri Representative Max Schwabe that he never hid his Party affiliation and that 
"communists will fight to the death any fascist conspiracy to overthrow our democratically-elected 
government."  Gold insisted that the notion of illegal practices that undermined the nation were 
"organized by the employers and gunman," not by the Communist Party.  After the debate concluded, 
Gold declared that "Congress has opened up a new phase of undemocratic and un-American activities 
aimed at destroying the rights of the people."660 
 Armando Ramirez, at the time 17 and looking for a job, signed up for work with the American 
Youth for Democracy in his hometown of Chicago while attending classes at the city's Abraham Lincoln 
School―named after the communist brigade that fought in the Spanish Civil War.  Ramriez's disconnect 
with postwar American life, however, resulted less from estrangement from politics, and more the result 
of witnessing continued persecution of his fellow Chicago based Mexican-Americans.661 Rita Verna, a 
third generation communist from Philadelphia, believed the division between her openly communist 
mother and more sympathetic but hesitant father created friction as far as her understanding of the 
tolerable limits of her public activism.662  Danny Rubin, while not a formal member of the CPUSA until 
1953, kept active in the Labor Youth League of Philadelphia to promote resistance to the Korean War 
between 1950 and 1952.663  Much like the various worlds of American Communism, there was enough 
complexity in the levels of social activism among communists during the late 1940s to question the idea 
that political estrangement prevented communists from relating to their communities.  While the 





necessarily translate into an inability to "comprehend" or "relate" to postwar American life by grassroots 
CPUSA activists and communists without affiliation to the CPUSA. 
 By 1950 and the outbreak of the Korean War, the CPUSA's fracturing had reached its ultimate 
limit as responses to the growing effects of McCarthyism continued to be understood as an increase in 
domestic fascism, causing unions and civil rights organizations to break any remaining ties with the 
Party's leaders and top organizers.  Prominent communists in the unions believed they could swing the 
membership against McCarthyist tactics, but were routinely disappointed.  Most unions, including those 
where communists held significant presence, were unwilling to sacrifice the gains made for the sake of 
defending specific individuals.  In the CIO, resistance to the CPUSA's active members was conducted on a 
"less democratic and principled basis" in some unions than it was in others.  The National Maritime 
Union had a long and passionate history with its communist activists, dating back to its ties with Homer 
Brooks and his leadership between 1937 and 1938.664  These unionists banked on continued support 
from the largely African American and Puerto Rican workers who were "not easily frightened by 
association with communists."  Nevertheless, the NMU broke with the Party in 1946.  Over the course of 
the next four years, it refused to participate with the Party's plan for a unification of maritime unions.  
Communists within the union faced accusations of romanticizing Stalinist policies while doing little, if 
anything, for the union organizationally in the postwar period.665   
 Throughout the 1950s, the efforts to disrupt the local political efforts of the CPUSA evolved into 
a methodical routine pushed by the FBI and its Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO).  CPUSA 
members were accustomed to FBI "tails" and "informants" attending nearly all major events across the 
country if it was actively promoted by the national Party.  The designers of COINTELPRO intended for 
their presence in local spheres of radicalism to "increase factionalism, cause disruption, and win 
defections" among the CPUSA membership.  One way of doing this was to nurture factionalism between 





lists to local SWP outlets.  The SWP would then distribute leaflets, attend CPUSA meetings, and tried to 
sway members into their organization.  The FBI also instructed Detroit informants to purchase copies of 
the SWP's Militant and deliver them to the state leadership of the CPUSA.  This methodology removed 
the FBI from the burden of having to ideologically combat domestic communism at all; instead, the 
resurgence of factionalism rooted in the political divisions of American Communism from 1928/29 
helped assure Washington that domestic communism would never regain the traction it once had.666  
 While anticommunism rattled the politics and social acceptability of communist presence in 
domestic American society, the CPUSA managed to keep a majority of its supporters as well as a large 
portion of its postwar membership up until 1951.667  At the same time, Foster and Dennis made little 
progress on reassessing the direction and course of the movement.  Regional leaders also made few 
effective efforts to combat anticommunist persecution, other than take a stand for free speech.668  
Between the disconnect of the upper and lower Party stratums, there was a desire to ask questions and 
seek historical explanations about/for the setbacks and defeats, but there was little effort to question 
the Party line of following the guidance of Foster and Dennis.  Many likely disliked the notion of bringing 
back factional strife, particularly as leaders and organizers were hauled off to court for their political 
ideology.   
Making Due:  Communist Activity and Life 1945-1957 
 The Smith Act, passed in 1940, by 1945 stipulated that advocacy of Marxism-Leninism amounted 
to conspiracy to overthrow the government.  The subsequent Smith Act trials and escalating Cold War 
that came to dominate the narrative of postwar America did not collapse the overarching ideology or 
the will of individuals that claimed allegiance to it.669  Furthermore, it did not see the end of new 
membership in the CPUSA and constituent organizations, albeit at lesser numbers than during the 
Popular Front.  Just like the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 did not destroy the ideals of 





destroy the ideals of those who continued to identify as communist, nor those who held communist 
principles such as abolition of private property.  Issues such as racism and the Party's resistance to social 
concepts like "white chauvinism" remained attractive features of the communist movement.  Since the 
late 1920s, those who identified as communist in the United States had a political refuge, a cohort of 
like-minded individuals, and a bandwagon of "fellow travelers."  This political refuge came in many 
forms:  The SPA, the CPUSA, the CLA, the SWP, and the WPUS.  By 1957, being communist had become 
socially estranged and politically discredited by the ideological front of the Cold War and the failure of 
class collaborationist policies after the Popular Front.  For those who valued communist ideals, 
expressing them became a consistent battle of countering charges of radicalism and logically asserting 
them within the boundaries of the American judicial system. 
 After the war, the communist movement maintained strength by attracting a cohort of activists 
passionate about militantly challenging racial discrimination.  For communists who remained home, 
such as Brodine and Lumpkin, the fight against Nazi tyranny and the aggressive military policies of Japan 
reinforced their support for the CPUSA despite the Nazi-Soviet Pact.  Some believed that fighting against 
Nazism and Japanese aggression set standards that would then be brought home.  Others’ experience 
fighting in the war created a new understanding of social relations that conflicted with the long-standing 
racial discriminatory practices in the South.  One Mississippi war veteran recalled how he witnessed, 
first hand, the quick and immediate return to Jim Crow normalcy and its effect on his subsequent joining 
the communist movement after returning from his tour of duty in the Pacific in the summer of 1945.  
Mr. "M" grew up the son of a Jewish clothing merchant; one of the few merchants in his county of 
Mississippi who employed African Americans.i  At age 17 and prior to learning about communism, M 
understood a link between racial discrimination of Jews in Europe with the discrimination of African 
Americans in the United States.  Because of his religious upbringing, M felt emotionally attached to the 
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development of conditions in Europe.  On December 8th, 1941, one day after Pearl Harbor, M found his 
local recruiting station and joined the Army Air Corps.  By 1944, he was promoted to Captain at the start 
and given an agitate role in a unit tasked with building and maintaining a flight echelon airport for 
supply missions on New Guinea.  At the time, African Americans were placed in segregated "Army 
engineer" units and tasked with the harsh effort of destroying jungle and building expansive airstrips 
and bunkers under the command of the Army Air Corps.  In October of 1944, preparing for the Marines 
invasion of the Philippines, M's unit was reassigned to a staging area on the island of Layte but arrived a 
week before their equipment.  They were ordered to bunker in with one of their units of Army 
engineers.  Since the engineer units had their own segregated sergeant commanders, this was M's first 
time witnessing African Americans hold positions of authority.  This “life changing” moment would 
prove to be impactful on his next major experience with civil rights one year later.670 
 Once victory in the Pacific was assured, M's unit was directed back to San Francisco to begin the 
process of returning troops home.  Upon arrival, a troop train picked up hundreds of soldiers as they 
came into port and organized them by car to be dropped off at specific locations as the train made its 
trek across the nation.  M's car was organized for the soldiers of Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and was 
made up entirely of African American GIs.  As the only officer of the car, M was assigned command and 
directed orders for the men "for the purposes of travel."  Over the course of the two week-long train 
ride to St. Louis, M and his travel unit bonded over celebratory drinks they had stocked into their car 
prior to leaving the coast.  Their car was detached in St. Louis and reattached to the Southern train line, 
The City of New Orleans, to make its way South.  Lacking a mess car on the new train, the Army issued M 
and his car meal tickets backed by the U.S. government for use when the train stopped.671   
A day later, the train stopped in Memphis.  The Memphis train station had two levels, the lower 
of which housed shops and a diner while the trains arrived on loading platforms above.  M led his men 





manager addressed M directly, and informed him that the restaurant "cannot serve niggers, it's against 
the law."  Though M was not a victim of Jim Crow, he knew well how it functioned in his home state of 
Mississippi.  He also recognized that although many of the men of his train also came from a background 
of Jim Crow, most had been away from it for at least two years and, more importantly, they "won the 
war" for the purposes of protecting the very restaurant that refused to serve them.  M informed the 
waiter that if they couldn't be served, his men would "bust up his store" and he would do nothing to 
prevent it.  Turning the situation into a confrontation ultimately worked:  M and his unit got their 
government-paid meal and they did so on their own terms.  The event proved "transformational, in 
retrospect," for M, as he subsequently sought out civil-justice seeking organizations after leaving Camp 
Shelby.672 
 The idea that African Americans put their lives on the line for the rights enjoyed by citizens 
during World War II, only to be faced with discrimination and inequality upon return, defined the civil 
rights movement for soon-to-be communists such as Mr. M in the postwar years.  M's confrontational 
"political act" with the diner’s manager resulted in new attitudes about civility and citizenship, but at 
first he decided to take advantage of the GI Bill and attend college at Tulane University.  There, he met 
Joe Blum, who came from New York, as well as former GIs who, like him, were inspired by left-wing 
politics and social justice.  Blum became M’s roommate and introduced him to the local New Orleans 
district CPUSA.  Not long into his first year at Tulane, M joined the American Veterans Committee (AVC) 
after he heard about its reputation as a veteran’s organization working to support local communities.   
The AVC had "propped up" in various parts of the community, and targeted universities such as 
Tulane to attract returning GIs.  M became a prominent member of the New Orleans chapter, which was 
separate from but worked with the Tulane campus chapter to organize events.  Unlike other veterans 
organizations, the AVC offered full membership to all those who participated in the war, including 





involvement in civic activism.673  At first, the CPUSA discouraged its members from joining or 
participating in AVC events.  After the American Legion banned communists from membership in 1946, 
the CPUSA changed its position and encouraged communist veterans to join the AVC and attract left-
leaning GIs such as M.  This continued until the AVC ousted its communist membership between 1947 
and 1948, decreasing national membership by almost 80,000.674  The decision to oust communist 
members was made by referendum at local levels, but nationally the choice was made to avoid any 
individuals supportive of "totalitarian parties."  For M, however, the limited amount of time he had 
exposure with communist organizers was sufficient to gravitate his activism outside the orbit of the 
AVC.675   
 The New Orleans AVC chapter worked with the Tulane campus chapter and the local district 
CPUSA to organize voter registration drives for non-whites and challenge local Jim Crow ordinances.  M 
described this as an "incipient movement" to the later voter drives of the 1960s, where M and his local 
communists and students went door to door to promote civil equality and social acceptance.  M and his 
team also attempted to bridge the segregated atmosphere of the Tulane campus by inviting African 
American scholars from nearby colleges to speak.  Eventually, they settled on attracting sociologists 
from Fisk University and campaigned for over a year at Tulane to gather support, but failed to get 
permission from campus administration.  Not wanting to be deterred, the AVC rented a local hall in the 
city and had speakers come meet with students and discuss civil justice reform.  Between fall of 1947 
and spring of 1948, M transferred to the University of Michigan to study law.  There, he linked up with 
one of the largest national CPUSA districts and continued to organize students and community members 
against social injustices, even after he left the Party to pursue his career practicing civil rights law in the 
early 1960s.676 
 For the communists remaining active in labor, the political world appeared shut off from new 





defense industries, Senator Robert A. Taft and Representative Fred Hartley worked in June of 1947 to 
pass the single greatest handicap legislation for labor organizing: the Taft-Hartley Act.  Although the act 
was unpopular across nearly all sections of the American labor community, it was fueled by business 
opposition to the National Labor Relations Board.  As a political idea it, it was viewed as a way to bridge 
postwar centrism between New Deal Democrats and moderate Republicans.677  Not enough attention is 
given, however, to the lack of CPUSA attempts at raising awareness of the issue and organizing against 
anticommunism as they had done so in the 1930s.  Leftist leaders in organized labor faced a forced 
"Hobson's choice" of organizing the rank and file to their defense and denying charges of being 
communist, or to accepting the oath and disavowing communist ideology.  It "was only in rare cases," 
such as that of UAW Local 600 in Detroit, that communist organizers could rally enough support from 
the rank and file to keep their jobs.  Overall, the Taft Hartley Act caused the loss of numerous influential 
leaders in the labor world who would have otherwise likely remained stalwart Party organizers and shop 
stewards.  American communists then watched the escalation of factionalism in both the political and 
labor world following the passage of Taft-Hartley, until Foster pulled the CPUSA from active political 
organizing in June after the passing of the act.  Foster insisted that future initiatives could not be 
supported unless the Party had the backing of the labor movement, which to the contrary was showing 
signs of distancing efforts.  This ended the remaining elements of the political world that held ties with 
the labor world previously held from 1934 to 1946.678 
 Taft-Hartley expanded Left factionalism into the labor world after 1946 by creating the need for 
a "defensive consolidation" of left-led unions within the CIO.  In one case it prompted an exodus from 
the labor congress entirely.  Numerous prominent figures resigned, such as Ben Gold of the Furriers' 
Union, as smaller left-led unions were incorporated into larger ones.  The UCAPAWA, which after the 
war changed its name to the Food, Tobacco, Agriculture, and Allied Workers of America (FTA), was still 





watched his political associates face charges of violating the Smith Act and his labor organizing 
associates quit political organizing altogether.  He eventually left the organization and quit professional 
organizing work entirely.  A leading example of the aforementioned consolidation, the FTA was 
absorbed with the Distributive Workers Union and the Marine Cooks and Stewards into the 
International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union.  The loss of jobs, the ruined career of those 
outcasts for refusing to give up their ideological ties, all caused political strain in the communities.  The 
United Electrical Workers (UE), still by the late 1940s one of the largest left-led unions, attempted to 
preemptively avoid the CIO purge by walking out as a rival union, the International United Electrical, 
Radio and Machine Workers (IUE), started getting representation.  The UE's actions amplified the rifts 
between CPUSA political organizers and their labor organizing comrades, as the Party never endorsed or 
called for such action, and communists became more divided over the autonomy of their labor sphere of 
organizers.  Eventually the UE's leaders agreed that the only way to rid themselves of organizing issues 
was to informally sever their ties with the CPUSA by ending cooperative meetings and gatherings, which 
they did by 1952.679 
At the individual level, the broader societal changes occurred in the background while the daily 
struggle to maintain employment, uphold political ideals, and work to improve the community took 
primacy.  In the fall of 1949, Russell Brodine and his family received another, more stable, job 
opportunity in St. Louis.  For the fourth time in less than two years, the Brodines packed up their 1934 
Chevrolet and moved to another city.  Based on previous experience with FBI investigations, Brodine 
thought his orchestra contract would be another single season deal.  Fortunately, when he received his 
first paycheck, he also received his full contract.  Not only would he take in more money per year but he 
was assigned a standing position in the orchestra as the assistant principal chair for the bass section.  
Believing this was likely to be their new home, Brodine sold their house in Los Angeles and prepared to 





communists connected with local associations and clubs while the nation around them began to change, 
knew that a secure job did not necessarily mean stable living conditions.  Finding secure employment 
and a new life amidst postwar America did not mean a cessation of activism, nor an abandonment of 
socialist ideals.  Under a new context and an era of suspicion, communists like Brodine began to direct 
their work more passively into civil rights and pro-peace advocacy. 
 The slow erosion of communist political and labor activity in the United States between 1945 
and 1956 did not equally erode the effort by individual communists to combat systemic social racism.  At 
the local level, the CPUSA's national depiction of a resurgence of domestic fascism was convincing to 
individuals who experienced systemic racial injustice as a day-to-day reality.  Benjamin Davis recalled as 
many as 40 lynchings in the South between the end of World War II and the summer of 1946.  The brutal 
murder of four African Americans, two of whom were war veterans, in Monroe, Georgia on July 25th, 
heightened Davis’ concern of racial injustice.  Two married couples, George W. and Mae Murray Dorsey 
and Dorothy and Roger Malcolm, were fatally shot on Moore's Ford Bridge, then subsequently hung by 
local members of the Ku Klux Klan.  Davis called the murders "one of the most barbarous, cold-blooded 
crimes every committed."  He rejected the FBI's claims to "investigate" the events since the suspects 
were known to be members of the local KKK.  Throughout the rest of the year, Davis assisted his Harlem 
city council members to work with Congressman Adam Clayton Powell in pressuring state and federal 
officials to pass an anti-lynching bill and raise awareness of the ongoing "terror" that plagued the 
South.680  Although Truman responded by creating the Committee on Civil Rights to introduce anti-
lynching legislation and attempt to jump-start a defense of civil rights at the national level, he failed to 
convince southern Democrats.  The incident would remain a stain on the early civil rights movement 
until in 1992 a witness, Clinton Adams, admitted to the FBI that he had been on the run for 45 years 





across the nation and sufficed to convince civil rights activists that "the war against Hitler was won in 
Berlin, but lost in Monroe, Georgia."681   
 In 1949, now married to Frank Lumpkin and formally taking her current surname, Beatrice 
Lumpkin assisted the Communist Party district local in Buffalo in resistance against Lake Erie cruise ships' 
racist admissions policy.  At the time, the cruise ships coordinated dances, but they routinely refused 
admission to African Americans, regardless of their previous war status and labor union affiliation.  As a 
mixed family, the Lumpkins believed they were ideal candidates to help end this struggle at the docks.  
In the summer of 1949, they teamed up with members of United Steelworkers' Local 2603 to try and 
draw attention against the cruise ships by attempting to obtain admission for three African American 
workers.  Within an hour, the police were called by the docks.  When Frank Lumpkin attempted to block 
a police officer from "rough handling" a student in attendance of the protest, the officer clubbed him in 
the face, causing permanent physical damage.  Another officer pulled out his pistol and was ready to 
shoot Frank until his pregnant sister, Jonnie Lumpkin, jumped in front of the line of fire, begging the 
officer not to shoot.  Beatrice and Jonnie took Frank to the hospital where he received five stiches and 
faced charges of "interfering with a police officer making an arrest."682 
To resist the charge laid against Frank, his mother, Hattie Lumpkin, organized a joint labor-
community committee to continue to organize resistance against the admissions policies of the docks.  
The committee sent a letter to the state attorney signed by fifty local clergymen urging that Frank's 
charges be dropped and pressure be placed on the cruise ship company to prevent disorder and 
violence at the docks.  Under pressure, the cruise ship company agreed to end their discriminatory 
policy, but Steelworkers Local 2603 stated its intent to continue monitoring the docks to ensure that the 
company adhere to its agreement.  James Annacone, candidate for Buffalo mayor by the American 
Labor Party, commented that Frank Lumpkin's "blood-stained shirt [was] a warning that Jim Crow must 





national sentiment of CPUSA leaders about the fascist nature of post-WWII America to create, for 
grassroots communists like the Lumpkins, an equation of police brutality and racism with the 
perpetuation of fascist tendencies seen in the Hitler regime.684 
 In Michigan, the CPUSA supported the ongoing use of the Civil Rights Congress (CRC) as a means 
for combating racism.  While the CRC was not formally part of the CPUSA, it carried a history of presence 
within the American communist orbit shared by the ILD prior to 1939 and the wartime Civil Rights 
Congress.  FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover depicted these fronts as "an integral part of the communist 
apparatus."  He stated that the domestic communist movement was handicapped without the 
assistance of these fronts, because they rely on non-communists "to do the work that communists 
themselves cannot do" such as engage with the broader public.  Historian Edward Pintzuk argued, 
however, that while these depictions compartmentalized and exemplified the dominant postwar idea of 
communism as a monolithic, pervasive, and deceptive political force, there was no actual need for 
"control" over individuals "when both organizations have largely the same views, as did the Michigan 
District of the [CPUSA] and the CRC."  Pintzuk also pointed out that the CRC was largely staffed by the 
local CPUSA and that its creation after the war "was the result of a decision and [the] help of the 
[CPUSA].  In this sense, the CRC was neither a front of the CPUSA nor a parallel organization with similar 
goals; it was "an arm of the CPUSA."685 
 Pintzuk's analysis of the CRC in the postwar years helps break down the idea that American 
Communism was solely a political force.  It is with this analysis that understanding the movement as split 
into various worlds becomes more important and necessary.  The diffusion of American Communism out 
of the CPUSA and into broader social elements of reform within the United States was neither planned 
nor predictable based on the conditions of the postwar period.  Instead, it became the natural by-
product of organizations such as the CRC continuing the CPUSA's traditions against racial injustice under 





postwar civil rights activism, but it never fully removed the ideals of social equality embraced by 
organizations such as the CRC.  Eugene Dennis considered the CRC "one of the main organizations in the 
fight for democracy" in the postwar period and proudly asserted his ongoing desire to see American 
communists commit themselves to an external organization in order to help "shape its outlook, its 
approach, its tactics and everything."686  
 In areas outside of Michigan and the CRC’s orbit, individual communists such as the Lumpkins 
took on civil rights concerns that directly affected their local community.  In 1950, the Lumpkin family 
had their second child near the start of spring.  The Lumpkins was at odds with the postwar recession 
and the unavailability of jobs for women, especially recently expectant mothers, and they lacked a more 
coordinated organization such as the CRC to address grievances.  Beatrice and Frank applied for welfare 
benefits, but they were rejected for failing to meet residence requirements in Chicago.  The family 
turned to the Salvation Army and local communist friends for financial assistance and made due 
throughout the summer and fall.  When Frank Lumpkin obtained a job at the Wisconsin Steel Chippers 
near the end of 1950, the family began to enjoy some of the fruits of postwar consumer society.  With 
no job to continue shop floor organizing and a sustainable income from her husband, Beatrice directed 
her efforts against racial discrimination in her neighborhood housing districts.  At the time in Chicago, 
realtors in the downtown and South Side area routinely used "scare tactics" to push whites out of the 
urban zones and into the suburbs.  As non-white families came in to replace the former tenants, 
landlords and realtors increased rents with the support of the city government on the basis of 
combating "shortages of housing."687 
 Housing discrimination was a common facet of the early 1950s, and Lumpkin's experience in 
Chicago exemplified the mentality of communists in terms of how to rationalize it.  In a "frenzy for quick 
profits," landlords of the city targeted apartments in low-income areas and subdivided them into three 





rents, and the new units were sold to African American families.  Apartment units that were left 
undivided were then sold to the remaining poor white and second-generation Japanese immigrants; the 
latter having escaped California and the persecution of Japanese Americans during the war.  The 
Lumpkins watched landlords collect rent but make little to no repairs, slowly turning the neighborhood 
into a "slum."  Subsequently, the landlords blamed African Americans for ruining the neighborhood and 
forcing them to lower rents.  This process convinced Frank and Beatrice Lumpkin that not only were the 
landlords "racist," but the city "found nothing illegal in the destruction of communities."  This led many 
to believe that the city's housing inspectors were corrupt and in league with the landlords to make a 
profit.  The only solution, in the eyes of the Lumpkins and other Chicago communists, was to wage a 
fight for tenant's rights.688 
 The CPUSA's Lake Park Avenue club served as the local resource for Chicago-based communists 
to fight against discrimination in the city.  Their first fight involved the Illinois Institute of Technology, 
who was trying to expand through "an excuse of 'slum clearance'" authorized by the city despite 
numerous tenants still living in the building.  Landlords responded to resistance by tenants by cutting 
water and heating to the building during the winter of 1950, forcing many tenants to leave and abandon 
their belongings.  Those that remained found support from the CPUSA Lake Park club, including the 
Lumpkins.  When communists arrived on the scene, they found surviving families using dangerous space 
heaters to keep warm while numerous other families crowded outside of city hall demanding assistance.  
The space heaters at one point caused an electrical fire, destroying a poorly remodeled garage used by 
two single mothers and killing five children.  City officials blamed the mother of the children for using 
dangerous equipment, while "nothing was said about the landlord collecting rent on an illegal structure, 
or the city inspectors who never condemned it."  The response by local communists was to create a 
coalition of civil rights activists and city tenants to "prevent future fire tragedies and end the racist 





Home against Fire (CSHF) to work with citizens across political lines and depict the battle as between 
haves and have-nots.  When landlords refused to budge on issues of maintenance, and in some cases 
locked furnace rooms so they could not be started, the CSHF called for a rent strike.  The strike lasted 
only a week, but involved entire apartment complexes on Lake Park Avenue.  At the end of the week, 
the landlords' legal representatives, Farr and Associates, called the CSHF to settle demands which 
amounted to nothing more than tolerance of the existing tenants and the right to heat the building.689 
 It didn't take long for the next fight against discrimination to occur for the Lumpkins.  In 
November, 1952, an African American couple reported to the CPUSA's Lake Avenue club that the 
Metropole Theatre on 31st Street refused to sell them tickets.  The CRC took the charge seriously and 
organized an effort to confront the theatre directly.  Since the Lumpkins were a mixed couple, they were 
chosen as one of seven couples tasked with trying to challenge the theatre's practices.  While the seven 
couples were allowed entrance to the theatre, within minutes the other viewers left the room.  Once 
Beatrice and Frank left the viewing hall to see what the commotion was about, they found over 500 
people blocking the street exit.  While Beatrice remembered Frank as being stalwart in the face of 
oppression, she herself felt "scared" and "worried about how to get out without being beaten by the 
mob."  Other prominent CPUSA organizers soon arrived, some under police escort.  One such member 
was Arlene Brigham, who later became a champion for defending civil rights and the remembrance of 
Emmitt Till after his murder in 1955.  When the film was over, rather than break up the mob and 
prevent further harassment, the city police backed up wagons to the theatre entrance and carted off the 
seven couples, as well as Arlene Brigham, "like convicts."690  While the incident served as a moment of 
resistance for Chicago communists, it also had the negative result of driving African Americans back 






 Nationally, American communists' commitment to fighting incidences of racism during the 
postwar period, such as that of the Chicago Lake Avenue Club, was sustained by the continued harsh 
punishments for African Americans guilty of crimes similar to that of the Scottsboro Boys.  The Willie 
McGee case of 1946 to 1951 was similar to the Scottsboro and Herndon cases of the 1930s in that it 
combined not only a fight for the defendant's innocence, but also a charge of unequal treatment under 
the law.  The CRC took on McGee's defense in 1946 after hearing about the nature of the charge and 
utilized elements of its Michigan-based CPUSA organizers to draw in national attention.  McGee was 
charged with rape after being caught having an affair with a married woman, Willet Hawkins, for over a 
year.  The case coincided with the development of new nations in Africa and the Third World, many of 
whom were watching the case "to see if [the United States'] words of democracy and freedom would 
apply to its black citizens."692  Rosalie McGee, Willie's wife, corroborated her husband's story, stating she 
knew of the affair as early as 1944, as did the Hawkins' pastor, Reverend G.L. Tucker.  Rosalie's 
testimony in particular was emotional; she stated that although she was aware, the affair continued 
because both she and her husband feared that Mrs. Hawkins would cry rape if McGee tried to end the 
relationship.  In court, the defense attorney offered "no defense at all" and put up little resistance to the 
prosecution, including not calling Willet Hawkins to the stand, before the all-white jury returned a guilty 
verdict.693  
 Pintzuk noticed a legal shift that developed between the local lawyers in Mississippi and the CRC 
lawyers who appealed the convictions and how the McGee case highlighted the importance of legal 
battles waged by communists in the fight for racial equality.  Although the circumstances of the case 
seemed to mimic the legal treatment of African Americans in previous cases, the trial itself was quite 
unusual.  The trial resembled the "lynch and military atmosphere of the first Scottsboro case," with an 
all-white jury, a quick and speedy verdict, and state militia surrounding the courthouse.  Machine guns 





to use it if his wife was defamed.  Previous decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, Pintzuk noted, had 
ruled that a fair trial in which African Americans had representation on juries was mandatory.  In the 
second appeal for McGee, the CRC noted that there was little information to explain why no potential 
black jurors were available.  In response, on February 9th, 1947 the Supreme Court of Mississippi 
ordered the prosecution to prove that African Americans were not excluded from the jury process, in 
effect reversing previous trends by the courts to place the burden on defendants.694  In total, the CRC 
spent $19,500 on the case, with the Michigan district taking on the bulk of fundraising. 
 From 1948 to 1951, the CRC threw all of its efforts at rallying defense for McGee.  In some 
instances this meant relying on local CPUSA districts to go door-to-door and persuade citizens of 
McGee's innocence.  The Daily Worker, as well, urged its readers to "plea for McGee" as hundreds 
descended upon Washington D.C. to chain themselves to the Lincoln Memorial.  Anne Braden, a civil 
rights activist present at a few of the demonstrations for McGee outside the White House, noted that 
"the CRC pioneered the idea of whites working in white communities to combat racism" and managed 
to bring together numerous groups who would otherwise avoid collaboration.  Though the CRC did 
everything they could to delay court action, McGee was executed on May 8th, 1951.  UAW Local 600 in 
Detroit organized a memorial for McGee from Grand Circus Park to City Hall, where the Sojourner Truth 
monument stood.  Afterward, both the CPUSA and CRC were accused of manipulating the case and 
delaying it for their own benefit, particularly the politicization of racial issues.  The efforts by 
communists within the CRC, however, demonstrate the dedication American communists retained to 
fighting racial discrimination at the national level in the postwar period.695  
Conclusion 
 The internalization of Party issues, such as French Communist criticism, Soviet genetics, and 
Yugoslav nationalism, and the inability of Party leaders like Foster and Dennis to relate better with their 





reorganizing, rethinking, and reassessing its role in the United States, other non-communist activists 
pushed for civil rights reform.  In doing so, they attracted communists in labor and community activism 
who had little interest for Party factionalism and political conflict.  In 1946, Dennis' leadership within the 
CPUSA looked to the possible economic outcome of the war and predicted "an economic downturn of 
massive proportions."  Coinciding with this view was the idea that, much like during the Third Period, a 
large radicalization of the American working class would occur.  Dennis then steered the Party back 
toward the left while the Truman Administration shifted toward the Right in order to counter threats of 
being soft on communism.  Although there was a slight recession during 1948, it was overdramatized in 
the pages of The Daily Worker and Dennis was ultimately proven wrong.  This rhetoric continued until 
1950, when it was not only clear that an economic recession was not inevitable, but that 
anticommunism began to target CPUSA members and leaders across the nation.696 
 For grassroots communists like Brodine and Lumpkin, the postwar period amplified support for 
progressive politics and labor legislation while also displacing the significance of the organizations that 
previously swayed their views.  In most cases, grassroots organizers settled for any opportunity they 
could find they could put their organizational capacity to use.  Lumpkin’s fight against racial 
discrimination in the late 1940s and early 1950s was fundamentally different from her efforts in the YCL 
during the 1930s in that they were not linked to Party doctrine or coordinated Party efforts.  For these 
organizers, it mattered little if the fight was waged personally like Lumpkin, if it was organized by a 
CPUSA club such as the Lake Avenue Club, or if it was promoted through a non-Party organization such 
as the CRC.  Communist postwar battles against discrimination were the product of an evolved 
understanding of social activism that began with the Party in the late 1920s but was nurtured by years of 
working with grassroots organizers and workers throughout the 1930s and 1940s.  By 1950, activists like 






CHAPTER 6:  THE GRIM WORLD OF AMERICAN ANTICOMMUNISM 
 After the turbulent late 1940s, the dominant issue for American communists became the widely 
pervasive atmosphere of anticommunism.  National Party leaders, public icons, intellectuals, and even 
non-Party members faced an uphill battle after 1949.  Their national identity was now put up for 
judgment.  Much of the negative perception of communists built on an argument that characterized all 
communists and anyone in a progressive organization as one and the same.  Coinciding with this was the 
perception that it was impossible to support ideals of communism while simultaneously remaining loyal 
to United States.  For communists with and without membership in the CPUSA, SWP, or AWP, the 
internal fragmentation of communist politics had only been the beginning.  Now they faced 
fragmentation and stigma for their pro-Soviet and pro-neutral stances while the American politics 
moved to the Right.  After the CPUSA reformed under the leadership of William Foster and Eugene 
Dennis, communism became a more credible domestic threat.  Through weaponized rhetoric and 
proactive legislation that sought containment of communism abroad and at home, the once radical yet 
cooperative Populist CPUSA became a foreign agency bent on usurping American values and institutions.  
This transition helped mute the various worlds of American Communism by oversimplifying the various 
dimensions of communist activity (political, civil, and labor) into a singular strawman: as treasonous to 
the United States.   
 This chapter addresses the issue of anticommunism; a topic that dominates most of the written 
scholarship on the CPUSA, its leadership, and the overall American communist movement between 1945 
and 1957.  Historian James Barrett depicted postwar American communism as a movement in decline 
"largely by government repression and the conservative political climate of the McCarthy period."697  
Historian Edward Pintzuk described the entire conditions of American Communism's postwar history as 
a history of "covert actions taken against the targeted organizations by state and private agencies to 





is important to recognize the differences between prewar and postwar eras of anticommunism and 
avoid getting trapped in what Barrett described as "the preoccupations of the Cold War;" thereby 
limiting the narrative in the 1940s and 1950s to a discussion of spies, subverts, and high ranking officials 
of the CPUSA exclusively.699  Other scholars have taken note of this tendency, such as Eric Arnesen who 
argued that historians have misinterpreted the "full-throated embrace of anticommunism" by numerous 
African Americans in the postwar years as "an unfortunate development of the early Cold War," instead 
of a long, documented tradition within the black community to avoid socially-antagonistic political 
groups.700   
 While acknowledging certain facets of postwar anticommunism, this chapter seeks to 
understand this social phenomenon as a world of American Communism, as opposed to an external 
force that would have been present, regardless.  Anticommunism has a common tendency to be 
discussed in both the classroom and research as a product of the postwar resolutions and Soviet 
intensions in Eastern Europe.  As such, it avoids clear links between antiradical efforts in labor, politics, 
and within civil rights organizations over a broader chronological context, dating back to the founding of 
the NAACP and federal investigations of radical labor organizations in the late 1920s.  A central question 
to understanding this world is: how did anticommunism develop in the prewar years, evolve during the 
Popular Front, and emerge at the end of World War II as a cultural milieu of postwar political and social 
morality?   
At war’s end, the continuation of anticommunism took on newer forms both politically and 
culturally.  To discuss the postwar period, this chapter examines four specific cases spanning across the 
worlds of American Communism, as opposed to attempt an all-encompassing visage of the 
anticommunist experience.  One of the hard truths about American Communism is that its existence 
prompted the trampling of constitutionally-protected individual rights.  The subsequent fight to protect 





in the United States must also factor in the international dimension, with regard to particular aspects of 
its development within the national dimension; especially the case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.  Their 
case arguably set the limit for the extent of anticommunist fear and influence within the American 
justice system.  American anticommunism took advantage of the desires of business leaders, the fear of 
average Americans and the unknown, and the postwar goals of the U.S. State to create, by 1953, an 
ideological scapegoat comparable only with the concept of a “terrorist” in the 21st century. 
 When her father faced trial in 1949 in Foley Square with other leading figures of the CPUSA, 
Michele Artt stood proudly with her mother outside the courthouse to protest the judgment of the jury.  
Artt grew up in the outskirts of Detroit, the daughter of Helen and Carl Winter and granddaughter of 
first generation CPUSA members Allison and Alfred Wagenknecht.  The Wagenknechts helped build the 
Party from its origins as a left faction of the Socialist Party.  By 1919, they were charter members while 
the Winters helped build the Party's base throughout Michigan.  Artt's parents both experienced 
anticommunist repression firsthand when they received indictments between 1949 and 1953 under the 
Smith Act for their involvement as leading Michigan district officials of the CPUSA.  Carl Winter was 
charged at the 1949 Foley Square Trial in New York City, along with William Foster, Eugene Dennis, and 
other prominent Party leaders.  Helen Winter faced charges three years later during the Michigan Six 
Trial of 1952, along with other prominent Michigan branch leaders: Nat Ganley, Thomas Dewitt Dennis 
Jr., Saul Wellman, and Philip Schatz.  Winter's role in the Michigan branch of the CPUSA by 1949 
involved organizing the local activists around acute issues, such as the expansion and protection of 
existing labor legislation and the sustenance of existing community relations between civil rights groups 
and unions.701   
 During the Third Period, Carl Winter was a disciplined and highly active activist; he promoted 
numerous hunger marches throughout Detroit and played a role in William Foster's local presidential 





Passaic textile workers strike in New Jersey.  At the time her father faced prosecutors arguing that he 
was guilty of attempting violent overthrow of the federal government, Artt was 7.  Artt's grandmother 
took on guardianship responsibilities and assisted with young Michele's upbringing as her parents faced 
conviction.  Artt didn't see her father again until she reached the age of 12.  To Artt, the era of 
anticommunism from 1945 to 1957 shaped and defined the way she understood democracy and social 
life.  It also prompted her subsequent involvement in the CPUSA and activism therein, as it did for a 
whole new generation of activists who grew up during the second Red Scare.702 
   For publicly active communists in the state department like Carl Marzani, the transformation in 
the public eye of communists after the war from allies and citizens to traitorous felons was primarily 
"perceptual."  Marzani faced indictment for perjury while working for the State Department after lying 
about his CPUSA membership.  Marzani's employment in government ended specifically due to a shift in 
the social understanding of 'communism' as a threat.  This new, "demonized image" of domestic 
communists filtered into the public's perception of communism as an ideology.  Fueled by rhetoric that 
associated communists as foreign and subversive, it became impossible, in the minds of many citizens, 
to be both 'communist' and 'American.'  Historian Ellen Schrecker identified how "most [scholarly] 
treatments of McCarthyism overlook this transformation" of the idea of communism and the perception 
of individual communists representing the idea.  Instead of seeing a shift from a more passive and 
political anticommunism into a cultural and national security issue, studies of McCarthyism often 
assumed that "the Cold War automatically led to the repression of American Communists."  The 
transformation was not a matter of circumstance resulting from the end of World War II, but rather 
from an effort to convince "policymakers and the public...that Communism was so bad and dangerous 
that it had to be driven out of American life."703 
 Although anticommunism dominated the political culture between 1945 and 1957, it was not a 





anticommunism" was a mix of decades-old “labor anticommunism” stemming from antiradical unionists 
between 1921 and 1939 and anti-New Deal Republicans from 1936 to 1952.704  Prominent American 
communist Elizabeth Gurley Flynn dated the early beginnings of what Luff described to around 1907, 
when workers and organizers faced public attempts by employers and city officials to deny basic 
constitutional rights, such as the right to free speech, to assemble, and to bear arms.  Flynn was charged 
with conspiracy in 1910 after gaining nationwide attention for addressing injustices against members of 
the Industrial Workers of the World.  Flynn later faced trials for her role as a CPUSA leader in 1952.705  It 
was only much later that anticommunism took on the more dominant form common in public memory.  
Stalin's speech to declare postwar relations between the East and West as "incompatible," the breakout 
of civil war in Greece between rivalist social democratic and communist forces in mid-1946, and the 
successful overthrow of the Czechoslovakian government by communist revolutionaries in February, 
1948, stirred new fears.  Anticommunism served as a prominent foundation for politicians to exploit for 
political advantage, best evidenced by anticommunism's more politicized title of 'McCarthyism,' but also 
present in the domestic political program of the Truman Administration from 1946 until the election of 
Eisenhower in 1952.   
This political purpose extended from the national level to the local level, where town halls could 
be rallied together behind the cause of preventing "reds" from gaining control in the communities.  Both 
politicians and political parties went to extensive lengths to "recklessly [smear] their opponents with 
false accusations," thereby swaying the public in one direction or another.706  The hysteria, which was 
neither strictly political nor cultural, knew few bounds.  It targeted civil activists, union organizers, 
politicians within the Democratic Party, academics, and religious leaders.  Because the investigative 
efforts sought a broad and detailed analysis of domestic communist presence, membership in the 





in favor of the idea that demanding knowledge of membership in a communist organization or of 
knowing individuals who held membership "did not violate witnesses' constitutional rights."707  
 Due to the Cold War's effects on political consciousness, the assessments of the courts only now 
seem obscure and irrational.  Despite the international scope of the Cold War and the escalation of 
tensions from 1947 to 1950 with the rise of the Iron Curtain, communist China, and the Korean War, 
American communists did not pose a serious threat to the United States government.  At the time, the 
negative depiction of communism was enough to justify the treatments communists faced in the courts.  
It was the "pervasive image" of the CPUSA as a "lethal foreign conspiracy" that allowed anticommunism 
in the United States to ferment as it did by the late 1940s.708  Schrecker argued that there existed "many 
McCarthyisms, each with its own agenda and modus operandi."  Among these were public, 
"ultraconservative" activists, and centrist liberals who "supported sanctions against Communists, but 
not against non-Communists."  Adding to this range, there were moderate socialists and anti-Stalinist 
communists who supported the persecution of "traitors to the socialist ideal," starting with the CPUSA's 
support for the persecution of the SWP via the Smith Act in 1941.709  The situation presented American 
communists across the spectrum, from passive advocates such as Russell Brodine, to passionate activists 
such as Lumpkin, to inner-circle Party leaders such as Dennis and Gates, with a decision:  To take a stand 
in supporting the ideology on the basis of constitutionality, to continue with their work and activism as 
silent supporters, to condemn or support those charged, or to abandon the political element entirely.   
 Most communists who spoke about their experiences place emphasis on the 1940 Alien 
Registration Act, or Smith Act, as the source of political and social discrimination against communists 
and other known "undesirables."  Others credited most of the witch-hunt work to President Truman for 
crafting a "strong anticommunist policy with domestic fallout" that included executive orders and efforts 





Philadelphia, pointed to the November 1946 Congressional election, where moderate Republicans used 
the "threat of communism" to displace the Roosevelt coalition and secure a GOP victory in Congress.711   
Unbeknownst to communists such as Labovitz in the 1940s, the roots of anticommunism stem 
back further than the Great Depression and even the formation of American Communism’s political 
world in 1928.  Labor anticommunism found root among conservative caucuses of organizations where 
communists, socialists, and left radicals held significant influence.  Some of these developments were 
culminations of antiradical organizers and an increasing desire to be free from the ideological 
constraints that later surfaced with the Nazi-Soviet Pact.712  Others were the result of localized corporate 
pressure against CPUSA activities in large industrial cities.  They used privately-hired spies to infiltrate 
known communist clubs and reported on agendas, meeting times, and the extent of communist 
involvement in workshops.713  While the world was at war, Congress passed the 1940 Smith Act to 
prosecute individuals or organizations that "advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, 
desirability, or propriety" of violent overthrow of the government.  The mechanisms to find, arrest, and 
associate such individuals with radical groups, however, were already in place by the time the Smith Act 
became law.714 
For the FBI, investigations of perceived radicals by 1940 were more than a routine; they were 
methodical.  The FBI's predecessor, the Bureau of Investigation (BI), had, as early as 1921, conducted 
regular checks on known Workers' Party associates as well as non-Party communists involved in 
syndicalist groups and within the American Federation of Labor (AFL).  The acting attorney general, 
Harry M. Daugherty, opened investigations on the AFL for suspected radicals and directed his work 
through the BI.  Foster's Trade Union Unity League (TUUL) caught the attention of the BI to begin open 
investigations of the burgeoning communist movement in the late 1920s, which added them to the list 
of primary suspects.715  Among the first targets the BI investigated and detained were radicals in 





Secretary of Labor was responsible for determining if known suspects had the right to an attorney.  In 
the "bifurcated" procedure for investigating undesirables, deportation was the "instrument of choice" 
by the Department of Labor in such matters.  Based on the bill which introduced the BI, it did not matter 
if the "undesirable alien...had an American wife and ten American children, or whether he'd lived in 
America for forty years."  Civil libertarians protested the procedure of the BI, but the Department of 
Justice viewed it as "the best way to avoid the snail's pace of the courts" and allowed the investigations 
to continue throughout the late 1920s and 1930s.716  In more ways than one, the BI set the stage for the 
FBI by creating the means to further investigate communists during the postwar era. 
One way the Bureau of Investigation succeeded in localized operations was by relying on private 
companies that already had the means of infiltrating unions and shop committees.  Among the oldest of 
organizations that offered infiltration of union services to employers, the Corporation Auxiliary Company 
(CAC), also sometimes called Corporation Auxiliary Services, hired private investigators and former 
policeman to infiltrate local shops and factories for the purpose of reporting conditions to company 
employers and obtaining information so as to best prevent the rise of union committees.  The CAC had a 
reputation dating back to 1913 when labor organizers blamed its infiltrators for the failure of the Akron 
rubber strike, who made up almost half of the charter members of the Akron Rubber Workers Union.717  
In the 1930s, the CAC’s two largest contract holders were Chrysler and Ford Motor Company.  In most 
cases, Detroit factory managers were unaware of the presence of CAC employees in their workforce 
since it served the interests of the employer to keep knowledge about spies to a minimum.  Such was 
the experience of William Gernaey, hired in 1927 to infiltrate a Chrysler plant and report worker 
conditions to his own CAC boss, independent of the local shop boss.  Gernaey was the son of a tool and 
die maker; but after he graduated High School and took courses at Detroit Business University, the CAC 
hired him to perform "efficiency work" at oil companies near the city—Shell, Wayco, Sun Oil, Texaco, 





tasked Gernaey with infiltrating the Highland Park Chrysler plant.  Gernaey's job was so secretive that 
not even shop management was informed of his real duties.  He was even laid-off in the spring of 1929 
due to the confidential nature of his employment.  It was this particular moment, however, that brought 
Gernaey into the communist movement.718 
Gernaey's loss of employment at the Highland Park plant did not end his contract with Chrysler.  
Rather, the company decided to place him in a more useful position and instructed him to get involved 
with the local Detroit communist scene.  He was told to "hang around communist halls" and "safeguard 
the interests" of both the Chrysler corporation and the CAC.  Gernaey frequented bars and dance halls 
along Woodward and Cas for week until he noticed a flier advertising for workers to meet to discuss 
political work.  At his first meeting he met Max Shapiro, a local representative for the CPUSA, and Joe 
Siroka, district organizer for the YCL of Michigan.  They offered him a meal, some money, and the 
address to their next Party meeting.  After only one night, Gernaey felt he "was in."  The CPUSA 
subsequently tasked him as a unit organizer for the YCL's section committee for organizing in Detroit 
shops, where he "worked as a communist is supposed to work; keeping in the background, not get[ting] 
arrested and safeguard[ing]" himself.719  Gernaey not only was expected to passively report on local 
communist activities, he was encouraged to seek leadership positions in the local Party "since very few 
carry out their tasks" and the Party was "always looking for stool-pigeons."  Leadership roles and 
heavily-active commitment helped secure trust between Gernaey and his local communist organizers.720 
Infiltrators such as Gernaey, however, typically engaged in more conspiracist-like investigation 
than one would expect out of a professional investigative organization attempting to unveil the 
seriousness of communist infiltration.  In the early years of the Third Period, Gernaey met with Mike 
Webb, Larry Gossman, and Nat Ganley to discuss his work as a YCL organizer out Hamtramck, near the 
Highland Park Ford plant.  Webb and Gossman worked at Ford Motor Company in the Amtorg Trading 





1920s and by the early 1930s served as the administrative wing of importing goods such as lumber, fur, 
and, through Ford, car parts.  Gernaey's interest was "booming" about whether or not Webb and 
Gossman's presence at Ford indicated that the Ford Motor Company might actually be working for the 
Soviet government; falsely assuming that the presence of communists in trading departments and the 
shipping of parts to Russia amounted to some level of conspiracy.  Upon further investigation, Gernaey 
was disappointed to learn that all Ford was selling to Russia was "obsolete machinery and tools."  In 
addition, Gernaey eventually learned that his concerns about Ford's involvement with the Soviets were 
unrealistic since the Amtorg Trading Company forbade its employees in the United States from 
participating with and associating with known CPUSA members.  While it is obvious that Webb and 
Gossman were in questionable violation of this standing order, Gernaey also found no evidence to link 
them to Amtorg the company directly; they remained identified as employees of Ford Motor Company 
and envoys to the Amtorg Trading department within Ford.721 
When trying to fully understand their case studies, infiltrators also occasionally exaggerated the 
extent to which Marxist philosophy mixed with emerging groups such as the CIO.  When talking about 
the significance of strength in the CPUSA's organizing methods, Gernaey falsely attributed Marx's 
quotes, "Workers of the World Unite!" and "Workers have nothing to lose but their chains" to Vladimir 
Lenin and incorrectly asserted to his superiors that the communist philosophy of "in unity there is 
strength" fit toe-in-step with the emerging political program of the CIO.722  Gernaey also depicted 
Ganley's shift from an active organizer for the Hamtramck CPUSA into his organizing position within the 
CIO in 1937 as evidence of commitment by Party leaders to "bring about a collaboration of communists 
within the AFL and the CIO."  Gernaey likely contributed to the illusion that communists were trying to 
use the CIO in Detroit as a means for securing gains they could not otherwise achieve through the AFL.  
As was made clear in Chapter 3, communist organizing in labor was built more on practical necessity 





geography.  Gernaey, however, insisted that increased communist presence in the CIO from 1935-1936 
was the result of efforts to "avoid any spies" and secure leadership positions in factory nuclei before any 
other group could succeed.  In 1937, Gernaey was found out and his role as a communist spy 
compromised.  He went on to testify to before the House Un-American Activities Committee after World 
War II.723  As for the CAC, their remaining infiltrators at Chrysler were identified by Johnny Andrews at a 
La Follette Committee meeting held in November 1936, and the organization began to lose contracts.724 
 By 1941, the federal government, after dealing with oppositional groups within the ACLU, AFL, 
TUUL, and CIO, generated the "legal architecture of federal anticommunism" and set the stage for the 
first victims of the Smith Act, the SWP, on June 27th in Minneapolis and St. Paul.  There, U.S. Marshalls 
and FBI investigators, on orders from the Department of Justice, seized documents from Russian 
revolutionary Leon Trotsky and two red flags.  The evidence gathered was then used in subsequent 
weeks to indict twenty-nine socialists working with the Teamsters Local 544.    Among those arrested 
were SWP leaders Max Geldman and Edward Palmquist for their involvement in a Works Progress 
Administration strike two years prior.  In addition, James Cannon, now fully independent of the CPUSA 
but still active as a political organizer, faced indictment as the unpronounced figurehead of the SWP.  In 
total, the twenty-nine accused Americans made up the legal, labor, ideological, and grassroots 
organizing capacity of the SWP in Minneapolis.  Only twenty-eight of the accused made it to the court on 
October 27th, as Grant Dunne had tragically taken his own life on the 7th.  After the trial on November 
18th, the presiding Judge, Matthew M. Joyce, issued a verdict of not guilty for five of the defendants on 
the grounds of a lack of sufficient evidence to prove they were aware of a conspiracy.  By December, the 
jury had delivered a final verdict of not guilty for the remaining twenty-three accused on the first count 
of organizing armed revolution.  For James Cannon and seventeen other top SWP leaders, however, they 





 After hearing about rumors of J.R. Oppenheimer’s past, including his previous romantic 
relationship with a known communist, Jean Tatlock, and his sister-in-law’s membership with the CPUSA, 
the FBI began investigating the Manhattan Project scientist in 1941, not long after the SWP trial.725  The 
FBI, under the direction of Herbert Hoover, was concerned with the possible leaking of information via 
ideologically-committed intellectuals.  Hoover’s obsession with incidents of possible espionage, and 
speaking publicly about it, had the effect of “convincing most Americans—public officials and ordinary 
citizens alike—that the [CPUSA] was breeding spies.”  Although the FBI did find links between CPUSA 
members and Russian agents, most of the records released reveal little information about the actual 
transmission of sensitive data.  The mere idea of communists spying on behalf of Russia, mixed with the 
SWP’s trial, was sufficient to establish a social fear of communism during the war that would prove 
tremendously influential after the war.726 
The case against the SWP in 1941 served as a litmus test for future indictments leading up to the 
Foley Square of 1949, Michigan Six trial of 1953, and numerous other trials in cities like Los Angeles and 
Philadelphia.727  Federal prosecutors and the FBI studied the SWP case carefully to see where the 
limitations were in the overall goal of exposing the organization as a danger.  During the early months of 
the postwar period, the legal aspect of anticommunism mixed with cultural fears about Soviet 
aggression and developed into a "carefully nurtured" and "unparalleled hysteria."  By 1945, the using 
the Smith Act to prosecute individuals had changed with the breakdown of the US-Soviet wartime 
alliance.   The Smith Act did not exclusively target CPUSA or SWP members, as membership or 
leadership in a communist organization was "never specifically prohibited by [the] legislation."  Instead, 
suspected targets included "advocates of any ideology that openly challenged the wisdom of 
maintaining a capitalist economic social system."728  The hysteria and trials allowed the Truman 
Administration to publicize communism as a "menace" and over-exaggerate the extent to which 





differences between various regional sects of the CPUSA and SWP, the state prosecution conducted the 
trials in a manner that put the entirety of communist ideology, not just the CPUSA or SWP leaders, up 
for public judgment.  This judgment was not contained to the high-ranking members of the CPUSA or 
SWP; but also to their friends, their families, and their community organizations—further sowing 
mistrust and division in labor communities that only a decade prior embraced unity.729 
The Smith Act stipulated particulars such as "knowingly or willfully advocat[ed]," which allowed 
flexibility on the part of prosecutors to simply determine that someone's political outlook suggested or 
tacitly approved of revolutionary theory.  Additionally, the act stipulated that to "print, publish, edit, 
issue, circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly display any written or printed matter" which advocated 
overthrow of the government violated its secondary statute.730  Not only did the CPUSA and SWP have 
their own publishing companies, newspapers, and journals, they also regularly distributed Marxist 
literature printed in the Soviet Union and by European communist parties.  With the widespread 
acceptance among American communists of Leninist and/or Trotskyist theories about the necessity of 
seizing control of the nation-state, the Smith Act's subsequent depiction of radical leftism amplified a 
culture of fear that conjured "visions of communists under everyone's bed" by the end of the war.  The 
1941 trial of the SWP set a standard that the Smith Act’s designers could not have predicted, which was 
to settle an accord between free speech and national security that, after the conclusion of World War II, 
quickly came to justify atrocious violations of citizens’ personal rights.731   
The SWP managed to survive the initial trials as well as the period of incarceration of its 
leadership, mainly due to the work of women such as Rose Karsner, Grace Carlson, and Dorothy Schultz.  
Carlson and Karsner were essential to maintaining a semblance of solidarity while Cannon and his 
comrades sat in jail; frequently sharing letters written by Cannon to the remnant of active SWP 
organizers and maintaining a connection between the SWP and the Civil Rights Defense Committee 





subscriptions to the SWP's Militant newspaper.  When Cannon and his comrades were released in 1945, 
they quickly returned to the party ranks; but they could not displace the now dominant role played by 
the organization's female members.  Based on letters, the women organizing for the SWP had to make a 
difficult balance of organizational work and the "continued demands of their lives as wives and 
mothers."732   
Rather that succeed at dismantling the SWP, the Smith Act trial had the opposite effect of 
bolstering civil rights support for the organization and its membership.  By the end of the war, the SWP 
had swelled to a membership of over 3,000 and continued to denounce the Smith Act as 
unconstitutional and a sweeping violation of personal liberties.  Additionally, the CPUSA began to openly 
denounce support for the SWP as it became a more popular topic among trade unionists.  They, along 
with the FBI, were concerned about the rising influence of Trotskyists within the unions.  The 
condemnation of the SWP and its supporters by the CPUSA expressed the clear disconnect communists 
such as Foster and Dennis had with the broader elements of the pan-Socialist Left.733 Rather than see 
the Smith Act as a threat, the CPUSA initially viewed it as an effective means to silence the opposition.  
This perception changed as the postwar political climate shifted rapidly with new questions about the 
sustainability of the United States' wartime alliance with the Soviet Union.734 
 When discussing the postwar development of the Smith Act's usage, Labovitz described the 
political climate in 1945 as one where "it did not really matter if the so-called evidence was slight, or 
doubtful, or irrelevant or even downright dishonest."  From this perspective, communists believed that 
the Smith Act prompted aggression "against the constitutionally guaranteed rights of speech and 
assembly."735  To prosecute individuals after 1945, investigators and state attorney's focused on two 
questions: First, they asked witnesses if they "are or ever have been a member of the Communist Party."  
The second question was to ask who else was a member.736  The second question was to build off the 





in Marxism, they fit neatly into the Smith Act's indictment of those who "knowingly advocated" the 
philosophy and created a legal basis for guilt by association.  If witnesses refused to answer the second 
question, the prosecuting attorney's knew the presiding judge could throw them in jail for contempt.  
Together, the questions served to validate the Smith Act’s focus on collusion and conspiracy as federal 
investigations sought to “set the judicial precedent that…‘the Communist Party as an organization is 
illegal.’”737 
 The subsequent threat of a ‘communist menace’ in the public’s view was not just a postwar 
anomaly intensified by the Cold War. Instead of being understood as a new threat to national security, 
as Schrecker pointed out, “policymakers and the public had to be convinced that communism was bad 
and dangerous” in a process that involved “partisan politics, bureaucratic infighting, intellectual 
conversions, legal proceedings, *and+ congressional investigations.”  The nature of the questions asked 
and the means of the FBI’s investigation fueled suspicions about the danger of communism in American 
communities as treasonous activities.  Within just four years, the CPUSA came to realize the reasoning of 
the SWP in resisting the Smith Act.  By the end of the 1940s, criminal activity and communist subversion 
had become nearly synonymous terms.  Crimes such as petty theft and murder could, in some way, be 
seen as parallel to subversion promoted by communists.  In most cases, “the specific crime was 
irrelevant,” and "communism" as a term became more abstract and negative.  Under this context, the 
“plausibility” of the threat described by the FBI made it “possible for so many Americans to adopt 
anticommunism so quickly.”738  
Making the matter more difficult was the issue of guilt in matters of espionage among suspected 
communists during the investigative process between 1945 and 1949.  Some communists passed 
information to Moscow while others lied under oath about their membership in the CPUSA, both adding 
to their indictment under the Smith Act and making claims of free speech less convincing to prosecutors 





same judgment, including those who had no reason to take such a stand.  President Truman's Executive 
Order 9835 expanded the concept of anticommunism into a broad policy of anti-liberalism by employing 
a loyalty-based security system within federal branches of government.  The order barred communists, 
fascists, and "anybody guilty of 'sympathetic association' with such undesirables or their organizations."  
By 1949 the Smith Act succeeded in stoking fear of subversion that, for many politicians and employers 
in the state department, could only be fixed by pushing forward with prosecutions.739  Regardless of the 
outcome, there was no turning back by 1949.  Within under a decade, communists went from being 
proponents of a radical labor agenda to enemies of the state with a goal, motive, and foreign 
governments to bankroll them.  This shift also threatened other political agendas that advocated for civil 
and legal rights and labor laws to manifest an overall political atmosphere of conspiracy and subversion. 
 Anticommunism existed within African American communities during the interwar period, but it 
was fundamentally different from the postwar, public policy of anticommunism. Anticommunism among 
African Americans built upon decades of anti-unionism and anti-radicalism.  Eric Arnesen, pushing back 
against the historical argument that civil rights and the pan-Socialist Left were inherently linked, traced 
African American anticommunism to the years following the Great War after the Socialist Party split, 
when blacks weighed in the merits of the communist movement.740  Kelly Miller, dean of Howard 
University in 1920, declared that communism would find few converts among African Americans, 
particularly because of the notion that the "seed of destruction and discord" would never resonate with 
the majority of the black community.741  Although the CPUSA's American Negro Labor Congress (ANLC) 
attracted few dedicated and long-term black members, it generated significant publicity and prompted 
black elites to respond in the mid-to-late 1920s.  Despite this, Arnesen contends that throughout the 
early stages of American Communism "neither black nor white elites need have worried about [the 





Their real number of recruits "remained insignificant" prior to the Scottsboro case.  For an 
explanation of the continued lack of popularity within the African American community from 1928 to 
1932, Arnesen points to the Party's Third Period conclusion on "self determination in the Black belt," 
which not only "had little attraction for black Americans" but also only sought to attract radical-minded 
black youths, like Hosea Hudson.  The Party's theoretical stance on civil rights for non-Whites and 
political engagement forced them to treat "as enemies virtually all liberals and other progressives, 
seeing them as 'social fascists,' 'labor fakirs,' and the like."743  The Scottsboro case proved to be the 
critical moment when NAACP spokesman Walter White lost his grip on the sentiments of most black 
Americans, while the CPUSA, teamed up with the International Labor Defense (ILD), came out on top by 
promoting a message that resonated with the African American community.   
 Walter White had been the de facto head of the NAACP throughout the late 1920s and into the 
1930s.  During the Third Period, White and his associate A. Philip Randolph did little to distance 
themselves from communists, because they felt it unnecessary.  In White's own words to Randolph, the 
NAACP was "neither procommunist nor anticommunist."744  By the early 1930s and the opening of the 
Scottsboro case, White and the NAACP changed their stance as criticism from communist community 
organizers sought to curb recruitment toward local communist clubs.  Communist organizer and activist 
Robert Minor charged that the NAACP represented a "reformist" and "bourgeois" institution that would 
never succeed at liberating African Americans from racial oppression.  When the ILD and CPUSA began 
their campaign in the fight to free the Scottsboro brothers, the NAACP's reputation got "a bruising" and 
the organization took a back seat role in civil rights organizing throughout the Popular Front.  White 
steered the organization to a more passive role, including avoiding a possible alliance with grassroots 
insurgency organizations nurtured by the National Negro Congress.  Toward the end of World War II, 
"communists' renewed sectarianism" and Browder's conclusions about Tehran distanced African 





already-existing anticommunism within civil rights organizations like the NAACP became more dominant 
and served to convince the public that civil rights reform did not require communist theory or the 
Communist Party.  Similarly, the rising discontent over the acceptability of communists in the United 
States made it easier for civil rights activists to turn to an organization like the NAACP.746 
Working communists across America dealt with the idea of "unacknowledged blacklists" once 
employers caught wind of communist presence in their workforce.  During the symphony seasons in 
1948 and 1949, Russell Brodine made only $756 as a bassist and blamed his short rate of pay on 
blacklists that targeted him and numerous other "progressive" musicians.  While Brodine's union fought 
for issues like residual pay for reused recordings, neither the union nor Brodine could avoid the studio 
hiring freelance, non-union musicians willing to work for low rates.  In desperate times, Brodine turned 
to fellow communists in building trades and industrial work.  He found help from communist organizers 
in Local 634 of the Carpenters' Union, whom he met while participating in strikes throughout California.  
It took less than two months for Brodine to become an active participant in the union.  After joining, he 
became part of the "progressive caucus," which resisted efforts by more conservative unionists 
advocating avoidance of strikes and instead appeal toward concessions with company owners.  Still, his 
desire to play music forced Brodine out of the union efforts and pushed him toward Saint Louis, where 
the local symphony director was looking for new bassists.  The extent of these "unacknowledged 
blacklists" in terms of their scope of targeting individuals like Brodine is uncertain.  Communists, 
however, found ways to get by and hang in as the national development of an anticommunist culture 
created the perception of unacceptance.747 
Communists in large cities like Lumpkin found ways to hang in and navigate around the 
atmosphere of anticommunism during the mid-to-late 1940s.  Living in Chicago, Lumpkin noted how 
communist parents in nearby Michigan faced discrimination in summer camps and social programs for 





husband Frank feared that their kids would be excluded from basic childhood activities for their parents’ 
views.  To avoid such scrutiny and maintain a public image separated from her political identity, Lumpkin 
continued to pass out fliers and pamphlets for her CPUSA local in Chicago; but she hid the paperwork in 
the carriage of her infant.  In this way, Lumpkin remained committed but prevented her children from 
facing direct discrimination.  She believed that perseverance in an era of repression and finding ways to 
work around systemic anticommunism amounted to a defense of "peace, jobs, democracy, and 
socialism."  At the same time, Lumpkin realized that such defiance had to remain mature and non-
aggressive so as to avoid agitation of local and state authorities.748 
 The pretext set by the wave of anticommunism after 1945 took on a greater legal significance 
during the Foley Square trial between November 1948 and October 1949.  William Foster, Eugene 
Dennis, Artt’s farther Carl Winter, legislative committee chairman Benjamin Davis, YCL leader John 
Gates, National Committee members Gus Hall and John Williamson, National Board advisers Gil Green 
and Henry Winston, editor of The Daily Worker Jack Stachel, and New York district leader Robert 
Thompson all faced charges of conspiracy and treason by federal prosecutor John McGohey.  The trial 
represented the “outward expression of the increasing governmental and extragovernmental 
repression” of the postwar period.  While the SWP trial in 1941 created the foundation to prosecute 
radicals, the Foley Square trial “set a precedent and laid the basis for arrests and prosecutions of the 
second-echelon leaders” of the Communist Party and its constituent organizations.  The trial was made 
for the new age of media as nearly four hundred police officers surrounded the Foley Square 
courthouse, and press coverage of the trial was updated daily.  Presiding over the trial was Judge Harold 
Medina, a Mexican-American law professor, who taught at both Princeton and Columbia.  Known for 
being easily agitated, Medina faced defense lawyers that "tried to make him lose judicial composure 
with ‘guerrilla tactics,’" such as continuous motions to delay court proceedings and accusations of a 





and appeals to Foster's ailing health, the defendants did not actually face the judge until March 7th, 
1949.  To make their case for treason and conspiracy, the prosecution focused on the "reconstitution of 
the Party" in 1945 after Browder's attempt to dissolve it.  It argued that the dictums of Marxism 
required communists to commit treason.  For evidence, the prosecution cited the works of Marx and 
Lenin; particularly the pamphlet State and Revolution, which implicitly referred to the seizure and 
“violent overthrow” of the state apparatus as the basis for socialist revolution.749  Foster was blamed for 
the reconstitution of the Party, which prosecutors argued was done with the sole aim of "overthrowing 
the government by force and violence."  Foster’s role in the Party was of particular importance to the 
government, who believed he was the motivation behind the CPUSA's postwar political line.750   
 In terms of building their defense, Foster and Dennis argued against the prosecution in what 
became a standard defensive approach used by communists in subsequent trials, even though it failed 
to persuade the jury in most cases.  In a document praised by the CPUSA as Foster's "climatic 
testimony," he challenged the claims of the prosecution line by line, starting with the claim that the 
Party's existence and basis in Marxist theory necessitated a method of "force and violence."  His 
approach became known as the 'labor defense,' but it might be more properly understood as a 
philosophical defense, since it rested on a defense of Marxism, rather than an appeal for free speech or 
the right to assemble.  Foster asked the government to provide evidence that the CPUSA advocated a 
policy of violence and encouraged prosecutors to take the actions of the Party during the Popular Front 
into consideration, such as the communists’ support for Roosevelt while Trotskyists rejected 
cooperation.  Rather than push for revolt, Foster argued, the communists advocated "the practical 
theory that has become possible...to regularly elect peoples' governments in the capitalist 
democracies."  Foster requested that the court take into consideration the changes understood by the 
CPUSA between the Third Period and the Popular Front.  He elucidated what he described afterward as 





for Foster and the rest of the CPUSA leadership in 1949, the courts cared little about the ideological 
differences between Popular Front communists and Trotskyists, let alone the suggestion that the Party 
favored democratic socialism. 
 Some have suggested that Foster's approach and its endorsement by the defense lawyers was 
directed at politicizing the trial and swaying public opinion against Judge Medina.752  This argument, 
however, overlooks the components of the trial where certain defendants, such as John Gates, who 
refused to answer prosecution questions on the grounds of the Fifth Amendment, instead invoked 
constitutional rights.  Appeals like Gates’ were hastily denied, but they did distinguish certain defense 
approaches from others in this early trial.  Because of their actions, Gates and other defendants who 
invoked their constitutional rights served thirty-day sentences for contempt of court.  A more accurate 
assessment of the CPUSA's defense should take into consideration the political fallout within the CPUSA 
between 1944 and 1946.  Still struggling to maintain a hold over their own political world, CPUSA leaders 
such as Foster, Dennis, and Gates not only faced rising anticommunism but also the deterioration of 
conditions favorable to communist organizers that existed only a decade prior.  In many ways, the 
CPUSA's defense at Foley Square was an attempt to rationalize communist activity for themselves in the 
newly hostile political climate.  The CPUSA, more than the prosecution and the FBI, knew they had little 
to gain from politicizing a trial in an era they overtly described as "fascist."  Instead, CPUSA leaders tried 
to rationalize Marxism through the legal apparatus of the court on behalf of their declining domestic 
base and the international communist movement watching intently.753 
 Despite Foster's efforts, the court returned a verdict of guilty for all eleven members accused.  
Foster's argument failed in part because Herbert Hoover and the FBI had already made it clear that the 
court's goal was to set a precedent that "the [CPUSA] as an organization [was] illegal."754  Although the 
court system did not enforce prison sentences until two years after the trial, the “repressive atmosphere 





members like Dorothy Healey and Donald Henderson and fellow travelers accused of association with 
CPUSA members were aware that they, too, could be targeted.  Investigators and prosecutors in 
subsequent trials gave defendants two options:  admit loyalty to the CPUSA and name other individuals, 
or refuse to testify.  Those under investigation could not hope to use the Fifth Amendment to support 
their case, since the Supreme Court had denied witnesses this protection in 1948.755  
 Contrary of the CPUSA’s actions in 1941, the Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP) rallied support with 
the Civil Rights Defense Committee (CRDC) for those indicted in the Foley Square trial to publicly 
condemn the Smith Act as unconstitutional.  In the eyes of FBI investigators and the House Un-American 
Activities Committee, the SWP and CPUSA were virtually the same organizations in everything but name.  
To the SWP, the CPUSA were political enemies but still American citizens, who retained the same 
constitutional rights they sought to defend in their own experiences under the Smith Act.  Writing about 
the trial in early 1949, The Militant described unionists who supported the Smith Act’s condemnation of 
communists as guilty of “the precedent set by the Stalinists in Minneapolis *in 1941+.”756  The SWP’s 
lawyers also were aware that the prosecution’s strategy in 1949 mirrored the 1941 approach.  Attorney 
General Tom Clark worked with Victor Anderson, the lead prosecuting attorney in the 1941 trial, to 
depict the case as combating the “historic mission” of radical political parties:  “adherence to the 
doctrines of Marxism-Leninism automatically obligated [them] to seek the overthrow of the government 
by violence and force.”  After the trial, SWP lawyers pushed for an appeal but met no success.757   
 Overall, the SWP's support did little to sway public opinion or to influence the decision of the 
courts.  In 1950, by a 5 to 2 vote, the Supreme Court upheld the 1949 decision.  The court upheld it 
again in the 1951 trial of Dennis v. United States.  Finally, the Court ruled that those convicted did not 
have the First Amendment right of free speech to protect them, if the exercise in question involved a 
plot to overthrow the government.  The decisions ushered in a wave of anticommunist repression at the 





Party by hitting it everywhere it had any remotely significant presence."758  Subsequently, state 
prosecutors proceeded with indicting "second-tier" CPUSA leaders in three successive waves in 1951, 
1954, and 1956.  The trials were spread out across the nation in cities such as Los Angeles, Philadelphia, 
Detroit, Seattle, Denver, and New York.759   
 State prosecutors used the approach of the Foley Square trial at the state level to indict dozens 
of CPUSA district-level organizers and leaders, including Dorothy Healey, Claudia Jones, and Elizabeth 
Gurley Flynn.  To identify targets, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover instructed federal agents to round-up 
individuals mentioned by witnesses who worked for the State Department or had close ties with federal 
agencies.  Although Hoover and the FBI worked with the limited data obtained from the trial, two other 
sources of evidence existed about individuals known to have participated in spying activities; Venona 
transcripts and declassified KGB files.  The Venona transcripts were obtained starting in early 1943, 
when the U.S. State Department was unsure about the possibilities of the Soviet Union making a pact 
with the Nazis.  U.S. codebreakers began cracking Soviet transmissions to reveal a deep network of 
covert activities inside and outside of Europe.  All of the evidence confirmed what at the time likely 
understood as a serious threat.  Roughly five hundred CPUSA members had transferred information, 
sometimes knowingly and sometimes unknowingly, to the Soviet Union during the 1930s and 
throughout the war.760 
 Perhaps no trial represented the extent and brutality of the federal government's response to 
covert communist activities and the legal precedent set by Foley Square than the trial of Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg from March 6th to 29th, 1951.  Julius Rosenberg had been a member of the CPUSA since he 
joined the YCL in the mid-1930s while attending electrical engineering classes at the City College of New 
York.  Ethel met Julius at a YCL meeting in 1936.  By the start of the war, they were married.  Beginning 
in 1940, Julius began work for the Army Signal Corps Engineering Lab at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.  





for his membership in the CPUSA.  By then, however, Julius already had recruited numerous spies in the 
Army's research and development teams under the KGB codename "Antenna."  He created, according to 
historian of Cold War espionage Steven Usdin, "one of the most effective industrial espionage 
operations in history."761  Between 1944 and 1950, Julius transferred various blueprints of "radio, sonar, 
military electronics, and jet engine technology" that historian Lori Clune believes aided the Soviets in 
keeping up with the United States during the Cold War.  The FBI and prosecutors ignored most of the 
data forwarded to the Soviets during the opening trial.  What concerned them the most was the 
possible transference of information on the atomic bomb.762 
 To build their case, federal prosecutors honed in on two individuals hired by Julius to deliver 
information on atomic weapons:  Russell W. McNutt, an engineer at the uranium processing plant in Oak 
Ridge, Tennessee, and David Greenglass, Ethel's brother and a mechanic employed at Los Alamos, New 
Mexico.  McNutt was a concern due to his high level security clearance access, which likely made Julius a 
much more valuable contact to the Soviets than other individuals working undercover.  Greenglass was 
arrested in June, 1950, on the charge of espionage based on data gathered by military codebreakers as 
seen in the Venona transcripts.   Just a day prior, codebreakers alerted the State Department that 
information about the atomic bomb was transferred to individuals outside of Los Alamos.  In less than 
eight hours, FBI investigators obtained Julius and Ethel's names from Greenglass in a personal 
testimony.  More recent historical evidence confirms that the specific details of the atomic data 
gathered and reported by Greenglass was relatively insignificant.  According to Lori Clune, the data 
amounted to little more than "corroborated material already forwarded by physicist spies" outside of 
Julius' ring, such as notorious KGB agent Klaus Fuchs.  In order to bring Julius to trial the Justice 
Department insisted that Julius and Greenglass had jointly given of "the secret" of the atomic bomb to 
the Soviet Union.  Ethel was charged on the grounds that, as Julius' wife, she was both aware of his 





extent of Ethel's involvement remains unclear, with some claiming she engaged in no espionage 
activities.  They point out that she had no KGB codename, while others say she acted as a messenger 
between Julius and his various contacts and thus had tacit knowledge of the information being 
transferred.763  In either case, the prosecution lacked the very same evidence historians lack to 
accurately understand Ethel’s overall involvement. 
 The context of the Cold War and the appeals process after the Foley Square trial were critical 
factors to help explain why State Department prosecutors sought the death penalty with regard to the 
Rosenberg case.  In late 1946, when Truman ordered investigations of loyalty among federal employees, 
former CPUSA associates like Benjamin Gitlow commonly acted as witnesses before congressional 
hearings and prompted FBI investigation into suspected atomic spies, which led them to Greenglass and 
Julius.764  Truman’s subsequent domestic and foreign policy “assum*ed+ that the Rosenbergs gave the 
atomic bomb to the Soviets.”  The Foley Square trial’s outcome allowed state prosecutors to charge 
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for conspiracy solely on their membership in and association with the CPUSA.  
Together, the Truman Administration assembled what they assumed were the actual course of events.  
First, they concluded that the Rosenbergs, as a couple, "gave 'the secret' to the atomic bomb to the 
Soviet Union," and that this led toward Stalin's desire to push for a more "aggressive" policy in Korea.765  
Second, that Kim Il Sung and the North Korean Communist Party were subordinate loyalists of Stalin, 
who simply "obeyed the Soviet leader's order to invade South Korea."  Finally, the Truman 
Administration concluded that the United States' role in the postwar world was to act as "the leader of 
the free world."  This necessitated the use of containment with regard to Northeast Asia.  Truman 
overtly attempted to "prove his tuff anticommunism" to the American people by sending troops off to 
Korea to fight against the expansion of communist forces, but politicians and citizens sought justification 





Truman pointed to the Rosenbergs and instructed the Justice Department to prosecute Julius and Ethel 
"to the full extent of the law."766 
 It is important to note that while the Rosenberg trial, and the Venona transcripts that facilitated 
it, focused on the act of espionage as an escalation of the threat of domestic communism after the Foley 
Square trial, the data also shows little signs of any large conspiratorial plot on behalf of the KGB and the 
CPUSA.  The majority of the high-profile subjects charged with espionage and identified by FBI records 
were skilled professionals in fields such as engineering, chemistry, physics, and research of subatomic 
particles.  More importantly, very few of those identified as Soviet agents were unionists, civil activists, 
or in any way involved with the CPUSA's broad network of union organizers.767  Luff identified the one 
exception to this rule was the Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians (FAECT).  
However, FAECT members who were identified as Soviet agents were also "highly skilled" and each "had 
privileged access to sensitive information" while the vast majority of the union's rank-and-file "had far 
less opportunity to collect such information."768 If the CPUSA and the KGB were in fact coordinated in a 
large espionage project, they avoided utilizing some of their most effective and broad-reaching 
organizations.  More likely is the scenario that the KGB was interested in professionals with access to 
data, and sought out ideological loyalists such as Julius, Fuchs, Greenglass, and Alger Hiss in order to 
merely transfer information as opposed to gather it.   
 During the initial trial procedure, prosecuting attorney Myles J. Lane reiterated Truman's view 
by asserting that if the crimes had not occurred, the nation would not be in the situation it was with 
Korea.  Under the circumstances, Lane asked the court for a one hundred thousand dollar bail and 
rejected a plea from Ethel to see her children on parole while the trial was ongoing.  Because the 
majority of the prosecution's evidence against Julius' spyring came from the Venona transcripts, which 
in 1950 remained classified as top secret, Lane needed Julius' personal testimony and used the arrest of 





government officials long after the trial concluded," it served the effective purpose of obtaining Julius' 
testimony in court.  Lane cited the period of June 6th, 1944 through June 16th, 1950 as the range of 
dates during which top secret information made its way through the Rosenbergs to the Soviets.  To 
reiterate the function of the Espionage Act, passed in 1917 by Woodrow Wilson and allowed the 
government to prosecute individuals for sharing information during wartime, the Justice Department 
clarified that espionage implied "spying on the United States to aid a foreign power;" any foreign power, 
allied or not.769 
 The trial took place in March, 1951, from the 6th until the 29th.  Unlike the defendants at Foley 
Square, Julius and Ethel jointly used the Fifth Amendment to assert their right to avoid incriminating 
themselves.  Like Foley Square, however, the prosecution had already deemed the Rosenbergs guilty 
through their association with the CPUSA and merely sought an affirmation of the evidence they had in 
secret through Greenglass.  As for the outcome of the trial, Clune suggests to look no further than the 
development of the Korea War between October, 1950 and January, 1951.  While American forces held 
a stable line of defense along the Yalu river in the months leading up to the new year, the surprise attack 
by the Chinese Red Army on October 19th "changed everything" about both the war and the way 
Americans at home felt about dealing with domestic communists.  Once the "quick and easy victory" 
promised in August of 1950 turned into an unpredictable and seemingly unwinnable conflict, "the 
Truman administration adjusted how to sell the Korean War to the American people."  Once victory in 
Korea appeared unattainable, the Truman administration "saw a way to strike at communism through 
the Rosenbergs."  The Supreme Court's decision to uphold the Foley Square convictions in May gave 
prosecutors all they needed to continue with the case, and on March 29th, 1951 the couple were 






 The Rosenbergs represented less than 10% of CPUSA members involved in espionage, which 
alone accounted for less than 1% of the estimated 43,000 to 50,000 CPUSA members between 1945 and 
1950.  Regardless, their trial and execution remain the height of anticommunist fear and the response 
by the Justice Department to perceived domestic threats despite plenty of evidence to suggest 
otherwise.  Clune suggests that while the facts remain clear that Julius committed espionage, he did so 
for ideological reasons, citing his KGB handler, Alexander Feklisov, who referred to Julius as taking on a 
"religious calling."  Rather than see his actions as betraying the nation and the values of the country, he 
viewed his actions as a sort of "military intelligence Robin Hood," who "[took] from the wealthy 
capitalists and [gave] to the poor communists."  The most significant piece of data transferred by Julius 
to the KGB was a prototype proximity fuse that was later used to shoot down Francis Gary Powers in 
1960.  As a committed communist, Julius Rosenberg likely shared the view of CPUSA leaders that fascism 
had survived World War II.  Ethel Rosenberg's case proved to be the most damning for American judicial 
history, particularly after prosecutors admitted years later that, in seeking the death penalty against her 
as a means for obtaining more names, "she called [their] bluff."  In 2001, Greenglass recanted on his 
testimony against Ethel's involvement, admitting that he didn't fully remember who was involved in 
transferring documents.771  In 2008, Morton Sobell, a member of Julius' spyring and engineer for General 
Electric, admitted to committing espionage; but he stated that Ethel took no part in Julius' activities.772  
The question of Ethel’s innocence aside, the Rosenberg case ultimately provided the FBI and the Justice 
Department with the necessary fuel to continue with Smith Act trials and investigate other possible 
cases of espionage. 
 Of the vast selection of trials that followed Foley Square and the Rosenbergs, two stood out as 
examples of both the continuing auspice of fear that surrounded American culture over the idea of 
communism as well as the overt trampling of personal rights done by the Smith Act:  The Michigan Six 





issue of constitutionally-protected free speech surfaced as the replacement argument for Foster's labor 
defense and the Rosenbergs' use of the Fifth Amendment.  To those who were defendants in these later 
trials, their efforts represented “a historic defense of the Bill of Rights” and a mission to defend 
traditions and values considered the right of all Americans.  Despite living through “a period of ultra-
conservative reaction,” communists found meaning in the trials as legitimacy not for their ideology but 
for the work they had done in the name of that ideology.773  
 The trial of the Michigan Six, also known as the Smith Act trial of the Detroit Six, occurred not 
long after the Rosenberg trial.  The trial appeared to be a continuation of the ongoing legal effort against 
domestic communism in the media's portrayal and the federal government’s goal of making 
communism seem like a pervasive danger.  A range of other factors also became more topics of 
discussion by 1951.  The Michigan Six trial occurred during an escalated period of tension caused by the 
Korean War and Western fears of Soviet expansionism mixed by the rise of Maoist China in 1949, the 
Soviet detonation of an atomic weapon in the same year, a communist revolt in French Indochina, and 
various independence movements who obtained political and financial support from Moscow.  While 
the Foley Square and Rosenberg trials appeared as an alleviation of fears about domestic communist 
activity, the development of the Cold War and the continuation of trials well into 1954 fueled the fear 
and cast doubts on the ability to combat communism domestically.774 
 The Michigan Six included Detroit district organizer Helen Winter, Detroit correspondent for the 
Daily Worker Billy Allen, editor Nat Ganley, Ford Motor Company CPUSA organizer Philip Schatz, 
Michigan district CPUSA organizer Thomas Dennis, and Saul Wellman, who by 1950 became the acting 
chairman of the Party's Michigan district.  The charges laid against the defendants were the same as in 
Foley Square:  conspiracy to overthrow the government by violence and force.  Unlike at Foley Square, 
however, the issue of "advocating" force and violence became a target of attack for defense lawyers.  





out, it referred specifically to speech.  The prosecuting attorney, William Hundley, admitted in hindsight 
that his participation in the trial rested on his acceptance of "the common belief that the American 
Communist Party was very bad, a threat, and a clear and present danger."  Goodman met with the six 
defendants prior to the proceeding of the trial, when they informed him of their belief that "fascism 
[had] come to America," and that they could never expect a fair trial.  Goodman refused to accept the 
view that fascism had taken root in the United States.  Instead, he took on the case specifically to prove 
to the defendants that their claims of "fascism" were not true and that their innocence fit within the 
parameters of the existing legal system.  The goal had to switch from a defense of communist theory to 
the right of an American citizen to speak it and assemble for it.  Three defendants reluctantly accepted 
Goodman's strategy, but the others maintained their desire to expose "fascism in the courtroom."775 
 The Michigan Six trial began with an almost identical opening proceeding as at Foley Square, 
with the defense emphasizing that the prosecution's depiction of the CPUSA was distorted.  Rather than 
seeking to overthrow the government, Goodman and the three independent defendants argued, the 
CPUSA in Michigan existed to organize and advance their political objectives.  Similarly, the prosecution 
recognized the uphill battle with presenting a case against the defendants' constitutionally protected 
rights and the complex involvement of the FBI with regard to investigations and evidence gathered 
through the Venona transcripts.  Hundley spent numerous weeks preparing for the trial by reading 
through FBI informant reports and deciding which individuals to put on the stand.  Hundley reported 
reading testimonies that emphasized "civil rights, unemployment, and socialism," and the process of 
finding ways to fit the six defendants into the charge of conspiracy to overthrow the government.776  
 In the process of finding key witnesses, Hundley came across meeting minutes where a CPUSA 
member in Detroit stood up in a meeting and asked 'when are we going to start the revolution?'  
Hundley asked the FBI to use the individual on the witness stand, but the FBI responded by informing 





Hundley dug deeper until he found two kinds of key witnesses: company informants within unions such 
as UAW Local 600, and individuals who had operated for numerous years as "professional witnesses" or 
"professional informers" for their testimonies in previous Smith Act trials and HUAC investigations.  One 
of the latter, John Lautner, served as a "significant internal functionary" of the CPUSA.  By 1949, he 
became a crucial government resource for data and names during investigation and prosecution 
procedures.  Informants such as Lautner gave tremendous detail to CPUSA meetings, organizing drives, 
and the internal Party factionalism, most of which became the basis for charging individual Party 
members.  When the six defendants took the stand to be asked the two critical questions of the Smith 
Act trials, Saul Wellman and Philip Schatz were among the most outspoken of the six who refused to 
name other names.  Upholding the standard of refusing to allow witnesses to avoid the question, Judge 
Picard ordered Wellman and Schatz to sixty days in prison for contempt of court, but Hundley didn't feel 
the need to press it any further in order to avoid creating negative stigma around the nature of the 
case.778 
 When the case came near its end, Judge Frank A. Picard instructed the jurors to remember that 
the federal government had already set a precedent with the Foley Square trial: that membership in the 
CPUSA was enough evidence to prosecute the six defendants.  On the morning the Jury was expected to 
deliver its verdict, Judge Picard expressed concern to defense attorney Ernie Goodman that the six 
defendants might be acquitted; clearly showing that he was worrisome about the possibility of the Jury 
siding with the defense.  Goodman recalled that he reassured Picard that there was no possibility that 
the defense would avoid conviction.  One hour after they talked, the Jury returned with a verdict of 
guilty for all six charged defendants.  In Picard's final statement on the case, he stressed that the 
defendants were guilty of "one of the gravest offenses of which a citizen may be guilty," and that he was 
willing to alter sentences within sixty days if defendants requested to move to the Soviet Union.  To 





were "not martyrs," but rather "Russian goats."  After the defendants refused the offer, Picard 
sentenced the Michigan six to four to five years imprisonment, and $10,000 in state fines each.  The case 
then went to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati, Ohio, where the appeals court upheld the 
convictions.779   
 Michele Artt's and Vicki Wellman's oral histories reveal the more personal side of federal 
anticommunism and the culture it fostered as the two young American women faced the possibility of 
never seeing their parents again because of the political party they affiliated with.  Vicki Wellman was 
ten when her father, Saul, was arrested and watched as her father's name filled the local newspapers.  
She attended the final trial as well when the verdict was returned, and unfortunately watched her father 
leave the courtroom in handcuffs.  During the appeals process after the trial, Vicki received an American 
Legion award for citizenship as the daughter of a convicted communist to validate her "Americanism" 
and reject the idea that she was some kind of foreign element in the community.  Despite being 
recognized, she still felt that her childhood was "very difficult" as a result of the trial.  In an interview 
about her memory of the Michigan Six trial, she explained that alienation and a general sense of 
indifference was a common experience throughout her social and public life as a young adult.  The 
common belief that the United States stood against the Soviet tradition of punishing "political prisoners" 
clashed with the Wellman's experience that "[she was] part of a political prisoner family."780   
 During the two separate trials of her parents, Michele Artt's grandmother, Allison Winter, 
teamed up with the family members of others on trial to organize discussion groups and support 
networks for the children of affected parents.  Artt participated with her mother in 1949 to protest the 
impending imprisonment of her father, Carl, while the Foley Square trial unfolded in New York.  Once 
Michele's mother, Helen, faced charges as well in 1951, Allison Winter assumed parental duties on a 
regular basis and moved the family's core to Michigan from the West Coast.  Allison graduated with a 





essential if Artt was to grow up in the United States without feeling like an outcast or victim.781  
Michele's mother, Helen, had phlebitis throughout the Michigan Six trial and had to be taken to court by 
ambulance occasionally since she was unable to walk.  On the first day of the trial, ambulance assistants 
brought Helen into the courtroom on a stretcher with the commonly-given "red blanket" for comfort 
and warmth.  Judge Picard dismissed the defendant's health concerns and ordered the red blanket out 
of the courtroom, insisting that it was a "political maneuver" on behalf of the defense.782 
 From prison, Carl kept in contact with Artt regularly; sending letters and giving her advice on 
homework that she would send to him, as well as visitation rights twice a year for one hour.  Artt found 
acceptance and support from teachers, who, although avoided political discussion in the classroom, did 
demonstrate support for her predicament.  Both in school and public spheres, Artt rarely faced 
agitation; but at home, in private, the FBI subjected the family to routine surveillance activities.  
Throughout the 1953 trial, Artt and her grandmother kept watch and logged the various unmarked 
government vehicles whenever they left the home.  When the family attended annual Party bazaars and 
fundraising drives, "everybody was photographed going in, license plates [were] taken down," and the 
general atmosphere of fear descended.783  Although Artt met up with her parents before the close of the 
decade and the Smith Act trials were subsequently reversed by the Yates decision, as a young American 
girl she lost critical years of her childhood with her parents as a result of what amounted to an irrational 
cultural fear.  Like Ethel Rosenberg, Artt and numerous children of American communists faced the 
experience of rejection at a societal level even though their involvement amounted to little more than 
familial and moral connections.  
 Following the Michigan Six trial, anticommunism became an even more open-ended platform 
for politicians big and small to take advantage of.  By the end of 1952, the House Un-American Activities 
Committee had 185 of 221 Republicans in Congress applying for seats when only a few years prior the 





shifting trend in American politics, as anticommunism developed into a kind of centrist glue that helped 
unify politicians across the aisle and facilitated Truman's expansion of the federal budget by framing 
domestic, progressive legislation as necessary to combating communism both at home and abroad.  In 
terms of practical results, the aftermath of the trials was dismal for membership.  While Party leaders 
and high-ranking cadres remained stalwart in the midst of the crisis, the CPUSA and SWP dropped in 
numbers significantly.  Likewise, it was not the Smith Act trials alone that contributed to the exodus; it 
also included "government hearings, loss of jobs, some violence, and deportation threats" that spanned 
across the nation.785 By 1952 it was simply impractical for any activist to be in public association with a 
known communist organization on the basis that it threatened potential progress in the organizational 
fields communists previously made headway: civil rights, political reform, and trade unionism.  
Considering the difficulty set forward by civil rights organizations in the early 1950s, one might think 
that rallying behind the major cases of mostly all-white communists could have prompted civil rights 
legislation earlier than 1962.  However, it was precisely the issue of standing behind communists, amidst 
the Korean War and the escalating tensions between Eisenhower and Khrushchev, which civil rights 
activists had to avoid in order to maintain momentum with their own goals. 
 On July 30th, 1953, the FBI and local police arrested Sherman Labovitz and five other CPUSA 
leaders from Philadelphia on the same charges as those in the Michigan Six trial.  Lebovitz could 
remember being under surveillance as early as June, 1950, and suspected that the time between his 
initial awareness of being watched and his arrest three years later was the effort of the FBI to “develop a 
scenario” that built off the backs of previous trials such as the Michigan Six.786  Within days, Lebovitz’s 
face was on the cover of The New York Times and the bond for the defendants set at $350,000.  The 
Philadelphia trial unveiled new secrets about the means by which communists organized their defense 





Not only did the prosecution seek to uproot the CPUSA’s local leadership, they also sought a precedent 
that would remove the organization altogether. 
While aspects of the common Cold War myth of “Moscow gold” ended up partially true after 
the availability of sources in the Russian archives, Lebovitz and his Philadelphia comrades had no 
monetary support from the national CPUSA, let alone from Moscow, throughout the trial.  Instead, they 
relied on initial support from Jack Zucker, executive director of the Philadelphia Civil Rights Congress 
Fund and Sol Rotenberg, a communist organizer for the Jewish Peoples’ Fraternal Order.  Even then, 
support was limited to bail and came with demands.  Zucker and Rotenberg desired public support, and 
withheld their offer to bail out those charged until their wives “set about doing the leg work” of getting 
the city’s Bar Association to provide counsel.787  Some believed the cost of the bail was set with the 
secondary intent of bankrupting the local CPUSA.  Fortunately for them, the Party’s Philadelphia 
treasurer, Ben Weiss, kept contacts with an anonymous beneficiary to a portion of the Horace Dodge 
estate.  Weiss and his associate would “loan out” reassignments from the estate which were generally 
“worth more than double the value of the loan.”  When the appeals process began, the defense 
attorneys bought into the plan and kept the case moving along.788   
 Continuous appeals after the Michigan Six trial and the Philadelphia trial coincided with 
numerous other state-level appeals for communist leaders, in particular the trial of Oletta Yates and 13 
other California communists.  In each of these cases, the issue of constitutionally-protected free speech 
was used as the standard defense.  Yates went on to appeal the trial until it reached the Supreme Court 
in 1957.  The case, Yates v. United States (1957), was the second and last Smith Act case to reach the 
Supreme Court.  The decision reached in October, 1957, dismantled the legal architecture of the Smith 
Act by reassessing the interpretation of the word “organize.”789  In a tremendous reinterpretation of the 
Smith Act after the Foley Square appeals had failed, the Supreme Court determined that while the Smith 





the realm of ideas."  This then forced the Supreme Court to reverse the decisions of all previous cases 
where the Smith Act was involved in the indictment of individuals on the basis of their advocacy of 
communism as a political ideology, which included the Foley Square and Michigan Six trials.  The 
rationale for the court's decision in 1957 is speculative, but some believe that the federal court desired 
to remove itself from the "sense of embarrassment" that followed the Foley Square trial during appeals 
for freedom of speech.  The Yates decision also required local courts to retry the convictions of certain 
trials, including the Michigan Six, but the courts never convened defendants and left the issue dead.  
When, by 1959, no further convictions were upheld and no further trials conducted, it was concluded by 
defense attorneys from Foley Square and the Michigan Six trial that the nation had "come to its 
senses."790 
 In 2010, the Historical Society for the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, 
expressed their understanding that the Michigan Six trial "was really about free speech," and that the 
ongoing questions about the possible limitations of free speech in the nation find themselves rooted in 
the 1951 and 1952 trial.  The trial remains as a primary example of when state governments, following 
the lead of the federal government, allow "constitutional issue[s]" to "come around and go around" with 
regard to its interpretation and usage based on the social context of the time in which the issue 
becomes predominant.  For the Foley Square and Michigan Six trials, the social context allowed for the 
interpretation of constitutional rights to uphold convictions against prosecuted communists. 
Subsequent and future debates about free speech both hinged and continue to hinge on a decision of 
whether or not to uphold the precedent of the Yates decision in 1957, or to "do what they have done 
before" and "succumb to the kind of paranoia and fear that leads to terrible injustices."791 
 Ending the legal foundation of anticommunism, however, did very little to neither end the 
predominant hysteria generated in 1948 nor did it immediately rectify the lives of those charged.  In 





Smith Act.  When Shermon Labovitz heard the Yates decision in October of 1957, he and the 9 other 
Philadelphia CPUSA members also remembered that the court of appeals was looking into producing a 
case against 5 remaining defendants using the Smith Act’s new terminology.  It took six months for the 
court to make their decision and drop all charges.792 The hysteria of anticommunism was most 
commonly associated with Senator Joseph McCarthy, but after 1957 it lost its political value.  In 
subsequent years after the Yates decision, anticommunism remained a cultural norm independent of 
any legal framework that made it necessary to prosecute individuals.793  This was in part due to the 
ongoing nature of the Cold War; including but not limited to the detonation of a hydrogen bomb by the 
Soviet Union in November, 1955, and the launching of Sputnik in October, 1957.   
The years of the Smith Act's dominance, 1940 to 1957, effectively transformed anticommunism 
from a legal/political tool to limit domestic communist activity into a predominant societal norm that 
could sustain itself through foreign affairs and diplomatic relations with Russia.  This helps explain the 
difficulty faced by individual communists with regard to continuing their organizational work and 
activism, as well as the continued shift of civil rights movements away from the political world of 
American Communism.  While the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the internal CPUSA factionalism, and strife with the 
SWP began the breakdown process of the political world, the wave of anticommunist repression from 
1941 to 1956 effectively marginalized political communism in the United States to the fringe edges of 
social acceptability. 
For Russell Brodine, the climate of anticommunism from 1948 to 1957 was sufficient to upset 
daily work and familial routines, but fell short at turning all communists into "witnesses" against their 
friends and comrades.  Brodine maintained that those who named names on witness stands did so 
because there was something to gain from it, such as getting out of an unrelated but committed crime.  
Brodine and his wife Virginia witnessed the aforementioned transition of anticommunism through shifts 





once supportive public figures, who previously "spoke out for living together in the same world with 
socialist countries, now enlisted in the Cold War against the Soviet Union."  From there, the Brodines 
witnessed anticommunism balloon into a "cancerous growth" that disrupted American Student Union 
activities on college campuses, pushed a "witch-hunt" throughout Hollywood, and directed the FBI to 
intervene in citizens' personal lives.794  In the middle of 1947, Russell faced a series of poor work seasons 
between 1947 and 1948 in Denver.  Looking for work outside of California, Russell banked on an offer 
given by the Central City Opera Company.  After trying to work with the orchestra's conductor, Russell 
saw his role sidelined by a former colleague of his alma mater; who knew of Russell's background as a 
communist and his involvement in union organizing.795   
Russell then tried Seattle's music scene for a few months until a former personnel manager, 
Ross Beckstead, informed him at a lunch that an open file from the FBI on his activities had been 
preventing him from obtaining a secure position in the bass section of previous orchestras, including 
Central City and the Los Angeles Philharmonic.  Beckstead encouraged Russell to "straighten [him]self 
out with the FBI" in order to be hired.  To Brodine, what Beckstead asked of him in order to join his 
orchestra, and what the FBI desired, amounted to "telling lies" about known associates in the CPUSA.  
Once again Brodine and his wife packed their car and moved, this time to Portland where the city's 
symphony proved open to new players; albeit with a wage cut and higher costs of living.  Upon arriving 
at the Portland CPUSA district, Russell became aware once again that the FBI closely followed his 
activities.  The district branch met a man using a pseudonym, "Taylor," who claimed to be an "old 
friend" of the Brodines and wanted to catch up.  Russell knew of no such person, and was happy to learn 
that the district refused to give out personal information.  Russell felt that the tactic was less of an 
attempt to gather genuine information and instead attempt to inform him that he "was being 
watched."796  After a poor season of employment from 1948 to 1949, Russell turned to his comrades in 





Carpenters' Union, where he supported the progressive caucus in their effort to resist the union's 
"reactionary international leadership" and their attempt to remove locally elected union officers.797 
 Unlike the upper echelons of the CPUSA, the anticommunism of the postwar period did not 
completely disrupt youthful engagement with local communist groups.  Young communist active like 
Danny Rubin and Armando Ramirez, kept beliefs and affiliations quiet as part of the routines of daily life 
throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s.  As with the Brodines, however, remaining mute and 
underground as an activist dictated the direction of their careers and organizational work.  Rubin began 
his work in 1949 for the Labor Youth League, a division of the CPUSA's youth organization in 
Philadelphia.  Eventually working his way onto the organization's National Student Commission, he 
helped to organize campus demonstrations against the Korean War throughout 1950 and 1951.  While 
working with the Labor Youth League, Rubin attended Swarsbourg college and worked with David 
Montgomery on campus for the Young Progressives of America, a youth branch of the Progressive Party.  
In 1953, Rubin officially joined the CPUSA to the dismay of his parents, who had hoped he would take 
over the family law business.  Rubin's wife got a job for the Party's International Publishers while he 
went on to study law at the University of Pennsylvania.  Despite passing the BAR exam and retaining 
membership with the BAR in the city of Philadelphia, Rubin avoided practicing law and kept his focus on 
community-based activism against social discrimination.  Left wing lawyers throughout the city routinely 
warned him of the atmosphere, and while they hoped the Supreme Court would eventually overturn 
Smith Act decisions, they emphasized that Rubin avoid putting himself in the spotlight.  Slowly losing 
interest in practicing law, Rubin turned to night classes for machine work and eventually got employed 
as the apprentice of a tool die maker by 1958.798 
 Ramirez worked with the American Youth for Democracy (AYD) based out of Chicago while 
attending the Abraham Lincoln School in the South Side from 1947 to 1956.  The stigma of 





faced difficulties in obtaining public demonstration rights and support on campus.799  The Department of 
Justice came after Ramirez's father in 1957, who was a block club captain and organized a store-front for 
Marxist literature in a predominantly Mexican-American neighborhood.  Only one witness was produced 
at the initial hearing to testify that both Armando and his father were present at various communist 
meetings, but the Justice Department never followed up with a trial.  Instead, by 1960, the negative 
public image got Armando's father laid off from the Union while the packing companies he worked for 
slowly moved out of the city.  The extent of Armando's active work declined to the point that he was 
only handing out issues of The Daily Worker to different plants while training to be a load operator.800  
Although never leading figures or high ranking officials of the CPUSA, the Brodines', Rubin's, and 
Ramirez's experiences testify to the extent of which anticommunism penetrated everyday American life.  
It also provides explanation for why communist clubs in areas like Chicago, Seattle, and Philadelphia 
thrived in an era of political repression.  Sometimes hearings were enough in particular neighborhoods 
to dismantle and break down the activism of American Communists.  In other cases, social pressure 
from citizens kept people like Rubin from engaging in their desired careers and filtered them into other 
occupations entirely. 
 By 1958 the Smith Act was effectively broken in terms of its value to prosecuting attorneys.  The 
period from 1948 to 1957, however, broke the political world of American Communism.  
Anticommunism sped up the process by which the political world diffused into other Leftist traditions, 
but some remained.  Communist groups surfaced once again in the “new communist movement” only 
after the Civil Rights movement had altered public perception about social inequality by 1962.801  This 
group included the CPUSA, the Students for a Democratic Society, Malcolm X, the Black Panthers, and 
the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP).  For all intents and purposes, the second Red Scare 
succeeded in its short term goal of disrupting and fracturing American Communist political and social 





prior where the CPUSA, CLA, and WPUS held significant influence:  Detroit, Chicago, Birmingham, New 
York City, Boston, and throughout Southern California. 
Conclusion 
 Throughout the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, anticommunism existed as its own world for 
two major reasons.  First, as a movement that targeted specific individuals in society, anticommunism 
was the reason for the gradual breakdown of American Communism’s political world and thus the ties 
held by community and labor activists who identified with communism.  Second, anticommunism did 
not just affect the history and lives of American communists; it affected the lives of the entire Left and 
transformed the culture of the United States to fit the ideological lens of the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations from 1945 to 1957.  Furthermore, the context of the early Cold War from 1945 to 1953 
form most public knowledge about the nature of anticommunism and is thus sometimes falsely 
understood as a postwar phenomenon.   
 American anticommunism had roots in conservative labor unions and business practices during 
and after World War I.  When deportations and dilemma set in during the Palmer Raids, anticommunism 
was understood as the most effective means for demonstrating the idea that domestic radicals were just 
foreigners bent on usurping American democracy.  Even during the Moral Crusade of the 1930s and 
early 1940s, communists who openly admitted their membership in a communist organization “risked 
losing their credibility and their jobs.”  Some labor organizers in the South, like Hosea Hudson, were 
conscious of these effects and worked to “promot*e+ workers’ welfare under existing conditions” by 
promoting involvement in alternative organizations such as the NAACP.802  During the same time period, 
private companies utilized company spies such as William Gernaey to gather information on the 
strength, capacity, and organizational tactics of grassroots level communists involved in both community 
and labor organizing.  Through the help of these key informants, organizations such as the Corporation 





research of not just communist leaders like William Foster, but also leaders within the AFL, the emerging 
CIO leadership under John Lewis, the Socialist Party of America, and numerous union locals across the 
nation.803 
 Future studies of anticommunism in the United States, sometimes called McCarthyism and The 
Red Scare, would do well to understand the importance of emphasizing the link between interwar 
anticommunism and postwar anticommunism.  This link demonstrates that anticommunism did not start 
off as a political endeavor nurtured by the Truman Administration and then exploded by Joseph 
McCarthy.  Rather, the link shows that in 1945, anticommunism was already a highly developed 
ideological movement with numerous individuals and organizations ready, capable, and, most 
importantly, willing to be utilized by state authorities to target radicals.  Though anticommunism 
succeeded by 1957 at destroying the political world of American Communism, it failed at destroying the 
community and labor elements that would go on to help build the New Communist Movement of the 


















CONCLUSION:  MANY PEOPLE, MANY WORLDS 
 From 1928 to 1957, American Communism defined the limits of radicalism for numerous 
grassroots political, labor, and civil rights organizers.  This movement was not confined to one 
organization, but rather was made up of a multitude of groups that were ultimately shaped and defined 
by the individuals who took part in them.  Most importantly, this movement was made up of people—
many of whom gave up opportunities to engage in communist organizing by personal choice, sometimes 
knowing that such a choice could mean the end of alternative career opportunities.  To fully understand 
a movement driven by ideology, one must connect the personal convictions and actions taken by people 
motivated by that ideology.  As part of a broader tradition of radicalism in U.S. history, American 
Communism was a heterogeneous movement deeply integrated into American working class history, 
cultural history, and civil rights history. 
It is important to remember that when talking about American communists we are talking about 
Americans who identify as communist, and not simply ‘communist party members.’  To do the latter is 
to remove personhood from those who value their identities as communist and their commitment to 
the idea regardless of their attachment or non-attachment to a communist political organization.  More 
importantly, American Communism as a movement depended upon values and ideals held by working 
people since the 19th century, such as civil rights and feminism, in order to thrive in the 1930s.  To see 
American Communism as a history of people, and not a political party, is the first step in developing a 
more sophisticated understanding of why individuals choose radical political ideals. Politically, 
communists tended to define themselves by what they were not:  socialists, anarchists, and “left-wing” 
progressives.  In the spheres of labor, however, communist organizers often found that political dogma 
served little use on the shop floor.  More often than not, communist organizers such as Maurice Sugar 





leanings.  Finally, in the world of organizing communities against unemployment and racism, grassroots 
communists applied methods that best served for what Robert Korstad called “civil rights unionism.”   
 The history of American Communism is complex because of the highly politicized nature of the 
historiography, the emphasis on certain groups over others, and the division between scholars on what 
to emphasize as the significance of communist activism in the United States.  One of the unique features 
of this history is that the historiography also already reflects the various worlds of American 
Communism.  The earliest studies of this movement began during the middle of the Second Red Scare 
and started their analyses with the assumption that communism was a foreign phenomenon.  This set a 
standard of viewing the movement through political lenses.  Building off these early assessments, 
subsequent scholarship developed an understanding of American Communism as a highly centralized 
political movement focused on the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA).  Labor 
scholars investigated the extent of communist involvement in labor unions while cultural studies and 
social scholars examined a link between communist activism and grassroots civil rights organizing.   
 This dissertation has sought to set a standard for understanding the way in which American 
Communism takes on a variety of meanings depending on which sphere of activity one examines.  The 
many worlds of American Communism demonstrate that certain movements never have just one 
history.  This includes the history that people remember, which many might argue carries the most 
significant meaning for future generations.  American Communism was, as traditionalist historians 
describe it, a “world political movement,” but it was also a way for African American activists to identify 
with and organize individuals in their community for change.  It was defined by the CPUSA’s clubs and 
committees, but it was also made up of smaller groups such as the Communist League of America, the 
Socialist Workers’ Party, and the Workers’ Party of the United States.  At the top levels of Party groups, 
the movement was highly centralized and motivated by ideology; but at the grassroots it was a 





 As stated in the introduction, because of these variances in experience, source data, and 
interpretation of said data, the history of American Communism is best understood as a multi-faceted 
social movement.  This movement, as well, existed as a sub-component of a broader pan-Socialist Left 
tradition in the United States that mixed 19th century anarchist, socialist, and unionist traditions.  To 
best understand this complex movement, one needs to look at the lives of the people who lived it.  
While it is important to understand the ideological world that defined American Communism for its 
supporters, this should not retract from how individuals transformed idea into action and what they 
remember as impactful for their lives. 
 Assessing this history in political and social terms has important implications for future 
scholarship.  Researchers are likely to find that there are many worlds of all social movements that exist 
throughout history and that a definitive history is not only unnecessary, it is impossible to achieve.  
American communists today do not define their history through a single organization nor a single aspect 
of their history; they define their history through the memory of what their movement helped achieve 
for working Americans.  A multifaceted approach is necessary for such a history, and it shows that 
communists in the United States experienced complex and often interwoven struggles for political 













AFL    American Federation of Labor 
BI    Bureau of Investigation 
CAC    Corporation Auxiliary Company 
CLA     Communist League of America (1928 – 1934) 
Comintern     Third Communist International 
CPSU      Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
CPUSA      Communist Party of the United States of America (1918 – Present) 
ILD    International Labor Defense 
SPA    Socialist Party of America (1901 – 1972) 
SWP      Socialist Workers’ Party (1938 – Present) 
TUUL      Trade Union Unity League 
UCAPAWA   United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of America 
UE    United Electrical Workers 
UAW    United Auto Workers 
WPUS      Workers’ Party of the United States (1934 – 1936) 
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